PeeCeeJay By Jideofor Adibe

 

Brexit, Bregret and Scaremongering

pcjadibe@yahoo.com

Twitter: @JideoforAdibe

The victory of the Brexiters (those who wanted Britain to quit the European Union) over the Bremainers (those who wanted Britain to remain in the Union) momentarily threw the world into a panic mode. Just a day after the official figures showed that the Brexiters won by 51.89 per cent to 48.11 per cent, the British pound crashed in value to a level not seen in almost 30 years. The London Stock Exchange and bourses around the world were also not spared. In fact one would think that the victory of Brexit amounted to an impending Armageddon, not just for the United Kingdom but for the entire world.  One commentator in fact wrote that the result of the referendum was guaranteed to turn Great Britain into Little Britain.

The run-up to the referendum was characterised by scaremongering by both sides. Sir John Major, the former Conservative Prime Minister for instance branded the Brexit camp “the grave-diggers of our prosperity” who would have to answer for their “lies”. Brexiters in turn talked about a disappearing British identity as a result of changing demographics occasioned by immigration.   

I believe that beyond the scaremongering by both sides, there are several important observations from the referendum:

One, the remorse and regret that followed the announcement of the outcome reminds one of the aphorism: “Beware of what you wish for because you may get it.” We are told that shortly after the verdict Google search for the meaning of European Union in the UK peaked – meaning that people just voted in a classical demonstration of negation being a form of affirmation.  A few days after the result was announced, there were anti-Brexit protests in London, which voted to remain in the EU, with some suggesting that London should simply secede from the UK. Those who signed the petition for a second referendum numbered over 4 million by June 29.  The petition said: “We the undersigned call upon HM Government to implement a rule that if the Remain or Leave vote is less than 60% based on a turnout less than 75%, there should be another referendum.”

Another sign  of Bregret is that UK officials have not shown any inclination of invoking Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon (signed in 2007), which made provision for countries that want to leave the Union. Rather there has been increasing emphasis on the advisory nature of the referendum and that it would need to be ratified by Parliament before it could be effectuated.

The crisis of confidence triggered by Brexit had precedence in Denmark. This was when the Maastricht Treaty (also called Treaty on European Union) was signed in 1992. At that time various counties held referenda to ratify their countries’ membership. In Denmark, in the first referendum held on June 2 1992 those  who did not want Denmark to be part of  the new ambitious political integration agenda of the European Economic Community (as it was then called)  won by  a slim margin of 50.7 per cent against 49.5 per cent. After that defeat scaremongering by government officials who had supported the Maastricht Treaty was let loose and a second referendum was held on May 18 1993. In the second referendum, 56.8 per cent voted in favour of the treaty with the four opt-outs that the government had negotiated as ‘sweeteners’ to the naysayers. This may be the most likely route for Brexit.

Two, an important lesson from the outcome of the referendum and the remorse that followed is that a referendum, just like any election for political office, is often not about taking the most rational decision, but knowing what is desired by the majority of people. Voters across the world are largely driven by emotions and sentiments, which is why democracy is often caricatured as ‘mob rule’. While the main supporters of the Bremain  were the so-called ‘thinking classes’  - academics and captains of industry - those who had their way were mostly those concerned about the dilution of British identity by immigration.  We also see in both the Danish nay vote in 1992 and the Bregret that followed Brexit, a version of the ‘iron law of oligarchy’ – the tendency for the dominant elite in any society to have a way of imposing their views of society on others. The dominant elite lost in the referendum but they are most likely going to win what they canvassed for by other means.   

Three, various analyses of how Brexit would affect Africa and Nigeria in particular verge on hysteria. Several commentators have for instance pointed out that the bilateral trade between Nigeria and the UK - currently worth USD8.3 billion and projected to reach USD25 billion by 2020 – would be negatively affected. They also argue that Brexit could trigger recession in the UK, which will negatively affect Africa and remittances from Africans in the UK.  This is purely speculative. I support Britain being part of the European Union but I am uncomfortable with the rash of scaremongering that followed Brexit. For instance those who inveigh about its possible negative effects on Africa often forget that once out of the EU, Britain could in fact be forced by imperatives to forge closer ties with blocs like the Commonwealth, the African Union and ECOWAS. There is also a wrong assumption that without being in the European Union a major country in Europe would fare badly. This is not supported by available evidence. Norway and Switzerland could join the EU if they want to but they are not interested. Russia is not interested and may not be wanted.  Similarly of the 28 members of the EU, only 19 use the euro and there is no evidence that those using the euro have fared better than others. Similarly it is wrong to assume that being outside the European Union Britain would be in a better position to control immigration. It will all depend on the type of arrangement it is able to reach with the EU – if it triggers Article 50. Britain is a mature democracy and an old industrial power. It has the capacity to manage whatever may be the consequences of not being in the EU.

Steve Barrow, head of G10 Research at Standard Advisory London has noted that any trade deals that African countries had with the UK were in effect trade deals with the EU, which has the sole jurisdiction over external trade for all its members. He suggested that if Britain exits the EU and really wanted to, it could simply turn all its EU trade deals with the rest of the world into UK trade deals with them, with the stroke of a pen.

Four, though a referendum does not necessarily guarantee that the most rational decision would be taken, it does ensure greater citizen participation in the political process. To this end it helps not only to extend the democratic space but also to deepen democracy. It is a principle that has become a template in mature democracies for resolving thorny issues, including on separatist agitations. In a referendum, people are allowed to aggressively market their opinions in the marketplace of political ideas. It is instructive that the contentious issue during the referendum was what Britain stood to lose or gain by being in the EU contra what it stood to lose or gain by being out of it. When applied to separatist agitations in a country like ours, it ensures that ideas are not driven underground and romanticised and their purveyors turned into heroes and heroines. Precisely because a referendum on such issues will be based on what the federative units gain from being in the union against what they will lose by being out of it, a referendum could force the country to be fair to all the federative units. Will Brexit energize separatist agitations or will Bregret be a counterweight to such agitations? There is no straight forward answer to this. The important thing in my opinion is that the recent UK referendum and the Brexit and Bregret it brought in its wake provide opportunities for fruitful conversations about what we sometimes call the ‘National Question’.

Five, David Cameron, who had campaigned for the UK to remain in the Union duly indicated that he would resign as British Prime Minister from October 2016. In the UK, his resignation was not treated as a big deal and did not add much to his political stature. If anything, his resignation if Brexit won was widely expected. Do we expect any Nigerian leader to resign for losing a simple referendum – when there are enough people and events to blame for such?