MONDAY QUARTERBACKING: The May Month that Shook Nigeria
By
[Burtonsville, Maryland, U.S.A.]
June 3, 2002
INTRODUCTION
I have been following, with interest, Dr. Nowa Omoigui's Nigerian-military-history-soaked "Weekend Musings". His latest one is simply titled: "May 30, 1967" [see http://www.gamji.com/nowa19.htm] with a lead-in:
"The month of May 1967 in the affairs of Nigeria was as dynamic and turbulent as any other in our history. It moved with breath taking speed, crystallizing in its wake, the final common pathway of momentous developments that were to culminate in the declaration of Biafra on May 30."
So Biafra was on Nowa's mind - and so I place it on mine too today, as I retrieve from my deep archives a fair-use serialization that I first provided back in October 1996 - March 1997. It was from General Alexander Madiebo's book "The Nigerian Revolution and the Biafran War", Fourth Dimension Publishers, Enugu (1980), 411 pages. Madiebo was Commander Biafran Army.
At the end of the Madiebo excerpt, I have added some historical notes of my own, including additional excerpts from other sources:
Enjoy.
Bolaji Aluko
--------------------------------------------
The Nigerian Revolution and the Biafran War
Major-General Alexander A. Madiebo, Rtd. Commander Biafran Army
Fourth Dimension Publishers, Enugu (1980), 411 pages 179 Zik Avenue, PMB 1164, Enugu, Nigeria --------------------------------------
CHAPTER 5
THE GATHERING STORM
The Final Plunge (Page 92 ff)
The news that Colonel Ojukwu was in Aburi, Ghana, with other Military Governors on the 4th January, 1967 to try to find a peaceful solution to the current disturbances in the country came as an encouraging surprise to me and to many other senior military officers in the Eastern Region. At the end of the two-day conference some important decisions were reached, among which were:
On the advice of some Federal senior civil servants, most of whom were acting on foreign advice, Gowon rejected most of these decision, particularly those pertaining to the payment of displaced persons and the reconvening of the Ad Hoc Constitutional Conference. As a follow-up, Gowon enacted Decree no. 8 which gave him power to declare a state of emergency in any Region irrespective of the wishes of the Governor of that Region. Later Gowon published these as the official outcome of the Aburi conference. The above measures were a clear indication that Gowon was no longer giving much consideration to the possibility of a peaceful solution. Rather he was preparing the ground for the use of force.
The Eastern Nigerian Government, then
absolutely helpless, passed a couple
of Edicts to protect the interests of its people and avoid a total
economic collapse of the Region. These Edicts were meant to serve as
temporary relief while a more permanent solution was being sought.
Foremost among these Edicts were the Registration of Companies Edict, the
Revenue Collection Edict and the Court of Appeal Edict. As a punishment
for these measures taken by the Eastern Nigeria Government, the Lagos
Government imposed economic sanctions on the Eastern Region.
As a result of the deteriorating situation,
Colonel Ojukwu convened a meeting
of the Advisory Committee of Chiefs and Elders at Enugu, on the 26th of May,
1967, to acquaint them with the latest developments and seek their decision.
He gave the committee alternative solutions to the crises:
On the 27th of May, the Consultative Assembly mandated Colonel Ojukwu "to declare, at the earliest practicable date, Eastern Nigeria a free sovereign and independent state by the name and title of the Republic of Biafra." Lagos' reaction to this was swift and immediate for Gowon at once announced a new constitution for Nigeria based upon the division of the existing four Regions into twelve States. By the arrangement, the Eastern Region was unilaterally split into three States: Rivers, East Central and South Eastern States [SEE NOTE 1].
Completely engulfed in an apparently misguided optimism, we perhaps spent by far too much time and money on propaganda with little left for military preparations. When the Head of State of Biafra told the nation that no country in black Africa could defeat by land, air or sea, the nation went wild with joy and thought that any further delay on our part in launching an attack against Nigeria was senseless. Yet the Commanders of the Army, Navy and the Air Force had not been told where the forces referred to were stationed [SEE NOTE 2]. Even the announcement by the Head of State that if we were attacked the grass would fight for us, was taken literally by many, who were beginning to ask for nothing but war. In an attempt to demonstrate the strength of the Biafran Army, Colonel Ojukwu took some top civilians to the firing range of the First Battalion at Enugu. There, some newly acquired machine guns and automatic rifles were displayed and later fired. The noise produced was impressive and sufficiently indicative of strength. When Chief Awolowo visited Enugu, just before the outbreak of war, two helicopters painted in Army colors, put up a short demonstration for him to illustrate our air power. When the helicopters finally landed on the grounds of the State House, and the fierce-looking pilots jumped out smartly, it was clear that the chief from Yorubaland was highly impressed. [SEE NOTE 3]
With the people's minds thus prepared for war, demonstrations were organised and held all over the country demanding immediate action against Nigeria. Everywhere the cry on everybody's lips was "Ojukwu Nyeanyi Egbe" (Ojukwu give us weapons.) Finally, on the 30th May, 1967, the Head of State declared Eastern Nigeria an independent and sovereign state of Biafra. [SEE NOTE 4] In doing this, he was merely acting in accordance with the mandate given to him earlier by the people. The mandate had authorised him to do so "at the earliest practicable date." Almost all senior army officers thought the answer to that question was an unqualified "No." The thought of being independent of Nigeria was simply glorious but to make this is a reality was going to be a miracle; yet there was universal jubilation.
By June, expatriates began to leave Biafra because of mounting pressures to do so from both the Lagos Government and their respective embassies. I remember some American staff, at the University of Nigeria, paid me a visit at my Nsukka Headquarters, on 4th July, 1967 to seek advice on the question of leaving Biafra. They disclosed that they had been told by Lagos to leave Nsukka immediately for Gowon's Army would go through that town on 6th July, 1967. While admitting the fact that the situation was very critical, I explained to them that Gowon's march through Nsukka, if it took place, would be resisted, and certainly long enough to allow them to pack up and leave the town or even the country. I however pointed out that the choice to remain in or leave Biafra rested entirely on them in the final analysis. I think they stayed on till the outbreak of the war when I also realised the significance of the date they had mentioned. [SEE NOTE 5]
Later on that day, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, also at Nsukka, called me to seek advice. He pointed out that, if all stories he had heard were to be true, and if all outstanding threats from Lagos were to be executed, Nsukka would be unsafe for civilians pretty soon. He was therefore contemplating a move from Nsukka after he should have heard from me. My advice was that a move before the outbreak of hostilities would be premature as the direction of the initial invasion was not known.
End of Madiebo Excerpt -----------------------
MOBOLAJI ALUKO NOTES ON MADIEBO EXCERPT
----------------------
NOTE 1
Rapid Activities on Both Sides
Nigeria was existing as a federation of three regions (Northern, Western and Eastern Regions) on the day of the first coup, January 15, 1966. On May 24, 1966, General Aguiyi-Ironsi abolished the regions by decree [Federal Government Decree no. 34 (Unification Decree)], replacing the Federal structure with a unitary government. He was assassinated in a counter-coup in July 1966 while touring the nation, [See Note 1a below] with Gowon becoming the new Head of State soon thereafter.
Following the Eastern Region Consultative Assembly meeting in Enugu mandating Biafrans secessionist action, on the very same day, May 27, 1967, Gowon issued a decree, dividing Nigeria into twelve states:
By June 3, Gowon appointed eleven civilians to the Federal Executive Council, making Chief Obafemi Awolowo the Vice-Chairman and Federal Minister of Finance. Others included Chief Anthony Enahoro (Information), J.S. Tarka, Alhaji Aminu Kano, and Wenike Briggs . The full Council included members from each of the twelve new states. Ukpabi Asika, Social Science lecturer at the University of Ibadan, became Administrator of East Central State in October 1967, after the fall of Enugu. Ken Saro-Wiwa, lecturer in English at the University of Lagos, at age 26 was appointed the Administrator of Bonny (Island) on November 11, 1967, while his father was still in Umuahia, Biafra (till the tail end of the war.) Three months later, Saro-Wiwa began working in Bonny very closely with then Colonel (now retired General) Akinrinade till September 1968 [See Note 1b].
Note 1a: MADIEBO, page 56 ff:
"Even at that late and very dark hour, while the North was putting finishing touches to their [COUP] plan, Ironsi was still confident he would reverse the ugly situation. He hoped to do this by touring all regions of Nigeria to explain to their leaders the merits and good intentions of Decree no. 34 and to reassure them generally. All Southern leaders - army and police officers, politicians, intellectual sand others - who could reach Ironsi advised him against undertaking such a tour but he was determined to go ahead with it.
Ironsi first visited the North, and there it was an arduous effort to restrain young Northern Nigerian officers from seizing advantage of his visit to commence their coup. What actually happened was that the more mature Northerners and their advisers did not want Ironsi killed in the North. Neither did they want to risk a confrontation with him in Lagos where all major units were being commanded by Ibos, with whose help he could easily foil the coup before it gained momentum. Midwestern Nigeria was unsuitable for such an operation because no troops were stationed there and a sudden movement of troops towards the Region would have alerted him. It was clear that Western Region was going to be the battleground for it satisfied all the necessary requirements. The only battalion in Western Nigeria was under the command of a Northerner, Colonel Joe Akahan, and the men on the exercise would be dealing with an indifferent population.
That Ironsi himself realised the dangers he faced was doubtful, but he was advised by all who knew the true situation to halt his tour and remain in Lagos for awhile. However, he was determined to continue his tour.
When he came back from Northern Nigeria, he left for Midwestern Nigeria on the 27th of July and, as expected, never returned.............
Page 62 ff
[Captain Dilibe, an Ibo Staff Officer at the First Brigade Headquarters....] revealed that Ironsi had telephoned the Brigade Headquarters from Ibadan at 0730 hours [ON THE 29th JULY] to say that the Government House where he was staying was surrounded by soldiers. Ironsi also informed the Brigade that he had already made several attempts to get a helicopter sent to him from Lagos but had failed......................
Page 85 ff
Ironsi's Air Force ADC, Captain Nwankwo, who was with Ironsi at the time of his death, later told us the story in Enugu of how the General died. According to Nwankwo, at 0630 hours on the 29th of July 1966,Ironsi, Fajuyi, the Governor of Western Nigeria and himself were arrested at Government House, Ibadan by Northern troops under the command of Captain Danjuma. Colonel Hilary Njoku, who was also present, escaped with multiple bullet wounds. The troops used to affect the arrests were those detailed to protect the General during his tour. The captives were driven to an isolated jungle just outside Ibadan. By the time they got there, the prisoners had been so thoroughly beaten that the older two - Ironsi and Fajuyi - could hardly stand up. Shortly after, Fajuyi was shot, then Ironsi.
While Ironsi was being shot, Nwankwo said he ran into the bush and escaped. He emphasized that his escape was not due to his cleverness, but because his colleague, the Hausa ADC who was also present, wanted him to escape.
Nwankwo explained that during the month of June, 1966, he and his Northern colleague had discussed the possibility of another coup. The Northern officer was emphatic the Ibos were going to do it again, but Nwankwo swore it was going to be done by Northerners. According to him, at the end of a long but heated argument, they came to an agreement that whichever side did it, the man on the winning side should save the other's life. Based on this agreement, the Northern ADC whispered t Nwankwo to escape while Ironsi was being shot, and also discouraged the soldiers from chasing after him. Nwankwo said he later made his way to Lagos and contacted this Northern officer again, who not only hid him for a couple of days, but eventually took him out of Lagos in the boot of a car.
Note 1b: Saro-Wiwa and Akinrinade
To learn about the deep admiration for Akinrinade by Saro-Wiwa, read his "On a Darkling Plain: An Account of the Nigerian Civil War.
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NOTE 2
Ojukwu's Top Military Echelon
Although somewhat anachronistic, this note is to put on record a note to be found below a picture on Page 323 of Madiebo's book:
"Biafran top commanders at Isu watching a parade to mark the 2nd Anniversary of Biafra's independence in 1969. Standing left to right: Colonel E. Udeaja (parade commander), Wing Commander W. Ezeilo (Air Force Commander), Colonel S. Ogunewe (Military Aid to Head of State), Major General P. Efiong (Chief of Defence Staff), General C. Ojukwu (Head of State), Major General A. Madiebo (Commander Biafran Army), Mr. P. Okeke (Inspector General of Police), Caption F. Anuku (Navy Commander). "
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NOTE 3
The Awo Delegation Trip to Enugu
Page 94 is the last page in Madiebo's 411-page book in which "the chief from Yorubaland", Obafemi Awolowo, is mentioned. Chief Awolowo had this opportunity to be "highly impressed", because at or around May 5 - 9, 1967, he was the head of a four-man National Conciliation Committee delegation.
Page 78 of Saro-Wiwa: " On a Darkling Plain: An Account of the Nigerian Civil War":
"The professional criers, as might be expected, were also hard at work bemoaning the suspected demise of the Federation. They sent a delegation to Enugu to make peace proposals. The composition of the delegation was quite interesting: Chief Awolowo, Leader of the Yorubas; a Yoruba economist, Dr. Aluko, who was given to writing "intellectual" articles and virulent criticisms of Government and had served for a stormy while at the University of Nigeria, and two other dignitaries from the Mid-Western Region [CHIEF JERETON MARIERE AND CHIEF J.I.G. ONYIA], one of them having Ibo sympathies..............
An excerpt from my Naijanet archives of June 19, 1995 details a record of the conversation between Ojukwu and Awolowo during this historic meeting:
------------------------
BEQIN POSTING: AWO-OJUKWU ENUGU CONVERSATION
I have excerpted below an unpublished response (by one Mr. Lanre Banjo) to an article titled "Igbo Leaders Vow Never to Fight for Yorubas, Fear Another Betrayal" in a March issue of "The Nigerian Times" published by Dr. Chika A. Onyeani of New York. My focus here is not on the views of the excerptor (Banjo) but on the recorded conversation between Awo and Ojukwu. This excerpt obviously can not be all of their conversation, but the authenticity and information that this short piece provides is there for us to judge.
------------------------------- Begin Excerpt ------------------------
.........
........[STUFF DELETED].
.........
... Here is the true account of what took place as taken from scripts of the discussion between Papa and Chief Ojukwu (the Ikemba). The discussion was taped by the Ikemba and the recorder was captured after Enugu fell.
On
Saturday, May 6, 1967, at 5.15 pm, a meeting began to take place,
at the State House, Enugu, between the then Excellency, Lt. Col.
Odumegwu Ojukwu (the Ikemba) and a delegation of the National
Conciliation Committee (Committee) led by the most Honorable Chief
Obafemi Awolowo. The Committee was represented by Professor Samuel
Aluko, Chief Mariere, Chief J.I. Onyia, while the Eastern Region was
represented by Lt. Col Imo, Lt. Col Effiong, Lt. Col. Kurubo, Mr. C.O
Mojekwu, Mr. N.U. Akpan, Professor Eni Njoku, Dr. Nwakanma Okoro,
Dr. P.N.C. Okigbo, Mr. C.A. Onyegbale and Mr. Ndem with the Ikemba
presiding over the meeting. The names are listed for the purpose
of verification of facts presented herein below with those of them who
may still be alive..............
.......
Papa:
The main concern of these delegates is to ensure that Nigeria does not disintegrate,
and I would like to see Nigeria bound together by any bond
because it is better than breaking the whole place up because
each unit will be the loser for it.
The economy of the
country is so integrated that it is too late in the day to try and
sever them without risking the death of one or both of them.
So we have come, therefore, to appeal to you to let Eastern
representatives attend the meeting of the Committee (ON-GOING
NATIONAL CONCILIATION MEETING) I do not want to put
myself in a position where I will be treated as an advocate of the
Eastern cause. Let the Eastern delegates go there, make their case
and then as a member of the Committee I will get up and say I
support this entirely. If at the meeting the East and West present
what they want for a new Nigeria whether temporarily or
permanently, and the North says "no, we are not going to have
it", I will go out and address a World Press Conference
and send our case to that body and say this is what we have done
and the North has turned it down.
I will then take any step
that is necessary to bring into effect what we want. The
North needed to be in a position of being presented with the United
front of the South.
Ikemba:
I started off this struggle in July with 120 rifles to defend the entirety of the East.
I took my stand knowing fully well that by doing so, whilst
carving my name in history, I was signing also my death warrant.
But I took it because I believe that this stand is vital to the
survival of the South. I appealed for settlement quietly
because I understood that this was a naked struggle
for power and that the only time we can sit down and decide the
future of Nigeria on basis of equality will always be
equality of arms. Quietly, I built up. If you do not
know it, I am proud, and my officers are proud, that here in the
East we possess the biggest army in Black Africa. I
am no longer speaking as an underdog, I am speaking from a position
of power. [SEE NOTE 3a] The only way for the South to present a united front
is for the South to meet and hammer out that united front.
It is a point which must be cleared first before proceeding
to make a statement of whatever it is. That is why to my
mind, at the present stage of the crisis the ideal thing is for
the Southern people to meet in any platform and discuss and
hammer out any difference they might have because I will
have nothing to do with the North.
Then going further, it would
then mean that to do this the South to meet; because if we wait for
their permission, we will wait for ever. On the
specific question of whether there is a possibility of contract with
the North, the answer is at the battle field.
Papa:
I do appreciate the points you have made, especially the suggestion the South could take the bull
by the horns, convene a meeting of its leaders and work out its
salvation. Well, I must say that a number of factors have
been overlooked in this regard.
I would be quite willing to
attend any meeting convened by the leaders of the South in the
South, but it must be realized that we in the West are in a
very difficult position. All the members of the bodyguard of the
Military Governor of the Western Region were Northerners; there
were over 36,000 soldiers in the whole of the West, most of
whom were Northerners, and all of them carry arms..... I led a
delegation to Lt. Col. Gowon on the 7th and at that interview I
made it clear on behalf of the West that if the soldiers of
Northern origin were not removed from the West we would not attend
any further meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee. He said he
would do something, of course he did not.
We passed our resolution (THAT
THE NORTHERN SOLDIERS SHOULD BE REMOVED FROM THE WEST) and Col.
Adebayo did very well and give us certain Yoruba officers with
whom to go and deliver the petition to Lt. Col. Gowon.
I did give him an ultimatum up to the 15th of May to remove
these Northern soldiers from the West. Of course, he
agreed to remove them by the 31st of May but the time we returned to
Ibadan Northern soldiers had taken up arms and wanted to kill me,
to kill Adebayo and all others.
Just now Adebayo does not sleep
in his house. Somebody told me that he has not been
sleeping in his house. I know why they put two policemen with two
rifles in front of my house the other day. Of course, I rang up
and said I wanted them removed. There were policemen in front of
Sardauna's house but they did not save him. The populace, of
course, turned against the Northern soldiers. I
don't know why Adebayo should issue the release that soldiers should not be
taunted. But this is the way we have been doing our quiet
fighting. You are remote from the West; you have advantages which
we do not possess. We cannot rush without rushing to our
death at the same time. We are not cowards in the West but we have
to move cautiously, because if we do not do that you might not
have us alive; you would only have monuments all over the
place.
And I may say in this
connection of Southern solidarity -- I am sorry to go into what has
happened in the past -- in 1953 there was an understanding between
the banned NCNC and the banned Action Group; we entered into
an agreement, which I hope we will use sometime, to the effect
that if the North remained intransigent we would declare a Southern
Dominion. This was signed by myself and Zik and I still stand by
it; but we prefer that you should send your delegates to this
meeting, so that we should, known to everyone, enter into
negotiations among ourselves and present a common front to the North.
Then nobody can accuse us of conspiracy or trying to divide
the country into two parts. I want you to look at it from our
point of view. If there were no Northern soldiers in the
West the position would be different.
And even if by the time I
return home the Northern soldiers have gone I still do not want to be
accused of perfidy. The issue at hand is not enough for us to
say that we do not like the North.
That is a negative approach.
I think a positive approach will be for us to meet. Unity
will last only if it is based on common understanding among us and the
basis will start at this meeting.
As I said before, I want you to
give me a chance of meeting your people regularly.
Let us resolve our differences and get what we want and quickly
too.
Ikemba:
If the reason is to get a platform for a meeting between the Southern leaders, I agree very
much that we should try and find a platform and here we seem to
be presented with a fait accompli.
The Southern leaders are here
now, so the main thing is to go on and discuss.
Papa: It will be something near fraud for us to sit down here and discuss in terms of the South especially as this delegation was sent here by a body consisting of the Northern delegation....
Ikemba:
Now coming to the wider question of the East attending, if it is a Reconciliation
Committee then it must be reconciling warring parties. A Reconciliation
Committee can not have the parties within, somehow, it does not
work, unless, of course, they have already agreed on the major
issues, because reconciliation is to stay in the middle of the
warring parties. And one thing is so clear in the Nigerian
situation: certainly the North and the East are warring.
For any Reconciliation Committee to do justice to the East, it
should not have Easterners and Northerners in it. That is one point.
How does the Reconciliation Committee expect us to go to Lagos ?
Can you, Sir, imagine Sir Kashim Ibrahim coming to the East to
meet and discuss ? The critical point of the Eastern stand is
that the East cannot go to any place where there are Northern
troops. That tells his own story.
The North has made it
abundantly clear that no association if they are not controlling the
central machinery, is acceptable to them. Even in the face
of the resolutions of the South, the Emirs, feudalist Emirs, had
the audacity to dictate to the South; first that they will not
allow the Northern troops to leave the West until they are
satisfied that the West has got sufficient troops.
Papa:
You have talked about Easterners and Northerners trying to go to the same meeting and bringing
about reconciliation because they are the two warring parties.
I do not think the fight is between the East and the North alone.
It affects all other parts of the country save that there is no
quarrel between the East and the West and Mid-West. The
fight involves all of us. The West at this moment, has its own
complaints against the North. The fact that we went there particularly
so soon after my withdrawal from the Ad Hoc Constitutional
Committee, which I observed was set up by the Federal
Government to wage war against the East instead of trying to put things
in check, must assure you that we are resolved to find a
solution to this.
You have also spoken about
Lagos or anywhere in the West as unsafe for the Easterners to
hold a meeting. Nobody can tell when life will be lost,
but I think, speaking the minds of entire people of Western
Nigeria and Mid-Western Nigeria, that if anybody can at this stage take
the life of an Ibo man or an Easterner, or if any
outstanding Eastern loses his life by the act of someone else, the whole
of the Western Region and the Mid-Western Region will take it
as the end of Nigeria. I can give that assurance on
behalf of Western Nigeria and Lagos."
[End of all the Awo-Ojukwu quotations in the excerpt - Mr. Lanre's Banjo continues:]
This
meeting was concluded on Sunday, 7th of May at about 2.15 pm with the
hope to reconvene and with the Ikemba maintaining that the South must
first meet. Before I go further, it would be noted that the Ikemba's view
was maintained due to hindsight (sic: LACK OF FORESIGHT). First, Papa
has just been released from prison for a charge of treasonable felony.
Secondly, he was in Enugu representing the Nigerian National Conciliation
Committee. How could Ikemba expect him to change and focus on Southern
plan of pulling out of Nigeria ? Papa was more principled than that.
Even prior to his meeting with the Ikemba, he had been falsely accused
of having teamed up with the Ikemba in his campaign against the Federal
Military Government by being in regular touch with him by phone calls
and personal visits to Enugu, to perfect their joint plans. That he had
been sending Professor Aluko and others to Enugu for illegal guerrilla
training. Given this situation, a sudden change to discuss how the South
will unite against the North will definitely confirm the dreadful
and blatant accusations already levelled against him.............
[STUFF DELETED]
------------------------ End of Excerpt ---------------------------------
END OF MY JUNE 19, 1995 POSTING
--------------------------------
Now, Back to Page 78 of Saro-Wiwa:
"It
cannot be believed that the [AWOLOWO'S ENUGU] delegation was expected to achieve much.
They probably obtained certain promises from Ojukwu, for they
returned to Lagos with proposals which were said to have been agreed
by Ojukwu.
The Federal Government was to lift the economic blockade
placed on the Eastern Region in some respects, a gesture which Ojukwu
would reciprocate by abrogating some of the laws he had passed
confiscating certain properties and assets of the Federal Government.
Gowon, acting in good faith, immediately
accepted the proposals and began to implement them. But Ojukwu had no
intention of accepting any proposals whatsoever, except that which was by now
uppermost in his mind: secession. He was considerably
encouraged by a statement made by Chief Awolowo [IN IBADAN ON MAY 1, 1967] which
has remained controversial ever since. Chief Awolowo had said that
"If the Eastern Region is allowed by acts of omission or commission to secede
from or opt out of Nigeria, then the Western Region and Lagos
must also stay out of the Federation." The Ibo leadership immediately interpreted
Awolowo's statement to mean that if Eastern Nigeria seceded, the West would follow
suit.
They may have been encouraged in that interpretation as much
by the erratic parts of Awolowo's speech [SEE NOTE 6] wherein he
called for a peaceful solution to the problem and trenchantly
opposed any war against the rest by the "North", as by the fact
that only a short while before, the Yoruba West had called for the removal of "northern" troops from the Western Region.
The Government of the West had subsequently banned the "Morning Post", as
Ojukwu had done earlier. The Federal Government had not been able to make its authority felt in either of these cases.
Indeed, by the end of the month, it had accepted publicly to withdraw
non-Yoruba troops from the West."
Note 3a An addition in Saro-Wiwa's book
In Saro-Wiwa's "On A Darkling Plain.." version of this same portion of the conversation, an addition at this very point is:
"It is not my intention to unleash the destruction which my army can unleash. It is not my intention to fight until I am attacked. If I am attacked, I will take good care of the aggressor."
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NOTE 4
Ojukwu's Declaration of Biafra's Secession
Page 193 ff Ojukwu: "Biafra: Selected Speeches with Journals of Events", (1969)
"Fellow countrymen and women, YOU, the people of Eastern Nigeria:
CONSCIOUS of the supreme authority of Almighty God over all mankind, of your duty to yourselves and posterity; AWARE that you can no longer be protected in your lives and in your property by any government based outside Eastern Nigeria; BELIEVING that you are born free and have certain inalienable rights which be best preserved by yourselves; UNWILLING to be unfree partners in any association of a political or economic nature; REJECTING the authority of any person or persons other than the Military Government of Eastern Nigeria to make any imposition of whatever kind or nature upon you; DETERMINED to dissolve all political and other ties between you and the former Federal Republic of Nigeria; PREPARED to enter into such association, treaty or alliance with any sovereign state within the former Federal Republic of Nigeria and elsewhere on such terms and condition as best to subserve your common good; AFFIRMING your trust and confidence in ME; HAVING mandate ME to proclaim on your behalf, in your name, that Eastern Nigeria be a sovereign independent Republic, NOW THEREFORE I, LIEUTENANT COLONEL CHUKWUEMEKA ODUMEGWU OJUKWU, MILITARY GOVERNOR OF EASTERN NIGERIA, BY VIRTUE OF THE AUTHORITY, AND PURSUANT TO THE PRINCIPLES, RECITED ABOVE, DO HEREBY SOLEMNLY PROCLAIM THAT THE TERRITORY AND REGION KNOWN AS AND CALLED EASTERN NIGERIA TOGETHER WITH HER CONTINENTAL SHELF AND TERRITORIAL WATERS SHALL HENCEFORTH BE AN INDEPENDENT SOVEREIGN STATE OF THE NAME AND TITLE OF "THE REPUBLIC OF BIAFRA." AND I DO DECLARE THAT:
all political ties between us and the Federal Republic of Nigeria are hereby totally dissolved;
all subsisting contractual obligations entered into by the Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria or by any person, authority, organization, or government acting on its behalf, with any person, authority, or organisation, or relating to any matter or thing, within the Republic of Biafra, shall henceforth be deemed to be entered into with the Military Governor of the Republic of Biafra for and on behalf of the Government and people of the Republic of Biafra, and the covenants thereof shall, subject to this Declaration, be performed by the parties according to their tenor............
it is our intention to remain a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations in our right as a sovereign independent nation.
LONG LIVE THE REPUBLIC OF BIAFRA! AND MAY GOD PROTECT ALL WHO LIVE IN HER. "
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NOTE 5
A Personal Anecdote
I cannot resist a personal anecdote here, because my family was one of those who sought advice and had to evacuate from the University of Nigeria, Nsukka. From my deep archives here on Naijanet, on August 11, 1994, in response to a very provocative piece by Dr. Sola Adeyeye, I had written, inter alia:
BEGIN QUOTE:
"...First, my father, Prof. Sam Aluko, was an activist economist staunchly in Awolowo's camp during all of this struggle, one of the young intellectual "Turks" (including Oluwasanmi) that Awolowo so much enjoyed their company. He (along with several others) was one of the very first university professors ever dismissed for political reasons in Nigeria, by Chief Akintola (in 1963/64) during the problems preceding the Western Region debacle. He was tried and sentenced for sedition, and upon refusing to pay the fine, received "forced" contributions from those present at the courthouse, otherwise he would have been hauled into jail ! It was his dismissal that forced him to go to take up appointment (and become Head of Dept. of Econs.) at the University of Nigeria, Nsukka in 1964 (notice: he could not have gone to NSUKKA in 1964, three years BEFORE THE SECESSION if there was so much hate between Igbos and Yorubas !). This move threw him into the thick of Eastern Region politics - he toured Aba, Onitsha, Arochukwu, Calabar, Ikot-Ekpene, Port Harcourt, all on behalf of the Action Group. I remember distinctly going with him to the broadcasting station in Enugu several times during the rigged elections in the Western Region, from where the Action Group announced its own "cooked " versions of the results for good measure !. I remember distinctly Wole Soyinka bursting into our home one night in Nsukka unannounced when he was being sought in the Western Region for attempting to assassinate Chief Akintola at the Ibadan TV Station.
On the eve of the secession, my father led a long caravan of students and faculty group of non-Igbos away from Nsukka, meeting others at Onitsha, despite entreaties from Ojukwu not to leave; Ojukwu was and remains a personal friend of his. He was however to return to Enugu as one of four eminent persons sent by Gowon (delegation led by Chief Awolowo) to persuade Ojukwu not to lead Biafra to secede, at which point Ojukwu disclosed that the momentum to secede was too far to stop the effort, that in fact his life would be in danger if he broached a retreat, but that he believed that the secession would be short-lived, and he would do everything in his power to make it so. Of course, history proved him wrong, but these are some truths (if you will permit me to be so blunt) that never come out in conversations..........."
END QUOTE
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NOTE 6
Speech
by Chief Obafemi Awolowo made to the Western leaders of thought, in
Ibadan, 1 May 1967. (Culled from Daily Times, 2 May 1967) and quoted in
"Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria (Volume 1), January 1966-July 1971" by
A.
H. M. Kirk-Greene.
BEGIN QUOTE:
" Awolowo Promises West will secede if the East does
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The aim
of a leader should be the welfare of the people whom he leads. I
have used 'welfare' to denote the physical, mental and spiritual
well-being of the people. With this aim fixed unflinchingly and
unchangeably before my eyes I consider it my duty to Yoruba people in
particular and to Nigerians in general, to place four imperatives before
you this morning. Two of them are categorical and two are conditional.
Only a peaceful solution must be found to arrest the present worsening
stalemate and restore normalcy. The Eastern Region must be encouraged to
remain part of the Federation. If the Eastern Region is allowed by acts
of omission or commission to secede from or opt out of Nigeria, then the
Western Region and Lagos must also stay out of the Federation. The people
of Western Nigeria and Lagos should participate in the ad hoc committee or
any similar body only on the basis of absolute equality with the other
regions of the Federation.
I would like to comment briefly on these four imperatives. There has, of late, been a good deal of sabre rattling in some parts of the country. Those who advocate the use force for the settlement of our present problems should stop a little and reflect. I can see no vital and abiding principle involved in any war between the North and the East. If the East attacked the North, it would be for purpose of revenge pure and simple. Any claim to the contrary would be untenable. If it is claimed that such a war is being waged for the purpose of recovering the real and personal properties left behind in the North by Easterners two insuperable points are obvious. Firstly, the personal effects left behind by Easterners have been wholly looted or destroyed, and can no longer be physically recovered. Secondly, since the real properties are immovable in case of recovery of them can only be by means of forcible military occupation of those parts of the North in which these properties are situated. On the other hand, if the North attacked the East, it could only be for the purpose of further strengthening and entrenching its position of dominance in the country.
If it is claimed that an attack on the East is going to be launched by the Federal Government and not by the North as such and that it is designed to ensure the unity and integrity of the Federation, two other insuperable points also become obvious. First, if a war against the East becomes a necessity it must be agreed to unanimously by the remaining units of the Federation. In this connection, the West, Mid- West and Lagos have declared their implacable opposition to the use of force in solving the present problem. In the face of such declarations by three out of remaining four territories of Nigeria, a war against the East could only be a war favoured by the North alone. Second, if the true purpose of such a war is to preserve the unity and integrity of the Federation, then these ends can be achieved by the very simple devices of implementing the recommendation of the committee which met on August 9 1966, as reaffirmed by a decision of the military leaders at Aburi on January 5 1967 as well as by accepting such of the demands of the East, West, Mid-West and Lagos as are manifestly reasonable, and essential for assuring harmonious relationships and peaceful co--existence between them and their brothers and sisters in the North.
Some
knowledgeable persons have likened an attack on the East to
Lincoln's war against the southern states in America. Two vital factors
distinguish Lincoln's campaign from the one now being contemplated in
Nigeria. The first is that the American civil war was aimed at the
abolition of slavery - that is the liberation of millions of Negroes who
were then still being used as chattels and worse than domestic animals.
The second factor is that Lincoln and others in the northern states were
English-speaking people waging a war of good conscience and humanity
against their fellow nationals who were also English speaking. A war
against the East in which Northern soldiers are predominant, will only
unite the Easterners or the Ibos against their attackers, strengthen them
in their belief that they are not wanted by the majority of their
fellow-Nigerians, and finally push them out of the Federation.
We have
been told that an act of secession on the part of the East
would be a signal, in the first instance, for the creation of the COR
state by decree, which would be backed, if need be, by the use of force.
With great respect, I have some dissenting observations to make on this
declaration. There are 11 national or linguistic groups in the COR areas
with a total population of 5.3 millions. These national groups are as
distinct from one another as the Ibos are distinct from them or from the
Yorubas or Hausas. Of the 11, the Efik/Ibibio/Annang national group are
3.2 million strong as against the Ijaws who are only about 700,000 strong.
Ostensibly, the remaining nine national group number 1.4 millions. But
when you have subtracted the Ibo inhabitants from among them, what is left
ranges from the Ngennis who number only 8,000 to the Ogonis who are
220,000 strong. A decree creating a COR state without a plebiscite to
ascertain the wishes of the peoples in the area, would only amount to
subordinating the minority national groups in the state to the dominance
of the Efik/Ibibio/Annang national group. It would be perfectly in order
to create a Calabar state or a Rivers state by decree, and without a
plebiscite. Each is a homogeneous national unit. But before you lump
distinct and diverse national units together in one state, the consent of
each of them is indispensable. Otherwise, the seed of social disquilibrium
in the new state would have been sown.
On the other hand, if the COR State is created by decree after the Eastern Region shall have made its severance from Nigeria effective, we should then be waging an unjust war against a foreign state. It would be an unjust war, because the purpose of it would be to remove 10 minorities in the East from the dominance of the Ibos only to subordinate them to the dominance of the Efik/Ibibio/Annang national group. I think I have said enough to demonstrate that any war against the East, or vice versa, on any count whatsoever, would be an unholy crusade, for which it would be most unjustifiable to shed a drop of Nigerian blood. Therefore, only a peaceful solution must be found, and quickly too to arrest the present rapidly deteriorating stalemate and restore normalcy.
With regard to the second categorical imperative, it is my considered view that whilst some of the demands of the East are excessive within the context of a Nigerian union, most of such demands are not only well founded, but are designed for smooth and steady association amongst the various national units of Nigeria.
The dependence of the Federal Government on financial contributions from the regions? These and other such like demands I do not support. Demands such as these, if accepted, will lead surely to the complete disintegration of the Federation which is not in the interest of our people. But I wholeheartedly support the following demands among others, which we consider reasonable and most of which are already embodied in our memoranda to the Ad Hoc Committee....
That revenue should be allocated strictly on the basis of derivation; that is to say after the Federal Government has deducted its own share for its own services the rest should be allocated to the regions to which they are attributable.
That the existing public debt of the Federation should become the responsibility of the regions on the basis of the location of the projects in respect of each debt whether internal or external.
That each region should have and control its own militia and police force.
That, with immediate effect, all military personnel should be posted to their regions of origin....
If we are to live in harmony one with another as Nigerians it is imperative that these demands and others which are not related, should be met without further delay by those who have hitherto resisted them. To those who may argue that the acceptance of these demands will amount to transforming Nigeria into a federation with a weak central government, my comment is that any link however tenuous, which keeps the East in the Nigerian union, is better in my view than no link at all.
Before
the Western delegates went to Lagos to attend the meetings
of the ad hoc committee, they were given a clear mandate that if any
region should opt out of the Federation of Nigeria, then the Federation
should be considered to be at an end, and that the Western Region and
Lagos should also opt out of it. It would then be up to Western Nigeria
and Lagos as an independent sovereign state to enter into association with
any of the Nigerian units of its own choosing, and on terms mutually
acceptable to them. I see no reason for departing from this mandate. If
any region in Nigeria considers itself strong enough to compel us to enter
into association with it on its own terms, I would only wish such a region
luck. But such luck, I must warn, will, in the long run be no better than
that which has attended the doings of all colonial powers down the ages.
This much I must say in addition, on this point. We have neither military
might nor the overwhelming advantage of numbers here in Western Nigeria
and Lagos. But we have justice of a noble and imperishable cause on our
side, namely: the right of a people to unfettered self-determination. If
this is so, then God is on our side, and if God is with us then we have
nothing whatsoever in this world to fear.
The fourth imperative, and the second conditional one has been fully dealt with in my recent letter to the Military Governor of Western Nigeria, Col. Robert Adebayo, and in the representation which your deputation made last year to the head of the Federal Military Government, Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon. As a matter of fact, as far back as November last year a smaller meeting of leaders of thought in this Region decided that unless certain things were done, we would no longer participate in the meeting of the ad hoc committee. But since then, not even one of our legitimate requests has been granted. I will, therefore, take no more of your time in making further comments on a point with which you are well familiar. As soon as our humble and earnest requests are met, I shall be ready to take my place on the ad hoc committee. But certainly, not before.
In closing, I have this piece of advice to give. In order to resolve amiably and in the best interests of all Nigerians certain attributes are required on the part of Nigerian leaders, military as well as non-military leaders alike, namely: vision, realism and unselfishness. But above all , what will keep Nigerian leaders in the North and East unwaveringly in the path of wisdom, realism and moderation is courage and steadfastness on the part of Yoruba people in the course of what they sincerely believe to be right, equitable and just. In the past five years we in the West and Lagos have shown that we possess these qualities in a large measure. If we demonstrate them again as we did in the past, calmly and heroically, we will save Nigeria from further bloodshed and imminent wreck and, at the same time, preserve our freedom and self-respect into the bargain.
May God rule and guide our deliberations here, and endow all the Nigerian leaders with the vision, realism, and unselfishness as well as courage and steadfastness in the course of truth, which the present circumstances demand."