Before the Final Ruling: on Akinterinwa’s  “In the Event of a Nigeria-Cameroon War”

By

William Etim Bassey

william_etim-bassey@canada.com

 

Preamble

 

Even as ongoing arguments before the International Court of Justice-ICJ seek to strengthen both-Nigeria’s and Cameroon’s, position in the boundary conflict regarding claims to the “tittle” of the Bakassi peninsula (a 1,000-square-kilometer-400-square-mile, area located in the Gulf of Guinea[E1]), I compliment Akinterinwa’s prescient instincts in writing “In the event of a Nigeria-Cameroon’s War” for directionally it appears the Bakassi dispute will ultimately be resolved by force of arms once available tracks of dispute resolution are exhausted.

 

Once again, I’m writing with the customary self-preservative warning about the limits of both author and topic. I am neither a lawyer, nor a legal academic in the strict sense. So I’ll define my terms, acknowledging that my thinking focuses more on the concept of peace, its components and security sector reforms. However and importantly, I am a pragmatist. Those I work for and with look to me to produce results- by analysing how systems function. Consequently, alot of my concepts are formed guided by experience post research and analysis from demands and pressures placed upon me.

 

While Akinterinwa’s writing focuses and accentuates Nigeria’s obvious capacity potential in comparison to Cameroon’s. It is important to note the past interplay between lethargy and ineptness which above all has brought Nigeria before the ICJ even when Nigeria raised “concerns” over the ICJ’s jurisdiction to adjudicate’2[E2].

 

Those asides, while thinking along the same lines as Akinterinwa, I here choose to do a situational analysis from a totally different perspective.  Amongst others, I’m here hoping to even if inexhaustibly limited, analyze issues of strategy post discussing reasons why this particular inter-state disagreement holds so much conflict potential. My perspective is Nigerian; all views are mine alone.

 

International Law in a divided world

 

Resulting from a lack of alternative, that the ICJ presents the best mechanism in resolving the Nigeria-Cameroon dispute over ownership of the Bakassi peninsula isn’t in doubt as the Organization of African Unity to which Nigeria and Cameroon belong both lack capacity and character to mediate and resolve this lingering conflict.

 

However, the issue specific challenges that will arise resulting from the ruling here presents a worrying scenario for as fitting as the ICJ is an arbitrar in this context. Enforcing the ICJ’s ruling will prove a sticky point. For basically, International Law which is normative is facilitated by the good will of states, who are signatory to the various treaties and conventions which empower and enables its articles.

 

For those of you conversant with International Law and its mechanisms, you’ll know that the International legal dispute settlement mechanism is incapacitated by a lack of enforcement mechanism. Implying, primarily, that the expected ruling might not be binding on both sovereign’s-Nigeria and Cameroon.

 

Limits of International

 

Many argue, and the primary complaint about international law is that it holds better on paper than in practice (Antonio Cassese, 1992). The norm being that States who feel unfavored by “certain” rulings. Especially in arbitration cases have opted to generally ignore rulings with impunity and have always somehow found practitioners of international law to interpret the various articles of International Law favorably

 

Nature of International Law

 

Historically, as much as no State denies the virtue of international law- (laws made by States for their own purposes and advantages), when matters of strategic or national interest are at stake, submission of independence of freedom of action or “sovereignty”? is held onto tightly.

 

The fact remains, most states try to honor their international social obligations except where there’s a challenge to its perceived sphere of national and strategic interest and or influence.

 

Issue

 

It is into this category that the Nigeria-Cameroon dispute over titleship of the mineral rich Bakassi peninsula falls under. As both Nigeria, and Cameroon whose claim to ownership is by virtue of the Maroua Declaration, June 1 1975 ’22 and the 1913 Anglo-German treaty ‘3 which put Bakassi as part of Cameroon, seek within the dictates of International Law, as symbolized by the ICJ for arbitrated settlement in this conflict which cost both countries losses in potential earnings, loss of life due to armed skirmishes and is a drain on national resources.

 

Above all, I’m hoping Akinterinwa’s article has Nigeria’s defense ministry officials thinking of posturing the armed forces even if as a deterrent in readiness to defend Nigeria’s sphere of socio-eco-political interest should the need arise because as is, the Nigerian armed forces rapid mobilization capability is undeveloped, at best suspect. Besides, I’m thinking, the era of playing big brother should be consigned to the historical dustbin and the past policy based on the doctrine of minimum force and containment be done away with and its use if expanded. The Nigerian government must now prepare not to be caught of guard of guard.

 

Reasoning

 

I know those acquainted with me will think it odd to counsel that the Nigerian armed forces be postured even if only to extract the highest deterrence value, especially since I now champion the logical and calm hearing of ordered argument in the settlement of disputes. Counseling the need to desist from violence and striving to trot the enlightened path of justice, reason, mediation, negotiated settlement and arbitration as alternatives in settling conflicts of interest.  A rational natural order for one dedicated to the concept of peacekeeping.

 

I beg to think and self-express liberally, I’m thinking as diplomat in this instance. In the hope that Akinterinwa’s article which is an inspiration, an articulated precedent to my thoughts in this context, thoughts, which have been held captive for years comes alive. Thoughts I’m sure many Nigerians share. Serves as a reference point when the whole Bakassi situation implodes on rulership’s face.

 

While I’m still for rational discourse and exploration of the multi-tracks of conflict resolution and while 100% in support of the Bakassi issue being resolved by the ICJ if it can to everyone’s satisfaction.

 

The following challenges are likely to challenge the ICJ’s ruling, the ICJ’s limited capacity to facilitate enforcement, the many gray areas in International Law (enforcement of ruling would be more enthusiastically facilitated in cases involving International Humanitarian Law, than say that of the Law of the Sea convention in my opinion) and the strategic relevance of the Bakassi peninsula guides and dictates my stance.

 

With that in mind, I’m thinking president Obasanjo’s government projects interest above any consideration and effectively posture the Nigerian armed forces. For previous governments have committed fundamental strategic errors, probably as a result of poor situational analysis (I commend the restraint of past government but a stand must be taken for the Bakassi people now)

 

Issues, and Errors by past Governments

 

Rhetorically, Akinterinwa points out that Cameroon having been on the offensive for so long was finally encouraged by the French government to initiate actions at the ICJ. In truth, if Cameroon had the strategic edge in capacity, which Nigeria enjoys, the Bakasi issue would have been long settled.

 

 I’m not inferring Cameroon isn’t a peace loving State but historically, countries with obvious strategic and muscular advantage have always exploited opportunities to further national interest and protect their perceived spheres of geo-political interest and “Centers of Gravity especially when opportunities self present.

 

Elucidated by Akinterinwa, Cameroon holds the initiative in this dispute because most confrontations, civil and military, have been initiated by the Cameroonian government i.e. the 1994 hostilities when Nigerian first militarily responded to Cameroonian incursions etc. Implications are that the government in Younde has always had the strategic edge in initiative even if short-changed by Nigeria’s apparent overwhelming resource and muscular capacity.

 

So why is Nigeria really at the “short end” in the dispute over Bakassi? This perhaps calls to question the direction of Nigeria’s whole national policy structure vis-ŕ-vis national interest and foreign policy, which has sadly been tied to the whim of the “days despot”-ruler-Gowons ratification of the Maruoa declaration, June 1, 1975’1, negating the basic principles or concept governing strategic reasoning is perhaps a starting point, in assessing an overall ineffective Bakassi strategy mired in lethargy.

 

 

This lack of direction (especially in the Bakassi context) by past governments who tended to be more reactionary and vein than objective in reasoning perhaps reflects our foreign policy thinking? A thinking self-manifest with benign insistence on Africa being the center of Nigeria’s foreign policy when the concepts of political-economy, globalization, real-politick and interest all tied to national survival and projection should propel our foreign policy- I bare in mind Nigeria’s need to preserve geo-ethno strategic influence.

 

To remedy the past mess as per Bakassi, I’d like to see President Obasanjo government show a willingness to defy traditional limitations because it is now obvious judging from the tight corner past re-actions have forced us into that aspects are limited in Nigeria’s foreign policy. Nigeria’s foreign policy doesn’t reflect the shift in thinking amongst progressive States.

 

This limitation is reflective in our ideology of progress, which is at best misplaced as much as in-cohesive especially in a strategic context-the Bakassi conflict is a case in point.

 

Cameroon’s Strategy

 

Cameroon’s well-conceptualized strategy by design or chance has been implemented effectively over the years and is probably achieving its desired end-state-objective in a strategic sense as she has tactically flogged Nigeria at every juncture simply by creating situations through opportunities facilitated by Nigeria’s lethargy and lack of initiative and simply sitting back to watch Nigeria play catch-up and react then countering or checkmating. 

 

A perfect strategy when all the variables aren’t in your hands as in this case. And off course Nigeria in an attempt to react even in self-defense will always appear too muscular in projection. Making it a no win situation.

 

Required Action

 

Firstly, there is need for serious introspection on Nigeria’s part, as this will best facilitate, helping to define the best option for countering Cameroon’s strategy post defining Nigeria’s own end-state in this context.

 

 Benign sentiments, such as reference to Nigerians as brothers by Prof. Ngole be ignored. No African nation has accorded visiting, immigrant or resident immigrant Nigerian worker with dignity or in a brotherly manner. It’s been xenophobic attacks, harassment, murder, deportation and victimizations from Harare, to Tripoli to Johannesburg to Maputo to Abidjan. Sometimes for no just cause even if occasionally self induced.

 

Truth is, if the Bakassi peninsula or islands is important to Nigeria’s survival, which it is. Then its expedient president Obasanjo initiate a pro-active strategy based on what I’ll term multiplicity of Civil-military actions based on interest, facilitated by a sense of purpose. For if not at the days end badly needed resources would have been expanded on purposelessness and sentiments, which Nigeria can ill-afford.

 

The strategy should rightfully be cohesive and well-orchestrated working in tangent within a framework supporting our efforts before the ICJ.

 

Truth is, Cameroon would have “assumed” ownership of the Bakassi peninsula years ago without recourse to due process or diplomacy had she the capacity to self-project effectively and maintains positive physical presence and control.

 

So, I’m thinking its time Nigeria self projects forcefully, moving from a state of potentiality to that of actuality all within legal and diplomatic confines even as it explores other traks of resolving this conflict. This sort of projection is allowable within the confines of modern diplomacy and will perhaps let president Paul Biya and his cabinet know Nigeria has finally woken up from her diplomatic slumber on the Bakassi issue.

 

Secondly, Nigeria can start by attacking Cameroon’s strategy having diligently sought for and defined Cameroon’s center of gravity in this context, I’d suggest France is a center of gravity. So, the next logical step in a strategic context would be working to disrupt that cozy Franco-Cameroonian understanding which is bound by a defense pact. Nigeria can leverage with French business concerns in Nigeria and the nominal dictate would be that in a situation where France has more economic interest in Nigeria it will at least keep Cameroon on a leash while Nigeria initiates her strategy.

 

The French aren’t likely to “switch” sides? Siding with Nigeria over Bakassi because it will obviously be easier to deal with the Cameroon government at the bargaining table as per oil block concessions for French companies, a point Nigerian strategic planners should note. But the advantage of attacking Cameroon’s strategy directly and attempting to disrupt her alliance with France in one swoop effectively leaves Cameroon standing without her “guardian” making her more vulnerable.

 

Thirdly, there is a need more now than ever to plan against retaliatory attacks and here national security advisers, defense chief and armed forces planners must work in tangent with governors of the states bordering Cameroon especially Cross River and Rivers state which is a “Center of Gravity”[W3]. The armed forces also have to be postured in readiness. This means an increase in defense spending especially for the Nigerian airforce, which has obsolete equipment, training modules and operational methodology. Also more than ever there is a need to initiate better training hoping to facilitate force interoperability and projection capacity. Expediently there’s a need to slightly modify our current peacekeeping heavy doctrine to perhaps reflect happenings and interest.

 

The president also needs to look at upgrading and facilitating the airbase in Port Harcourt, I don’t know if the airbase in Calabar still has life in it. For reacting from the tactical air command in Makurdy might prove ineffective in the Bakassi context although nominally for a modern airforce it shouldn’t be an issue

 

These initiatives will require simultaneous component activities, the most important being pro-activeness, because for as long as Cameroon has held the initiative, successive Nigerian governments have shown a lack of willingness and lethargy in decisively tackling the Bakassi issue, this lethargy Cameroon has continuously exploited.

 

This obvious lack of willingness and lethargy is evident by the total lack of infrastructural and developmental response initiatives in the Bakassi peninsula itself while Cameroon attempted to enforce its rule. (I disregard Florence Etta-Giwa’s rather in-articulate and in-coherent initiative to bring notice about the plight of the Bakassi people to national attention.  It was purely self-serving and in my opinion exploitative. It only sought to facilitate her political ambitions). Her attempt sought to achieve no sustainable developmental goal, can’t be quantified thus had no effective impact on the day-to-day living of the islands inhabitants.

 

Conclusion

 

I’m not a warmonger or a thespian. And as one with a vibrant mind, I believe in the principle and concept of negotiated and mediated resolution in conflict situations. I have also come to believe strongly in the rule of law and due process. I believe process is the foundation on which sustainable societal development should be hinged.

 

However even the good-books- talks about times and seasons for everything under the sun.

 

In my opinion, it is time Nigeria self asserts. Just maybe it is time using Prof. Ngole’s “brotherly” reference to say hey, “don’t pock big brother anymore, he actually bites you know.

 

On Nigeria’s part, amongst many questions requiring answers are, can sustainable socio-political and economic growth and stability be facilitated by the federal government in Bakassi? Does Nigeria; really need the Bakassi peninsula as part of modern Nigeria and finally which side do the inhabitants of the peninsula feel they belong etc? I admit this might prove a crude mechanistic approach but the high conflict potential of the whole issue calls for serious introspection on Nigeria’s part.

 

Perhaps instead of reacting to Cameroon’s strategic offense over the years resulting in Nigeria dragged before the ICJ, there’s the need to create a national consultative forum inclusive of the national security advisers, defense ministers, heads of the armed forces and their strategic force component commanders, and the governors of States bordering Cameroon, to do a situational analysis as per the merits and de-merits of the situation purely from a strategic perspective. This way our strategic objectives will be defined and a response strategy fashioned.

 

What’s currently obtainable, whereby Nigeria lacks an overall strategy, though she’s represented by the able Richard Akinjide won’t cut it.

 

The Bakassi issue is as much legal as political, as socio-economic and public relations based thus improper non-cohesive strategy based on what I’ve termed “multiplicity of efforts” will on the long-term hurt Nigeria.

 

From a purely strategic perspective, in such situations as is-Nigeria-Cameroon, especially as evidenced by past skirmishes. Most country’s, while willing to work within the dictates of the Vienna conventions, its additional protocols, the Law of the Sea Conventions etc-international law, will most likely effect a strategy based on Bilateral Symmetry[E4] where national interest and end-state-objective having been defined the strategy employs with nominal differences diverse tactics simultaneously within the same tangent seeking to achieve the same strategic end-state only maneuvering to leverage as applicable[E5] .

 

Right and in the context in which I’ve expressed my thoughts it would perhaps be of strategic advantage for president Obsanjo to posture the armed forces even as week seek for arbitrated resolution. For the longer the whole Bakassi issue drags on, the more wasteful resource wise it becomes. For if Cameroon have all the resources in the world to persecute the Bakassi issue, Nigeria needs to move on and deal with more pressing socio-developmental issues and Cameroon is a total distraction.

 

On the flip, if Nigeria doesn’t so to say force a settlement of sort, eco-political challenges in the future might force her to loose interest in the Bakassi or she might though still enjoying capacity potential edge just be too distracted to bother about Cameroon and the Bakassi. My hope is that the ICJ can resolve and enforce its ruling even if that might appear rather assumptious baring in mind the interplay between ruling and binding enforcement.

 

Reference:

¨       Antonio Cassese’s, International law in a divided world, (Claredon Press, 1992)

¨       Brian Boldgett, “Clausewitz and the “Theory of Center of Gravity” as it applies to Current Strategic, Operational, and Tactical levels of opertion”. See http://members.tripod.com/Brian_Blodgett/CoG.htm

¨       Olalaken Rasheed Sodeinde’s work makes a good and educative read… See http://www.ddl.org/figtree/pub/proceedings/nairobi/sodeinde-TS17-1.pdf

 

 

 March 31st , 2002



 


 [E1]See-http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/library/cijwww/icjwww/idocket/icn/icnorders/icn_iorder_19991021.htm

 [E2] See-Separate Opinion of Judge Kooijmans-http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/icn/icnjudgment/icn_ijudgment_980611_separateKooijman.htm

 [W3] Concept; Brian Blodgett, working from a Clauswetzian perspective defines “Centers of Gravity” as the “hub of all power and movement upon which everything depends”, I concur to imply within a given entity…He concludes in his epigraph…While the definition of a “center of Gravity” is quite clear, discerning the “Center of Gravity” is not…the “Center of Gravity” may be a physical object, or it may be abstract….therefore needing constant re-appraisal. I concur to determine value…See; http://members.tripod.com/Brian_Blodgett/CoG.htm

 [E4]It’s a term more to do with bio-genetic composition-physiological makeup, I recently studied it when attempting to write an article on forming a “National Guard”…I have here made it applicable in the Bakassi context to drive home my point….Bilateral symmetry requires that the left and right halves of the body start out as mirror images of each other…..later developmental accommodations….may result in slight differences between these two halves, but every ….”organ”-strategy….retains its development as a midline structure. Therefore, they are still following perfect bilateral symmetry….See; http://www.ensc.sfu.ca/people/grad/brassard/personal/THESIS/node44.html

  

 [E5]