Before the Final Ruling: on Akinterinwa’s “In the Event of a Nigeria-Cameroon War”
By
William Etim Bassey
william_etim-bassey@canada.com
Preamble
Even
as ongoing arguments before the International Court of Justice-ICJ seek to
strengthen both-Nigeria’s and Cameroon’s, position in the boundary conflict regarding claims to the “tittle” of the Bakassi
peninsula (a 1,000-square-kilometer-400-square-mile, area located in the Gulf of
Guinea[E1]),
I compliment Akinterinwa’s prescient instincts in writing “In the event of a Nigeria-Cameroon’s War” for directionally
it appears the Bakassi dispute will ultimately be resolved by force of arms once
available tracks of dispute resolution are exhausted.
Once again, I’m writing with the customary self-preservative warning about the limits of both author and topic. I am neither a lawyer, nor a legal academic in the strict sense. So I’ll define my terms, acknowledging that my thinking focuses more on the concept of peace, its components and security sector reforms. However and importantly, I am a pragmatist. Those I work for and with look to me to produce results- by analysing how systems function. Consequently, alot of my concepts are formed guided by experience post research and analysis from demands and pressures placed upon me.
While
Akinterinwa’s writing focuses and accentuates Nigeria’s obvious capacity
potential in comparison to Cameroon’s. It is important to note the past
interplay between lethargy and ineptness which above all has brought Nigeria
before the ICJ even when Nigeria raised “concerns” over the ICJ’s
jurisdiction to adjudicate’2[E2].
Those
asides, while thinking along the same lines as Akinterinwa, I here choose to do
a situational analysis from a totally different perspective.
Amongst others, I’m here hoping to even if inexhaustibly limited,
analyze issues of strategy post discussing reasons why this particular
inter-state disagreement holds so much conflict potential. My perspective is
Nigerian; all views are mine alone.
International
Law in a divided world
Resulting
from a lack of alternative, that the ICJ presents the best mechanism in
resolving the Nigeria-Cameroon dispute over ownership of the Bakassi peninsula
isn’t in doubt as the Organization of African Unity to which Nigeria and
Cameroon belong both lack capacity and character to mediate and resolve this
lingering conflict.
However,
the issue specific challenges that will arise resulting from the ruling here
presents a worrying scenario for as fitting as the ICJ is an arbitrar in this
context. Enforcing the ICJ’s ruling will prove a sticky point. For basically,
International Law which is normative is facilitated by the good will of states,
who are signatory to the various treaties and conventions which empower and
enables its articles.
For
those of you conversant with International Law and its mechanisms, you’ll know
that the International legal dispute settlement mechanism is incapacitated by a
lack of enforcement mechanism. Implying, primarily, that the expected ruling
might not be binding on both sovereign’s-Nigeria and Cameroon.
Limits
of International
Many
argue, and the primary complaint about international law is that it holds better
on paper than in practice (Antonio
Cassese, 1992).
The norm being that States who feel unfavored by “certain” rulings.
Especially in arbitration cases have opted to generally ignore rulings with
impunity and have always somehow found practitioners of international law to
interpret the various articles of International Law favorably
Nature
of International Law
Historically,
as much as no State denies the virtue of international law- (laws made by States
for their own purposes and advantages), when matters of strategic or national
interest are at stake, submission of independence of freedom of action or
“sovereignty”? is held onto tightly.
The
fact remains, most states try to honor their international social obligations
except where there’s a challenge to its perceived sphere of national and
strategic interest and or influence.
Issue
It
is into this category that the Nigeria-Cameroon dispute over titleship of the
mineral rich Bakassi peninsula falls under. As both Nigeria, and Cameroon whose
claim to ownership is by virtue of the Maroua Declaration, June 1 1975 ’22
and the 1913 Anglo-German treaty ‘3 which put Bakassi as part of Cameroon,
seek within the dictates of International Law, as symbolized by the ICJ for
arbitrated settlement in this conflict which cost both countries losses in
potential earnings, loss of life due to armed skirmishes and is a drain on
national resources.
Above
all, I’m hoping Akinterinwa’s article has Nigeria’s defense ministry
officials thinking of posturing the armed forces even if as a deterrent in
readiness to defend Nigeria’s sphere of socio-eco-political interest should
the need arise because as is, the Nigerian armed forces rapid mobilization
capability is undeveloped, at best suspect. Besides, I’m thinking, the era of
playing big brother should be consigned to the historical dustbin and the past
policy based on the doctrine of minimum force and containment be done away with
and its use if expanded. The Nigerian government must now prepare not to be
caught of guard of guard.
Reasoning
I
know those acquainted with me will think it odd to counsel that the Nigerian
armed forces be postured even if only to extract the highest deterrence value,
especially since I now champion the logical and calm hearing of ordered argument
in the settlement of disputes. Counseling the need to desist from violence and
striving to trot the enlightened path of justice, reason, mediation, negotiated
settlement and arbitration as alternatives in settling conflicts of interest.
A rational natural order for one dedicated to the concept of
peacekeeping.
I
beg to think and self-express liberally, I’m thinking as diplomat in this
instance. In the hope that Akinterinwa’s article which is an inspiration, an
articulated precedent to my thoughts in this context, thoughts, which have been
held captive for years comes alive. Thoughts I’m sure many Nigerians share.
Serves as a reference point when the whole Bakassi situation implodes on
rulership’s face.
While
I’m still for rational discourse and exploration of the multi-tracks of
conflict resolution and while 100% in support of the Bakassi issue being
resolved by the ICJ if it can to everyone’s satisfaction.
The
following challenges are likely to challenge the ICJ’s ruling, the ICJ’s
limited capacity to facilitate enforcement, the many gray areas in International
Law (enforcement of ruling would be more enthusiastically facilitated in cases
involving International Humanitarian Law, than say that of the Law of the Sea
convention in my opinion) and the strategic relevance of the Bakassi peninsula
guides and dictates my stance.
With
that in mind, I’m thinking president Obasanjo’s government projects interest
above any consideration and effectively posture the Nigerian armed forces. For
previous governments have committed fundamental strategic errors, probably as a
result of poor situational analysis (I commend the restraint of past government
but a stand must be taken for the Bakassi people now)
Issues,
and Errors by past Governments
Rhetorically,
Akinterinwa points out that Cameroon having been on the offensive for so long
was finally encouraged by the French government to initiate actions at the ICJ.
In truth, if Cameroon had the strategic edge in capacity, which Nigeria enjoys,
the Bakasi issue would have been long settled.
I’m not inferring Cameroon isn’t a peace loving State but
historically, countries with obvious strategic and muscular advantage have
always exploited opportunities to further national interest and protect their
perceived spheres of geo-political interest and “Centers of Gravity”
especially when opportunities self present.
Elucidated
by Akinterinwa, Cameroon holds the initiative in this dispute because most
confrontations, civil and military, have been initiated by the Cameroonian
government i.e. the 1994 hostilities when Nigerian first militarily responded to
Cameroonian incursions etc. Implications are that the government in Younde has
always had the strategic edge in initiative even if short-changed by Nigeria’s
apparent overwhelming resource and muscular capacity.
So
why is Nigeria really at the “short
end” in
the dispute over Bakassi? This perhaps calls to question the direction of
Nigeria’s whole national policy structure vis-ŕ-vis national interest and
foreign policy, which has sadly been tied to the whim of the “days
despot”-ruler-Gowons ratification of the Maruoa declaration, June 1, 1975’1,
negating the basic principles or concept governing strategic reasoning is
perhaps a starting point, in assessing an overall ineffective Bakassi strategy
mired in lethargy.
This
lack of direction (especially in the Bakassi context) by past governments who
tended to be more reactionary and vein than objective in reasoning perhaps
reflects our foreign policy thinking? A thinking self-manifest with benign
insistence on Africa being the center of Nigeria’s foreign policy when the
concepts of political-economy, globalization, real-politick and interest all
tied to national survival and projection should propel our foreign policy- I
bare in mind Nigeria’s need to preserve geo-ethno strategic influence.
To
remedy the past mess as per Bakassi, I’d like to see President Obasanjo
government show a willingness to defy traditional limitations because it is now
obvious judging from the tight corner past re-actions have forced us into that
aspects are limited in Nigeria’s foreign policy. Nigeria’s foreign policy
doesn’t reflect the shift in thinking amongst progressive States.
This
limitation is reflective in our ideology of progress, which is at best misplaced
as much as in-cohesive especially in a strategic context-the Bakassi conflict is
a case in point.
Cameroon’s
Strategy
Cameroon’s
well-conceptualized strategy by design or chance has been implemented
effectively over the years and is probably achieving its desired
end-state-objective in a strategic sense as she has tactically flogged Nigeria
at every juncture simply by creating situations through opportunities
facilitated by Nigeria’s lethargy and lack of initiative and simply sitting
back to watch Nigeria play catch-up and react then countering or checkmating.
A
perfect strategy when all the variables aren’t in your hands as in this case.
And off course Nigeria in an attempt to react even in self-defense will always
appear too muscular in projection. Making it a no win situation.
Required
Action
Firstly,
there is need for serious introspection on Nigeria’s part, as this will best
facilitate, helping to define the best option for countering Cameroon’s
strategy post defining Nigeria’s own end-state in this context.
Benign sentiments, such as reference to Nigerians as brothers
by Prof. Ngole be ignored. No African nation has accorded visiting, immigrant or
resident immigrant Nigerian worker with dignity or in a brotherly manner. It’s
been xenophobic attacks, harassment, murder, deportation and victimizations from
Harare, to Tripoli to Johannesburg to Maputo to Abidjan. Sometimes for no just
cause even if occasionally self induced.
Truth
is, if the Bakassi peninsula or islands is important to Nigeria’s survival,
which it is. Then its expedient president Obasanjo initiate a pro-active
strategy based on what I’ll term multiplicity of Civil-military actions based
on interest, facilitated by a sense of purpose. For if not at the days end badly
needed resources would have been expanded on purposelessness and sentiments,
which Nigeria can ill-afford.
The
strategy should rightfully be cohesive and well-orchestrated working in tangent
within a framework supporting our efforts before the ICJ.
Truth
is, Cameroon would have “assumed” ownership of the Bakassi peninsula years
ago without recourse to due process or diplomacy had she the capacity to
self-project effectively and maintains positive physical presence and control.
So,
I’m thinking its time Nigeria self projects forcefully, moving from a state of
potentiality to that of actuality all within legal and diplomatic confines even
as it explores other traks of resolving this conflict. This sort of projection
is allowable within the confines of modern diplomacy and will perhaps let
president Paul Biya and his cabinet know Nigeria has finally woken up from her
diplomatic slumber on the Bakassi issue.
Secondly,
Nigeria can start by attacking Cameroon’s strategy having diligently sought
for and defined Cameroon’s center of gravity in this context, I’d suggest
France is a center of gravity. So, the next logical step in a strategic context
would be working to disrupt that cozy Franco-Cameroonian understanding which is
bound by a defense pact. Nigeria can leverage with French business concerns in
Nigeria and the nominal dictate would be that in a situation where France has
more economic interest in Nigeria it will at least keep Cameroon on a leash
while Nigeria initiates her strategy.
The
French aren’t likely to “switch” sides? Siding with Nigeria over Bakassi
because it will obviously be easier to deal with the Cameroon government at the
bargaining table as per oil block concessions for French companies, a point
Nigerian strategic planners should note. But the advantage of attacking
Cameroon’s strategy directly and attempting to disrupt her alliance with
France in one swoop effectively leaves Cameroon standing without her
“guardian” making her more vulnerable.
Thirdly,
there is a need more now than ever to plan against retaliatory attacks and here
national security advisers, defense chief and armed forces planners must work in
tangent with governors of the states bordering Cameroon especially Cross River
and Rivers state which is a “Center
of Gravity”[W3].
The armed forces also have to be postured in readiness. This means an increase
in defense spending especially for the Nigerian airforce, which has obsolete
equipment, training modules and operational methodology. Also more than ever
there is a need to initiate better training hoping to facilitate force
interoperability and projection capacity. Expediently there’s a need to
slightly modify our current peacekeeping heavy doctrine to perhaps reflect
happenings and interest.
The
president also needs to look at upgrading and facilitating the airbase in Port
Harcourt, I don’t know if the airbase in Calabar still has life in it. For
reacting from the tactical air command in Makurdy might prove ineffective in the
Bakassi context although nominally for a modern airforce it shouldn’t be an
issue
These
initiatives will require simultaneous component activities, the most important
being pro-activeness, because for as long as Cameroon has held the initiative,
successive Nigerian governments have shown a lack of willingness and lethargy in
decisively tackling the Bakassi issue, this lethargy Cameroon has continuously
exploited.
This
obvious lack of willingness and lethargy is evident by the total lack of
infrastructural and developmental response initiatives in the Bakassi peninsula
itself while Cameroon attempted to enforce its rule. (I disregard Florence Etta-Giwa’s
rather in-articulate and in-coherent initiative to bring notice about the plight
of the Bakassi people to national attention.
It was purely self-serving and in my opinion exploitative. It only sought
to facilitate her political ambitions). Her attempt sought to achieve no
sustainable developmental goal, can’t be quantified thus had no effective
impact on the day-to-day living of the islands inhabitants.
Conclusion
I’m
not a warmonger or a thespian. And as one with a vibrant mind, I believe in the
principle and concept of negotiated and mediated resolution in conflict
situations. I have also come to believe strongly in the rule of law and due
process. I believe process is the foundation on which sustainable societal
development should be hinged.
However
even the good-books- talks about times and seasons for everything under the sun.
In
my opinion, it is time Nigeria self asserts. Just maybe it is time using Prof.
Ngole’s “brotherly” reference to say hey, “don’t pock big brother
anymore, he actually bites you know.
On
Nigeria’s part, amongst many questions requiring answers are, can sustainable
socio-political and economic growth and stability be facilitated by the federal
government in Bakassi? Does Nigeria; really need the Bakassi peninsula as part
of modern Nigeria and finally which side do the inhabitants of the peninsula
feel they belong etc? I admit this might prove a crude mechanistic approach but
the high conflict potential of the whole issue calls for serious introspection
on Nigeria’s part.
Perhaps
instead of reacting to Cameroon’s strategic offense over the years resulting
in Nigeria dragged before the ICJ, there’s the need to create a national
consultative forum inclusive of the national security advisers, defense
ministers, heads of the armed forces and their strategic force component
commanders, and the governors of States bordering Cameroon, to do a situational
analysis as per the merits and de-merits of the situation purely from a
strategic perspective. This way our strategic objectives will be defined and a
response strategy fashioned.
What’s
currently obtainable, whereby Nigeria lacks an overall strategy, though she’s
represented by the able Richard Akinjide won’t cut it.
The
Bakassi issue is as much legal as political, as socio-economic and public
relations based thus improper non-cohesive strategy based on what I’ve termed
“multiplicity of efforts” will on the long-term hurt Nigeria.
From
a purely strategic perspective, in such situations as is-Nigeria-Cameroon,
especially as evidenced by past skirmishes. Most country’s, while willing to
work within the dictates of the Vienna conventions, its additional protocols,
the Law of the Sea Conventions etc-international law, will most likely effect a
strategy based on Bilateral Symmetry[E4]
where national interest and end-state-objective having been defined the strategy
employs with nominal differences diverse tactics simultaneously within the same
tangent seeking to achieve the same strategic end-state only maneuvering to
leverage as applicable[E5].
Right
and in the context in which I’ve expressed my thoughts it would perhaps be of
strategic advantage for president Obsanjo to posture the armed forces even as
week seek for arbitrated resolution. For the longer the whole Bakassi issue
drags on, the more wasteful resource wise it becomes. For if Cameroon have all
the resources in the world to persecute the Bakassi issue, Nigeria needs to move
on and deal with more pressing socio-developmental issues and Cameroon is a
total distraction.
On
the flip, if Nigeria doesn’t so to say force a settlement of sort,
eco-political challenges in the future might force her to loose interest in the
Bakassi or she might though still enjoying capacity potential edge just be too
distracted to bother about Cameroon and the Bakassi. My hope is that the ICJ can
resolve and enforce its ruling even if that might appear rather assumptious
baring in mind the interplay between ruling and binding enforcement.
Reference:
¨
Antonio Cassese’s, International
law in a divided world, (Claredon Press, 1992)
¨
Brian Boldgett, “Clausewitz
and the “Theory of Center of Gravity” as it applies to Current Strategic,
Operational, and Tactical levels of opertion”. See http://members.tripod.com/Brian_Blodgett/CoG.htm
¨
Olalaken Rasheed Sodeinde’s work makes a good and educative read… See
http://www.ddl.org/figtree/pub/proceedings/nairobi/sodeinde-TS17-1.pdf
March
31st , 2002
[E1]See-http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/library/cijwww/icjwww/idocket/icn/icnorders/icn_iorder_19991021.htm
[E2] See-Separate Opinion of Judge Kooijmans-http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/icn/icnjudgment/icn_ijudgment_980611_separateKooijman.htm
[W3] Concept; Brian Blodgett, working from a Clauswetzian perspective defines “Centers of Gravity” as the “hub of all power and movement upon which everything depends”, I concur to imply within a given entity…He concludes in his epigraph…While the definition of a “center of Gravity” is quite clear, discerning the “Center of Gravity” is not…the “Center of Gravity” may be a physical object, or it may be abstract….therefore needing constant re-appraisal. I concur to determine value…See; http://members.tripod.com/Brian_Blodgett/CoG.htm
[E4]It’s a term more to do with bio-genetic composition-physiological makeup, I recently studied it when attempting to write an article on forming a “National Guard”…I have here made it applicable in the Bakassi context to drive home my point….Bilateral symmetry requires that the left and right halves of the body start out as mirror images of each other…..later developmental accommodations….may result in slight differences between these two halves, but every ….”organ”-strategy….retains its development as a midline structure. Therefore, they are still following perfect bilateral symmetry….See; http://www.ensc.sfu.ca/people/grad/brassard/personal/THESIS/node44.html