How Valid is the Case for Igbo Presidency?

By

Okenwa R. Nwosu, M.D.

mnwosu@erols.com

Politics has always been a game that the elites play ostensibly on behalf of the rest of us. As in all games, there are rules and methodologies that players rely upon. Nigerian politics is replete with written as well as unwritten rules about how the game is to be played. Terms like “rotational presidency”, “power shift” and “zoning” are examples of such rules that, though unwritten and thus extra-constitutional, feature routinely in the lexicon of Nigerian politicians. These terms, which are more implicit than explicit in nature, have been bandied about for so long that the mass media and the society at large have come to identify with them as the key operational pillars of the nation’s political economy. For a multi-ethnic polity like Nigeria , one can easily see the necessity for devising peculiar stratagems to ensure that the basic tenets of democracy, to which the country is committed in principle, are approximated in actual practice. In halcyon days of the First Republic when semi-autonomous regions in the North, East and West had optimal control of their respective domains, national political equation was balanced by joggling the perceived interests of Nigeria ’s major ethnopolitical groups, Hausa/Fulani, Igbo and Yoruba. With the present 36-state structure, the nation’s political power clearly resides at the center rather than the periphery. Competition for control and access to the center now dictates trends in Nigerian politics to a level that was unconscionable in the immediate post-Independence era.

As much as some would like to downplay its significance, it is widely believed that Obasanjo’s presidential ambition in the run-up to the last general elections was facilitated by widespread perception that there was an urgent need for a power shift in national leadership at the center. The political calculations that resulted in making Obasanjo the choice candidate of the ruling party were underscored by the wish of the Northern political elite to make the power shift to the South as brief as possible. Some saw the need to placate the West for the June 12 mishap since one of theirs was denied the right to nation’s leadership after supposedly winning a free and fair presidential electoral contest during the Babangida transition program. Since it was overdue for someone from the South to assume control at the Aso Rock, the Northern political strategists sought to kill two birds with one stone. Obasanjo’s presidential candidacy was seen as the best means to placate the West and accomplish a power shift at the same time. Before then, the clear frontrunner for the PDP presidential ticket was the former Vice-President, Dr. Alex Ekwueme. If he had been allowed to proceed to win the last general elections, the power shift to the South would be achieved but the ire of the West might not have been assuaged. Ekwueme’s political ambition was essentially sacrificed at the alter of political expediency by those who would like to eliminate any compelling reasons for the presidency to remain in the South even a day longer than is absolutely necessary.

Judging from the rhetoric of the Northern political elite, it is obvious that some of their leaders are set to orchestrate a power shift back to the North as soon as the next general elections in 2003. Obasanjo’s presidency has done little to placate the desire of geopolitical zones in the South to assert their influence in the center. Though some politicians of Southwest origin have benefited from his presidency, the average Yoruba still tends to regard President Obasanjo as a handpicked choice of the Northern political elite. Obasanjo, an ethnic Yoruba, has been a major beneficiary of sponsorship of the ruling party but an opposition party, the AD, is still firmly entrenched in all the 6 State Houses of his geopolitical zone of origin and will likely continue to be so for the foreseeable future. When all is said and done, the political opinion molders of the Southwest may yet not have been placated by making their son a Head of State. In the Southeast and Southsouth zones, political leaders feel that granting leadership to someone from the Southwest does not necessarily satisfy the dire need for the former East to produce Nigeria ’s executive Head of State since conclusion of the Civil War. Many strongly feel that, before the power at the center is allowed to shift up North again, either or both of the other 2 geopolitical zones that comprise the South must have their turn at sending one of theirs to the Aso Rock. Obasanjo’s bid for a second term would lessen the chances that the succeeding Head of State shall soon come from either the Southeast or Southsouth zones since the North will surely become restive by the conclusion of Obasanjo’s second term if he wins re-election. It is in this light that one should see the stance of those who press for an Igbo presidential candidate to successfully bid for President Obasanjo’s present job in 2003. The same logic informs the decision of presidential aspirants from the Southsouth zone.

The pitch for an Igbo to assume Nigeria ’s presidency in 2003 is a potent tool in the hands of politicians and presidential aspirants from the Southeast zone. Whether this tool can be utilitarian in accomplishing the objective of enabling an Igbo to become Nigeria ’s president in 2003 is uncertain at best. Intrinsically, an Igbo presidency should be a no-brainer because the average Igbo is as good, if not better, than his average compatriot on matters that pertain to nation building as well as leadership in all aspects of human endeavor. It is obviously not the dearth of talents that has kept Ndiigbo from providing leadership at the center since end of the Civil War. Dr. Ekwueme has twice come very close to becoming the Nigerian president but his ambition was scuttled on both occasions. The zoning formula adopted by the NPN in the Second Republic was botched by the second coming of military rule while his bid to secure the PDP ticket for 1999 general election cycle was smothered and extinguished at the Jos convention by those who masterminded Obasanjo’s candidacy. If anyone should know what it would take for the Igbo to secure Nigeria ’s presidency, Dr. Ekwueme must be that one. Which politician is spearheading the Igbo presidency project? What is Ekwueme’s stance on this matter? For the project to succeed, one must not forget that a child is unlikely to run before his elder sibling learns how to walk, according to an age-old Igbo adage.

Ndiigbo have the right to assert that one of their own should be elected as Nigeria ’s president in 2003. But statement of such a fact should be seen as only the beginning of a long road that could lead any Igbo presidential candidate to the seat of power at the Aso Rock. Two things are necessary to assure success for the prospects of Igbo presidency in 2003. Firstly, residents of the Southeast must be made to buy into this concept because their solid support should provide the launching pad for such a major project. Secondly, the case for Igbo presidency should be projected and sold to nationwide audience as a prelude for building the necessary coalition for the would-be presidential candidate of Southeast origin. The uphill task of achieving unanimity of purpose amongst political groups of the Southeast must never be underestimated by anyone. The ruling party, PDP, is in full control of all the State Houses and the political machine of the Southeast at the moment. Of the newly registered political parties, APGA claims to have its core support base in the Southeast but its influence at grassroots level remains untested. Many political leaders of PDP in the zone have already publicly declared their support for Obasanjo’s bid for a second term. Some influential Igbo leaders have openly expressed their reservations or outright opposition to a concerted push for Igbo presidency project in the 2003 election cycle for a variety of reasons.

But even if Ndiigbo were to come to an agreement soon to rally behind a unifying candidate for the 2003 presidential bid, the eventual outcome of this whole endeavor will surely hinge on how other interest groups in Nigeria welcome and cooperate in actualizing this idea. The political fate of the Southeast and Southsouth are intricately intertwined to the extent that some pundits often fail to appreciate. Even though Ndiigbo constitute the majority group within the political block that comprises the Southeast and Southsouth zones, acquiescence and support of the minority interest groups of the area is key to the success of a potential Igbo presidential candidate’s nomination and eventual election in 2003. Suffice it to say that presidential aspirants from the these contiguous geopolitical zones don’t see eye to eye at present on whose turn it is to present the unifying candidate for the upcoming general elections. Whatever contacts that are made so far between aspirants in the two zones are, at best, exploratory in nature without any commitments or firm indications that any such rapprochement is in the offing. For the bid of an Igbo presidency to succeed, the rickety bridge that links the strategic interests of Ndiigbo and those of the many minority groups that comprise the Southsouth must be mended or at least, shored up in the interim. The minority groups of the Niger Delta and former East constitute the political Achilles heel of Ndiigbo which must be secured prior to any major engagement elsewhere on the national stage.

The task of selling the Igbo presidency on the national arena will likely entail a replay of the tripartite political jigsaw puzzle that has characterized the politics of yesteryears. If the Obasanjo’s bid to secure his party’s endorsement for a second tenure stands, it would mean that he will face candidates from any of the opposition parties during the next general elections. The Southwest will likely vote massively for Obasanjo even though an opposition party, the AD, is in control of the zone. His campaign team would then endeavor to garner whatever support it can get out of the other Southern zones and the North to assure his re-election. If this scenario plays out, a potential Igbo presidential candidate will likely come from any of the 5 registered opposition parties. Other opposition parties may also table their own candidates if a multiparty alliance against the incumbent Head of State fails to emerge before the general elections. One of the many political challenges that any opposition presidential candidate must face and overcome in order to defeat the incumbent’s bid for re-election is the building of a credible coalition outside the ruling party that can match President Obasanjo’s arsenal. If the precedent of AD/APP makeshift alliance during the 1999 general elections is anything to go by, it is easy to see that building a functional and effective coalition for electoral purposes can be both tricky and treacherous.

Perhaps, the surest means to assure the success of any potential challenger in the 2003 presidential election is to scuttle Obasanjo’s bid to secure the PDP nomination as the party flagbearer. If President Obasanjo bows out of the race soon or is eventually defeated in the party primaries, things will be a whole lot easier for whoever wishes to bid for presidency in the forthcoming elections. The collapse of Obasanjo’s re-election bid will surely deal a severe blow to the PDP party machine to the extent that its grip on the Southeast zone, for example, shall likely slacken. The PDP will be hard pressed to seek its presidential candidate from the Southeast and Southsouth zones in order to avert a mass desertion of the party in the area. This scenario will certainly increase the chances for the emergence of an Igbo as the presidential flagbearer for the ruling party. So far, only Senators Chuba Okadigbo and Ike Nwachukwu are serious Igbo contenders that seek the PDP’s endorsement for the 2003 general elections. If these two senators fail to satisfy the expectations of the party mainstream, an alternative candidate could be chosen from the Southsouth zone or elsewhere. In spite of the myriad of problems that currently plague the ruling party, there are no clear signs that the PDP is going to unravel anytime soon. When compared with other parties on the scene, PDP still remains the party to beat if general elections were held today.

Ndiigbo must be wary of the fact that attempt to deploy unorthodox means to realize the ambition of Ohanaeze and other groups that are committed to Igbo presidency can seriously destabilize Alaigbo thereby making things worse than they are at present. The average Igbo is ill-disposed to acquiescing to dictation from his fellow citizens irrespective of the import of the issue at stake. The best way to get the average Igbo to go along and tow a preset line is to deploy patient persuasion backed up with superior argument. Threat of force or sanctions is considered tyrannical and often rebuffed, no matter the consequences. There is palpable cynicism and distrust for the average politician across Nigeria , Alaigbo included. The decision to pursue the Igbo presidency project for 2003 is basically a brainchild of the Igbo political elite. Though, in theory, a Nigerian president of Igbo background would augur well for Ndiigbo, the experience so far is that Igbo political elite have not performed creditably enough in recent times to earn the unalloyed loyalty and confidence of those whose interests they claim to represent. Talk of sanctions makes sense only within the context of preservation of values and ethics that Ndiigbo understand well and share in common. Alaigbo has no place of honor for those who deploy the threat of sanctions or violence for the purposes of achieving ill-defined and short-term political goals.

Nigerian democracy is seriously threatened by the emergence of supra-partisan parochial groups which attempt to steer the nation in disparate ways for the purpose of actualizing perceived special interests of many ethnocultural groups that make up the country. The bid for an Igbo to become the next Nigerian president is spearheaded by the Ohanaeze Ndiigbo, for example, even though this entity has no control of any of the registered political parties. A just-concluded convention organized by the Diaspora pan-Igbo organization, World Igbo Congress (WIC), released a communiqué that has endorsed the position taken by the Ohanaeze regarding the selection of next Nigerian president from Igbo homeland in the South. The demand for a Nigerian president of Igbo origin is valid. In like manner, any of the hundreds of ethnocultural groups in the country should have the right to make their demands on fellow compatriots as long as everyone understands beforehand that all political ambitions must be pursued within the framework of the nation’s constitution. As compelling as the case for an Igbo presidency appears at the moment, no one should presume that such a goal is a fait accompli just for the asking. Igbo political leaders must first demonstrate that they have a unity of purpose and the dexterity with which to maneuver successfully through the political maze of a multinational polity like Nigeria . Can this be done soon enough to be able to meet the deadline of the next presidential elections which is expected in the first quarter of 2003?

OKENWA R. NWOSU, M.D.

Upper Marlboro, Maryland .

U.S.A.