Ojukwu and Igbo Leadership
By
Tochukwu Ezukanma
I am ambivalent about the past because on the one hand, the past is
irretrievably lost, but on the other hand, the present is only a reflection
of the past, and an understanding of the past provides necessary tools for
resolving the problems of the present. So, while there are many more
contemporary issues that should rivet the focus of most imaginative writers,
I cannot help to retrospect, and glean insights from the events of the past.
As we ponder the vast scene of confusion that is our beloved country, are we
not confronted with the inexorable reality that our present problems are the
direct results of the happenings of yesteryears. Not surprisingly, as I brood
over the plight of the Igbo nation, I am irresistibly drawn to the past, to
the civil war. While there may be some fundamental cultural and historical
factors that militate against Igbo political progress, it was the civil war
that actually deal the Igbo a bludgeoning blow. To really address the present
Igbo political problems, we cannot escape an objective assessment of that war
and the central figure in that war, Chukwuemeka Ojukwu. Ojukwu's recent presence in the Washington DC area did not inspire much
enthusiasm within the Igbo community. The Igbo's earlier perception of
him
was shaped through the distorted prisms of the Biafran propaganda. The
Biafran propaganda apotheosized him, so, in the Igbo minds, he became
something of a deity, an invaluable political asset. But, over the years, he
proved himself a political profligate, improvidently spending his political
capital. His repeated political blunders, especially, that his infamous waltz
with Sani Abacha demystified and stripped him of much of his political
legitimacy. It left him devoid of any political good will, except for the
lingering grip of the Biafran propaganda on some Igbo minds.
As an emissary of the Abacha government, he was in Washington DC. His mission
then was to burnish the badly blemished image of the Abacha government,
evidently for a consideration. It was 1995, and he stood before an
exclusively Igbo audience. As usual, he was a riveting presence: a consummate
orator, a captivating demagogue. With credulous and adoring listeners, he
was spouting some half truths, twisted facts and some downright falsehood;
and his audience in their gullibility were applauding. That forum reinforced
my earlier conviction that the problem with politicians is that they
generally lie too much, that the problem with their following is that they
barely think, and that it is the volatile mix of these two worrisome
realities that has brought the world most of its political calamities.
He said that the Igbo will provide the next Nigerian president. Surprisingly,
this statement drew a thunderous applause from his audience. I was appalled
by this brazen piece of demagoguery. I crafted some questions for him. I
wanted to rattle him with some pointed questions. I raised my hand
frantically, but I was not allowed the opportunity to ask any of my
questions. The self-appointed Igbo leaders of Washington DC were at work. It
was their evening, and they were putting a spin on it. They have a penchant
for ingratiating the Nigerian Embassy, and fawning over every important
visitor from Nigeria. So, in their customary sycophancy, they orchestrated
the event in a way that will preclude serious questions that may disconcert
the August visitor. Applicants for the most menial jobs are subjected to
rigorous interviews. Lamentably, men who lay claim to the leadership of a
people are shielded from meaningful questions from those whom they supposedly
lead. Evidently, we carried across the Atlantic elements of that
hero-worshipping that imperiled accountability in Nigeria public life.
The Igbo producing the next president as of 1995? Staggering nonsense! After
all, Moshood Abiola who was wasting away in jail as of then was a crony of
the northern dominated military elite and an intimate friend of the northern
aristocracy. Moreover, like the majority of the northerners, he was a Moslem.
If the northern powerbrokers could not trust him with power, what Igbo could
they have entrusted with it.
In the same speech, he also extolled the Constitutional Conference. The
Constitutional Conference was tendentious rubbish, a gaudy political ploy
that kept the politicians busy while Abacha tightened his hold on power. It
was something of a nursery game at which a bunch of venal politicians played
at the supervision of Sani Abacha. Ojukwu and the other Igbo leaders
stampeded into the Constitutional Conference ostensibly to "enshrine"
rotational presidency, and the devolution of power to regional units in the
new constitution. What of the previous constitutions, and all the grandiose
ideals enshrined in them? Were they not all violated, and shoved aside at the
whims of the northern feudal lords and their military surrogates. If all
previous constitutions were tossed away as worthless pieces of paper, what
was to ensure the sacrosanctity of the one written by the Constitutional
Conference? If the Hausa/Fulani as of then were refusing to rotate the
presidency with the Yoruba who had been their allies for about 30 years, why
would anyone expect them to rotate it with the Igbo whose presidency, in the
words of Abubakar Umar (supposedly, a progressive), "will be too much for
the
country to bear"?
I had a feeling that Ojukwu left that forum dismayed by the quality of his
listeners, that is, not knowing that it was the hero-worshippers in their
traditional shamelessness who deliberately searched out mostly the
incoherent, and inarticulate to ask questions. Is Ojukwu really a hero, or do
we just glory in nonentities?
In a naval battle in the South Atlantic, the British Navy disabled a German
warship, and the commander of the German warship, Hans Langsdorff shot
himself in the head. In his suicide note, he stated that "for a captain
with
a sense of honor...his personal fate cannot be separated from that of his
ship". Ship, captain, and honor. What of nation, leader, and honor?
"In
politics and statecraft", Richard Nixon once wrote "power means life
or
death, prosperity or poverty, happiness or tragedy for millions of people".
Honor linked the personal fate of a captain to that of his ship. So, quite
naturally, honor should inextricably bind the personal fate of a leader to
the life or death, happiness or tragedy of his people.
Ojukwu led the Igbo in a war against northern domination of Nigeria. That war
was not wrong in itself. However, while there were insinuating circumstances
that impugned the basis for one Nigeria, Biafranism was not the only
political option open to the Igbo. Eastern Region of Nigeria, even Igboland
was not an ideological monolith. There were contending views as to the
response to the mass murder Easterners in northern Nigeria. There were
knowledgeable and respectable voices who urged for a more circumspect
approach. Nnamdi Azikiwe among others disagreed with Ojukwu's methods,
and
counseled against his policy of secession. Ojukwu ignored and/or suppressed
all such dissenting views, and set off on his own political course. So, he is
liable for Biafranism, and all the pains, sorrows, and ravages it wrought on
the Igbo. Even the qualified endorsement of secession by the Ojukwu appointed
Consultative Assembly does not in any way exonerate him from this
responsibility.
Yakubu Gowon was then an ill-baked, insecure and mild-mannered ethnic and
religious minority foisted on Nigeria by the northern feudal lords and
neo-colonial interests. He was inexorably beholden to his northern masters
and Yoruba allies. Still, he is culpable for the war to keep Nigeria and all
its concomitant horrors. Even in democracies where the leader's choices
are
circumscribed by the constitutional prerogatives of the parliament/congress,
the leader is still held answerable to his political decisions and actions.
For example, in spite of the intrinsic limitations placed on leadership by
the institutional moorings of democracy, it will be most grotesque to suggest
that Winston Churchill was not responsible for the British stance in the 2nd
World War, or that President Roosevelt be not accountable for both the New
Deal and American involvement in the 2nd World War.
Soldiers by both training and orientation are ill equipped for political
leadership. Edward Gibbon, that 18th century man of letters, once wrote that
"...the temper of soldiers, habituated at once to violence and (servitude),
renders them very unfit guardians of a legal or even a civil constitution.
Justice, humanity, or political wisdom, are qualities they are too little
acquainted with in themselves to appreciate them in others". In spite of
these inherent handicaps, the soldiers were thrust into Nigeria politics by a
political accident. They were neither expecting it nor prepared for it. Out
of the confines of the barracks and the parochialism and regimentation of
military life, these young army officers were overnight saddled with enormous
powers and responsibilities. That mixture of military brashness, political
power and youthful ebullience was to be a dangerous experiment.
Yakubu Gowon, probably conscious of his limitations, sought the advise of the
politicians - older men and experienced men. Ojukwu, on the other hand,
befogged by his imperiousness, arrogance and superciliousness, ignored the
counsel of older and experienced politicians, notably Nnamdi Azikiwe.
Azikiwe, although notorious for his equivocation and inconsistence, was still
universally revered for his learning, prudence and experience. It was a
profound act of irresponsibility for a 33year old soldier to rebuff the
political advise of the father of Nigerian nationalism renowned for his
political instincts and intellectual penetration. It smacked in the face of
the traditional Igbo, actually African respect for age and the wisdom of the
elders. He chose to tread his own political path, a path devoid of the
foresight, staidness and somber reflection of the elder, but replete with
youthful impulsiveness, wanton despotism and military license. Not
surprisingly, he led the Igbo into a quagmire of powerlessness and
helplessness.
By building an autonomous power structure that defied, and to some extent
repressed the traditional Igbo political power structure, he disjointed and
severely weakened the Igbo leadership order. Historically and culturally, the
Igbo do not readily submit to a hierarchical social order, or coalesce around
a leader. So, the pre-1966 power establishment in Igboland must have been
painstakingly cobbled together over many decades. Ojukwu's repudiation of
the
established Igbo leadership form, rocked that traditional power structure to
its core. Subsequent swipes at it after the civil war only furthered the
deterioration of an already decrepit system.
War is an infernal monster that racks, devours and devastates. It generally
takes its highest toll on the youths. With their reckless idealism,
impressionable minds and an excitability that can easily be kindled, they are
readily whipped into a frenzy. Youthful idealism and exuberance are forged
into combat material by military training, a zombification process that
drills men into obeying orders unquestioningly. The word "infantry"
evolved
from the French word for child because of the child-like compliance instilled
in soldiers. For every soldier thus trained, armed, and ordered into battle,
his stake is clear. He is staking his life for some lofty ideals as made
believe by the leadership. But, what are the moral obligations of that
supreme commander who is ordering young men to their death in droves from the
comfort and security of his bunker? What are the stakes for him that has
convinced young men that the struggle was worth their lives, hundreds of
thousands of them?
Some leaders in history dramatized the stakes of leadership under such
circumstances. As the German Third Reich with all its attendant dreams
tumbled down, Adolf Hitler took his own life, and Joseph Goebbels, Hitler's
minister for propaganda, killed his six children,. and with his wife, Magda,
committed suicide. When her revolt against Roman suzerainty ended in her
defeat, the Icenic queen, Boudica, drank poison and died. But, as it all
closed in on Emeka Ojukwu, he packed his bag and baggage and ran away.
The civil war exposed the Igbo to untold hardship. The Igbo persevered in the
fight because they believed in the superior validity of their cause, and were
acutely conscious of the unmitigated danger of northern hegemony. That war
decimated the flower and promise of Igboland (it is estimated that hundreds
of thousands of Igbo youth died in that war), and the associated hunger took
a devastating toll on the Biafran populace. It did irreparable damages to
many families, and irretrievably shattered many dreams.
If the war for Igbo self-determination was worth that many lives, and such a
colossal sacrifice, was it not worth Ojukwu's life? If Biafranism was not
Ojukwuism, that is, if in Biafra, Ojukwu was not merely serving a personal
interest, or realizing a personal ambition, if he was giving expression to
the collective aspirations of the Igbo, then his personal survival of the war
was not important, because there will always be men to lead the Igbo, and
consequently give voice to the Igbo interests and aspirations in accordance
with the social and political realities of the time. These men need to be
guided by examples. Ojukwu should have therefore been prepared to die with
Biafra as a tribute to the hundreds of thousands of men who died obeying his
orders, an atonement for the pains and sorrow his decisions and choices cost
his people, and above all, as an example to future generations of Igbo
leaders. The example being that no Igbo leader should ever abandon the Igbo
in times of adversity, that every Igbo man, especially, those in authority -
those who have been entrusted with the fate of the entire ethnic group - must
be ready to make the ultimate sacrifice for the Igbo nation.
The public good requires the rigorous subordination of the individual to the
nation. According to Richard Goodman, "the process of the individual life
is
bound by irrevocable limits"; it is but a blip in time inexorably
sandwiched
between birth and death - just a breathe that can be snuffed out by the
vagaries of life. On the other hand, the life of the nation is eternal.
Therefore no sacrifice made by the individual for the group can ever be too
much. The obsession by man to cling unto to life is laudable, even sublime as
long as it is not given precedence to the welfare of the entire group. As
the war ended, the issue was not Ojukwu's personal survival, but the
future
of the Igbo nation. Laying the ground rule for this future was more important
for the Igbo nation than the continued existence of any one individual,
because irrespective of any one's station in life, he is but a
dispensable
cog of history.
The future of a people is predicated on their collective attitudinal
disposition (especially attitude towards sacrifice, honor and loyalty) and
the quality of their leaders. Ojukwu led the Igbo through the most trying
period of their history. To the Igbo, the civil war was both attitudinal and
psychological watershed. Wars, especially of such devastation brings about a
convulsive transformation of the society, a sharp break with the past. This
break was obvious in different facets of Igbo life, but especially in the
Igbo mindset; there was a psychological and attitudinal shift. Overhanging
this shift was Ojukwu's abandonment of the Igbo. Ojukwu's
desertion of the
Igbo had a subliminal, but profound effect on the Igbo psyche. It perverted
the Igbo value system, and debased her public virtue. Subliminally, it
impressed on the Igbo, especially those in authority that it was alright to
use your people for personal advancement, and abandon them when things go
wrong. It ushered into the Igbo ranks a new culture - a culture of
opportunism. It is this culture of opportunism, more than any other single
factor that has been the bane of the Igbo nation since the end of the civil
war.
A man who was poised to cash in on power, grandeur and history if the
"toil,
sweat, tear and blood" of his people pay off, and prepared to run away if
everything goes crashing, is not a hero, not even a leader, but an
opportunist who gambled with human lives. On the other hand, we should always
respect the courage, and determination of those men who made up that
ill-equipped, but indomitable army that bogged down the Nigerian military
machine for nearly 3 years. We should always appreciate the sacrifices of
those young men who had their lives rent permanently, and their future turned
bleak by the crippling and disfiguring injuries they sustained fighting for
Biafra. Finally, we should always remember, and pay tribute to those fallen
heroes who laid down their youthful lives for Biafra.