Why Biafra Lost (A Riposte to Revisionism) By Mazi K. Ani There
has been a proliferation of Biafra and Ojukwu-related articles lately in
the Nigerian cyber media. This is both a reflection of the critical role
of one man -His Excellency Gen. Chukwuemeka Odumegwu-Ojukwu- in the
historical turning point of Nigeria as well as the Igbo proverb that
after brave men have done the real fighting, the effeminate would remain
at home by the fire-side and tell the tales. The cyber space has become
the ultimate fire-side, the destination for cowardly tale telling by
effeminate revisionists of all hue about a war that ended over three
decades ago. One theme
that recur with regularity in these fancy tales is the issue of Ojukwu's
leadership and the outcome of the Biafran war. However, all the articles
written so-far on the issue have missed the point by narrowly focusing
on leadership. Therefore they suffered from one debilitating weakness:
one-factor analysis. The theme Ojukwu da da da da da taken out of its
historical context from predictable sources has become as boring as it
is unproductive. In this essay, we unpack the real reasons for Biafra's
loss of the war and the implications for the brand of total political
posturing that fail to account for the changed context of that defeat. Biafra lost
mainly because the idea that it portrayed was too far advanced for its
time. The Biafran war broke out just over 6 years after Nigeria's
independence. At that time, anti-colonial struggles were still going on
elsewhere in Africa, pitting African nationalists against colonial and
neo-colonial forces in countries such as Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe,
South Africa etc. The issues thrown up by Biafra had not been properly
understood at the time as they are now. These issues are: (a)
Self-Determination vs. Territorial Integrity. The dominant
debate in the war was the right of nations to self- determination versus
the right of states to maintain their territorial integrity. At the time
of Biafra, the principle of territorial integrity was upheld world-wide
over self-determination. And because the Nigerian side represented
the politically correct ideology at the time, it was able to mobilise a
vast array of forces incorporating both NATO and Warsaw Pact countries
and the Arab League (USSR, UK, OAU, USA, Egypt etc.) against Biafra
which was seen as a threat to Nigeria's territorial integrity. At the time
Biafra was declared, very few people e.g. France's Charles De Gaulle,
Tanzania's Julius Nyerere, Zambia's Kenneth Kaunda etc. upheld the right
of nations to self determination over territorial integrity of states.
Today, the picture is different. The scale has tipped in favour of
national self-determination as seen in Eritrea, Yugoslavia, East Timor,
USSR etc. Indeed during the Biafran period, the collapse of a
state, any state was viewed with utmost horror. Yakubu Gowon scored
cheap points by raising the spectre of tens of African republics
invading the UN! No one imagined that the almighty USSR would disappear
from the world map, each of its 15 constituent republics becoming full
members of the UN and the high heavens did not fall. Today the reality
of collapse is taken for granted after the disintegration of USSR,
Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and separatist pressures in Canada, Spain,
Britain etc. (b) The
Viability of Colonial Boundaries in Africa. What Biafra
challenged at the time was the viability of the African boundaries as
constructed by colonial powers. At the time, the received wisdom was
that African boundaries were inviolable and non-negotiable. The idea was
that if these boundaries were successfully challenged, it would open a
floodgate for more agitation and therefore chaos in Africa and
elsewhere. As a result, the OAU incorporated in its charter, the
inviolability of African boundaries, a clause which it defend with great
zeal. It was
precisely this principle that Biafra attempted to challenge in the
1960s. Again this idea was far ahead of its time. Today after millions
of Africans have died in wars related to these same boundaries, millions
are maimed and million more rendered homeless, serious people
everywhere have come to see the futility of maintaining those artificial
boundaries. In fact, many more Africans have died fighting about
Africa's artificial boundaries that killed under direct European
colonialism itself. When the British colonial police shot a dozen coal
miners in Enugu, all hell broke lose, but the Biafran War alone claimed
over 2 million lives. The same scenario is being played out in Rwanda,
Burundi, Congo, etc. Therefore, a lot more people are today willing to
accept that African boundaries are not and should not be inviolable.
Ironically Ethiopia itself where the fate of Biafra was discussed
several times became the first to accept this compelling reality by not
only letting Eritrea to go but also incorporating the rights to
secession in its constitution! The OAU itself has lost much of its
relevance and became a talking shop for tin pot dictators, no longer
able or willing to assert the principle of inviolable and sacrosanct
boundaries. (c)
International Matters. The Biafran
war strategy was based on the goodness of the international community
and their ability to intervene in the resolution of conflicts. Biafra
believed that the international community would not stand by while acts
of genocide were being committed. Again this idea was far ahead of its
time. It was not until the 1990s in Rwanda, Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo
and East Timor that the international community became involved in this
way. At the time of Biafra, the international community was there all
right but there was no unity of purpose between the wishes of the masses
and their governments. Thus while
the masses and their organisations in Europe and North America i.e.
charities funded by mass donations supported Biafra, their governments
supported the Nigerian side. Nigeria's argument that other states should
not interfere with its internal affairs was more or less accepted by the
international community, except the aid agencies. Today, the situation
is different in that governments can actually act according to the
humanitarian impulses of the masses to prevent international disaster on
the Biafran scale, territorial integrity or no territorial integrity,
internal affairs or no internal affairs as seen recently in Kosovo. (d)
Religion: Islam vs. Christianity This was
another question thrown up by the Biafran struggle which was poorly
understood at the time. Although the conflict between Islam and
Christianity is a very old one, at the time of the Biafran struggle, the
main ideological battle was between communism and capitalism. Biafra
however presented the religious side of the conflict to the world, but
again on this issue too, Biafra was far ahead of its time. Whereas
Biafra saw the conflict as a struggle between Islam and Christianity,
the Nigerian side was able to use Yakubu Gowon, Anthony Enahoro etc. as
fronts to mask the religious dimension of the war. With the end
of the cold war and the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism world-wide
threatening the interests of the USA and European states, the religious
issue is viewed rather much differently today. The re-emergence of the
Sharia etc. in Nigeria, Al Quida and Islamic international sponsored
terrorism today shows a far clearer understanding of the question than
was possible at the time of Biafra. (e) The
Concept of Hausa-Fulani Hegemony and the Role of Local Groups Aside from
the international ideological currency in favour of maintain territorial
integrity of existing states at the time of Biafra, the other major
reason for Biafran defeat was the role of local groups. Biafra
interpreted the conflict in north-south terms, internal colonialism and
the need to fight Hausa-Fulani domination. This idea turned out to be
far ahead of its time in that many local groups did not buy the idea of
Northern domination. Indeed, many Nigerian groups contested the notion
of Hausa- Fulani domination and considered Igbo domination as a more
dangerous threat to themselves. This
explained the pattern of alliances that occurred during the war. In
Western Nigeria, the idea of Northern domination was bought only by a
radical fringe made up of Wole Soyinka, Tai Solarin etc and was of no
mobilising value. In the Midwest, the idea of Northern domination was
totally rejected by all non-Igbo groups who considered Igbo domination
to be far more dangerous. In Eastern Nigeria, not only was Hausa-Fulani
domination rejected but non-Igbo groups saw the Hausa-Fulani as
liberators from Igbo domination. This writer finds this attitude
intriguing given that oil had not become as important in this area at
the time. Ultimately the answer to this antipathy towards the Igbo must
be found in pre-colonial history. Only in the 1990s after three decades
did the idea of Hausa-Fulani domination begin to be accepted. Even then,
how much this is weighted against the bogey of Igbo domination among
southern Nigerian groups remains unclear. (c) The
Leadership Issue Biafra lost
the war also because we were outgunned and out manned by the Nigerian
side. As a result of the local and international climate which
existed at the time of Biafra, the Nigerian side was able to put
together a far more formidable array of forces that eventually gave them
more military clout and led to the fall of Biafra. Those international
configurations of forces and ideologies have now shifted. I read an
Hausa chap in Gamji.com recently proclaiming that the whole world would
not sit by today and watch Nigeria murder two million Igbo as was the
case in 1966-70. This is a fact. The local attitudinal climate also
appears to have changed in such a way that will make it impossible to
recreate the anti-Biafran alliances of the 1960s. The idea
that Ojukwu's personality was contributory to Biafra's Defeat is a myth
created to scapegoat and demonise him after the war. Sociologically,
there are three sources of legitimate authority: traditional,
legal-rational and charismatic. Ojukwu was (and still is) a charismatic
leader, precisely the sort of leadership you need to found a new state.
Every other issue must be subordinated to that single aim and that was
precisely what happened in Biafra. So, Ojukwu has done his bit. All the
arm-chair theorists and back-stabbing internet revisionists are hereby
reminded that modern states and nations are not founded by whingeing
sissies, cringing fence-sitter or crumb eaters who believe in nothing
and will ultimately die for nothing. As things
stand, it seems that the first Biafran war was merely a notice served to
the effect that a state of that name will someday re-appear in the world
map unless the grievances that led to war in the first place are
addressed. In that respect, Ojukwu has played his historical role of
putting Biafra on that map of world history complete with its own flag,
national anthem, currency, postage stamps etc. No liberation struggle on
the scale of Biafra has ever been totally and permanently defeated.
Nigeria may well become a world first in this regard if the underlying
grievances are addressed. In May 2000,
the anniversary of Biafra's independence the Biafran flag was hoisted
anew in Igboland by a local group. Quite clearly, the Biafran saga is
not over until it is over. Unless the grievances that lead to that war
are satisfactorily addressed, those dry bones may yet rise. Triumphalism
or revisionist posturing about Igbo, Biafra, Ojukwu etc. may be
soothing, but they cannot by themselves change the course of world
history. Mazi K. Ani Executive
Director |