Sanusi Lamido, the Philosourpuss: His so-called engagement with Shaikh Ja’far(I)

By

Banu Az-Zubair, M. K

modibbo@hotmail.com

 

 

 

It is pertinent that, from the very start, I make my position clear. I am not holding brief for Shaikh Ja’far and, neither do I place myself as an arbiter in the so-called engagement. However, as always, I intervene in a discussion only if there are issues of fundamental importance to Islam at stake. The previous times I have commented on Sanusi Lamido’s writ-ups, either in the print media or the internet, have been for the same reason, and will continue to do so whenever fundamental Islamic tenets are at stake.

 

On reading the title, “Identity, Political Ethics And Parochialism: Engagement with Sheikh Ja’afar”, I was honestly a bit excited. As I know Sanusi Lamido to be a thought-provoking writer, even if I do not always agree with him. And I know Shaikh Ja’far as an Islamic cleric and preacher. I thought now, this is something to go home and read. Nevertheless, after reading the first part of the article I was disappointed; I resolved, however, to wait for the second part, perhaps, I thought, there will be more substance there. The outcome, on reading the second part of the article, by Sanusi Lamido Sanusi, is this article, hence the title above. For those who might be wondering about the title of my article, it is not a misspelling. The noun philosophy is from the Greek philosophia. Philos in Greek means ‘loving’, and sophia is ‘wisdom’; making philosophy literally the ‘love of wisdom’. The definition of philosophy, as the ‘love of wisdom’, is very basic and is strictly no longer tenable, but I will keep the definition for the purpose of this write-up, as its use as such is relevant to my discussion later. However, a ‘philo-sourpuss’ on the other hand is the ‘love of being bad tempered’, or more accurately s/he who loves being bad tempered, as I believe Sanusi Lamido does. I will comment, rather briefly, on the issues as alluded to in the said article, in order of which they are placed in Sanusi Lamido’s title. One of the cherished attributes of a philosopher is accuracy in the use of language and its interpretation; a good philosopher betters that, he is consistent in argumentation and uses accurate language; an excellent philosopher is simply elegant in the use of both language and arguments.

 

Firstly, I must say this: I know both Shaikh Ja’far Adam and Sanusi Lamido Sanusi. In fact, I have had more interaction with Sanusi Lamido than I had had with Shaikh Ja’far, however, I consider the two as my friends. I will not join issues with respect to what might have been going on between them, such as insults exchanged to which I am not privy. I will nonetheless comment on what I read in the papers, because I consider it a duty as a Muslim. Secondly, Shaikh Ja’far has never claimed, to my knowledge, of being a philosopher or an intellectual. The only ‘intellectual’ discussion I had had with him, during one of his visits to Maiduguri a few years ago was on the implication of cloning in Islamic law; it was apparent to me that he was out of his depth. Sanusi Lamido, however, makes claims to being a philosopher and an intellectual, and he and I have been involved in debates several times, particularly, one in the Daily Trust and on Gamji.com, on the issue of ‘Islamic Theology, Western Philosophy, and Predestination’. So, naturally, when I read the title of the article in which he engages Shaikh Ja’far Adam, I was mystified and curious. Finally, I intend by this intervention to demonstrate three things: that the charges Sanusi Lamido makes against Shaikh Ja’far Adam are false and unjustified on the basis of the interview published in Weekly Trust of 16 April 2005. Secondly, I will show that some of Sanusi Lamido’s philosophical positions reflect a fundamentally deficient grasp of philosophy and profound superficial understanding of Islamic theology. Finally, I will demonstrate that Sanusi Lamido is philosophically inconsistent. Let me quote the comment Shaikh Ja’far made in the interview that provoked Sanusi Lamido’s response, as it appeared in Sanusi Lamido’s article:

 

“I saw so many write-ups along that line, especially those written by Sanusi Lamido Sanusi and Dangiwa Umar…Anyone who reads these people’s writings will know that they don’t know where they come from. They don’t have the identity of the religion they belong to. They equally don’t have the identity of the tribe they belong. President Obasanjo has his Yoruba identity and Christianity as a religion which he overzealously protects; Sardauna had a northern identity and that of Islam which he overzealously protected; Awolowo had his Yoruba identity…Ojukwu had his Igbo identity…Every person who knows what he is doing must have such an identity.”

 

From this quotation emanated the following charges against Shaikh Ja’far. Sanusi Lamido said: “Before I proceed with my philosophical discussion on the ethics of identity, let me make the following observations on the quote above. What Ja’far is clearly accusing Dangiwa and myself of is that we are not tribalistic enough…”. “Secondly, Ja’far assumes that one can have a tribal or religious identity (a presumption that is itself problematic) but that one cannot, or at least should not have a national identity...”. “Finally, and most revealingly, Ja’far assumes that identity is in itself a moral category, that there is virtue in simply being Fulani or Hausa or Yoruba, or professing to be Muslim or Christian.”

             

Identity as a concept has several categories, depending on whether it is defined philosophically, psychologically, or socially. And even within each of the three categories I have mentioned there are sub-categories. For example, under the rubric of the ‘social identity’ is the sub-category of ‘political identity’. Further, the various categories of identity do not necessarily overlap. Nevertheless, inherent in ‘identity theory’ are certain properties of identity, such as sameness, quality, numerical, who, what, type and kind, the relevance of these properties depending on the category of identity under discussion.  However, I will not go into detail discussion of identity theory or the ethics of identity, but will do so only briefly, as it touches on the thrust in Sanusi Lamido’s article. It seems, from the rest of the title of Sanusi Lamido’s article, that, it is the definition of identity as a social concept and in political ethics that is under discussion, as opposed to identity as an abstract concept. In this regard, then, there are certain questions we must ask: what is the relevance of identity? What are the ethical implications of proclaiming an identity in politics? I will attempt to answer these questions, briefly, within the context of addressing the charges made against Shaikh Ja’far.

 

The first charge made against Shaikh Ja’far is Sanusi Lamido’s interpretation, that, what Shaikh Ja’far meant or implied by saying ‘they do not have the identity of the tribe they belong’ is that he and Dangiwa “… are not tribalistic enough…” This claim by Sanusi Lamido is presumptuous and problematic. A tribe may be defined as a group of people who see themselves and seen by others as sharing a common history and pervasive patterns of thought, values and behaviour; and with a distinctive and enduring collective identity distinguishing it from others. That means every tribe has its “Suecism”, its culturally specific practices, that forms the basis by which a person may be identified as a member of that tribal group and, that distinguishes it from others. Furthermore, in varying degrees, physical appearance and language are important contributors to ethnic identity that cannot be overlooked. Shaikh Ja’far’s statement, that, Sanusi Lamido and Dangiwa ‘do not have the identity of the tribe they belong’ may mean, among others, that, they do not behave like, or, have the values and culture of the tribe they claim to come from. Sanusi’s charge that, this implies he and Dangiwa are not sufficiently tribalistic is simply his own presumption, but not the meaning of what Shaikh Ja’far said. Neither could Sanusi Lamido read from the statement that he should, or ought to, be tribalistic, at least he cannot linguistically or logically make that claim on the basis of the quote above. He may only, rightly, ask, what Ja’far meant by the phrase ‘identity of the tribe they belong’, in other words, ask Ja’far what that identity is that they are lacking? Sanusi Lamido’s charge is also problematic because, when he does not even know the identity he was supposed to have, or is lacking, as stated by Ja’far, how could he imagine that Shaikh Ja’far expected him to be more tribalistic; for that is what Sanusi Lamido meant by the phrase “we are not tribalistic enough”? You are first to be tribalistic before someone can make a judgmental statement of whether it is enough or you need to be more so. His first charge is, therefore, false. It cannot be based on anything from his quotation of Shaikh Ja’far’s statement above.

 

Sanusi Lamido’s second charge, that, “…Ja’far assumes that one can have a tribal or religious identity (a presumption that is itself problematic) but that one cannot, or at least should not have a national identity” completely misses the point. In fact, if anything, Shaikh Ja’far is not making an assumption, he is asserting the point that one should have a tribal and religious identity. Otherwise, why would Shaikh Ja’far say that Sanusi Lamido and Dangiwa do not have their ethnic identities? However, Shaikh Ja’far neither made the assumption, nor implied that one should not have a national identity. Yet, again, this charge by Sanusi Lamido is not discernible by any reading of the text in question. It is just another assumption being made by Sanusi about what the Shaikh said. In fact, the people that Shaikh Ja’far cited, all were, or are, Nigerians and none of them, to my knowledge, demurred on their identity as Nigerians, even if they vociferously proclaimed their tribal and religious, (or regional and religious, in case of the Sardauna), identities. This second charge also falls flat, and is false. Why Sanusi Lamido thinks the statement even as a presumption, which it is not, is problematic he did not explain.

 

Finally, Sanusi Lamido says: “…Ja’far assumes that identity is in itself a moral category, that there is virtue in simply being Fulani or Hausa or Yoruba, or professing to be Muslim or Christian. But this is an assumption that merely reflects a lack of training in philosophy, and also a lack of understanding of Muslim thought at any level beyond the superficial and literal.” The emphasis is mine. Yet, again, this charge is false and is not justified. Shaikh Ja’far did not, at least it cannot be read from the interview, that he implied or indicated that being Fulani or professing Islam is a virtue. The only reasonable reading of Shaikh Ja’far’s statements, as contained in the quotation, is that he believes Muslims and ethnic groups like the Fulani and Hausa should emulate the examples of the people he cited earlier, in recognition of Nigeria’s Realpolitik. He meant that people should protect and defend whatever they identify with, either ethnic or religious, as others are wont to do. The claim that Shaikh Ja’far meant that tribal or religious identity is a virtue is not what can reasonably be read from his statement. None of the charges Sanusi Lamido has made against Shaikh Ja’far can be substantiated on the basis of the interview quoted. Perhaps, it might be supposed that, Sanusi Lamido is reading a prior text into the comments made by Shaikh Ja’far in the interview. Otherwise, none of the charges he has made, based simply on the interview, can be justified. The entire charges against Shaikh Ja’far by Sanusi Lamido appears to me, not to be based on the need to engage the Shaikh intellectually, but, as a personal attack derived on previously perceived wrong. Sanusi Lamido based his charges against the Shaikh on assumptions he Sanusi imposed on the Shaikh’s comments. It is impossible to read any assumptions, or the meanings imposed on them by Sanusi Lamido; neither can it be said that Sanusi’s interpretations are implicit in the statements Shaikh Ja’far made. This entire disputation really is just Sanusi Lamido’s imagination and, I suppose, he needed to create and impose ‘meanings’ to the text in order to have a basis for the so-called engagement. 

 

The fact that Sanusi Lamido has no intention whatever, in engaging Shaikh Ja’far, but is simply bent on disparaging the Shaikh and on a self deluding discourse becomes apparent as he started discussing the issue of identity in philosophical debates. He first problematise the concept of identity, he says: “The debate on identity is an old philosophical debate. Put simply, the following questions have been raised and continue to be raised. Which is more important: Who a person is or what he/she is? Is a white man better than a black man by virtue of the what of being white or black, or is there some other measure of virtue? Is a man better than a woman? Are Yorubas better than Igbos?” Then he made another unjustified and false allegation, that, “All people like Ja’far, who argue that we should have identity of our tribes and religion, focus on the fact of what we are, rather than the value of who we are.” If this charge is a reflection on anything, it is a reflection of the superficiality and inadequacy of Sanusi Lamido’s knowledge of Islamic thought and his grasp of the fundamentals in philosophy; his pretentious claim to the contrary notwithstanding.  Before I demonstrate the falsity of the charge, I would like, firstly, to discuss briefly the underlying assumption to the charge. As I mentioned earlier, that, inherent in ‘identity theory’ are certain properties of identity, such as sameness, quality, numerical, who, what, type and kind the relevance of these properties depending on the category of identity under discussion. Sanusi Lamido’s charge, that, those “…who argue that we should have identity of our tribes and religion, focus on the fact of what we are, rather than the value of who we are” is an indication he does not know the difference between the ‘who’ and ‘what’ of identity. He assumed that ‘tribe’ and ‘religion’ are a ‘what’ property of a person and, he is wrong. The ‘what’ of a person is an intrinsic property, while the ‘who’ is an extrinsic property. A person’s ‘tribe’ or ‘ethnicity’ is a ‘what’ of the person, like maleness or femaleness, while a ‘religion’ is not. So putting the ‘tribe’ and ‘religion’ under a ‘what’ property of a person, as Sanusi Lamido did, is nonsense and false. A person may change his ‘religion’, but he may not change his ‘tribe’ or ‘ethnicity’ or ‘gender’ intrinsically. Note that I said intrinsically, because one can change his ‘gender’ superficially through surgery, or change his ‘tribe’ through emigration (e.g. Yoruba-Fulani of Ilorin).  Sanusi Lamido’s deficiency in philosophy becomes apparent when he said: “Nasir el-Rufai is a Muslim and a northerner. So is Ibrahim Mantu…. But are they the same?” The emphasis is mine. Philosophically, the question is meaningless. When he asks the rhetorical question, “are they the same”, he did not give us any indication of what he meant by it. The property of ‘sameness’ must first be defined before the question can reasonably be posed. It is, also, not clear at all, at least philosophically, what this ‘same’ meant, as there are different categories of ‘same’. Nevertheless, I will go one better and logically demonstrate that they are the same, within the context of Sanusi’s argument (not that I agree with it). I will put it in very simple logical terms. Let Nasir el-Rufai, represent A; and being a Muslim and northerner equals M. Then, let Ibrahim Mantu represent B. This can now be represented by the following preposition,

                                    A =      M;

                                    B =      M;

Then, the conclusion is A = B.

 

Sanusi Lamido implied by the rhetorical question that they are not the same. I have not only shown that his own statement is false, but that he is contradicting himself.

 

Furthermore, Sanusi Lamido does not seem to understand the difference between the property of ‘who’ and that of ‘what’, which not only complicates his analysis but renders it meaningless. The word ‘same’ is used sometimes to indicate similarity, as in ‘Muhammad is the same age as Kabir’. Nevertheless, similarity comes in degrees and under different categories; and the relatedness of things is not as straight forward as it might appear. According to Wittgenstein, in Tractus Logico-Philosophicus, “…to say of two things that they are identical is nonsense, and to say of one thing that it is identical with itself is to say nothing at all.” That is, to say A is the same as B, when A and B are distinct, is false; but to say that A is the same as A is to speak tautology. The criterion of identity of many things, particularly persons, is vague, especially over time. I would not want to go into the details of this philosophy, as this is not the appropriate media. This, then, brings me to the definition of a Fulani.

 

Sanusi Lamido says: “I had stated clearly what I believed was true Fulani identity and in doing that I relied on Sa’ad Abubakar’s work referred to above. I wrote: ‘Pulaku, as Sa’ad Abubakar tells us…is a code whose essential elements are as follow: Semtende (shyness), munyal (patience), hakkilo (care and forethought), doutare (obedience), mangingo (respect for elders), Yerduye (trust), chusu (courage) and ainoldina (strict observance of religion).’ Strict observance of Pulaku is expected of every true Fulo and violations can earn sanctions like ostracism (hombondu) or a fine (nyamtol). Furthermore, the leader (Ardo) of any Fulbe clan is supposed to be an embodiment of Pulaku, its head (mando) and guardian. The first point to note here is that Pulaku is entirely based on values and conduct-nothing else. Being Fulani is not about belonging to an ethnic group or a language group or geographical area. It is a quality, earned by living in accordance with an established code, deviation from which leads to rejection and effective stripping of the right to one’s “Fulaniness”. The emphasis is mine. When the Roman Emperor (AD 161-80), Marcus Aurelius, wrote to his young son on the necessary qualities of a prince, the list included all the virtues under the rubric Pulaku, and a whole lot more. It included in addition to the virtues under Pulaku, such virtues as, ‘fortitude’, ‘loyalty’, and ‘bravery’; yet he was not a Fulani, at least I do not think he was. So to claim that a Fulani is defined by Pulaku is nonsense. Every tribe is defined by Pulaku and something else… the language, the culture and biology! A tribe is biology, and, therefore, a ‘what’ of a person’s identity. A religion, on the other hand, is an acquisition, at least in its most profound manifestation, not in its most basic form. This is why people can change it as they please. You may be able to change some of the attributes that define your tribe, but you cannot change your tribe. Otherwise, we cannot, as we are now able to do, use genetic information to determine a person’s tribe. The technique for doing so was invented by one of my colleagues at Cambridge University. Clearly, the claim that Pulaku is the definition of a Fulani person is both false and meaningless. Sanusi Lamido claimed he also knows that Pulaku is the definition of a prince; I just wonder if he thought he fits the bill?

I have already exonerated Shaikh Ja’far of the charge, by Sanusi Lamido, that he “…assumes that identity is in itself a moral category, that there is virtue in simply being Fulani or Hausa or Yoruba, or professing to be Muslim or Christian.” The emphasis is mine. In fact, I would make the claim that, in a certain context, not having, or denying, a tribal or religious identity is problematic politically and ethically. I would also like to pick up the gauntlet and declare that, indeed, to profess Islam and have an Islamic identity is a virtue. However, I will discuss this in more detail in the next paper. To profess a faith is to accept the totality of its precepts, and to profess Islam is to claim a personal moral character equal to none, as there are no more virtuous precepts than that of Islam. As I mentioned earlier, to accuse Shaikh Ja’far of promoting tribalism is really stretching the point of the Shaikh’s comment. Sanusi countered, that, “The implications of this are obvious to a beginning student of Islam. Ja’far may claim to be the living defender of the Prophet’s Sunnah, but he glorifies tribalism, a vice condemned by the Prophet in many well-established traditions.” This so-called vice of tribalism is condemned only in the context of the Muslim Ummah, amongst Muslims. This is as it should be, because the Prophet said: “ A believer is the brother of a believer. He protects his losses and guards his flank. A Muslim is the brother of a Muslim. Do not oppress him or betray him. Whoever attends to the needs of his brother, God will attend to his own needs…” With respect to those Muslims Sanusi believes are not better than a non-Muslim, it is said: “Help your brother whether he is an oppressor or one who is oppressed”. Of course, helping the oppressor mean to give him or her good advice and admonishment that will enable him or her to mend their ways and become better Muslims. So, who is the beginning student of Islam, Shaikh Ja’far or Sanusi Lamido? 

 

The comments attributed to the governor of Kano are non-consequential. Whether the data on Muslim representation in key government security and administrative post are correct or not is debatable. Others who wish to challenge the data must produce their own lists; otherwise they are talking nonsense. Besides, everyone knows that in a situation where the Muslim community has a choice of representation, they are duty bound by Islam to choose those who will best represent Islam and, this is precisely the point General M. Buhari tried to make in Sokoto, which was later deliberately distorted. Why are the Christians not concern with the type of Christian there is occupying any post? Perhaps, it is because they take to the prophetic comment of helping your brother whether he is an oppressor, by advising him to be better. Why can’t the governor and his like try to help those that needed help instead of the self-righteous comment that it is the type of Muslim that matters, not just a Muslim? Why not make him or her into the kind of a Muslim that will serve his or her community? It is easy to criticise people, because talk is cheap. Furthermore, the list published by the Supreme Council for Shari’ah are in key security and administrative posts, where the Muslim community has neither voice nor choice in the matter, due to deliberate attempt to marginalise them. Interestingly, in America and Western European countries that have substantial Muslim populations, the governments are busy trying to rectify the disparity in Muslim representation in their military, police and other relevant security agencies. Yet it is here, in Nigeria, we have talking heads saying disparity in Muslim-Christian representation does not exist, or is a myth, despite the facts, or, that, it does not matter. The West is not only making aggressive recruitment and concessionary admission policy to address such disparity; they are also making concessions in dress codes to encourage Muslim womens’ participation. It is only in Nigeria Muslims are not allowed to speak out when there is genuine distortion in the government. What the Kano governor and the rest of the government apologists ought to do is to encourage the massive enrolment of the kind of Muslims they believe should be in those key security agencies, so that two birds may be killed with one stone. When Muslims interests are threatened, the enemy will not make a distinction about whether you are a proper Muslim or not. Where were the governor and his fellow travellers, when Muslims were being selectively removed from the military? If the table were turned, do they suppose the others will be quiet?

 

I believe that Sanusi Lamido’s characterisation of Shaikh Ja’far’s background has really pulled the rug from underneath his claim as a ‘prince’, unless, of course, he considers being a prince a biological attribute. If the so-called Pulaku is the definition of a Fulani identity and, as Sanusi Lamido claimed, also that of a ‘prince’ (a Fulani prince too I suppose), I would suppose that modesty must be part of it. However, modesty is mysteriously missing in the list of those virtues under Pulaku, as Sanusi Lamido understands it. There we have it, an immodest little Fulani ‘prince’ of Kano Metropolis. The immodest little ‘prince’ is not only rude but arrogant as well.  Sanusi Lamido made the statement, that: “It is usually those who are suffering from a sense of deep personal insecurity who feel the need to build up identities out of biological accidents, fate, providence or serendipity and attach moral worth to morally ambivalent facts.” Then, after describing what may or may not be the true picture of Shaikh Ja’far’s background, as an itinerant almajiri, ambulating from one village to the other, he says: “Ousmane Kane’s analysis of the social base of Ja’far and his class of preachers suggests certain common attributes: lowly social background, alienation from their environment, and a radicalization that is the product of both. For most of them, extremism is a route to recognition and vertical social mobility. We thus have the picture of a man born in Daura and bearing the epithet “Katsina”; an ambulant who grew up without stability or parental care; a charm maker who turned into a fanatical wahhabite; an alien and settler in his place of abode; a Nigerian who was educated on the charity of Saudi Arabia and whose mosque and school-his source of livelihood-are funded by Arabs; a strong advocate of anti-Americanism whose patron is doing good business with the Great Satan himself; in other words, a man whose life has been a series of dislocations, contradictions and alienation; an exile throughout his life, groping for terra ferma beneath his feet; an unknown quantity that rides on the back of religious fundamentalism to gain social relevancy. Such a person needs an anchor desperately because of his inherent insecurity and instability, and he finds it in paranoid and parochial identities. He needs an identity, because without one he is nothing. And if he has none, he must construct it. This is why we must understand, and view with compassion, the fanaticism, the irresponsible propagandism, the absence of patriotic nationalism and even the disrespect for our social hierarchy that emanates from such a character.”

 

Now, compare the statement above and what he says of Shaikh Ja’far’s background with this: “The truth is that, by virtue of Divine providence and the circumstances of my birth, up-bringing and education, I [Sanusi Lamido Sanusi] have no need to announce my ethnic, religious, racial or family background, nor seek recognition on that basis. I take them for granted and I am more interested in who I am, in the sense of how do I become an exemplar of what I am? This is something Ja’far can never understand, and that is as it should be, because that is the difference between an exile without roots and his opposite.” This is fantastic! He has strung up enough rope around his neck to self-destruct! Who then, for heaven’s sake, between Shaikh Ja’far Adam and Sanusi Lamido Sanusi is “suffering from a sense of deep personal insecurity who feel the need to build up identities out of biological accidents, fate, providence or serendipity and attach moral worth to morally ambivalent facts.” I think this says it all! I need not comment. This much from one claiming to be a philosopher, ‘prince’ and Fulani, what a disgrace. Philosophy is supposed to be the ‘love of Wisdom,’ you can now imagine what it does in the wrong heads. Good thing poor Shaikh Ja’far Adam did not read all those books he is told he could not possibly have seen, or read, as an almajiri; at least pretentious intellectualism will not be attributable to him. Further, for Sanusi Lamido to say that “…I am more interested in who I am, in the sense of how do I become an exemplar of what I am” is total nonsense. What he is, is a Black, male, and Fulani. To talk of becoming an exemplar of ‘what’ you are by being more interested in ‘who’ you are, is utter nonsense and gibberish. He cannot be exemplar of Black or male, through ‘who’ he is, he can only be an exemplar of Fulani only partially, because a tribal identity is combination of ‘what’ and ‘who’ of the person’s identity. And I think Shaikh Ja’far has done remarkably well in ‘who’ he has become in spite of his ‘lowly background’, and is an exemplary of ‘who’ he is. What Shaikh Ja’far has become is a clear indication that he has character and ‘iron’ will, for he has transcended his ‘lowly background’ to make something, indeed very good, of himself. I seriously doubt that Sanusi Lamido, if he were in similar circumstances, could do as well, or better. This can be inferred from the fact that, despite Sanusi Lamido’s pampered upbringing and education, it could only produce a mediocre ‘intellectual’ with serious delusion of persecution. The measure of a man, after all, is not in his lineage, or his learning; it is in his positive contribution to the wellbeing of others. 

 

The word almajiri has recently acquired certain negative connotations, such as dislocation, lowly background and begging. The word in Hausa actually means a student; it is the corrupted form of the Arabic word al-Muhajir, which means an emigrant (particularly referring to those who emigrated with the Prophet Muhammad from Mecca to Madina). The kid who emigrates, (or ambulates by Sanusi) in search of Qur’anic knowledge is honorifically called almajiri as both were seeking for God through the Qur’an, in the former case as companions to the Prophet as it was being revealed and in the latter through the study of the revelation. The catastrophe that has become the almajiri system in Nigeria ought to be a concern to all well meaning Muslims and, not to be used to disparage those most unfortunate amongst us through our collective failure as the elite. If Sanusi Lamido feels that collecting scholarship ‘charity’ from the Saudis is wrong, what has he done to ameliorate the situation for the teeming almajiris in his metropolis? The collection of charity scholarships has become a charge refrain for all those who disagree with Sanusi Lamido and happened to have been to Saudi to study on a Saudi scholarship. I remember when similar venomous insults and charge were hurled at Dr Ahmad Gumi of the Sultan Bello Mosque a few years back. As a ‘prince’ I would have thought helping the vulnerable amongst his ‘subjects’ is the sort of things he ought to busy his mind, not condemning those who could not afford an education without external help. Such odium as shown by the write-up is certainly unbecoming of a ‘philosopher’, not to mention a ‘prince’ writing in response to one of his alien ‘subjects’. I will stop here. This rejoinder has been mainly on identity. My next rejoinder will start with the analysis of the quotation below, from the context of political ethics, the second concept in the title of Sanusi Lamido’s article. What is the relevance of identity in politics? What are the ethical implications of proclaiming an identity?

 

The so-called engagement is clearly a charade, given Sanusi Lamido’s estimation of the one he engages, he says: “I do not expect Ja’far to be familiar with philosophical works on this topic. For example I doubt if he has read the books of the contemporary African philosopher, Kwame Anthony Appiah, such as The Ethics of Identity or In My Father’s House: Africa in the Philosophy of Culture. I doubt if he has even read Majid Fakhry’s Ethical Theories of Islam or Sohail Hashmi’s Islamic Political Ethics: Civil Society, Pluralism and Conflict. I do not expect that he has ever come across Segun Gbadegesin’s brilliant article “Yoruba Philosophy: Individuality, Community and the Moral Order”; Anthony Kirk-Greene’s  ‘ “Mutumin Kirki”: The Concept of the Good Man in Hausa’; or Sa’ad Abubakar’s equally insightful analysis of the concept of Pulaku among the Fulani in his master-piece of Adamawa history, The Lamibe of Fombina.  If he had read any of the above, he would know that among the Hausa, or the Yoruba, or the Muslims or Christians, or whites or blacks, or men and women, there are “good” people and “bad” people and this goodness or badness is a quality that is separate from and distinct in itself from the colour of the skin or the ethnicity or the gender or the faith of the person… The problem we have with some of our scholars is their presumption that every Muslim must rely on them for mediation not just in understanding religious texts, in which they may or may not have achieved a standard of competence, but also in matters beyond their competence, such as the question of negotiating the difficult terrain of politics and developing true concepts of citizenship in plural societies. There is nothing wrong with an Imam participating in political discourse, but he must understand that memorizing thirteenth century texts written by Ibn Taimiya will not make him an authority in contemporary political thought…” The emphasis is mine.