The Annan report states that the new Security Council must be more broadly representative of the international community as a whole and the geo-political realities of today. Thus, Annan has proposed an expanded 24-member Security Council from the current 15 providing two formulas for doing so.

Model A would add six permanent seats, with no veto power, and three additional members with two terms.

Model B would add eight members with four-year renewable terms and one-year, non-renewable seat.

Neither plan changes the veto power enjoyed by the five permanent members. Annan would seem to have de-emphasised the possession of the veto power by the prospective members ( a majority of them in the South: Brazil, India, Pakistan, Nigeria, South Africa; Japan may make the list if she repents, in sackcloth, for her war-time misdeeds against China ( in realisation of the fact that the attraction and prestige it used to command, and the usefulness it once served, during the Soviet or Cold War years, have long ceased to exist. Annan, in agreement with Bush, is more interested in democracy, the rule of law, good governance and development. “The veto power is a power wielded solely by the five permanent members of the Security Council. It gives them the power to void any Security Council resolution, no matter what the supporting majority. The power is exercised when any permanent member enters a “nay” vote. An abstention vote will allow the measure to pass. It was established to protect the interests of the founding members of the United Nations ( the United States, Britain, Soviet Union and China ( which were the countries that won the World War II. At the U.N. founding conference in 1944, it was decided that the representatives of Britain, China, the Soviet Union, the United States and, 'in due course,' France, should be permanent members. France had been defeated and occupied by Nazi Germany, but its role as a permanent member of the League of Nations, its status as a colonial power and the activities of the Free French forces on the allied side, allowed it a place at the table with the Big Four.” Until the advent of the reform, basically to reflect what is seen as a long, overdue democratisation of the world body, Nigeria has always been a leading contender ( amongst the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries ( for a seat at the Security Council. Past debates about which country should represent the African continent ( as in the late '80s and early '90s ( were tacitly moderated, as it were, to see Nigeria's position fiercely tugged at by such strategically positioned countries as South Africa, Egypt and Senegal. The debates were not, necessarily, about reform ( a la Annan ( but, depending on how you understood them, some effort at testing the treacherously calm waters of international politics of the immediate post-Cold War years. The Berlin Wall had come down, Eastern Europe was assuming a new attractive identity and, more than anything else, the sprawling Soviet Union ( of the Gorbachev days ( was undergoing a fast transformation. It was tempting, then, to think that the debates were sponsored by some irresponsible and idle Marxists, who were fast losing their bearing and relevance in the newly emerging global order.

The whole exercise ( hasty as it was ( was, irredeemably, laced with so much ambition as to restructure the Security Council: let there be new permanent members, who'd also exercise the veto power. That was a position which was rightly seen as naively brash in its assumption that the permanent five ( Britain, China, France, Russia and the United States ( would brook a forced breach of their own exclusive terrain. Certainly not by countries with less democratic habits or culture ( countries that were not there when the triumphant Allied Powers ( in a pleasant exercise of their prerogative of rewriting history ( reshaped the structure of global politics following their defeat of Nazi Germany and Japan. Even so, it was argued that because of the geography of the veto and the proportion of those wielding it ( five countries out of more than 130 members of the United Nations ( was too lean in its spread and representation (whatever the meaning of that!) and did not reflect the 'new age of global democracy'. That was probably so; except that it, too, was, again, an uninformed assumption that the underlying case of morality therein would be pressed as to supplant the practical realities of global politics.

The arrival of the neo-conservative Republicans at the White House ( since the beginning of the 21st Century ( it appears, has long washed away the persuasive basis of morality in sharing international power and resources, especially when some strategic interests are at stake. International law, in that circumstance, must, unfortunately, be ready to suffer gravely, when democracy has to be foisted on a certain country by Bushmen using shock and awe as tactics. Whatever the feelings of the civilised men who still cling to their toys called veto power! That, too, was an assumption that was flawed to the extent of not factoring the history of the veto ( a history that has been enriched by the events of September 11, 2001: to hold the world in a firm leash so that it does not stray from the path of peace into that of a wasteful war, say. Because of the emerging post-Soviet, unipolar world, it was the thinking of some commentators that the new debates on admitting new members to the Security Council was to find an avenue of neutralising the Western tilt or advantage of the veto ( Washington, Paris and London. That tilt would be more pronounced when Berlin ( as the economic power house of the European Union ( arrives at the Security Council. The ultimate target was Washington, which, it was felt, should not be allowed to straddle the narrow, capitalist and democratic world ( even though, admittedly, it was ( and it still is ( a colossus. Wonder whether such wishful thoughts would ever be transmitted to fruition. Great powers, since the Roman times, have come and, reaching their apogee, have faded away ( as if in fulfilment of some negative prophecy ( into the bosom of history.

But, America? Will it be in response to some pressure from a rising and competitive China? A fairly liberal China that would be more interested in the revivification and sustenance of South-South economic co-operation and diplomacy ( chiefly to take a nourishing advantage of the expansive market of the region? Well . . . .

The African chapter of the past debates about the expansion of the Security Council was that the continent should be represented by a democratic country. Time there was when the top contenders, were such democracies as Senegal, Cote d'Ivoire and Botswana; and apartheid South Africa. Dakar and Abidjan were touted because of the influence of Presidents Leopold Sedar Senghor and Felix Houphouet-Boigny in Francophone Africa. It was hard to contemplate Gaborone, though a stable and thriving pluralist state, taking Pretoria's place. Both West African states would not have made it that cheaply, though, to the exclusion of other countries or regions. Nigeria ( under a military dictatorship ( did not fit well. Egypt ( a regional ally of Washington's and a de facto autocratic state ( was also ruled out. But there was then, as now, the need to protect Israel's regional interest, even though the U.S. veto had always done that. The nature of that debate has long changed ( narrowing the contenders, by Annan's reform, to only two permanent members.

The Director of the United Nations Information Centre, Lagos, Mr Finjap Njinga, said the issue of democratisation of the veto power at the Security Council has, after more than three decades, come to a head. Some major global developments that have taken place, within the distance, have reinforced advocacy at the world body. For the reality of current international politics ( and as reflected in the Annan report ( it does not seem practical, at this stage, that the veto power would disappear, primarily because those wielding it would have to renounce it. If it has to melt away, that would be by a decision of the Security Council; by a revision of the Charter of the U.N. following certain criteria ( consensus, say, on the part of all the permanent five. For now, Njinga said, “we don't seem to see any light at the end of the tunnel in terms of abolishing the veto.” China, for one, would insist on holding firmly to the veto, partly because of her suspicion of the international political system, but, in large part, for its waxing geo-strategic interests in the Far East: prospecting for oil in the disputed Spratlys, the occasional, if risible, furore over the status of democratic Taiwan and the influence it has over nuclear-thirsty North Korea. “We're trying to enlarge the Security Council,” as Njinga put it, “so that we can have more voices, more eyes, more ears and more participation from other regions.” In a lecture titled “United Nations Reforms for the 21st Century,” delivered at the Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria Training School, Shogunle, Lagos, he observed that no African country had been named, but there had been several meetings by the African Union to examine how Africa could be represented at the Security Council.

That crucial decision would be taken when the African Union meets in July. Between now and then, Obasanjo may have to ponder over the chances of Nigeria making the shortlist of two African countries at the Security Council. Yes, no countries have been tipped for the historical assignment, but assume for now, Nigeria and South Africa. Besides, Obasanjo's position, as the Chairman of the African Union, his intriguingly opaque and calculatingly cold mien would almost make the Nigerian choice a fait accompli. It is likely that in a momentous issue such as a seat at the Security Council, Nigeria will have the votes of the Economic Community of West African States ( in recognition of Obasanjo's role in making peace ( alongside the Chirac administration in the sub-region ( from the Mano River Basin to Togo; and from Zimbabwe to the Great Lakes. Pretoria might be expected to weigh in with her democratic transformation and economic prowess, which have made her a regional power ( not to mention what influence Dr. Nelson Mandela may be expected to play.

If this turns out the case, it would be an occasion for some pleasant reflections by a humbled Obasanjo: a former soldier, who played an active role in the decolonisation of Africa; an ex-military leader who, in defence of the pride of the Black race, fought against apartheid; and an elected democrat and statesman, who, as the captain of the African Union, led the continent's permanent members ( Nigeria and South Africa ( to the Security Council.

*Nduka Uzuakpundu is on the Foreign Affairs Desk of a Lagos-based newspaper -- VANGUARD.