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The Impeachment Process, Ouster Clauses, Non – Justiciable Provisions and the Interpretation of Nigeria’s Constitution By Omoba Oladele Osinuga Dagenham, Essex, UK
The recent constitutional crisis in Oyo State following the impeachment of the State Governor Rashid Ladoja raises important questions on the law, jurisprudence, legal historicism, canons of statutory interpretation and democratic principles in Nigeria. It is the responsibility and obligation of every patriotic Nigerian to ensure that the supremacy of our constitution is essential in the effective running of our fledging democracy. Thus where there are apparent breaches of our constitution we as citizens should do all within our legitimate constitutional powers to redeem these breaches. Understanding our constitution, its workings and operations is sin qua non in any democratic society. It is not the preserve of scholars, lawyers, constitutional thinkers, and politicians for that matter but of all Nigerians as stated in the preamble to the Constitution, “We the people of the Federal Republic of Nigeria”. Thus it is not an easy task discussing the issues arising from the Oyo State crisis without resort to legal parlance.
Bamidele Aturu’s article Impeachment Proceedings and the Courts in The Guardian of 16 January 2006 was an erudite piece on the role of the courts in relation to the impeachment proceedings. The writer was brilliant in deconstructing the myth and what I call academic laziness on the school of thought within our judiciary which seems to think that a non - justiciable provision or ouster clause is equivalent to not doing anything. The genesis of the lack of independent thought and judicial activism which seems common place in certain areas of our judiciary today can be traced in no small way to the methodology of teaching in most Nigerian Universities where as one recent Nigerian graduate currently undergoing post graduate studies in England told me “lecturers in Nigeria expect you to answer questions in exactly the same manner as you were taught in class whilst in England in addition to what you were taught in class you have to express your views and criticise in your answers to questions” that she found somewhat difficult at first but a brilliant scholar she has learnt the hard way and started to adjust brilliantly. That unfortunately is the general state of our ‘back to sender’ methodology of education and hence the reason why I pity the lack of exposure to the rigours of in-depth academic training by some of our finest legal minds who have been trained entirely in Nigeria. This unfortunately is apparent and glaring in the drama that is being played out in Oyo State where the ‘back to sender’ methodology has been deployed to what is the simple interpretation of a clause in the constitution. The impeachment process is one that is entirely alien to our system of governance first introduced in the 1979 Constitution. An understanding of the process requires us to examine the historical background to the process.
Historical background of the Impeachment process
Our impeachment process though influenced by the provisions of the United States Constitution in Article II, Section IV which states, “The President, Vice President and all civil officers of the United States, shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors” the origins of the process is much a creature of the United Kingdom’s unwritten constitution and parliamentary system. Dan Plesch writing in the UK The Guardian Newspaper, of Wednesday January 28, 2004 states that, “The process originated in the House of Commons in the late 14th century, the first accused being a merchant in the City of London. Impeachment was used as a tool to bring high officials to account and was used for around 100 years in the political battles of late medieval England. Under the Tudor dynasty, parliamentary factions and parliament itself declined in importance. By the time of the Stuarts, Charles I sought to abolish parliamentary authority and create an absolute monarchy. As part of the parliamentary response, a committee was created to investigate ancient rights of the House of Commons that could again be put to use, and by the 1620s impeachment was revived as a way of pursuing Charles's ministers, especially the Earl of Strafford. Impeachment then remained a procedure used from time to time until the eve of the Victorian era, in the early 1800s”.
Similarly in the 1974 report written by the Judiciary Committee of the US Congress in the aftermath of the Watergate Nixon Impeachment Crisis, the committee examined the historical origins of the process, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/politics/special/clinton/stories/watergatedoc.htm the committee in its reports states, “ A. The English Parliamentary Practice - It played a continuing role in the struggles between King and Parliament that resulted in the formation of the unwritten English constitution. In this respect impeachment was one of the tools used by English Parliament to create more responsive and responsible government and to redress imbalances when they occurred…….The phrase does not reappear in impeachment proceedings until 1450. In that year articles of impeachment against William de la Pole, Duke of Suffolk (a descendant of Michael), charged him with several acts of high treason, but also with "high Crimes and Misdemeanors," including such various offenses as "advising the King to grant liberties and privileges to certain persons to the hindrance of the due execution of the laws," "procuring offices for person who were unfit, and unworthy of them" and "squandering away the public treasure.” Impeachment was used frequently during the reigns of James I (1603-1625) and Charles I (1628-1649). During the period from 1620 to 1649 over 100 impeachments were voted by the House of Commons. Some of these impeachments charged high treason, as in the case of Strafford; others charged high crimes and misdemeanors. The latter included both statutory offenses, particularly with respect to the Crown monopolies. and non-statutory offenses. For example, Sir Henry Yelverton, the King's Attorney General, was impeached in 1621 of high crimes and misdemeanors in that he failed to prosecute after commencing suits, and exercised authority before it was properly vested in him”. According to the learned committee, “Two points emerge from the 400 years of English parliamentary experience with the phrase "high Crimes and Misdemeanors." First the particular allegations of misconduct alleged damage to the state in such forms as misapplication of funds, abuse of official power, neglect of duty, encroachment on Parliament¹s prerogatives, corruption, and betrayal of trust. Second, the phrase "high Crimes and Misdemeanors" was confined to parliamentary impeachments; it had no roots in the ordinary criminal law, and the particular allegations of misconduct under that heading were not necessarily limited to common law or statutory derelictions or crimes.
The Cornell University paper earlier cited states further on the constitutional authority of impeachment that, “At the time of the drafting of the Constitution, impeachment was an established process in English law and government. The Founding Fathers incorporated the process, with modifications, into the fabric of United States government. The Constitution, however, only provides the framework-the basic who's, why's, and how's. The remaining procedural intricacies reside in the internal rules of the House and Senate. Why? Article 2, Section 4--". . .on impeachment for, and on conviction of, treason, bribery, or other high crimes or misdemeanors."This implies that the impeachment process is not tightly linked to the criminal law. The test is not satisfied by all crimes. With only two named offenses to provide context for the inclusive phrase "high crimes and misdemeanors," the standard remains undefined. The language suggests, however, that criminal action may be required. It is worth noting that the term "misdemeanor" does not correspond to the modern definition of a less serious (sub-felony) statutory or common law criminal offense. The trial of the impeached officer is held in the Senate. In Nixon v. US, regarding the impeachment trial of a Federal judge, the Supreme Court ruled that the application of the phrase "sole power to try all impeachments" to a particular case was not justiciable. In other words it held that the proper application of this constitutional language to a specific impeachment proceeding was not a question for the courts. Therefore, the process and procedure for impeachment lie solely within the purview of the legislature. The officer subject to an impeachment proceeding has no appeal to a federal court. Constitution is Article II, Section 4, which by its express terms, applies to all civil officers, including judges, and defines impeachment offenses as "Treason, Bribery, and other high Crimes and Misdemeanors." Each of the thirteen American impeachments involved charges of misconduct incompatible with the official position of the officeholder. This conduct falls into three broad categories: (1) exceeding the constitutional bounds of the powers of the office in derogation of the powers of another branch of government; (2) behaving in a manner grossly incompatible with the proper function and purpose of the office; and (3) employing the power of the office for an improper purpose or gain”.
The Cornell University paper highlights three core principles involved in the Impeachment process (emphasis mine), “1. Exceeding the Powers of the Office in Derogation of those of Another Branch of Government - The issue between the President and Congress was which of them should have the constitutional-- and ultimately even the military-- power to make and enforce Reconstruction policy in the South. The Johnson impeachment, like the British impeachments of great ministers, involved issues of state going to the heart of the constitutional division of executive and legislative power. 2. Behaving in a Manner Grossly Incompatible with the Proper Function and Purpose of the Office and 3. Employing the Power of the Office for an Improper Purpose or Personal Gain. The Cornell University paper further states that the common theme in the impeachment articles, “are allegations that the officer has violated his duties or his oath or seriously undermined public confidence in his ability to perform his official functions.. It is intended to reach a broad variety of conduct by officers that is both serious and incompatible with the duties of the office. The American impeachment cases demonstrate a common theme useful in determining whether grounds for impeachment exist-- that the grounds are derived from understanding the nature, functions and duties of the office”.
As someone keen in Constitutional History I vividly observed the impeachment trial proceedings of President Clinton which was beamed worldwide live on Television. I am reminded of the brilliant presentation of Clinton’s defence team of Kendall, Ruff, Mills and Bumpers. Notably that of retiring US Senator Dale Bumpers of Arkansas a brilliant orator who in his closing speech outlined the history of the Constitution’s conventions deliberations on the impeachment process, according to Bill Clinton who is also a lawyer and Professor of Law in his autobiography My Life (Hutchinson 1993) Senator Bumpers stated that impeachment, “covered offences, distinctly political against the state and that the senate should rise above politics and do your solemn duty“. A call entertained by the US senate when despite the Republican majority 2 republican senators broke ranks and joined their Democratic Colleagues in voting against the impeachment of Bill Clinton.
The Nigerian Impeachment Process
The process for the impeaching a State Governor is stated in Section 188 (a similar provision exists in Section 143 for the President and Vice-President). The discretion in using this tool as can be seen in the UK and US is very much within the discretion of the legislature in this case the state house of assembly. This exercise of this discretion is implicit in the wording of Section 188 (2) (b) stating, “that the holder of such office is guilty of gross misconduct in the performance of the functions of his office”. The term ‘gross misconduct’ is defined in Section 188 (11) as, “a grave violation or breach of the provisions of this Constitution or a misconduct of such nature as amounts in the opinion in the House of Assembly to gross misconduct”. This in itself is a very subjective test and in the absence of further definition in the constitution reliance is placed on the general dictionary definition of the term and what obtains in Employment law where the term is commonly used in contracts of employment. Gross misconduct can be defined as an unacceptable and wrong act by someone is a position of authority and responsibility. Reliance is once again placed on the three principles established in the US that gross misconduct can be established where the Governor or Deputy Governor has exceeded the Powers of the Office in Derogation of those of Another Branch of Government, behaved in a Manner Grossly Incompatible with the Proper Function and Purpose of the Office and Employing the Power of the Office for an Improper Purpose or Personal Gain. It is respectfully submitted that these three ingredients must be present before a prima facie case of Impeachment can be effective.
The stages, framework and timescale of impeachment process are expressly stated in the constitution. The first stage in the impeachment process [Section 188 (2)] what I call the Notice Stage is the notice of any allegation in writing signed by not less than one-third of the members of the House of Assembly. The second stage [Section 188 (2) (b)] the Receipt of Notice Stage is that the speaker of the House of Assembly shall, within seven days of the receipt of the notice, cause a copy of the notice to be served on the holder of the office and on each member of the House of Assembly, and shall also cause any statement made in reply to the allegation by the holder of the office, to be served on each member of the House of Assembly. The third stage is the motion stage [Section 188 (3)] Within fourteen days of the presentation of the notice to the speaker of the House of Assembly (whether or not any statement was made by the holder of the office in reply to the allegation contained in the notice -, the House of Assembly shall resolve by motion, without any debate whether or not the allegation shall be investigated. The fourth stage is the passage of motion [Section 188 (4)] A motion of the House of Assembly that the allegation be investigated shall not be declared as having been passed unless it is supported by the votes of not less than two-thirds majority of all the members of the House of Assembly. The fifth stage appointment of investigative committee stage [Section 188 (5)] Within seven days of the passing of a motion under the foregoing provisions of this section, the Chief judge of the State shall at the request of the speaker of the House of Assembly, appoint a Panel of seven persons who in his opinion are of unquestionable integrity, not being members of any public service, legislative house or political party, to investigate the allegation as provided in this section. The sixth stage is the right to defence stage [Section 188 (6)] The holder of an office whose conduct is being investigated under this section shall have the right to defend himself in person or be represented before the panel by a legal practitioner of his own choice. The seventh stage is the investigative committee report stage [Section 188 (7) (b] (b) three months of its appointment, report its findings to the House of Assembly. The final stages of the process as stated in [Section 188 (8)] is that where the Panel reports to the House of Assembly that the allegation has not been proved, no further proceedings shall be taken in respect of the matter and [Section 188 (9)] where the report of the Panel is that the allegation against the holder of the office has been proved, then within fourteen days of the receipt of the report, the house of Assembly shall consider the report, and if by a resolution of the House of Assembly supported by not less than two-thirds majority of all its members, the report of the Panel is adopted, then the holder of the office shall stand removed form office as from the date of the adoption of the report. The constitutional process of impeachment would now be examined on the face of the facts in issue in Oyo State.
The Oyo State Crisis Facts in Issue
Governor Ladoja was accused of 14 allegations amongst which allegations conflict of interests, fraudulent conversion of government money and operation of foreign bank account. Specifically, he was alleged to have opened an account at STB/UBA contrary to paragraph 1 of the 5th schedule of the Constitution and that he remained a director of the bank contrary of paragraph 2 (b) of the 5th schedule of the constitution. Ladoja was also accused of diverting local government allocation from the Excess Crude Oil Reserve into an account in Standard Trust Bank (STB) from August 2003 to May 2005 and for failing to distribute over N1.999 billion accruing from the Excess Crude Oil Reserve to the local government. Furthermore Ladoja was accused of operating an account at Natwest Bank, London in breach of Paragraph 3 of the 5th schedule of the Constitution. In his response Ladoja categorically denied the allegations adding that while the STB/UBA account was duly opened by the state government, he ceased to be a director of the bank on assumption of office. Ladoja further stated that all the funds from the Excess Crude Oil Allocation between April and May 2005, were duly paid into the state Joint Local Government Statutory Allocation Account and not a personal account." In relation to the opening of a foreign bank account, Ladoja stated that the allegation had been investigated by the Code of Conduct Bureau and found to be unsubstantiated."
The seven man Investigative committee and Panel of Inquiry presided over by Chief Bolaji Ayorinde (SAN) by submitted its report and concluded that the 14 allegations have been proved.
There are 32 members of the Oyo State House of Assembly of which 18 were in favour of the removal of the Governor while six had been suspended and the remaining 8 were in support of the Governor. 18 members of the Assembly constituted the constitutionally required majority of two third of the entire membership of the House. It is pertinent to examine the law in relation to the facts prevalent in the Oyo State Governor’s impeachment process.
Ouster Clauses, Non-Justiciability and Constitutional Interpretation
The term ouster clause and non-justiciability are often used interchangeably with respect to clauses in legislation, statutes and law which purport to oust the jurisdiction of the courts in any aspect, questions or issues related to the law. Put simply it is often a device by legal draughtsmen to limit the authority of the courts with respect to statutory interpretation which primarily is the role of the Judiciary. The Courts particularly in Common Law jurisdictions notably Commonwealth Countries (including Nigeria) and the United States have been quite robust in asserting the authority and independence of the Courts in declaring such provisions as being incompatible with the rule of law. The so called ouster clause and non justiciable provisions in this case has arisen as a consequence of the wording of Section 188 (10) which states that, “No proceedings or determination of the Panel or of the House of Assembly or any matter relating to such proceedings or determination shall be entertained or questioned in any court”. It is respectfully submitted that such a provision is incompatible with other sections of the Constitution particularly those under the Fundamental Rights provisions contained in Chapter IV. Section 36 (1) states that, “In the determination of his civil rights and obligations, including any question or determination by or against any government or authority, a person shall be entitled to a fair hearing within a reasonable time by a court or other tribunal established by law and constituted in such manner as to secure its independence and impartiality. Section 36 (2) (a) further states that,”…. the persons whose rights and obligations may be affected to make representations to the administering authority before that authority makes the decision affecting that person; and (b) contains no provision making the determination of the administering authority final and conclusive. The importance of this provision is such that it is absolute and there is no constitutional provision for its abrogation. It also provides a constitutional veto to the so called ouster clause. It is also a universal right recognised in various International Charters and Conventions including the United Nations Human Rights Declarations, the African Charter of Human Rights, the American Bill of Rights and the European Convention of Human Rights. Section 188 (10) is a rogue clause which seems only designed to cause mischief though the intention of the framers of our constitution no doubt genuine has been badly misconstrued. Furthermore Section 1 (3) states that any law inconsistent with the provisions of the constitution shall be void as to the extent of its inconsistency. In relation to the facts of the Oyo State crisis the question of the constitution of house members, the panel members and whether the stages laid out in Section 188 has been followed is the key here. What were the circumstances in which six members of the house were suspended? Was their suspension a breach of the Constitution? I am of the opinion that where there is a breach in the stages laid out in Section 188 including the purported suspension of House members then it follows that any actions arising from such impeachment process is fatally flawed. More so any flaw in the process including a breach of the Governor’s rights enshrined in Section 36 renders the outcome illegal, unconstitutional, null and void notwithstanding the provisions of Section 188 (10). Section 188 (10) would only be valid where the process laid out in the provisions of Section 188 have been properly followed and are in accordance the Governor’s rights under Section 36. Accordingly the Courts has a duty under their inherent powers of oversight and scrutiny to subject other branches of government to check where there is an abuse of power. The Court through the use of Judicial review have consistently maintained that provisions ousting their jurisdiction have no place in law. In the words of Simon Brown J, now Lord Brown of Eaton under Heywood Back, “Judicial review is the exercise of the court's inherent power at common law to determine whether action is lawful or not; in a word to uphold the rule of law".[40] R v HM the Queen in Council, ex parte Vijayatunga [1988] QB 322. Similarly the famous Lord Denning said that, "If Tribunals were to be at liberty to exceed their jurisdiction without any check by the courts, the rule of law would be at an end."[41] R v Medical Appeal Tribunal, ex parte Gilmore [1957] 1 QB 574, 586. Lord Justice Woolf, the immediate former Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales www.law.cam.ac.uk/docs/view.php?doc=1415 in his Squire Centenary lecture speech titled The Rule of Law and a Change in the Constitution delivered at the University of Cambridge was on record as stating that an ouster clause , “could bring the judiciary, the executive and the legislature into conflict with the rule of law………… and should not be contemplated by any government if it had respect for the rule of law…. as a matter of constitutional principle some form of higher judicial oversight of lower tribunals and executive decisions should be retained. … What is the use of courts, if you cannot access them?”
In the African Humans Rights Commission case of Ubani v Director of State Security Services & Anor [1999] ICHRL 105 (7 July 1999) the Commission held that , “The courts retain jurisdiction in the present case because the fundamental rights protected in the African Charter and the Act are superior to all municipal laws in Nigeria, and cannot be ousted by decrees of the military government (dicta of Musdapher JCA in Fawehinmi v Abacha (1996) 9 NWLR (Pt 475) 710 (Nig CA) and Comptroller of Prisons & Ors v Adekanye (1999) 10 NWLR (Pt 623) 400 (Nig CA) followed) ..the ouster provision is therefore inoperative; the lower court should have assumed jurisdiction over the appellant’s complaints. The Commission concluded that the,” African Charter is superior to all municipal laws, including decrees, it is unnecessary to examine the provisions of Decree No 12 of 1994. Suffice to say that its ouster clause is ineffective in relation to complaints based on infraction of the African Charter”. http://www.worldlii.org/int/cases/ICHRL/1999/105.html The Constitutional Rights Project and Civil Liberties Organisation/Nigeria, African Comm. Hum. & Peoples' Rights, Comm. No. 102/93 http://wwwserver.law.wits.ac.za/humanrts/africa/comcases/102-93.html stated that, “The ouster clauses create a legal situation in which the judiciary can provide no check on the executive branch of government. A few courts in the Lagos district have occasionally found that they have jurisdiction; in 1995 the Court of Appeal in Lagos, relying on common law, found that courts should examine some decrees notwithstanding ouster clauses, where the decree is "offensive and utterly hostile to rationality." In a unanimous opinion the court of Appeal Holden at Lagos on December 12 1996 in the case of Chief Gani Fawehinmi v General Sani Abacha, Attorney-General of the Federation, State Security Services, Inspector General of Police, held that the African Charter being the joint effort of States, no legislative body in Nigeria could oust its operation and application in Nigeria...the basic premise of international human rights law is that certain standards must be constant across national borders, and governments must be held accountable to these standards”.
Lord Irvine of Lairg the erstwhile Lord Chancellor of England and Wales in a lecture delivered on Friday, 18 September 1998 to the High Court in Hong Kong titled "Principle and Pragmatism: The Development of English Public Law under the Separation of Powers" http://www.dca.gov.uk/speeches/1998/hongkong.htm stated that, “the judiciary’s treatment of statutory provisions which - on their face, at least - exclude the jurisdiction of the courts provides perhaps the most graphic illustration of the interaction of hard-edged constitutional doctrine and the courts’ practical desire to subject government to legal control. The most striking example of the courts’ jurisprudence in this area is found in the celebrated decision of the House of Lords in Anisminic. The claimant in this case had sought monies from the Foreign Compensation Commission as reimbursement for the expropriation of its property during the Suez crisis in 1956. Since the Commission refused to pay any compensation, the claimant sought to challenge the legality of the decision on the ground that the Commission had misunderstood the scope of its legal powers. However, the legislation which established the Commission provided that its determinations could not be "called in question in any court of law". Ultimately it was held by a majority that, upon a proper construction of the legislation, Parliament had not intended to preclude judicial review entirely. The ouster provision had to be interpreted within the framework of the legislation. Since Parliament had set limits to the Commission’s power, a strong presumption arose that Parliament must have intended those limits to be enforceable at law. "What would be the purpose," asked Lord Wilberforce, "of defining by statute the limit of a tribunal’s powers if, by means of a clause inserted in the instrument of definition, those limits could safely be passed?” By this reasoning, it was possible for the judges to pursue their familiar policy of favouring the subjection of government to legal control, without infringing constitutional principle by disregarding Parliament’s stated will. Lord Wilberforce was confident that the court had been faithful to legislative intention, and said of the decision that it would be "a misdescription to state it in terms of a struggle between the courts and the" elected branches of the constitution. Lord Reid also presented the decision as turning simply on the construction of the language which Parliament had used, explaining that, "It is a well established principle that a provision ousting the ordinary jurisdiction of the court must be construed strictly - meaning, I think, that if such a provision is reasonably capable of having two meanings, that meaning shall be taken which preserves the ordinary jurisdiction of the court." And Parliament, of course, is well aware that it legislates against a background of such interpretative presumptions”.
Our learned judges have also been robust in asserting the role of the judiciary with respect to ouster clauses drawing a great deal of influence from the English Court, Pats-Acholonu Justice of the Court of Appeal in the case of Guardian Newspapers Ltd & Ors v Attorney General of the Federation & Anor [1995] ICHRL 36 (13 June 1995) http://www.worldlii.org/int/cases/ICHRL/1995/36.html the learned judge stated that, “The concept of the rule of law presupposes that the court, within the framework in which it can still operate in Nigeria, can examine any decree with a view to determining whether an ouster clause contained in it seeks to preserve something otiose such as the Military Government’s assumption of judicial powers. The court can equally examine the nature of the legislation to determine whether it is essentially a judicial pronouncement and it cannot be imputed that the Military Government intends to contradict itself by delving into an area that is the special preserve of the judiciary. The court below should not readily have washed its hands of the case on the pretext that its jurisdiction was ousted. The court can exercise jurisdiction in the matter. Concurring with the learned judge in the same case Justice Ayoola states that, “Ouster clauses should be strictly construed in a manner consistent with the rule of law so that, where the exercise of power may interfere with individual liberty or rights and no adequate provision has been made for the consideration of grievances by alternate tribunals, abuses of power can be contained. An ouster clause does not prevent the court from construing it or from determining whether the activity in question falls within the authority of the statute (Anisminic Ltd v The Foreign Compensation Commission & Anor [1969] 1 All ER 208 applied). No reasonable law maker will be presumed to have granted powers which can be abused with impunity. The Federal High Court should not, therefore, have declined jurisdiction at the stage it did, even if the two instruments were effective as decrees, without further inquiry. The court should not abdicate its role of providing remedies for wrongs and relief from unjust treatment without ensuring, if at all possible, that the true intention of the law-maker is to deny the citizen of all remedies”.
The unlimited jurisdiction of the High Court provided for in Section 46 where a person’s fundamental human rights has been breached states, “(1) Any person who alleges that any of the provisions of this Chapter has been, is being or likely to be contravened in any State in relation to him may apply to a High Court in that State for redress. (2) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, a High Court shall have original jurisdiction to hear and determine any application made to it in pursuance of this section and may make such orders, issue such writs and give such directions as it may consider appropriate for the purpose of enforcement or securing the enforcing within that State of any right to which the person who makes the application may be entitled under this Chapter”. Our courts have been bold in ruling any statute including the Land Use Act enshrined in section 315 (5) (d) that purportedly ousts jurisdiction of court as void and incompatible with part IV of the Constitution. Now that we have reached a constitutional log jam with the mockery of multiple lawsuits in courts related the impeachment process, is there a way forward?
The Way Forward Significantly the way forward out of this constitutional crisis is in the constitution following on from the authorities and leading judges cited and provisions of Section 46 an appeal to the Appellate Courts should be the next course of action by Ladoja’s legal team using the appeal by way of case mechanism stated provided for in the case of Court of Appeal in Section 241 and should that fail to the Supreme Court provided for in Section 233. The jurisdictions of these appellate courts in relation to this crisis is expressly stated respectively in Sections 241 (1) (c) and (d) and 233 (1) (2) (c) and (d) which gives jurisdictions to appellate court on questions and points of interpretation and application of the constitution and importantly on decisions in any civil or criminal proceedings on questions as to whether any of the provisions of Chapter IV of this Constitution has been, is being or is likely to be, contravened in relation to any person. This to all intents and purposes empowers the appellate courts the authority and jurisdiction to question the impeachment process in Oyo State. The reasoning for having these constitutional provisions is to ensure that where there is a multiplicity of law suits and to avoid forum shopping where parties institute proceedings in courts with concurrent jurisdiction arising from the same facts the appellate court has the jurisdiction to rule on matters of the law and constitution in relation to such proceedings to establish clear legal principles and the decision of the Supreme Court as the ultimate superior appellate court is final.
As an absolute Constitutionalist I believe in the supremacy of our constitution and the rule of law. That in order to sustain our indivisible and indissoluble sovereign nation (words taken directly from the preamble of the constitution) defending our Constitution is a price worth paying in a truly democratic society where the values of justice, fairness and equity prevail.
Omoba Oladele Osinuga, Contributing Editor Africanlives.com writes from Dagenham, UK.
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