IBB: The Unresolved Conflict Between Conviction And Conspiracy

By

Al-Sheriff dan Koko

There is no doubt that the ongoing emotive reaction to the kite flying Presidential ambition of GENERAL Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida is not the best for the polity. The primary goal of public commentary is to beam a searchlight on issues, with a view to providing a clear picture of what is going on in the nation to the ill-informed and confused citizens.

However, many commentaries have tended to be media for the distribution of heat rather than being a light to guide the footsteps of both the leadership and followers. Considering this disconnection between what should be (ideal) and what is happening (reality) it is imperative therefore that the person of General Babangida be subjected to a Close study; because adequate appreciation of the past would enable us make reasonable judgment for the future. The citomplexy and duality of man cannot be denied, thus, the density of this phenomenon called IBB.

In the circumstance, this write up is only out to provoke a rational and fact based analysis of his person. In order to situate the man in a proper perspective, I shall take off with the portraiture of IBB by Margaret Thatcher and Professor Ojetunji Aboyade. Margaret Thatcher captures IBB thus, “he was a forceful, intelligent man trying to put Nigeria’s economy on to a sounder footing and in due course, we hoped, to create the conditions for a restoration of democracy.” (Please see p.525 of “The Downing Street Years”). O…….Babangida is extremely kind, warm, intelligent and very easy to get along with”.  “……. n the other hand, Professor Ojetunji Aboyade described him this way “…Babangida is a gamesman. Even when he feels convinced on an issue and he finds that he is alone or he is not carrying his team with him, he backs out” (extracts from Newswatch, May 16, 1988). These two character sketches highlight the atomic nature of IBB’s personality i.e. a continuing struggle between comradeship and conviction. I shall use the June 12 election annulment as the benchmark to scan this conflict. Many commentators, understood the annulment as being in furtherance of an agenda to perpetuate self in office, but I think otherwise. I consider it an expedient reaction of a man in a quandary on whether to fulfill a pact with a comrade in conspiracy or allow the democracy run its full course.

This assertion is premised on the following assumptions: - I am aware that the August 27 1985 coup-de-tat was coordinated by Sani Abacha. IBB was in Minna on D-day, thus, it was Abacha that provided the physical backbone to the storm troopers i.e. Umars and Shagaya’s on the execution of the coup-de-tat. Secondly, in the early days of the regime it was reported in the media, that General Abacha took exception to Commodore Ukiwe being referred to as the number two in the administration. This would appear to be a Freudian slip of a conspirator who feels that the pact is being threatened. It is therefore not incongruous to suggest that the premature retirement of Ebitu Ukiwe was only a removal of a hurdle on the way. Thirdly, I strongly suspect that   the sideways movement of General Domkat Bali to Internal Affairs was to clear the obstacles on the succession path. Fourthly, the nominal retirement of Admiral Aikomu from the Armed Forces but continuing to function as the Vice President would appear to be part of the grand design   for the ascendancy. Fifthly, there was no rational reason to have cancelled the 1992 primaries other than the fact that there was not to be any democratic transition.

 As an aside, may I state that the 1992 cancellation is worse than the 1993 annulment, because ordinarily primaries are an intra party affair, which should not have aroused the intervention of Government? Sixthly, I am aware that the Jos S.D.P primary was to be cancelled presumptuously on the evidence provided by Kingibe and Nzeribe, but the plan was thwarted by the networking efforts of Obasanjo, Danjuma, and Y’ardua on the need to redeem the integrity of the Armed Forces.

On the seventh count, we were all aware that the June 12 election was to be postponed based on the Abuja High Court judgment, but the U.S through the U.S.I.S director’s statement aborted the plan. Eighthly, I am aware that the last but one meeting of the A.F.R.C was stalemated because, Abacha in spite of the recommendation of the tripartite agreement of the S.D.P, N.R.C and Armed Forces to have a civilian transition Head of State, was insisting on a Military Interim Head of State.

Moreover, I have to learn that in the course of the Orkar coup, that Babangida from his hideout got a phone call through to Raji Rasaki, fingering Abacha as the coup-leader. It was Rasaki that re-assured him that Abacha had contacted Bamaiyi and was mobilizing to counter the coup-de-tat. This suspicion could safely be interpreted to mean that IBB feared that there was a fast forward attempt to unilaterally actualize the pre-arranged succession agreement.

Lastly, why were the apolitical and relatively junior service chiefs retired on the eve of the hand-over to the Interim Government and the most Senior was retained, and made the heir apparent by the succession provisions of  the Interim Government Decree.?

In essence, I strongly suspect that there was a pact between IBB and Abacha prior to the 1985coup-de-tat. The subsequent shifting of the terminal dates was only a manifestation of a personal struggle within Babangida on his fidelity to a comrade and his duty to Nigerian Nation. IBB is not strongly disinterested in having another shot at the presidency, if the environment is right. I think the question we should be asking IBB is that considering his antecedents and the apparent dilemma, would it be reasonable to give him a second chance to sacrifice the national interest on the altar of personal consideration. May I conclude by quoting Professor Aboyade again “I would hope that biographers, historians, psychologists would study this man in depth because he intrigues me. Maybe somebody like Wole Soyinka, somebody with that kind of skill who can capture his totality. He intrigues me. I found it much easier to predict General Obasanjo because he will tell you straight off “I don’t agree” and he is so combative, we will argue. But once he says “yes” it is “yes”. This is a different person.”    

Al-Sheriff dan Koko