Terrorism in Nigeria: Head or Tail, the Government Losses!

By

Willima Ernest Etim-Bassey

william_etim-bas@canada.com

 

 

In memory of P.F Adepo, too convenient a death.

Introduction                                                                                                                                       

In May of 2005, I sat drinking coffee with seven of my childhood friends in Kaduna central. One had driven from the command and Staff College Jaji; the others had driven the short distance from the Defence Academy in Kaduna where they hold various command or semi-command post. This innocuous gathering was for old times sake, although we also talked about what we mostly hopped for in the future as well as the banal things most men like to talk about.

As the evening wore on, I tried to broach the subject of politics unsuccessfully. As many of you know, many Nigerian military officers are still smarting from the Abacha days when you could hardly verbalize your thought for the fear of being mis-quoted and witch-hunted, for no just cause. In the Abacha days, it was smatter to shut your trap and think no thoughts. 

Invariably and as nightfall fast approached, our conversation drifted to international politics and conflict, and since I was keen to discuss the crises in the Nigerdelta to get a feel of what they thought, I broached the subject subtly, but still got not response. Finally, I had given up on trying to make my own friends uncomfortable through broaching discomforting themes.

However, I must have sown a seed for just before we departed, one from my group of friends, a Major whom I consider one of the most rational minds in the Nigerian military decided to “enlighten” me a little on challenges to resolving the Nigerdelta conflict.

In my friend’s opinion, President Obasanjo was neither dismissive not too disconnected to understand the challenges faced by the Nigerdelta people. However, he argued that there were too many dimensions to contend with in resolving the Nigerdelta conflict.  A peeve of his was the huge cultural dilemma, which the government and oil companies were tired of grappling with.

For twenty minutes, I sat back and listened to how “attempts” were made by the federal government and the oil companies operating in the Nigerdelta area to facilitate capacity building and socio-infrastructural development. I was in informed, that all these attempts often came to naught because the communities seemed to disagree amongst each other in deciding where to site projects etc. Invariably, his central argument was that as a result of these inter-communal squabbles, little will be achieved developmentally in the Nigerdelta area for the foreseeable future.

I had started debating my friend whom I hold in the highest intellectual esteem. However, he was dismissive of my rather “theoretical approach and take”, and I was not willing to engage in a non-polemic argument. In truth, my friend shut me up by insisting that the Nigerdelta conflict was too complex for my “theoretical methodologies” to resolve. 

There was no need to debate or argue further, my final take was that it was only a matter of time before the Niger-delta conflict found a rallying point, acquired adequate funding alongside a degree of sophistication. At that point, Nigerian’s and indeed the world would listen to the Nigerdelta people.  I guess the connection here was my own late fathers moral crusade against the corrupt rulership of Governor Essuene in the old Cross River state, which bore little dividence until he changed strategy and harassed the state government through publications in his Nigerian Peoples Press. 

Fast forward to February of 2006, I am sitting through a terrorism and security seminar in some non-descript research centre when news of the kidnapped oil workers in Nigeria broke through the airwaves. “"They get nothing out of the oil, and they produce all of the oil…they’re tired of it, so they're going to fight, and they're going to fight until death." That is the headline around the world; the insurgents have won the strategic battle I thought, someone will finally listen and not be dismissive of them again.

For me, it was a déjà vu of sort, my mind raced back to that dusty evening of May 2005 in Kaduna, and my conversation with my dear friend. I guess my words were proverbial for the government of President. Obasanjo is obviously faced with its biggest challenge to date, the phenomenon called terrorism presents a totally distinct challenge such as Nigeria has never faced before. Do not get me wrong; the Nigerdelta insurgency is not the creation of President Obsanajo’s government, invariably, all Nigerians are guilty of relegating the Nigerdelta conflict to the background while enjoying the benefit of the oil being drilled in the Nigerdelta area.

A question of terminology: Terrorism vs. Insurgency

Unsurprisingly, I use the term insurgents in reference to The Movement for the Emancipation of the Nigerdelta –MEND, because terrorism, the term preferred by the Nigerian government is nothing but an adjunct in an insurgency -insurgents often adopt terrorist tactics till they are able to wage a real war of insurgency. Besides, what –MEND is currently doing is what good insurgents do. That is, fight un-conventionally using the method of terrorism, which places high premium on the psychological impact it exerts on its target audience to attract media attention to their cause and objectives.

Defining Terrorism

Before I run ahead of myself, I need to define my terms and themes to ensure clarity and understanding, for I am a neo-classical realist as well as a student of strategy. What necessitates the definition of term is the need for an understanding of amongst other what terrorism really is and why it is difficult to win a war against groups who employ terrorism as a tactic.

Nigeria will be the central theme of this article, because it is “awa” Nigeria that is caught in a conflict in my humble opinion I think she can never win. But, lets however start with trying to understand what terrorism really is. So, what is terrorism and is there a definition for terrorism?

Alongside the unstructured nature and irregular tactics of groups who employ terrorism as a tactic, one of the major challenges with developing the perfect counter terrorism strategy is that there is no consensus definition for what terrorism really is.  They are many reasons for this, and I will briefly examine the major one identified by the respected American intellectual and political commentator Noam Chomsky.

Chomsky notes that amongst other factors, the unfortunate position the U.S. now finds herself, -a past sponsor of subversive groups globally such as the CONTRAS in Nicaragua in the 1980s, and now her recent position as a direct victim of terrorist attacks in 2001, makes it difficult to arrive at a consensus definition of what terrorism really is.

However, Alex Schmidt’s definition of terrorism which I find too technical for this article is the “consensus” working definition for those of us in the field of terrorism and security, the academia and some states in the international community. The U.S. government defines terrorism as "the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives".

In other words, terrorism is nothing more than a tactic or a method, terrorism principally seeks to drive a message from its perpetrators home through fear. It is mostly ideologically or politically motivated, and its high lethality impact makes it attractive to those who feel they have no voice or hope. But again, why should people feel they have no voice?

Critical Issues & the Nigerdelta

 

This is a difficult and complex matter for which space and time will not permit me to address. However, if the truth be told, the Niger-delta people right from the days of Isaac A. Boro have complained bitterly about their lot without a thing being done for them. Aside the environmental degradation which has denigrated their communities, there are no schools, no roads, no portable water alongside the lack of a functional health system. So, the emergence of -MEND is really not a surprise, it was just a matter of time as I pointed to my army "buddie in Kaduna in May of 2005.

Retrospectively, I vividly remember mocking my army  ”buddie” that night in Kaduna on Arabs being smatter than Nigerians, since I had read in the house of “House of Saud”, how a non-literate ibn Saud had extracted concessions from Aramco to build schools, settlements, hospitals and leisure centers as part of their oil concession in Saudi Arabia in the 1950s or so.

The mockery was actually the result of my confusion as to why Nigeria with her experienced technocrats and educated public officers will not extract these same concessions from the oil companies who pillage the Nigerdelta region, feed their pockets fat and leave the Nigerian people in penury –A review of Shell Internationals recently released profit figures makes a good review. However, since I am not trying to be a civil right activist, I will let that retort hang and move onto the “so what” range of questions every good strategist must ask. So, what are the options, or what will the likely outcome be in this unfortunate situation the Nigerian people and government find themselves?

Cynically put, the option is simple, it is very simple. The Nigerian government and the oil companies drilling oil in the Nigerdelta need to be more proactive in developing and enforcing the environmental laws they dare not break in Europe and the America’s. They need to partner with the constituent communities and stop mickeying these “poor bloody ignorant Africans”. They need to find a way to diplomatically circumvent the so-called local tribal leaders who feed fat on the people’s ignorance. They also need to get the Nigerian government to negotiate with –MEND and stop trying to get the Nigerian security forces or military to get involved in a prestige war of attrition they very well know the Nigerians cannot win. Possibly, they need to adopt a “Hearts and Mind” type approach and jettison the gunboat policy. I will elaborate on this.

 

Cynical foreign Partners & the war on terrorism

 

I read in one of the Nigerian online newspapers that U.S. security experts have been brought into Nigeria to facilitate or advise on how to war against –MEND? Smart idea, wrong people. And I will explain my take.

I admire the way the American military is able to fight and project itself menacingly and ubiquitously. Their overall capabilities are in a class bar none, although tactically, counter arguments can be made since the American military is sometimes risks averse although depending on the strategic circumstance. However, since the focus here is terrorism/counter-insurgency and Nigerians -MEND is hopefully only constituted by Nigerians I will hope? I would argue that bringing in American counter terrorism experts is not the smartest thing to do -rhetorically, the British are probably a shade better in these types of campaigns although you arguably want neither to meddle in your internal politics and security matters.

My argument is that the Nigerdelta situation is a simple one that does not require external security experts. Besides, the American approach to counter terrorism or insurgency is not what President. Obasanjo needs as Nigeria transits into an elections year. However, if external help must be sought, in my own humble opinion, the British model is best to replicate considering their phenomenal success in Malaya in the 1960s. In that campaign, their seminal “Heart and Mind” approach based on soft power and what we call the “enclave strategy” was very successful- the enclave strategy focuses on protecting and working with the constituent population who form the support bedrock of the terrorist group. This approach will probably work best in the Nigerdelta even if political leadership is poor and the will to resolve this “unfortunate situation” is lacking. 

The challenge with using American counter terrorism experts is that the “American way” of counter terrorism mirrors the intensity with which their military fights; the emphasis is on the use of high technology and there is a “high body counts” emphasis- a kill as many as possible type doctrine. This works well for those seeking promotion in the services and for media effects. It does not however achieve concrete targets like securing the peace, which a soft power, “Hearts and Mind” type campaign can do.

“Talk-Talk”, the Strategy to consider

Many experts in the field of security, strategy, politics and military studies generally consider a war against terrorism unwinable. However, based on certain abstractions I have picked up from the demands made by –MEND, and the fact there they are willing to negotiate. I hold the humble opinion that Nigeria might just prove them wrong case-specifically. 

In a recent conversations on strategy and terrorism with a man under whose tutelage I am. He argued that in the realm of grand-strategy, two categories of terrorist exist. Those you can do business with, in this group I am including the-MEND. This group is made up of what we refer to as the old age group of terrorist organizations who basically have defined socio-political objectives. In a second category, there are groups such as the Japanese millenarian sect Aum Shinrikyo etc, these are the new age or millenarian groups who consider themselves in a metaphysical battle between good and evil forces. These are the groups you cannot do business with.

Based on the fact that the -MEND are willing to negotiate and that the military task force commander, Gen. Zemani (sic) has wisely counselled that the federal government find alternative means to resolving the threat posed by the -MEND. I am confident the –MEND can be easily dissuaded from fighting through basic capacity and institutional development response initiatives, such as education, limited empowerment and provision of basic social service Amenities. This will prove more cost effective and sensible, and this will definitely nip this “terrorism quagmire” in the bud.

What is Strategy?

I have considered examining the use of intelligence, which is critical to defeating groups such as the-MEND when used in concert with an “enclave strategy” type approach. I have also considered examining the legal dimension of these kinds of campaigns; I recently spoke at a seminar on the Canadian experience with the “War Measures Act” enactment in the 1970s, when the Front for the Liberation of Quebec threatened succession. I have also considered examining the possibility of using military force against the –MEND because I am currently working on such a project, but because there is no possibility of a  “military victory” against an amorphous and asymmetrical adversary, considering “victories” are now relatively evaluated by the long-term peace they establish, but I find these initiatives redundant in the present context.  

I am however positive, that with the proper use of strategy, positive control in the Nigerdelta by the Nigerian security forces is possible even if total victory is not assured. Besides, negotiation or mediation is still the cheapest options. Introspectively, I am wondering why I opt for the soft power option? Perhaps, I am here influenced by my strong Christian beliefs and the value I place on the largely Christian Just War theory, which I have greatly come to believe in. But again, am I not a strategist first and foremost?

This compels the final questions, so, what is strategy? And how does strategy work here against the -MEND?

I will simply conclude with this retort and argue like Colin lucidly does, that there are 17 dimensions of strategy, so Nigeria only needs to know and apply one dimension against the –MEND, and that one dimension should solely focus on convincing the –MEND that there is no need to fight a war they have already lost. If Nigerian cannot facilitate this, then she has already lost the war on terrorism before she has had a chance to fight that very war.  

Conclusion

Truth be told in conclusion, the challenge or threat of terrorism or insurgency that confronts Nigeria is truly existential, because not a single item in Nigeria’s billion naira arsenal can compare with the brevity of a potential suicide bomber. Two things are here critical to my position, firstly, the -MEND has had time to prepare and perfect its ways and tactics. They will make things difficult for everyone, and we do not need that when we should be consolidating on the gains of the Obasanjo years. Secondly, terrorism is difficult to war against, and the un-esoteric minority advocating for the use of military force are obviously clueless of the challenges associated with pitting a conventional military forces such as Nigeria’s against an adversary who fights asymmetrically. Besides, the Nigerian Armed Forces is probably still at a 1st generation warfare level which makes it totally unprepared for a 4th generation warfare task.

On a lighter notes, when I was recently thrown the question of can the war against terrorism be won at a seminar last year, I fumbled to find a reply. Finally, a sharp quip from good old John helped me, he said, “if we had an answer and a ready way to achieve such a victory, we would all be working directly with Mr. Anann”.

Acknowledgements

In writing this article, I have been fortunate to use two distinguished men in the field of Politics, Strategy and Security as resources to draw my own conclusions that I am solely responsible for. These men are, John Jackson who was deployed in counter-insurgency operations in Northern Ireland in the 1970s. John until very recently taught terrorism and security at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst. I am sure many Sandhurst graduates in Nigeria appreciate what a “Ginny” John really is.

I am also honoured to be under the tutelage of the grand-master of Strategy, Prof. Colin C. Gray. For those of you in the field of Strategy and Geo-politics, Colin needs no introduction. For those of you who have never heard or read about Colin, some describe him as the only living grand-master of geo-politics.

Dedication

In memory of my late father in-law Chief. Patrick Fatai Adepo, who spent the last year of his life trying to reform the Nigerian prison system for President. Obasanjo. The circumstance surrounding his passing away was callous in my personal opinion, but this is the only way I can pay his respect.

W. Ernest Etim-Bassey is an Associate of the Pearson Canadian Peacekeeping Training Centre, a member of the Canadian Institute for Strategic Studies and the Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy Washington D.C. For further details contact William_etim-bassey@canada.com