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A Clean Break from the Past: Strategy for Restoring Nigeria and Defending the Realm By Anthony U. Esealuka, PhD
The State of Things or the Nature of the Problem
There is no doubt that the physical and corporate existence of Nigeria is under great duress. Nigeria is bedeviled on all sides by both tactical and strategic vulnerabilities that invites internal dissensions and insurgencies, and excites the greed and machination of any country, powerful enough to exploit the weakened state of Nigeria and strike at her. The state of things in the country, its internal discords, its corrupt leadership, its confusions are so bleak and almost unbearable that it will collapse from a significant external assault mounted by a medium or second-rate power. And such powers exist in Nigeria’s strategic neighborhood as exemplified by Egypt, Libya, Algeria, South Africa and other actors outside of this neighborhood. Specifically, we mean France and its willingness to protect its interests in Africa.
But Nigeria does not have to be vulnerable as it is today if only its political and military leaderships have attempted to rule and govern even with a minimal awareness of its obligations to those it governs. Their failure to do this is responsible for the present tragedy of Nigeria and of its people. The tragedy of people, in the precise meaning of that term, arises from the characters and personal failings of its leaders.
A rehash of all the ills that terrorize Nigeria is not the intent of this piece but a cursory identification of them will enhance our understanding of the perilous danger that laps at Nigeria’s mid-section and now threatens to decapitate it.
Nigeria, as an independent state and defined by its capacity to manage its affairs, secure its unity, territorial integrity and harness its resources for developing its space and enhancing the happiness and well-being of its people, has failed and woefully too. It lacks at any level of scrutiny a meaningful and implementable national development plan or any of the indicators used to measure the economic and social trajectory of a country from an incoherent, agrarian state to one in the process of or at the threshold of educational, social, economic and industrial transformation.
There is no one particular area in Nigeria that is either managed by government or somewhat impacted by government that can be confirmed to have achieved the policies and objectives that it was meant to accomplish. The visible organs and agents of government like the police, the military, the bureaucracy, immigration controls or customs, the judiciary, education, power and electricity, including sports have only achieved the peculiar and singular success of bringing sorrows rather than comforts to helpless Nigerians. The waste, inefficiency, corruption and total disregard for the decency of its citizens by the Nigeria ruling class must constitute the second worst crime to have befallen blacks and people of African descent in the last 500 years with the first, being the apprehension and carting away of blacks into slavery.
Government’s Lack of Capacity
The signs and manifestations of government’s lack of capacity or lack of will to deliver the most basic and minimal protection to Nigerians are clear for all who have suffered the consequences of government insensitivity, or ethnic blame letting or crime. Proof of the failure of government to meet the most basic need of Nigerians can be seen in the number of Nigerians, whom against great uncertainty, chose a life of emigration and exile than remain as citizens of a failed country whose leadership and those they employ are more interested in rhetoric, dissembling and acquisition than in actually delivering well-being and hope to those who have entrusted theirs and their children’s destinies into their hands.
One cannot transit the vast regions and landscape of Nigeria or talk to average Nigerians from all walks of lives or read local Nigerian newspapers without encountering unrivalled testimonies to the sufferings of Nigerians and the daily sacrifices they make to survive in a country that has not only rejected them but has denied them the remotest possibility for self decency and self-manifestation.
Patriotism is Earned
It is hard to imagine that there exist leaders in Nigeria who do not feel foolish asking Nigerians to be patriotic in the midst of their great dissolution and undoing caused by government or its agents. Would the citizens of a country that tramples upon rights and treats its people as cattle or indentured servants rise up to defend such a country in the event of an outside invasion or international ridicule?
“Patriotism” is a word often touted by Nigerian leaders of various stripes and often of dubious characters as a principle and a practice, which every Nigerian should espouse as though it is an unchanging psychological state in which one is born into. Patriotism in of itself is not worth the energy required to pronounce it. No person wakes up in the morning without hope and retires to bed hungry solely sustained by thoughts of patriotism. Rather, it arises as a gift of exchange between those who govern and persons they govern. It arises out of a basic human need to give in the hope of receiving. Citizens give patriotism only to leaders and countries that have sufficiently provided them with reasons to be patriotic, with a stake in the society.
It is difficult and singularly sadistic where it is expected that someone who works for government and has not drawn a pay or salary for upward of six months to retain respect and patriotism for a government that does not honor its minimum contract. It is impossible to engender or instill patriotism in people’s heart where the institutions of state governance, control and coercion have been taken over by a hardened gang of criminals and their praise singers. Where agents of government on a constant basis behave badly toward citizens than would a foreign occupying army. The recent public executions of six innocent Nigerians in Apo, Abuja by elements of the Nigerian Police Force are a productive example of the diseased state of the Nigerian union. The heinous manner of the killings by some of the highest place officers in the NPF suggests a crisis of deeper proportion within that organization and the psychological instability of even its ranking officers.
Forsaking the Problem
But for some unattenuated reason the Nigerian state is offended and threatened because some foreign experts examining the actions and inactions of Nigerian leaders – past and present arrived at dire conclusions that most Nigerians know and have expressed in one form or the other.[1] Instead of identifying the worst case outcomes for Nigeria predicted by those experts as a wake up call to elevate itself and its ambitions for the sake of Nigeria It would rather like a lazy and amoral person focus its impotent anger on those who reminds it of its grievous shortcomings and the injustices and pains that government and its institutions rations out on a daily basis to the citizens of a sacred land that God in His infinite wisdom has chosen to create, a land of great prosperity and power to anchor and probably give strength and respite to the black race that has been scarred and adrift for more than 500 years when their world and humanity was ravaged and continues to be ravished to the present.
It is not our purpose to place blame for the rapid decline and fall of Nigeria; the lack of enthusiasm among its citizens that clouds and delays its present as well as postpones its future. We intend to leave that to the historians, the chroniclers and the cloud of critics. Ours is to find solutions and to identify a national defense and security policy that will help Nigeria find itself, recover from its current drift and hopefully take its rightful place as a country and a people worthy of respect.
We begin from the premise of security because we believe that security offers the broadest and most effective handle for engineering the recovery of Nigeria and enhancing its well-being. As used here, security focuses not only on the physical ingredients and characteristics of power projection but also on its corollary – investments in the country, its people and economic productivity.
Where We Are
At the beginning of this essay, we discussed the present and remarkable vulnerability of Nigeria to internal and external aggressions. The economic and social wealth of the country – largely its off shore oil and gas assets are at risk of being taken over by a more determined and powerful adversary or a concert of adversaries united by greed or adventure. This vulnerability is more significant as soon as it is recognized that Nigeria neither has the military capacity or the “patriotic” public support to fend off such an invasion. Furthermore, we should also account that the Niger-Delta, which for many years has had to endure the wickedness of the Nigerian state, is susceptible to foreign inducements. They will be willing, given the opportunity and chance for success, to follow the direction of a country that promises them better deals than they currently receive from the Nigerian state. Would an American or a French or for that matter, a South African overture to the people and leadership of the Niger-Delta not solicit the desired support and affirmation for weakening or removing the hands of Abuja from its affairs?[2]
Such strategic thinking and preparing for it is outside the capacity of past and present Nigerian leaders. It is even difficult for most Nigerians to accept that a country such as the United States or Britain or France, desperate for oil in a world where oil production has peaked and with escalating demand from the growing economies of China and India, would ever consider expropriating our offshore oil fields. The naval presence of the United State’s in the Gulf of Guinea worries us to no end. A friendly U.S today does not guarantee a friendly U.S. in the near future. And because Nigeria has deliberately chosen to curtail its ambition and invest less in its manifestations, the Nigerian Navy and the other branches of its military does not have the means to police and defend the Nigeria’s space. The navy has not bought a major platform or weapon system since 1981. Its flagship, the frigate NNS Aradu was commissioned in 1972. It is best to assume that its weapon, communication and surveillance system is old and limited. Neither does the Nigerian navy have the capacity to survey and monitor all shipping traffic or the activities of foreign navies in its territorial waters. The failure to induct new weapon systems and technology has affected not only the operational capability of the Nigerian navy but also all branches of the Nigeria armed forces. It essentially means that the equipment profile of the navy and its sister arms is so outdated that it will be nothing short of mass suicide to send our men and women into combat armed as they are. Interestingly, at the same time that the operational capability of the armed forces has shrunk its responsibilities has increased.
Given this vulnerability, there is an urgent need for government to articulate a national security strategy that will aim to modernize and equip the armed forces for the next 25 years. Such national security strategy must not and cannot be the preserve of only persons in the presidency and the armed forces. The National Assembly, the universities and identified Nigerian experts in the Diaspora must be included in the process of articulating this strategy. In order to get the idea and implementation of such a strategy rolling we propose that Nigeria must as a national priority implement the following:
Strategic Objectives
It is our belief that it is not enough to simply articulate this as a national security and strategic goal but that government must work to assure its successful implementation. Implementing it does not require the sole reliance on the central authority’s power of coercion or to visit arrests or harm to advocates of secession but that government must work hard to assure that the conditions that give rise to the desperate desires of peoples and communities for balkanization must be addressed and where iniquity, inequality and disequilibria exists it behooves government to correct it. It is critical that the desperate cries of ethnic groups in the Niger Delta and the South East zones of the country must be addressed and corrected. These communities must be brought into the Nigerian mainstream through investment in essential facilities – power plants, roads and schools. Similar approach must be followed too in the other political zones of the country. Failure of government to redress the worst conditions that exists in our political zones especially the hell that is the lot of the peoples of the South East and South-South zones amounts to a perversity, and an invitation to disunity and calamity. Today, the call for secession is stronger in these two zones than in any part of Nigeria and the existence of separatist tendency signifies a colossal failure of government to the Nigerian family. Government commits further errors of tediousness and incoherence if it believes that it can without addressing the needs of these zones; contain their agitation for separation through the use of force because it cannot. In the long term government and the nation will pay a terrible price if it insists on its present policies of foolhardiness.
In the second year of America’s invasion of Iraq, the U.S Secretary of defense, Donald Rumsfeld was quoted as saying that a country goes to war with the army it has.[3] This point of view was widely criticized by many who felt that an army must adequately be trained and armed before being sent into harm’s way. Our position is that the Nigerian army is not well trained, equipped nor provisioned for the tasks it is likely to face. We understand that the priorities the country has and that its limited resources minimize the proper equipment of the armed forces. While this realization mutes our criticism we also experience the dissonance that Nigeria, among countries that are similarly endowed, has the worst prepared and equipped military[4]. We cannot understand why Nigeria’s leaders and elites have tolerated this state of affairs for so long despite the gathering storm. Why its leaders will chose to sit on their hands while danger gathers around the country. We see this state of affairs as very tragic especially in the context of the large sums of monies the country has wasted on projects that neither benefits its peoples or the state or for that matter when juxtaposed against the large sums that its leaders have siphoned out of the country. To understand the sorry state of the Nigeria military today it is best to examine the component parts of that military. This is not meant as a detailed examination but only to throw light on what remains for all intents and purposes a military that is not capable of sustained action outside its borders against a decent adversary. The Nigerian air force does not have front line fighter aircrafts able to either intercept an air strike against Nigeria or to carry deep strikes against an enemy combatant. Its current frontline fleet consists of Alpha trainer’s aircrafts that were made with 1960s technology and this aircraft is no rival to the types of aircrafts fielded by such countries as Sudan, Angola, Zimbabwe, South Africa or Angola.
To partially address this glaring inadequacy the Nigerian government recently signed a $250 million contract with China to buy 12 F-7N aircrafts and 3 F-7N Trainers. But this purchase further demonstrates the lack of will and foresight on the part of government to prepare its air force for warfare under modern technological conditions. The F-7 fighter aircraft is a Chinese redesign of the Russian made MiG-21 Fishbed though with improved Western avionics and weapon suites. The aircraft is so outdated that it cannot enhance the effectiveness of the Nigerian air force one iota except to conduct raids or attacks against a poorly armed militia force. The F-7 fighter plane was first deployed by the Chinese in 1964 and is only in use as a support plane with the air forces of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLAA)[5] and those of Pakistan. Its capabilities are so limited that neither the Chinese nor the Pakistanis use it as a frontline aircraft. To compensate for this gap Pakistan bought and deployed F-16 aircrafts from the United States and the Chinese have bought Russian Su-27s and Su-30MKK.
To enhance the capability of the air force we believe that Nigeria must follow a two-track process. First, it must repair and upgrade its fleet of MiG-21s and Jaguar fighters using Israeli or Western avionics and technology. This will assure that the country can and at little cost deploy a fleet of aircrafts to make up three or four strike squadrons. Secondly, that it must begin the process of creating a more technical branch of the air force and one that is equipped and technically proficient enough to prepare for warfare under modern, technological conditions. To achieve this ambition we believe that Nigeria must open negotiation to acquire sophisticated, all-weather multi-role fighters such as the Su-27 or the Su-30 fighter jets from Russia including packages for medium air-to-air missiles and air-to ground missiles to arm these planes. We believe that there is an urgent need for the Nigerian government to boost the strike capability of its air force and that in failing to do so; it provides a temptation or an invitation to a foreign aggressor or a terrorist band bent on adventure. We also believe that other areas that are in dire need of upgrading and improvement in the Nigerian air force includes:
To enhance its security and assure an effective deterrent against external aggression, we take the position that the capacities of the other branches of the Nigerian armed forces – the navy and the army must also be addressed. The navy especially is in such critical need for enhancement given the poor state of its current fleet, capabilities and mission goals.
We argue that the Nigerian navy more than the other two branches of the armed services has experienced an exponential growth in the new demands placed upon it and that never has an institution been called upon to do more with little or no resources as has the navy. A brief illustration of its responsibilities will offer a productive example of its strategic constraints.
The Nigerian Navy
The Nigerian navy, as of the early 1980s, was divided into two naval commands – the Western and Eastern command. The navy is charged with defending Nigeria against sea borne attacks, patrolling its coastal waters, including the many and multi layered creeks of the Niger Delta. It is also responsible for protecting the economic assets of the country that are offshore. These include the oil-rigs, platforms and other economic resources at sea and inserting and providing gun support for onshore invasions. It is hard to begin to conceptualize the strategic importance of a strong and effective navy for Nigeria without taking into account how important the sea is to Nigeria’s economic survival. For example, Nigeria accounts for 70 percent of all sea borne commerce in West and Central Africa[6] and more than 70 percent of the country’s oil production comes from offshore productions. Furthermore, the navy is also responsible for protecting Nigeria’s sea-lane from piracy, illegal fishing from foreign trawlers, and the dumping of chemical and biological waste in its waters. Though, Nigeria has a coastline of less than 1600 kilometers, the strategic importance of the sea to Nigeria cannot be over stated. The navy is also responsible for stopping illegal bunkering by local criminal Nigerian gangs and their foreign collaborators. These tasks when placed within the capacity of the Nigerian navy seem insurmountable hence our call that government must with utmost urgency and without delay focus on upgrading the capacity and capability of the Nigerian navy. We believe that sufficient investments must be made to make the Nigerian navy not only an effective coastal force but also one of a gray water navy within the next five years. We commend the efforts of the now retired Chief of Naval Staff (CNS) Michael Afolayan who with limited or non-existent resources and support, resuscitated the moribund Nigerian navy. We also support the recent call by its present CNS Admiral Adegoke for government to come up with the resources to within five years repair the navy’s listless ships and re-equip it so that it can effectively carry out its mission goals.
It is also worthy of note for Nigeria’s defense planners to anticipate that any invasion or attack on Nigeria by either a power or a coalition of powers or from terrorist groups must of necessity include a significant attack from the sea given that much of the economic resources and oil installations of the country are in the littoral area and following the historical records of such invasions elsewhere. For example, between 1946 and 1982, naval forces were the sole or principal element in 250 American military operations.[7] It also holds true for the Royal Navy of England.[8] Naval strategy, at least, as it is spelled out, in the maritime strategy of the United States and other Western navies, including the evolving ones of China and India, is to move from the earlier focus of “Operations at Sea” against a significant naval power, e.g., the Soviet Union, towards operations “From Sea” against, lesser, localized forces. In other words, the emphasis in naval doctrine and strategy is on littoral operations. The strategy is on projecting sustainable power from the sea, a shift from seeking “sea control” to “land control”.[9] Such interventions from the sea against littoral states, beyond ensuring intervention ashore to influence, can also be used to intimidate or control a littoral state with impunity[10].
The strategic importance of the littoral in the naval doctrine of countries cannot be over emphasized. Though constituting a small portion of the earth’s surface, coastal areas provide home to over 75 percent of the world’s population, locations for over 80 percent of world’s capital cities, and nearly all of the market place for international trade. It has been posited that the littorals are also the places where important future conflicts will occur.[11] Because of the importance of the sea to the economic lifeline of Nigeria we believe that Nigeria’s defense strategy must emphasize the acquisition of capabilities that will enable its navy to add teeth to its maritime or “Trident” strategy which requires it to have sea control to defend Nigeria’s maritime sea interests, defending its coasts and protecting its coastal approaches, its exclusive economic zones (EEZ) and providing sealift and gun fire support to its amphibious forces. Such maritime capabilities must include the acquisition of
· Guided Missile Destroyers · Guided Missile Frigates with ASW capabilities · Submarines of the Kilo or Scorpene class · Corvettes · Fast Attack Missile Boats (FACs)[12] · Large Patrol Boats · Coastal Patrol Boats · Minesweepers · Surveillance stations for both the coast and sea-lanes · Amphibious and logistic vessels · Turbo prop air planes for sea patrols and maritime reconnaissance · Naval helicopters for coastal reconnaissance, protecting oil pipelines, minesweeping, anti-submarine warfare and for search and rescue operations · Constituting a brigade of naval marines separate from the existing amphibious force that is attached to the 82nd composite Division based in Enugu. · Deployment of land and ship-based cruise missiles that will give the navy sufficient deep strike capabilities. The adoption of such supersonic anti-ship missiles like the jointly developed Russian-Indian Brahmos will add such offensive capability to the navy · Improve naval operational capability through more regular fleet level exercises involving the Eastern and Western commands · Deepen current strategy of gaining competence in local ship repairs · Expand international naval cooperation and joint naval exercises with the navies of the United States, Britain, West Germany, Brazil and South Africa.
We believe that while some will balk at the financial burden such naval rearmaments will entail that it is possible to do so within the country’s limited resources through the judicious acquisition of used ships from such countries as the Netherlands, Sweden, Britain and West Germany. As resources become available in the future Nigeria can invest in new ships. Chile and Turkey are countries that have developed very adequate and robust navies through the acquisition of used naval ships and platforms.
The Nigerian Army
We contend that the present size of the army at 70,000 is too small for the duties that it has been assigned and for a country the size of Nigeria. In the late 1970s and early 1980s the size of the army was reduced from its post civil war height of 250,000. The reason given then for justifying the reduction besides cost, was to increase the professionalism of the army and to equip it as a compact, mobile and deadly adversary. These reasons appear sound but only if it were not only conceptualized but also implemented. But alas, though the size of the army has been reduced to about 68,000 soldiers organized in five divisions, its effectiveness through the deployment of better and advanced weapon systems has not occurred. The army lacks sufficient and sophisticated tanks in the caliber of the U.S Abram M1A3 tanks, Russian T-90 tanks or the German Leopard II tanks. Instead, the army continues to operate such archaic and inadequate battle tanks as the T-55 and Vickers tanks. The Vickers tanks are also disadvantaged because its 105 mm guns is no match for modern tanks that have 120mm smooth bore guns that can be fired on the move. The army also lacks enough armored personnel carriers (APCs) for its troops. Just as it lacks air defense batteries to protect its deployed soldiers in the field. This inadequacy must be corrected. We noticed that the high loss of lives that the Nigeria army experienced in its deployments to Liberia and Sierra Leone arises from the inadequacy in its equipment and combat training. We believe that it is critical for the army to acquire the sort of weapon systems and equipments that will enhance its capability, overwhelm potential opponents, minimize battlefield losses, assure troop survivability and achieve mission objectives. We see the purchase or the co-production of such systems as necessary for the kind of army Nigeria deserves and must field:
All internal agitations for the breakup of Nigeria and the groups or associations who sponsor or support such calls for disunity must be proscribed and its leadership charged with treason. But this get-tough policy with these agitators and marginalized malcontents should not be instituted in isolation. First, efforts must be made to understand the fundamental reasons underlying these acts and actions taken to redress the reasons for them. Especially where it is found that deliberate government policies have engendered them, as is the case with agitators for the resuscitation of Biafra or for the creation of a separate Niger Delta republic. But other instances where neither government failure nor deliberateness is responsible then these groups must be extirpated as a matter of national urgency. Failure to do so will create an enabling environment for any group or persons who wish for attention or relevance to seek the dismemberment of Nigeria as we find with the religious fanatics in the north and their call for the imposition of Sharia upon a hapless population. It is correct for these irredentists to be confronted lest they provide the arrowhead to be exploited by a foreign power or concert of powers bent on weakening Nigeria or blackmailing its people and government into submission.
It is very critical to Nigeria’s security that the country must seek to diffuse its influence through the regions of both west and central Africa. Failure to do so will open these regions to foreign competition as we currently see with the deployment of more than 10,000 French soldiers in west and central Africa. The process of building and shoring Nigeria’s influence will be slow and will require the extension of economic and where needed military aid to the countries of the regions. The large number of French speaking countries here entails that building such an influence will not be easy and neither will it be cheap. It will require that Nigeria must first engage in a long-term confidence building measures with these countries and efforts made to reduce the perception of fear that Nigeria’s size creates among the countries.
To achieve this goal Nigeria must sign a non-intervention treaty with these countries whose goal will emphasize the disinterestedness of Nigeria in interfering in how these countries are to be governed. Even in the presence of pressure on Nigeria to insist that democracies should be instituted in these countries it is not in our interest, at least in the short-term, to agitate for such as was the case in Togo when Eyadema’s son succeeded his father. Nor should we be opposed to military takeovers even if its tolerance engenders the possibility of such occurring in Nigeria. Instead, we must first stress economic cooperation with the goal of creating intertwining economic ties that over time becomes critical to the welfare of those countries. Nigeria should also consider providing discounted oil and gas to the countries at a cost that will be at least 50 percent cheaper than if these countries were to buy their oil and gas in the open market. Nigeria can also target on deepening its relations with such countries as Angola, Senegal, and France in order to remove the possibility of these countries marshalling opposition to Nigeria’s efforts to increase and enhance its influence. Nigeria can also offer to sign a treaty of friendship and non-aggression with some of these countries. Such a treaty will aid Nigeria’s effort to show that Nigeria has no territorial ambition or design on these countries. Nigeria should also establish a strategic oil alliance with interested countries, which will make available to signatory alliance members cheap gas through the construction of pipelines to carry Nigeria’s liquefied gas to the industries of these countries at prices that will be 70 percent cheaper than market rate. As time goes, it is possible for this “gas alliance” to extend agreements into other areas to the extent that the economies of these countries become dependent on Nigeria’s cheap gas. Regular port visits by Nigerian navy ships to these countries will not only enhance the confidence of alliance members but will assure them of Nigeria’s capability and how the capabilities can be deployed to protect these countries coasts, seaborne trade and Nigeria’s strategic interests.
This objective should be tied to the goal of Nigeria exercising influence in her regions. It is a failure of diplomacy and of ambition for a country the size of Nigeria to have to contend with the presence of European military powers in what ought to have been its geographical zone of influence. The continuous presence of French soldiers in Gabon, Chad, Ivory Coast and the Central African Republic (CAR) though a carryover from the colonial era represents a manifestation of the weakened state of Nigeria and a strategic threat to Nigeria. Some of the presence of foreign powers can be traced to the failure or timidity of Nigeria to play a significant role which requires the development of its military and security to maintain law and order in its regions. Today, the United States 6th fleet patrols the Gulf of Guinea because of the non existent Nigerian navy which lacks the platforms, surveillance, communication and capacity to assure that the gulf does not get exploited by terrorists. Acts of piracies continues to plague ships in Nigerian waters due to the ineffectiveness of its navy to adequately protect its waters. Exploitative fishing of its waters by Japanese, Russian and other countries trawlers has neither been reduced nor stopped. More importantly, beyond the issue of naval capacity political leaders appear to lack the will and the inclination to protect its great resources at sea or to take appropriate measures to protect the country. It is ironic and also tragic that a country where its leaders callously under fund programs meant to ensure its internal and external security for lack of resources always manages to have billions of dollars and other currencies for its leaders to loot and stash away in foreign bank accounts based in countries that look down on them with racial contempt. Countries that will not hesitate to exploit and enslave them if the interests and profits to be made are discernible from such enterprise. This atavistic impulse in its leaders has led to the very situation where the country is weakened to the point of incoherence. Where nothing works and more alarming, where roads are non-existent that the state can neither send its public officers to collect taxes nor its police to enforce the law.
It is in Nigeria’s strategic advantage to seek to solidify its existing relations and to seek new alliances that will enhance Nigeria’s goal and ambition of being a regional power in West and Central Africa. These relations must be built with the country’s permanent interests in mind and not as has been the case in some instances on the personal preferences or conjectures of whomever happens to be the leader at the time. Nigeria’s relations with other countries or organizations must be based on the dynamic principle of deriving significant benefits from the relationship. It should be based on the economic, trade, technological and military advantages that are bound to accrue to Nigeria from having such relations. Never, must it be based on religion as we saw with Ibrahim Babaginda’s dastardly action in smuggling Nigeria into the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC). Alliances based on religion poses considerable risks for a country with the sort of religious makeup as Nigeria has. Even where it is welcomed in certain quarters its long-term effect and consequences is to further balkanize the country along the fault lines of religion. Its advantages, either in the past nor in the future cannot be quantified or demonstrated in a manner that satisfies objective scrutiny. It is a wasteland that enhances no one and damns the country to tragic consequences long after the initial reason advanced for their usefulness have been forgotten or no longer sustainable.
Securing and strengthening our external relations and alliances with others should be strictly based on the advantages that are likely to accrue to Nigeria from having such alliances. Nor should such relationships be based on the whims and caprices neither of the leader who happens to occupy Aso Rock nor on the absolutism of the “potentate” who wishes to demonstrate to the often-incredulous foreign leaders how much power they wield. It is not far-fetched to hear of examples in Nigeria’s foreign policy where seasoned and skilled diplomats have negotiated agreements with their foreign counterparts only to have the agreement nullified by the imbecile in power because they were appealed to over the heads of the diplomats who have done the heavy lifting. While existing relations with the great powers of U.K., France, China, Russian and the United States must be kept and nourished there is an urgent need to re-start the concert of medium powers that Nigeria’s foreign minister Under President Shagari, Bolaji Akinyemi had advanced in the 1980s. Efforts should be made to establish strong and profitable relationships with the likes of such countries as Brazil, Argentina and South Africa, our strategic competitors in the South Atlantic Ocean and with China, Sweden, Germany, Singapore, Malaysia, Israel, South Korea, India and Pakistan. Indeed, any effort that calls for the transfer of technology from these medium powers to Nigeria are more imbued with the potential for success than sole dependence on the European powers and the United States. At the same time, it will also be manifestly tedious and unworkable for Nigerian security and defense planners to imagine, if such was possible, that China’s defense technologies is a good substitute than what the West and the US can deliver or effective for our military.
Implementation
No plan no matter how well or clever it is thought out can succeed in the absence of implementation. Just as a journey of many miles often begins with taking the first steps, the development of infrastructures and logistics for a more effective security for Nigeria will begin when Nigerian leaders learn to appreciate that no good deed ever arises from the failure to plan and implement. Implementation of key decisions in the economy, schools, civic and military will naturally follow a course that runs like this:
1. Construct or reconstruct a network of road, rail and water travel that aids the movement of people and materiel across the length and breadth of Nigeria. This will also assist the much-needed integration of peoples.
2. Invest in projects and programs that contribute to Nigeria’s economic growth and manufacturing such as in power plants, schools and establishing the rule of law and order in Nigeria.
3. Need to target initial strategic investments in economic zones that will help us build national power.
4. Build an active and layered national defense structure
5. Focus on adding tactical and strategic capabilities
6. Grant defense budget priorities to the air force, navy and air defense forces
7. Focus on the continuous transformation of the military through training and developing capabilities in satellites and reconnaissance.
8. Invest in Research and Development for both the civilian economy and for gaining technical competence and self-sufficiency in arms and weapon production.
9. Need to properly and officially define the role of Nigeria in West Africa, Africa and the world. Such understanding will guide the development of a defense need and the required investments for meeting that need.
10. Need to properly and coherently define what Nigeria’s security environment is and will be in the near and future terms so as to formulate a defense security needs and investments. Currently, Nigeria’s defense and security plan does not enjoy input from the National Assembly, the press and academia because of the secrecy and incompetence surrendering the formulation of such a plan. In the updated 2005 Nigeria’s defense plan it appears that decisions and conclusions reached in that plan were all formulated by President Olusegun Obasanjo with a few key advisers.[13]
Challenges in Nigeria’s Security Environment
Critics of the military often claim it increases defense spending that Nigeria has no need for especially for such “luxuries” as a well-trained and equipped armed force. They point to the lack of a definable threat in the West African sub-region as constituting further proof of their position. But this stance is at best wishful thinking and at worse, a failure on the part of its advocates to think clearly and understand the fluidity in relations between countries. That a country’s ally today may very likely become their staunchest opponent a decade from now, for such is the nature of countries and their national interests. There is also the added dimension of non-state actors like terror organizations that have the means and the will to inflict serious and costly harm to a country. We identified the following possibilities as posing serious or potential threat to Nigeria and her economic interests and should serve as a prompter to persons who argue that Nigeria does not need sufficient robustness in its defense preparation and acquisitions.
· Great power intrigues in Africa and specifically in West and Central Africa · Active and obsequious role of France in her former colonies and the presence of French soldiers on African soil · Large presence of Syrians and Lebanese in West Africa represents a potential threat because they offer recruits and infrastructure to terrorist groups like al-Qaeda or Hezbollah. · Gang-up by nations against Nigeria with the specific aim of frustrating Nigeria’s ambition and objectives. We see evidence of this gang-up in the recent failure of Africa’s countries to support Nigeria’s bid for a permanent seat in the soon to be re-designed United Nations Security Council (UNSC), in the failure of countries on the South Atlantic coast – Angola, Senegal, Sao Tome, etc., to ratify the Gulf of Guinea Cooperation Council. · Fear and envy of Nigeria by neighboring states can cause them to support ethic militias in Nigeria or to extend invitation in the form of providing a base for any hostile power intent on punishing Nigeria · Since the civil war in Liberia, Sierra Leone and now, Ivory Coast, insurgencies and guerrilla warfare remains very likely threats in Africa and Nigeria is not immune to this threat. And neither our military nor civil security agencies are geared to fight armed guerilla warfare nor to protect us from terror strikes.
Conclusion
The greatest impediment, we believe to the lack of economic development in Nigeria and in other African countries, has been the lack of security. The conflicts and instability that arises from this limitation kills investments, scares away foreign ones and discourages self-funded ones. We argue that security must not be treated as distinct from economic development or political equity. While, we call for a creative and determined endeavor for improving Nigeria’s security and developmental objectives we insist that serious dialogue begin between the central authorities and those groups that feel particularly marginalized by government policies. We believe that no level of security can occur in the absence of internal equilibrium and harmony.
Finally, we call upon the Obasanjo government to release the recently updated National Defense Plan for Nigeria for public review and debate. We think that such review will enhance the defense plan and possibly help fortify areas that were overlooked in its development.
The writer is the Director of the Center for the Study of African Security and Economic Development, a recently formed think-tank based in Madison, Wisconsin. He can be reached at esealuka@ahcip.org
[1] See the U.S. National Intelligence Council estimate on the potential breakup of Nigeria in 15 years, published in May 2005. The report can be accessed by going to this website www.cia.gov/nic/confreports_africa [2] For persons who doubt the likelihood of such an invasion for resources we refer them to the 1975 report for the U.S. Committee on Foreign Relations titled “Oil Fields as Military Objectives: A Feasibility Study”. The report argues that potential targets for the U.S. should include Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Venezuela, Libya and Nigeria because the militaries of these countries were “quantitatively and qualitatively inferior and could be swiftly crushed. [3] See the Washington Post of November 24, 2004 [4] We invite readers to examine the military balance of such countries as Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Angola, Sudan, South Africa, Ethiopia or Malaysia, to see how Nigeria lags in its defense priorities. [5] See www.sinodefense.com We invite readers to review the military posture of such countries as Algeria, Sudan, Angola, South Africa, Malaysia for a fuller understanding of Nigeria’s lack of preparation for its defense [6] See Wikipedia, www.wikipedia.org, Nigerian Navy, p.4 [7] See James D. Watkins (Admiral USN) “The Maritime Strategy”, U.S Naval Institute Proceedings, Maritime Strategy Supplement January 1986, P.5.
[8]Also, the United Kingdom, Ministry of Defence, “The Royal Navy: incidents 1945-1963”, and “The Royal Navy in the Post War Years: Royal Navy and Royal Marines Operational Deployments 1964-1996”.
[9] See United States White Papers, “From the Sea”, and “Forward from the Sea”.
[10] The United States Navy defines littoral areas and “from the sea” actions against them as comprising of two fundamental elements, “seaward”- which is the area from the open ocean to the shore which must be controlled to support operations at shore and “landward” – the area inland from shore that can be supported and defended directly from the sea.
[11] See United States Marine Corp concept paper, “Operational Maneuver from the Sea” and U.S Naval Doctrine publication (NDP) 1. [12] It is important to record here that Nigeria’s currently naval strategy or at least, aspects of it, as recounted by its present CNS calls for more use and deployment of FAC around frigates as its naval battle order. FACs are cheap and small platforms compared to destroyers or frigates and can carry effective strike punch when equipped with missiles and or torpedoes. Used in large numbers and at night in close quarters, they can hold their own against larger boats like destroyers or frigates. Their limitations are that they do not operate far from the shore. [13] Senate President, Ken Nnamani calls for Senate input and approval of Nigeria’s defense plan paper as reported in the Nigerian Guardian of September 17, 2005.
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