ETHNO-RELIGIOUS CONFLICTS IN NORTH-WESTERN NIGERIA; MYTH AND REALITY

BY

SULAIMAN KHALID, PhD.

Department of Sociology

USMANU Danfodiyo University,

Sokoto. Nigeria

e-mail:-sulkhalid@yahoo.co.uk

1.         Introduction

 “Peoples and countries with similar cultures are coming together. People and countries with different cultures are coming apart. Alignments defined by ideology and super power relations are giving way to alignments defined by culture and civilization. Political boundaries increasingly are redrawn to coincide with cultural areas: ethnic, religious and civilizational……The question “which side are you on?” has been replaced by the much more fundamental one, “who are you?” every state has to have an answer. That answer, its cultural identity, defines the states place in world politics, its friends, and its enemies” (Huntington, 1997).

Today, inter-state conflicts are relatively rare, but the numbers of internal wars within a given state are increasing. Throughout the African continent, the nation is finding it difficult and or impossible to co-exist with the state. Nationalist, regionalist, ethnic and religious sentiments are rising, and the state is being challenged by these forces. The result of this development on humankind is devastating. Violent conflicts in various degrees of intensity rage with massive social, economic and humanitarian consequences.

Terms such as pogrom, genocide, ethnocide and ethnic cleansing are becoming common adjectives for describing communal conflicts in Sudan, Somalia, Burundi, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Nigeria , Cote d’ Ivoire and so on.[1]

Internal conflict is however no longer restricted to the South. The conflicts between the Serbs, Croats, Albanians and Muslim Slavs population in the defunct Yugoslavia have become some of the most devastating cases of human tragedy in recent history. Most of these conflicts are attributable to identity related issues such as ethnicity and religion. Ethnic and religious conflicts have on many occasions challenged the territorial unity of Nigerian’s federation. Northern Nigeria in particular has, since 1980, remained the theatre of armed communal conflicts which resulted in widespread destruction, thousand of deaths, and enormous property losses.

In spite of the various remedies proposed and tried, ethno-religious conflicts have not only remained a recurring feature of the country’s socio-political scene, but it has in recent times assumed a frightening dimension in various parts of the region. The perennial occurrence of the problem does suggest the inadequacies of both the prevailing intellectual analysis and prognosis of the problem as well as the remedies proposed and tried so far.

2.         ETHNO-RELIGIOUS CONFLICTS IN NORTH-WESTERN NIGERIA

Violent communal clashes in Northern Nigeria have characterized relations between the Hausa-Fulani and Kataf, Kuteb and Jukun, Hausa-Fulani and Mambilla, the Jukum and Tiv, the pastoralist and farmers. These conflicts are labeled ‘ethno-religious because what we normally call religious conflicts here often has ethnic, political and economic undertones, while the so-called ethnic conflicts have often been complicated by religious, political and many other social factors and considerations. Among the most widely reported ethno-religious conflict that occurred in the region are: the Maitatsine religious revolt (Kano, 1980), the Muslim-Christian conflict (Kano, 1982), the Kafanchan crisis (Kaduna state, 1987), the Zangon-Kataf Muslim-Christian conflict (Kaduna, 1992), the Sabon-Gari market disturbances (Kano, 1995), and the Sharia-inspired Muslim-Christian violence, episode I and II (Kaduna and Sokoto states, 2000). 

It could be observed that most of the ethno-religious conflicts in northern Nigeria occur in the North-West geo-political zone. It is against this background that this paper will limit its focus and analysis to this zone.  

3.         NORTH-WEST ZONE:-SOME BACKGROUND INFORMATION

The North-West zone of Nigeria consists of Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Sokoto and Zamfara States. These seven states were originally part of defunct Northern region.

The North-West is one of the largest and most populated of the six geopolitical zones in Nigeria. It occupies a total land mass of 216,065 square kilometers, and going by the F.G.N. Gazette No. 25 Vol. 84 of 15^th April 1997 the zone has a total population of 22,913,322, representing 25.75 percent of the total Nigeria  population. This indicates that one out of every four Nigerian lives in the area.

The North-West is the home of ancient Hausa states of Daura, Gobir, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Zamfara and Zazzau, which were brought under a common political umbrella by the 19^th century jihad led by Usman Bin Fodio. Numerically, the Hausa speaking people dominate the zone and, along with the Yoruba-speaking and Igbo-speaking people they dominate the Nigerian political and economic life. However, far greater linguistic and ethnic groups are to be found in the area. They include the Fulani, Zabarmawa, Dakarkari, Kambari, Gungawa, Dandawa, Dukkawa, Kaje, Kataf, Gwari, etc. Hausa is however, the language that is spoken by almost every person in the zone. Hausa identity hinges upon not only language but also on religion, “since a true ‘Bahaushe’ (Hausa man) is a Muslim” (Philips, 1989:40). Hausa speakers who maintain their pre-Islamic beliefs are referred to as “Maguzawa’ (sing. ‘Bamaguje)’ and one common means of expressing conversion to Islam is “Na zama Bahaushe” (lit. ‘I became a Hausa) (ibid). Thus, Hausa ethnic identity is a complex of variables involving not only language but also religion and even descent.

Islam is the dominant religion in the North-West particularly among the Fulani, Hausas, Zabarmawas and Dandawas. Some groups from the Southern part of Nigeria also practice Christianity. There are also pockets of practitioners of traditional religion all over the zone and across ethnic divide.

Agriculture is the dominant occupation of the people of the North-West. Subsistence crops include millet, guinea-corn, rice, maize and yams; cash crops peanuts, cotton, tobacco and gum Arabic. The Hausas in particular are often farmers/traders rather than exclusively peasant cultivators. Thus, it is common for the people to engage in some kind of craft or trade during the dry season.

The North-West has produced most of the political leaders of modern day Nigeria, Ahmadu Bello (Sardauna) Murtala Muhammad, Shehu Aliyu Shagari, Muhammad Buhari and Sani Abacha. Its political stature notwithstanding, the zone today, occupies the unenviable position of the most backward area in the country. The incidence of poverty, ignorance, disease, squalor, poor diets and shelter is more pronounced in the North-West than in any other part of Nigeria.

The National Consumer Survey, reported that the average expenditure per month for the country as of 2001 was N4,058. Out of the country’s six geopolitical zones[2], the North-West zone had the least figure of N2, 942. The zone also recorded the lowest figure of household income of N3, 769 while the highest figure of N7,213 came from the Southern zone. The level of poverty is also striking; about 54 percent of the inhabitants live below the poverty datum line, second only to the North-East zone. The zone has also the least access to education. With over 25 percent of the country’s population the zone could not account for 1 percent of the total candidates eligible for admission into Nigerian Universalities as at 2000 (JAMB; UME Report: 2000). Household survey also showed that 73 percent of the male population in the North-West has not attended Western-type school, compared with 18 percent in the South-West; amongst females, the figure are 80 and 30 percent respectively (Word Bank Report, 1998). 

The children of this zone are much more undernourished than children from other geo-political zones of this country. According to the UNDP (1997) 50.4% of children under five in the North-West zone are stunted largely due to poor nutrition, while that of the South-East is 36.6% and 35.6% in the South-East. Instances of death by avoidable diseases in the North-West are higher than places recognized as poorest in the world. The GNP of the zone is lower than Mali and Burkina Faso, nations regarded as among the poorest on the planet earth.

3.0       THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS FOR ETHNO-RELIGIOUS CONFLICTS

3.1       ETHNICITY AND IDENTITY

Basic identity-related factor such as religious and ethnic affiliation are often of fundamental importance to the psychic and moral well being of communities. Many of today’s functioning multi cultural societies such as Canada, Australia and the United States have built their success on being a melting pot of many different cultures and religion (international IDEA, 1998:30). However, such diversity can be as threatening as they are energizing. As Osaghae (1994) has put it: “the experiences of Balkan regions and the defunct Soviet union is pointer to the damaging impact of ethno-religious conflict on national cohesion” (p. 34).

In view of this, it is needful to kick off the theoretical discussion with a conceptual clarification of the term ethnicity. There is no universally acceptable definition of ethnicity: sociologically, ethnic group is defined as a collectively of people who share the same primordial characteristics such as common ancestry language and culture. Ethnicity then refers to the behaviour and feeling (about oneself and others) that supposedly emanates from membership of an ethnic group (Assefa, 1996; Egwu, 1999). Thus an ethnic group is not a mere aggregate of people but a self conscious collection of people united, or closely related by shaved experiences and a common history. Ethnic conflict has therefore come to mean cleavages between groups based on differentiations in ethnic identities. In this sense, few states (such as Somalia) are ethnically homogenous and many are poly-ethnic in composition.     

It is however wrong to assume that those who share a common ancestry, language, culture, and religion should have a relationship of solidarity and harmony with each other but one of cleavage and conflict with those who do not share their ethnic identity. Ethnic similarity in Somalia has not assured social harmony nor avoided the outbreaks of large scale conflict. In Somalia there is great deal of evidence that an ethnic group divided into lower-level identities and fought each other with as much zeal as they might fight other ethnic groups. Alternatively, there are also societies in the region where ethnic diversity has not been a prescription for violent conflict (Assefa, 1996:32-5).

Egwu (1999) identified five major characteristics of ethnicity. First, ethnicity involves contextual discrimination and exclusive practices and claims which seek to edge out members of other ethnic groups. It thus fosters and grows on the common conscious ness of being one in relation to others. Built into the concept therefore is the in-group/out-group or “we” versus ‘them’ reference. The second important attribute relates to the conflict generating nature of the phenomenon because it is essentially a tool of competition for individuals and groups for scarce public goods. It is this conflictual nature that presents it as a negative and reactionary force in the social process. The third deals with the fact it is primarily a political phenomenon in so far as it deals with the central issue of “authoritative allocation of values”. For this reason it is a state-linked category rather than an archaic survival mechanism of the African people. Fourthly, ethnicity interacts closely with other cleavages such as class and religion. They cross-cut and interpenetrate at various levels of the social formation resulting in some complexity that can compound the analyst. As a form of consciousness, it can hardly exist in a pure form. Indeed, “as a social phenomena, it converges, by imperceptible steps, with related yet distinct phenomena that it is difficult to draw the line” (Yingar, 1994:3) The final issue here is the situational character of ethnicity Group definitions, identities and alliances are not fixed or static as all these are contingent on what is at stake, the size of resources involved and the strategy which the interest bearers may choose out of several alternatives.   

Several explanations have been proffered for the emergence and persistence of ethno-religious conflict in the society. In the first place conflicts portend the presence of instability in the society. The latter is related to, or proceed from, the rules governing organizational process in the society (Dudley: 1973:10). In studying conflicts, Obserchall (1978:107) emphasizes opposing goals of interdependent parties “such that the probability of goal attainment for one decreases as the probability of goal attainment for the other increases”. Obserchall sees conflicts, as encompassing class, racial, religious and communal conflicts riots, rebellions, strikes and civil disorders, marches, demonstrations, protest gatherings and the like”. (P.291).

Many conditions are linked to rise of conflicts. The key ones, according to Bande (1998) are:. a. Differences in economic structure; b. Values; c. Changes in times difference issues generate controversy at different time; d. Population shifts and heterogeneous values; and e. Existing cleavages in the residuum of past controversy.

According to Nnoli (1989), the persistence of ethnic problem in Africa is linked to the failure of democracy:-

There is a democratic side to the ethnic question in Africa. It concerns the right of each group to be treated equally with all the others, for their members to be secure in their lives and property, from arbitrary arrest and punishment, and for them to enjoy equal opportunity in trade, business, employment, schooling and enjoyment of social amenities (Nnoli, 1989:206).

In conflictual political situations, ethnic, cultural, religious and other identity differences are less pronounced than is often assumed even if it looms large in the imagination.

“What is important is the initiation of and subsequent accumulation of acts of mutual punishment, deprivation and destruction of groups which builds up hate memories and a self perpetuating and punishment as groups, however defined, accumulate the fear that they could be annihilated. (Ibrahim, 1999:6).

Somalia, Rwanda, Burundi and Yugoslavia are a very good example of this process. Ibrahim (1999) is of the view that it is necessary to rehabilitate the analysis of the state in understanding extreme forms of identity conflicts. This is the because the legitimacy of the modern state is linked to its capacity to present itself as a provider of necessary public goods and more important, a neutral arbiter arbiter that guarantees the security of all sections of society. When the state is generally perceived as serving the particularistic interest of one group, it starts losing its legitimacy, and indeed, its authority. As state capacity declines, fear of “the other” rises and because an objective factors of survival and people are forced to resort to other levels of solidarity-religious, ethnic, regional etc. in search of security.

With particular reference to Nigeria, cultural identity, economic factors and politics are important elements in ethnic conflict. As Nnoli (1982; 1994) has observed, many an ethnic conflict can be explained not in terms of the mere contact between different ethnic groups but by the competition between them, one that makes a particular group to consider the other as “stranger” or “parasites”. The forcible incorporation of ‘incompatible’ culture groups by the colonial masters as exemplified in the works of Schwarz (1965) and Olurunsola (1977) is another explanation preferred for ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria. Osaghae (1994) and Usman (1986) on the other hand traced the emergence and, particularly, the persistence of ethnic antagonism to the manipulation of ethnicity and religions by elites in their competition for economic resources and political power. According to this line of argument, because of the centralization of state power over the distribution of resources, “ethnicity and religious bigotry are used as expedient tools by ethnic and religious missionaries”. Interestingly, Osaghae (1994) emphasized that ethnic violence gets exacerbated during the process of democratization. This is because people’s attention becomes focused on whom controls state power and, therefore, the distribution of resources. This situation gets compounded when democratization is combined with economic restructuring such as privatization and commercialization which gives room to “pent-up tensions”.

4.2       POSITIVE IMPACT OF CONFLICT

Conflict itself is not always negative. Indeed, conflict is one of the most powerful positive factors in a society. “Conflict tells us that something is wrong; conflict is the improvement” (International IDEA, 1998: p. 34). Writing on the positive impacts of ethnic conflicts, Nnoli (1994) argues that since the political demands of many ethnic movements concern liberty and justice, conflict arising there from “contributes to democratic practice by its emphasis on equity and justice in socio-political relations “(P.12). This shows that ethno-religious conflict in plural societies can neither be wished away nor eradicated and, at the same time, cannot be left alone because they are capable of destroying states.

Peace itself is not simply the absence of violent or armed conflict. At any given historical moment, what is called “peace” is the outcome of political and socio-economic processes in which actors attempt to institutionalize new rules of the game that reproduce and reinforce certain identities and interests, structure actor’s choices toward certain behaviours and not others, and specify acceptable ways of making decisions about the settlement of ethno-religious and political disputes and the use of force.

5.0       ETHNO-RELIGIOUS CONFLICTS IN NORTH WEST

Violent conflicts in the North-West of Nigeria generally take the form of Muslim/Christian communal cashes and farmer/pastoralist dispute, and they are fought along both ethnic and religious divide.

5.1       FAITH-RELATED CONFLICTS

Some of the well known conflicts in the Northern Nigeria fought along religious divide are the Muslim/Christian conflicts in Kano (1982) Kafanchan (1987) and Zangon-Kataf (1992). Since then many battles were fought between Muslim and Christians in the area and there is steady rise in the death toll, from a few persons to dozens, hundreds and now even thousands.

A number of common features could be observed from the religious conflicts in the area. Most of them involve problems of perceived political and economic domination of a group (Hausa-Fulani Muslim) considered as external or illegitimate over smaller ethnic groups (mainly Christian Kataf, Kajes and so on). And they are all over control of land and political power.

In Nigeria, so far the universalistic religions like Islam and Christianity did not succeed in containing or transcending the tensions of parochial and ethnic rivalries. On the contrary, the universalistic religious have sometimes reinforced the parochial loyalties. The British colonial policy itself played a crucial role in sharpening ethnic differences. On the one hand, the Christian missionaries were discouraged and often excluded from Muslim areas in the north by direct governmental policy. On the other hand, the missionaries were allowed free hand among those who were considered ‘pagans’, mainly smaller ethnic groups scattered all over the region. One result was that the difference between the Hausa-Fulani and the Kaje or Kataf in the North was in time no longer simply that one group was Hausa-Fulani and the other was Kaje or Kataf. There arose additional distinction that the Hausa-Fulani were mainly Muslim and the Kaje or Kataf mainly Christian. Similar explanation could be applied to the existing relationship between Hausas in the North and Igbos in the South. What all this in turn amounts to is a deepening of ethnic consciousness as a result of the impact of Islam among the Hausa-Fulani and Christianity among the Kajes, Katafs or Igbos. Thus, “far from Islamic and Christian universalism diluting or transcending ethnic parochialism, those two global winds of Islam and Christianity helped to fan the flames of ethnic suspicions” (Mazrui, 1986).

Indeed, all the inter-religious violence that took place in the North-West zone, the Sharia inspired conflicts inclusive, could be subjected to ethno-religious interpretations. At least five major ethno-religious violence took place (two in the North-West, two in the North-East, and one in the South-East Zones) over the introduction of Shari’ah legal system between February 2000 and June 2000 alone. In each instance the conflict was remarkably similar. The Kataf, Kajes and other mainly-Christian tribes from Southern parts of Kaduna State engaged the Hausa-Fulani, Kanuris, Nupes and other mainly Muslim ethnic groups in armed violence resulting in widespread destruction, thousands of deaths, and enormous property losses. Indeed only the communal riots of 1966 surpass the destruction wrought by the violence over Shari’ah in Kaduna state and reprisal killings in Abia state in the South-East.

Ethno-religious violent communal conflict erupted once again at Tafawa-Balewa in the North-East zone on 18^th June, 2001, six years after the 1995 crises, and ten years after the bloody spectre of 1991. The pattern is remarkably similar: the mainly Christian Sayawa engaged the Hausa/Fulani Muslim in armed confrontation over the introduction of Shari’ah legal system. 

It has already been noted that ethnicity co-exists with other forms of consciousness such as religion without apparent tension. Two factors appear to have pushed the issue of religion to the fore in recent times. One relates to the fact that like ethnicity, religion is a very powerful symbol of mobilization and organization. The second has to do with the persistent decline of the economy, the mass poverty and frustration that have accompanied it. In northern Nigeria, religion enters into the definition of reality where their boundaries more or less tend to overlap. Indeed, there could be a material content to it.  

5.2       PASTORALIST- FARMERS CONFLICT

In other part of the zone, communal conflicts take the form of competition over ownership and control of natural resources, especially land, between sedentary agriculturists and pastoral nomads. These conflicts are less widely reported because they involve mainly Hausa farmers and Fulani herders. Clashes between farmers and herders are one of the most widespread types of conflict in the area. The basic issue is not cultural but economic one. Indeed, this is a good example of competing modes of livelihood, requiring tact and foresight by policy makers. Land is the most important resources in agrarian communities. It is the basis upon which the family survives. For the herder as well, land is a key resource. Access to grazing land is so critical that any attempt to limit it is resisted by all. Housea et al (1995:1) have argued:-

Indeed conflict in land use between pastoralists and the farmers arise from differences in the perception of land resources, the institutional tools for utilizing the land resource base, and the very process of land utilization between the two systems. 

The increase in size of population and size of herds generates anxiety and competition. Where there are inadequate policies for the delineation of routes or grazing areas, problems arise. Indeed, in the North-West region, clashes-many resulting into of lives-of this kind are dominant, notwithstanding centuries of association between farmers and herders. The population of herders in the zone, estimated at over 2 million in 1988 (Ezeomah et al, 1988) is significant in appreciating the potential for conflict.

Many farmers complain of willful destruction of crops by herders. There is mutual suspicion flowing from this. Not surprisingly, each group blames the judicial system for favouring the other party: Fulani herdsman complain of being looked at as uniformed, so they maintain, judicial officers, and law enforcements officers generally, extort large sums of money from them, even where they are not at fault. These points are borne out as true by Housea et al (1995) where they stated, in connection with a study of a district in Plateau State:.

From the pastoralists’ perspective, conflict between them and the local farmers originate from the inability of pastoralists to secure unhindered access to grazing land………inflated fines by courts and local chiefs for crop damage by cattle track, and the burning of bush and farmlands by cultivators, deliberately denying them access to dry grass (P.13).

Farmers decry what they see as the arrogance of the herders, who think they can influence any judicial officers. This mutual distrust of the pronouncements of the various courts aggravates the problem. At times verdicts take over 5 years to reach.

Aside from what problems are perceived, the pressure on the land is a key factor in the shrinkage of usable space for both herders and farmers. Yet, upon closer examination, the two systems can co-exist better if policy makers think through the matters in a systematic manner (Housea, P.11). Many have argued as well that provision of exclusive right to grazing land and watering places to pastoralists and the integration of crop and animal production should help (A.M. Ibrahim. 1995:10). Many writers also emphasis the importance of education of the pastoralists as a way of lessening conflict (Ibrahim (1995: Ezeomah, 1988)

6          CONCLUDING REMARKS

Cultural and religious differences are often evoked to explain these bloody clashes. But these differences do not explain anything because the communities have been living together for centuries and the current level of hatred has never been attained previously. Why then have the communities that have lived together for long periods, under conditions of ‘normal’ conflict and co-operation suddenly amplify their differences and mutual suspicious, transform them into hatred and start engaging in genocide activities?.  

The answerers can be found in the impact of colonialism and economic and social devastation occasioned by the prevailing economic crisis and the enforcement of neo-Liberal strategy of market reforms initiated in the first half of the 1980’s. Jega (1999) has observed that the relatively short history of colonial role in Nigeria has created, or invented, as well as consolidated, ethnicity in Nigeria and it has also accelerated ethnic consciousness in the ways in which groups have subsequently interacted and related with one another. For example, there were no verifying Yoruba, or Hausa or Igbo identity predating colonialism. As Usman (1994,1995) has shown, the rapid processes of urbanization and migration and political upheavals in most of the centralized and semi-centralized societies in the immediate pre-colonial period in what is now Nigeria , had precluded ethnic solidarities and identities in the sense in which we now know them. Rather, the identifying Notions were those associated with the political community and centralized political power where these existed.

For example, people in the area in Northern Nigeria  where the so called Hausa-Fulani now are, did not perceive themselves as Hausa, or Fulani, not to talk of Hausa-Fulani, but as Kabawa, Gobirawa, Ranawa, Zage-Zago, Katsinawa, Daurawa, and so on. Similarly, there was no homogenous Yoruba ethnic group and identity; there only existed Igbo’s, Ekiti’s, Ijebu’s, and so on, until the colonialists invented that notion and made it to stick. On the other hand, amongst the so-called stateless societies such as those of the Igbo’s and other Southern uninorities ethnicity developed only in the colonial period, and on account of migrations, and settlements in other non-Igbo urban areas such as Lagos, Calabar, Port Harcourt, Kano, Ibadan and so on. Among the Igbo’s, this gave rise to town various, and subsequently, especially in reaction to perceived discrimination and harassment by the communities amongst whom they settled to larger group solidarity and identity, the Ndi Igbo.

The situation is worsened by the shrinking of the democratic space and the prevalence of authoritarian political order by the long Military dictatorship in Nigeria the dialectical interplay between dictatorship and the revival of ethnic and cultural identities was aptly captured by Soyinka (1996:139) .   

“Under dictatorship, a nation ceases to exist …..The only weapon of resistance that is left intact is a cultural memory. Make a careful study of people under dictatorship, and invariably you will observe that it marks a period of internal retreat into cultural identities ….the essence of nationhood has gone underground and taken refuse in that primary constituency of human association, the cultural bastion. And the longer the dictatorship last, the more tenacious become the hold of that cultural nationalism, attracting to itself all the allegiance, social relevance, and visceral identification that once belonged to the larger nation” (cited in Egwu, 1999:123).

 Thus in coming to grip with the pervasive problem of ethnic-religious conflicts, the question of the state, the massive economic decline in the context of harsh economic policies need to be closely examined. 

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