REFLECTIONS ON THE OGONI ETHNIC MINORITY OF NIGERIA’S

NIGER – DELTA REGION

By

Oche Onazi

Prologue

With approximately 300 ethnic groups, majority of which being the Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba, Nigeria is indeed a very heterogeneous society. The Ogoni(s) together with larger groups akin to the Ijaws, Urhobos, Ibibios and Itshekiris, are approximately 500,000 people of the oil rich Niger –delta region.  Whilst the Ogoni(s) dilemma remains dominant particularly in the international context, questions of human rights, the environment and role of Transnational Corporations (TNCs) are not circumscribed to the Ogoni(s). Neighbouring communities here mentioned share in the same dilemma.  In a wider context, the Ogoni(s) resistance is encased in the broader minority question in Nigeria.

The Minority question

Exclusion or the lack of equitable distribution of political and economic resources is central to claims of Minorities in Nigeria. Nevertheless, description of minorities in the Nigerian context is problematic; they are defined strictly in numerical and ethnic terms; social, religious, linguistic or even geographical perceptions of the term are lacking. For instance, ethnic groups like the Hausa, who numerically fall without the accustomed Nigerian perception of minorities, may indeed become minorities in a geographical location in which they are outnumbered.   Also peculiar but not limited to Nigeria, is the “minority” within “minority” situation.  The Ogoni(s) readily becomes a reference point in this sense, especially in comparison with the Ijaw, Itshekiri and Urhobo, themselves minorities but of numerical superiority.

The Ogonis and Minorities in Nigeria’s Niger – Delta

The Ogoni(s) resistance among other things typifies the broader struggle by ethnic minorities in Nigeria.  Much is known about the paradoxical situation in which they find themselves.  Amidst plenty yet denied basic human rights to life, food, water, shelter, health as a result of devastation suffered by oil exploration by Trans-national Corporation (TNC) Shell in collaboration with the Nigerian Government. Beneath these rests a legitimate claim for self – determination, though not in its hegemonic state – centred perception but in its embryonic internal manifestation.  Even then the boundaries of internal self – determination under international law remain unclear and in this context unhelpful. Domestically, the failed attempts in the resource control law suit and political reform conference of 2005, both bringing to the fore the questions of greater autonomy and control over resources are indicative of the inadequacies of internal constitutional and other mechanisms to this end.

In recent times, though starting with the unfortunate hanging of Ken Saro Wiwa in 1995, violence has remained the dominant means of agitation. A plethora of armed groups, such as the Niger – Delta Peoples Volunteer Force (NDPVF) and Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) have emerged, resorting to the use of terrorists tactics in dissatisfaction with the state of affairs in the region.[i] On the other hand, the Nigerian Government itself has on occasion resorted to terror, through the deployment of disproportionate means by its military leaving thousands of women and children to bear the brunt.[ii]  With these turn of events, the Niger – delta region in general remains one of the most dangerous places in Nigeria today. 

For the Ogoni(s), the wrangling leading to Saro Wiwa’s death and resultant factions within the Movement of the Survival for the Ogoni People (MOSOP), dealt a strong blow to credibility of the Ogoni(s) cause in the perception of Nigerians. However, with an apparent end of hostilities through Nigeria’s Government’s “Ogoni reconciliatory initiative”, peace seems to have prevailed within and between the Ogoni(s), Government, Shell, especially with resumption of production by the latter.  In terms of the debilitating conditions in Ogoniland, Media reports suggest an attentive effort on the part of the Nigerian Government to uplift the Ogoni(s) from the doldrums of poverty, unemployment, lack of electricity and education, with considerable investments to this end. [iii] Nonetheless, a lot still remains to be done, for instance, water is still lacking. 

Whilst much of the blame rightly rests on Shell and the Nigerian Government especially in its role as vanguard of human rights,[iv] a Nigerian perception suggests the component federal units in the State and Local Governments Councils made up of local indigenous politicians are equally as complicit. Ogoniland and indeed most of the Niger- Delta is not an exception to the seeming lack of prudent management of allocated resources that plague most of the country today. This perception, in my opinion is responsible for the failed attempts at various political forums to properly address the question of “resource control” by these component units.

Epilogue

In conclusion, despite the availability of resources, the various tiers of Government have failed to take the necessary steps to ensure delivery of essential socio – economic services in line with its core international human rights obligations. The recent creation of a special council of socio – economic development for the Niger – Delta region by the current Nigerian Government gives credence to the previous and current failures.

Finally, violence unfortunately remains the primary means of expression in the Niger – Delta, which only suggests the absence of concrete legal, constitutional or other mechanisms of protest. At present, although a relatively feeble truce appears to be in place with the creation of the socio – economic development council, a well thought out demobilization strategy must also exist alongside it to disarm the hundreds of ‘insurgents’ in the Niger – Delta. Only then can any real benefits accrue from any efforts.

References