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The Vatsa Story By Chris Ajaero FORWARDED BY DR. NOWA OMOIGUI Monday, September 04, 2006
Originally published by the Newswatch Magazine at: http://www.newswatchngr.com/editorial/prime/Cover/10904121009.htm
Here is the authentic story of the Vatsa
coup, backed by documents on the level of his involvement, his trial and
execution along with nine other military officers.
The controversy is raging like wild fire
in a harmattan. Twenty years after General Mamman Jiya Vatsa, former
Minister of the Federal Capital Territory, F.C.T. was executed for a
coup plot that would have toppled General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida's
administration, tongues are wagging as to whether he was properly
convicted.
General Domkat Bali, the Chief of Defence
Staff under Babangida's regime opened the salvo in an interview he
granted to The News magazine in May, this year. "My regret is
that up till now, I am not sure whether Vatsa ought to have been killed
because whatever evidence they amassed against him was weak," he said.
Sefiya Vatsa, widow of the deceased,
followed it up with a petition to President Olusegun Obasanjo, demanding
for the prosecution of Babangida for the murder of her husband. She
claimed she has documents to prove that the former military president
wilfully killed her husband for personal reasons.
But loyalists of Babangida retort that
both Bali and Vatsa's wife were being economical with the truth. Alex
Akinyele, former Minister of Information and political associate of
Babangida, believes that the duo was being used to score cheap
political point.
In order to unravel the truth of the
matter, and set the records straight, Newswatch dug dip and
obtained exclusively documents containing blow-by-blow details of the
1986 coup trial. They include, the official records of proceedings of
the trial by the Special Military Tribunal which sat at the Brigade of
Guards, Victoria Island, Lagos, report of the Military Investigation
Panel on the coup plan, the judgement of the special military tribunal
forwarded to the Armed Forces Ruling Council, AFRC, and an assessment of
the trial by Bola Ajibola, who was then Attorney-General and Minister of
Justice.
Based on the official record of
proceedings of the tribunal headed by Major-General Charles Ndiomu,
Vatsa and 16 other military officers involved in the alleged coup plot
received fair trial. In the course of the proceedings, the prosecution
called 16 witnesses who testified on its behalf and were subsequently
cross-examined and re-examined fundamentally by the accused persons and
their counsel.
All the accused persons were represented
by counsel except Vatsa who opted to appear for himself. Vatsa, too, had
refused to make a written statement. However, in their confessional
statements, the ring leaders of the coup plot linked Vatsa with the
putsch. According to them, in pursuance of their successful execution of
the plan, they had discussed extensively and during one of their
meetings in Kaduna on November 30, 1985, the issue of finance came up.
The meeting was attended by Lt. Col. Musa Bitiyong, the chief
coordinator of the coup plot, Lt. Col. C.A. Oche, Lt. Col. M. Iyorshe,
Wing Commander Ben Ekele, Wing commander A.C. Sakaba and Major D.I.
Bamidele. Bitiyong informed them that there would be no problem
regarding financing their plan as Vatsa had already given him N10,000 as
initial grant from a total of N50,000 for the purpose. He added that
should the need arise; he could always go back for more.
Iyorshe said initially they did not want
any senior officer to be party to their plot, but later decided to work
with Vatsa through Bitiyong when he told them that the late general
would always be willing to support them. Sakaba also corroborated
Iyorshe's position on Vatsa's funding of the coup. "Although most of us
did not want any senior officer involved, we eventually agreed that
since we lacked finance, Major General Vatsa's sponsorship will be
accepted," he said.
When Bitiyong was confronted by the panel
on the money he received from Vatsa, he claimed that it was meant for
his farm project as he was yet to get a certificate of occupancy which
would enable him raise a loan. He, however, admitted disbursing the
money for the coup plot. While he took N6,000, he gave out N1,000 and
N3,000 to Oche and Iyorshe, respectively. He further confessed visiting
Vatsa after discussing the coup plot with Oche and Iyorche to brief him
on the progress of their plot. "It was within this period that in one of
my visits to General Vatsa that I told him about my discussion with Oche
and Iyorshe. About the same time of our discussion with Iyorshe and Oche,
then myself and Vatsa gradually started changing discussions from
general to specific," Bitiyong stated in his confessional statement
dated December 30, 1985.
Bitiyong also confessed that he involved
Vatsa in the coup plot because he knew from his interactions with him
that he was not happy with the Babangida administration. He admitted
that during one of his discussions with Vatsa, shortly after Babangida
overthrew the General Muhammadu Buhari regime, on August 27, 1985, the
late general told him that he had consistently advised Buhari to get rid
of Babangida when he was the Chief of Army Staff but he did not heed the
advise. His feeling was that the Babangida coup which toppled Buhari was
uncalled for.
But Vatsa denied being a party to the coup
plot. He admitted that when he returned from Mecca and Bitiyong visited
him and informed him of a possible coup plot, he told him that he had
"thought something like that would happen and he warned the
authorities." He refused to name any person. Vatsa said the N10,000 he
gave to Bitiyong was a loan to assist him in harvesting his farm crops.
He denied asking Buhari to remove Babangida as Chief of Army Staff when
he was Head of State as Bitiyong alleged.
However, in its report, the tribunal
stated that based on the volume of evidence before it, Vatsa's
complicity in the coup plot was not in doubt. The tribunal's president
described Vatsa's prevarications in the face of interrogation as clearly
the impulsive, psychological mechanism of a person who had something to
hide. "It is pretty clear to the tribunal that Major General Vatsa, the
poet and rich author and soldier, an intelligent man knew what he was
doing. Not only was he financing the plot, he was masterminding it,"
Ndiomu said.
According to him, all the accused persons
except two who were discharged and acquitted for want of evidence,
confessed to holding a number of meetings at various places with the aim
of overthrowing the Babangida regime. And Vatsa was privy to the
meetings. Investigation by the panel had revealed that from the
operational details of the botched coup, it would have involved the use
of air force planes to take out armoured car at the Ikeja Cantonment and
to strike at Dodan Barracks. Ndiomu gave a graphic picture of the plan
of the coupists. He said: "The flurry of journeys, discussions,
suggestions to hijack the president and commander-in-chief of the Armed
Forces of the Federal Republic of Nigeria while in the presidential jet,
to knock out armoured vehicles at Ikeja Cantonment, the funding of these
journeys or programmes, smear campaigns against the president and
commander-in-chief of the armed forces et cetera are all tantamount to
levying war jointly or in agreement against the state of Nigeria."
Intelligence sources revealed to the
tribunal that between October and November 1985, the coup plotters were
making contacts with officers in and around Lagos, Kaduna and Makurdi.
The director of military intelligence later placed the officers under
strict surveillance. It was also discovered that key military personnel
and installations were placed under observation by the plotters. The
Nigerian Air Force Base, Makurdi was identified to be the operational
headquarters of the coup plotters. Murtala Muhammed International
Airport was also discovered to be of interest to the Lagos group as Lt.
Col Oche and Squadron Leader Martin Luther had inspected it on December
14, 1985.
According to report, the coup plotters
mapped out several strategies for their abortive putsch. The first was
to secure the force at Makurdi NAF Base and the Army 31 Airborne Brigade
troops in Makurdi.
Secondly, on securing the formations, MIG
aircrafts were to carry out a bombing mission on Ikeja airport.
Simultaneously, C.130 Hercules aircraft was to ferry the troops from
Makurdi to secure the Murtala Mohammed Airport.
Thereafter, a number of C.130 sorties were
to fly plotters' troops to Lagos, to reinforce and further secure
Murtala Mohammed Airport. Pockets of resistance were to be suppressed by
aerial bombing/strafing. The naval ships were to be used to bomb Lagos,
Port Harcourt, Calabar and any other coastal areas to cause panic.
The second option which the coup plotters
were to adopt was to hijack the presidential plane with the president
inside, to Makurdi. There, they were to confront the president with some
subversive documents about his activities when he was in the Army
headquarters and then force him to make a tape recorded speech
abdicating the presidential seat. Thereafter, they would fly him to a
country of his choice; come back to Nigeria and play back the recorded
speech to the nation.
To assess the workability of their plans,
the ring leaders made enquiries into the operational capabilities of the
aircraft bases in Makurdi, Lagos and Kainji. Based on the evidence
before the panel, it appeared the plotters realised the futility of
securing ground troops in Lagos and therefore, the more favourable
option was the hijacking of the presidential plane. During the ring
leaders' last meeting in Makurdi on November 30, 1985, the strategies
were discussed exhaustively.
They modified their reasons for the coup
to include the fact that they believed that the August 27, 1985 coup
through which Babangida overthrew Buhari was uncalled for. Secondly,
they claimed it was becoming unacceptable to them for the same set of
those they called "corrupt individuals" to be changing themselves
through the execution of coups. Similarly, they did not take kindly to
Babangida's approval of open debates on the International Monetary Fund,
IMF, loan, the cocaine case and the mass release of political detainees
who were jailed by the Buhari regime.
Therefore "based on the evidence adduced
before the tribunal, the 23 exhibits produced, the interpretation of the
relevant laws and the judicial summary of the Judge-Advocate, the
tribunal came to the conclusion by consensus that 13 of the 17 accused
persons were guilty of the charge of treason brought against them.
On discovery of the coup plot, the
Babangida administration had promulgated. The Treason and Other Offences
(Special Military Tribunal) Decree 1986. The decree, among other things,
"empowers the Armed Forces Ruling Council to constitute a Special
Military Tribunal for the trial of any person… who in connection with
any rebellion against the Federal Military Government has committed an
offence of Treason." And in the military, the punishment for treason is
death.
It was against this background that the
tribunal headed by Ndiomu had no option than to sentence Vatsa and 12
other coup plotters to death by a firing squad on February 25, 1986.
This was, however, subject to an appeal to the Joint Chief of Staff and
confirmation by the AFRC.
A copy of the memorandum by Babangida, the
then president and commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces on the
judgement dated March 4, 1986, showed clearly the fears of the AFRC
which made its members to rule out the issue of clemency for Vatsa and
his co-conspirators. The memorandum appraised some of the basis upon
which the AFRC took a final decision on the capital punishment
recommended by the tribunal.
The memorandum viewed the plan by the coup
plotters to bomb various locations as reprehensible because it would
have led to the unnecessary and callous death of thousands of innocent
people. "Even if the coup attempt had succeeded in eliminating the
initial targets, there would have been so much loss of innocent lives
and property that the ensuing state of civil disorder would have led to
the total disintegration of the country which we swore to protect. This
is serious enough to warrant the execution of the plotters," Babangida
stated in the memorandum.
He further stated that the execution of
the coup plotters would serve as deterrence not only to would-be
plotters in future, but would also reduce the number of those who did
not wish the country well. "This is particularly so since it is known
that a good number of the plotters are hard-liners who are
uncompromising in their attitudes and belief. There is no guarantee that
once they are given clemency they would not attempt a second time.
History is full of cases of dissidents who, having been set free, plan
and execute coup from prison," he said.
Other implications of not dealing severely
with the Vatsa mutiny, according to the memorandum include vendetta and
misunderstanding. On vendetta, he argued that if the plotters were
released, "the hard-liners might think of taking vengeance on those who
wanted to put them in trouble." Besides, any punishment, not severe
enough would lead to various interpretations and improper motives. "It
is even possible for people to go as far as to say there was no coup at
all," the memoranda stated.
In a bid to ensure that the trial met all
the legal requirements for fair trial, a copy of the judgement was
referred to Ajibola, a legal luminary who was then minister of justice
for assessment. In his assessment paper dated March 5, 1986, (See Box)
the distinguished lawyer said that the procedure and process of
adjudication by the tribunal reflected truly the human rights posture of
the Babangida administration. "It has been a trial which even though
ought to be conducted within the concept and modus of a court martial
yet adequately underwent the due process of law," Ajibola said.
Commenting on the emotional and
sentimental statements in the media which appealed to the then military
administration to commute the death sentence of the condemned plotters
to life imprisonment, Ajibola said to accede to such request would be
tantamount to enthronement of injustice and double standard. "The law is
no respecter of any person and nobody must be seen to be above the law.
People commit capital offence daily in this country and when proved and
found guilty of such offences they were accordingly punished. Why then
should people adjudged under the provision of section 37(2) of the
Criminal Code be spared in this case?," Ajibola asked. He insisted that
the Babangida administration would not condone indiscipline or anarchy
in the name of human rights.
Apparently acting on the professional
advice of the then minister of justice, the AFRC had no option than to
approve the death sentence against Vatsa and 12 other convicts.
Ironically, Bali who is now claiming that
he regretted the killing of Vatsa was the one who announced to Nigerians
the decision of the AFRC on March 5, 1986. He had said that the AFRC
"gave very careful consideration to the recommendations placed before it
and after exhaustive discussions," decided the fate of the coup
plotters.
He even made reference to the dastardly
role Vatsa would have played in the coup plot. He said: "According to
the findings of the investigators, after causing so much destruction and
loss of lives in Lagos, Major General Mamman Vatsa was to announce the
change of government from Abuja. To deliberately plan wanton destruction
of lives on this scale is, in my humble opinion an immoral thing to do.
Human life is sacred according to the tenets of all known religions;
tenets which the coup plotters decided to ignore or simply brush aside."
Bali restated that in the military, the punishment for treason is death;
hence Vatsa and nine other officers found guilty "were executed about an
hour ago."
The late Vatsa was born December 3, 1944.
He joined the army in 1962 and was commissioned February 9, 1964.
Between 1963 and 1964, he was at the India Military Academy. After the
civil war, he proceeded to the School of Infantry, England in 1970. He
was appointed Commander, Brigade of Guards in 1976. When the army sacked
the Second Republic, he became the minister of FCT and a member of
Buhari's Supreme Military Council, SMC. At the inception of the
Babangida regime, he retained his position.
Before Vatsa's death, he had written a
number of books, mostly volumes of poetry. In one of his poems titled:
The Soldier's ABC Rhyme, Vatsa wrote: "With 'M' for mutiny I get court-martialised."
Incidentally, he was court-marshalled for plotting a coup to overthrow
the Babangida administration; and he paid the supreme price.
The Verdict that Sent Vatsa to the Gallows
http://www.newswatchngr.com/editorial/prime/special/10904120346.htm
Thirteen of the accused persons to wit:
Major-General Mamman Vatsa, Lt-Col Musa
Bitiyong, Lt Col C. A. Oche, Lt. Col. A.
Iyorshe, Sqn. Ldr. Martin O. Luther, Major D. I. Bamidele, Wg. Cdr. Ben
Ekele, Wg. Cdr. A. C. Sakaba, Lt. Col. M. Effiong, Cdr. A. A. Ogwiji,
Sqn. Ldr. A. Ahura, Major D. E. West and Major T. G. Akwashiki are
guilty and are hereby convicted of the offence of conspiracy to commit
Treason contrary to and punishable under section 37 (2) of the Criminal
Code.
On count two, the Tribunal is of the
opinion that the charge is based on the same set of facts as in Count
One. Count two is, therefore, expunged because it is bad for duplicity.
(Pause For Plea for Mitigation If Any)
Sentence
The thirteen convicts named above are
hereby sentenced to death by a firing squad, subject to an appeal to the
Joint Chiefs Of Staff and subject to confirmation by the Armed Forces
Ruling Council as provided in the treason and other offences (Special
Military Tribunal) Decree 1986 as amended.
MAJOR-GENERAL C. B. NDIOMU
President
BRIGADIER Y. Y. KURE
Member
COMMODORE M. NYAKO
Member
COLONEL R. M. KUPOLATI
Member
COLONEL E. B. OPALEYE
Member
LT. COLONEL D. MOHAMMED
Member
ALHAJI M. NASSARAWA (COMPOL)
Member
Judgement delivered on 25 Feb. 1986.
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