Addressing the Democratic Deficit in Nigeria: Can the Human Right to Political Participation be Emancipatory?  

By 

Oche Onazi* 

ocheonazi@yahoo.com

Introduction

Despite the difficulty of universality and relativity or the primacy of civil and political over economic, cultural and social rights. Human rights remain a central emancipatory aspect of progressive politics and legitimate resistance juxtaposed against authoritarianism or as a means of enhancing democratic control.[i] It is in this context that I explore the extent to which human rights, particularly the ‘human right to political participation’ can serve as a theoretical framework for reforming what I suggest as the Nigerian democratic deficit.

Addressing this deficit remains incomprehensible without first setting the context in which I use the term ‘democracy’. The challenge of democracy in most parts of the World today rests primarily on its definitional ambiguity.[ii] This is further challenged in recent times by scholars who suggest the idea of a global democracy, suggesting the discourse of democracy beyond the boundaries of the nation-state.[iii] Nevertheless, Post’s definition of democracy as the “ineffable right of all of us as human beings, without distinction of gender, race, nation or class to control the decisions that determine our lives and future prospects”[iv] not only shapes my comprehension but also bears upon my understanding of its deficiencies. It is therefore its paucity that underpins my suggestion that the Nigerian experience is anything but democratic.

Before 1999, Nigeria’s previous encounter with democracy was from independence in 1960 – 1966 and 1978 – 83. All other periods in her history were periods of military rule. Nigeria is structured as a federation of 36 states similarly modelled on American republicanism with a few modifications.[v] Therefore, electoral and representative democracy is the principal form of political participation and democratic expression. Hence quarterly elections of the president, state governors, national and state parliamentarians are believed to be the ultimate expression of the ‘will of the people’ and primary means of accountability. With a systemic dilemma of corruption, emphasis on elections in the Nigerian context remains highly problematic. The electoral process remains a site of corruption and to a large extent fraudulent;[vi] hence the Nigerian democratic experience is indeed formal.  In this essay I ponder but not exhaustively on Nigeria’s current democratic disposition as other periods of its democratic history were indeed with similar characteristics.

The principal argument I make is that although the human right to political participation holds emancipatory propensities, the primacy of elections and representation over other forms of democratic expression confines its ability to tackle the predicament of representation, governance, corruption, poverty, as well as the endemic of ethnic, communal and religious conflicts in Nigeria. Hence to realise this emancipatory predisposition, human rights must overcome this formal vision of democracy and give meaning to wider participatory theories of democratic expression. Without which, mainstreaming democracy through the language of human rights will be culpable of a different agenda or an illustration of why Rajagopal suggests that the human rights discourse is sometimes invisible to certain violations that fall without its understanding.[vii]

The human right to political participation: rhetorical or emancipatory?

Whilst the post war human rights discourse remained neutral to an exact political system, the primacy of electoral rights over for instance, the direct or indirect right to take part in government in both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) is evocative of a prejudice towards the liberal democratic system.[viii] Marks discourse on ideology is to a large extent helpful in understanding the implications of these events, (especially in relation to the hegemony of the western liberal democratic states when these documents emerged). Although with different meanings, Marks refers to ideology in the context of legitimating relations of domination. Hence just as ‘the promotion of democracy through international law serves to stabilize systemic asymmetries of power’;[ix] I similarly argue that the inclination towards a system of political participation in both the UDHR and ICCPR principally intends to serve the same objective.[x] 

The end of the cold war is critical to cogently correlate democracy and human rights, especially with the emergence of what is today referred to as the right to democratic governance.[xi] These events are so eloquently described by Rajagopal, who notes that

“[T]hough none of the human rights treaties call for any particular political regime in which they may be enjoyed ( indeed, until the end of the cold war  it was customary for international lawyers to assert this non – ideological character of human rights), it is asserted by many that human rights promote and are dependent upon western – style liberal democracy.”[xii]

Influenced by the end of the cold war, scholarly writings initiated by Thomas Franck’s enunciate the nature and character of the right to democratic governance.[xiii] Franck’s elaborates that rights such as self-determination, freedom of expression, assembly, thought and religion are rudiments of a liberal democratic system.  Primarily drawing its meanmet from the ‘right to political participation’, he attempts to suggest boundaries to this right. Franck also illustrates from various United Nations General Assembly resolutions as well as United Nations programmes, which illustrate the proper practice of ‘periodic and genuine elections’ with little or no elaboration on the ‘right to take part in the conduct of public affairs’, in support of this thesis.[xiv] Others like Fox and Nolte particularly shape our understanding of the efficacy of elections and their authenticity.[xv] 

If we accept these arguments then General Comment 25 of the Human Rights Committee (HRC), which recognises Article 25 as the core rights of ‘any democratic society’, appears to be the most authoritative source of the right to democratic governance.[xvi] It notes somewhat contradictorily its (Article 25) relationship between the rights to self determination, which is the right of peoples to freely choose their political status as well choose their ‘form of government’.[xvii] These provisions maybe contrasted with Article 7 of the morally persuasive Algiers declaration of the Rights of Peoples, which categorically specifies a people’s right to democratic government.[xviii]

Nevertheless, General Comment 25 observes that the ‘right to take part in the conduct of public affairs’ implies an individual right with recourse to the HRC under the Optional Protocol.[xix]  It therefore beckons on states to create conditions possible through legislation for the realisation of such rights. Interestingly, although 12 paragraphs in General Comment 25 are devoted to issues relating to voting rights and obligations of states in this regard.[xx] It also endeavours to spell out in 3 paragraphs the parameters to which the ‘right to participate in conduct of public affairs’ is to be enjoyed.  In its broad conception, it is defined as

“[t]he exercise of political power, in particular the exercise of legislative, executive and administrative powers. It covers all aspects of public administration, and the formulation and implementation of policy at international, national, regional and local levels. The allocation of powers and the means by which individual citizens exercise the right to participate in the conduct of public affairs protected by article 25 should be established by the constitution and other laws”.[xxi]

Thus recognising citizen’s rights irrespective of race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status to exercise such rights. Either in a representative sense, be they as members of legislative bodies, holding executive offices or the direct individual participation in the amendment of the higher law, decision making through referendum, participation in popular assemblies in the case of local community issues or through dialogue with representatives.[xxii]

The human right to political participation as a framework for democratic reform in Nigeria

Whilst the foregoing comments may indeed suggest emancipatory propensities to the Nigerian context, this inclination may well be problematic in the light of the following observations:

Firstly, upholding such rights as individual rights is in direct conflict with Nigerian communal societies or histories.[xxiii] This notion of individual rights may indeed explain the bias towards institutional frameworks (political parties, parliaments and media) for the realisation of ‘classic liberal rights’[xxiv] to the neglect of ‘extra – institutional arenas’,[xxv] in the promotion of democracy. Santos’s arguments though in the context of the right to self - determination may be useful in overcoming this difficulty. It therefore may be suggested that such rights should be exercised as both collective and individual rights, since as Santos argues that ‘at the core of any collective rights is the right to opt out of the collectivity’.[xxvi] 

Secondly, whilst state reports are mandatory in the light of electoral rights, a corresponding requirement in relation to the right to take part in the conduct of public affairs is lacking. Insofar as this right primarily rests on the ability of the state to provide a favourable legal framework for public participation, failing to make state reports obligatory leaves a window of opportunity for violation.  It is appreciated that while the ability to take part in public affairs is solely not a state responsibility, it to a large extent bears upon civil society mobilisation. Nevertheless, the ‘civil society concept’ itself has remained problematic and narrowly defined in the framework of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) or what Rajagopal calls the “NGOization of civil society”.[xxvii] NGOs in developing countries remain to most popular extra – institutional site which receives attention from multi-lateral and donor programmes for democracy. [xxviii]With this predilection, local NGOs are circumscribed to promoting this restrictive institutional vision of democracy. For example, most Nigerian NGOs involved in ‘democracy programmes’ would be engaged in capacity building leadership programmes for legislators, political parties and government office holders, the extent to which they engage members of the public would be to stress on voting rights. This to a large extent limits any emancipatory predisposition of civil society. Nancy Fraser’s notion of civil society as “subaltern counterpublics” may also be helpful to the Nigerian context.[xxix]   “Subaltern counterpublics” are

 “[p]arallel discursive arenas where members of subordinated social groups invent and circulate counter discourses, which permit them to formulate oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests and needs”.[xxx]

Thus any emancipatory predilection of the human right to political participation or even the democratic idea of self – governance may well be achieved if a widened understanding of the civil society is appreciated to allow for broader participation by voiceless women, workers, students, farmers, disabled and squatters etc in determining their affairs.

Finally, General Comment 25 is silent about participation in the context of economic decision - making. To what extent does this right to take part in the conduct of public affairs include popular participation in the control, management or ownership of public goods and services? For instance, to what extent can community, neighbourhood or village - based associations, through democratic control over public goods and services provide answers to failed Nigerian State- Owned Enterprises (SOEs) or the anguish of privatisation? Private ownership of public goods and services in spite of its agony appears to be the preferred economic policy choice in countries like Nigeria over popular democratic accountability. Although reasons for this are purely not internal, the dialectics between local economic reform and economic liberalisation are to a large extent a significant factor. Economic liberalisation with its many faces (such as, structural adjustment programmes, good governance or now poverty reduction strategy papers), is itself an anathema to authentic democratic practice. The post cold war inclination to associate democracy and economic liberalisation has itself been problematic to countries like Nigeria, in that it restricts local contextual responses to problems. [xxxi] To be emancipatory, the human right to political participation itself must have to overcome this predilection.

Conclusion

In spite of these inherent ideological difficulties, the human right to political participation does provide a site for liberating Nigerian ‘subalterns’ from formal elitist democratic practices. Whilst it is appreciated that the Nigerian context is rather complex and beyond single solutions, the petitioning mechanism under the Optional Protocol provides an alternative for developing an expansive understanding and practice of democracy.  The recent but rather rhetorical practices of the international financial institutions (IFIs) and donor organisations of trying to circumvent political institutions in the delivery of programmes, such as the poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPS) are a testimony of the failure of electoral and representative democracy in developing countries as a whole. Hence emancipating democracy in Nigeria from its deficiencies must be founded on the ability of subalterns to have more control over decisions that affect their lives. Antonio Negri’s eloquent words, thus, serve as a logical point to conclude

“To speak of constituent power is to speak of democracy…[T]o acknowledge constituent power as a  constitutional and juridical principle, we must see it not simply as producing constitutional norms and structuring constituted powers but primarily as a subject that regulates democratic politics”.[xxxii]

Endnotes