A Qualitative Cost Benefit Assessment Of The Redenomination Of The Naira

By

Dr. Emmanuel Ojameruaye

Phoenix, USA

emmaojameruaye@yahoo.com

On August 4, 2007, the Governor of the Central Bank Nigeria (CBN) sent a shock wave across the country and the Nigerian Diaspora when he announced that the CBN plans to redenominate the naira in August 2008. According to Governor, “we intend to restructure the entire currency by dropping two zeroes or moving two decimal points to the left from the currency, and issuing more coin denominations. This would entail a total currency exchange and phasing-out of all the existing denominations from August 1, 2008. Effectively, at the current exchange rate, this policy would mean that the Naira/US dollar exchange rate would be around N1.25 to US$1 then. All Naira assets, prices and contracts will be re-denominated by dropping two zeroes or two decimal points to the left with effect from this date”. He enumerated the objectives of the redenomination exercise to include the following:

• To restore the value of the Naira (in the short-term) close to what it was in 1985 before the commencement of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in 1986.
• To better anchor inflationary expectations
• To strengthen public confidence in the Naira
• To make for easier conversion to other currencies
• To reverse tendency for currency substitution
• To eliminate higher denomination notes with lower value.
• To reduce the cost of production, distribution and processing of currency.
• To promote the usage of coins and thus a more efficient pricing and payments system.
• To lay the foundation for the convertibility of the Naira as well as make it the ‘Reference currency’ in Africa.

The governor also announced three other complementary policies to ensure the success of the currency redenomination exercise, viz:

• Adoption of Inflation-Targeting Framework for the conduct of monetary policy;
•  Sharing Part of the Federation Account in US Dollars to deepen the Forex Market and for Liquidity Management
•  Current Account Liberalization/Convertibility and Accession to Article VIII of the IMF.

As with any major economic issue, the announcement was accompanied by both praise and condemnation by Nigerians from all walks of life. The objective of this paper is to examine the likely benefits and costs of the proposed redenomination of the naira, and make some recommendations to improve the process. The analysis is qualitative due to the paucity of relevant data and time constraint to conduct a quantitative analysis. I will begin by describing what currency redenomination is all about and the rationale for it.

1. The Theory of Currency Redenomination

Technically, currency redenomination is defined as the process whereby a country’s currency is recalibrated due to significant inflation and currency devaluation. In general terms, however, it is simply referred to as the “dropping of zeros” from a currency.

For example, in January 2005, Turkey dropped or removed 6 zeros from its currency, the Lira (L), and replaced it with the new Turkish Lira (YTL) with conversion rate of  million lira (1,000,000L)  = one YTL (1YTL). Also, in July 2005, Romania dropped or “knocked off” four zeros from its currency, the leu (ROL), when it replaced it with the new Romanian leu (RON) with a conversion rate of 10,000ROL = 1RON.  In July 2007, the Ghana redenominated its currency, the cedi, by making one new Ghanaian cedi (GHc) equal to 10,000 old cedi (c), i.e. by dropping four zeros. Come August 2008, the CBN plans to convert 100 naira into one new naira, i.e. drop two zeros.

The introduction of a single European currency, the Euro, on January 1, 1999 can be viewed as a redenomination of the national currencies of some of the participating countries that had high “old currency”/Euro or dollar ratios such, as Italy, Portugal, Spain and Belgium because their conversion rates were fixed at 1 Euro = 1,936.27 Italian Lira (ITL) = 200.482 Portuguese Escudo (PTE) = 166.386 Spanish Peseta (ESP) = 40.3399 Belgian Franc (BEF) = 1.18 US Dollar. However, the Euro was physically non-existent until January 1, 2002 (“E-day”).

Currency redenomination is not a new phenomenon. It dates back to the 19^th century but the most spectacular one was that of the German currency in the 1920s.  According to Layna Mosley[i], “Among developing and transition nations, currency redenomination was employed on 60 occasions during the 1960-2003 period. These redenominations varied in size, from removing one zero from the currency (14 instances) to removing six zeros (9 instances); the median redenomination was three zeros, dividing the currency by 1000. Nineteen countries have used redenomination on one occasion, while ten countries have redenominated twice (sometimes, with many years in between, as in Bolivia, in 1963 and 1987; in other cases, redenominations follow rather quickly, as in Peru in 1985 and 1991). Argentina (4), the former Yugoslavia/Serbia (5), and Brazil (6) are the most frequent users of redenomination”.

In the ongoing debate about the redenomination of the Nigerian currency, some commentators have been using the terms redenomination and revaluation interchangeably, i.e. to mean the same thing. Technically, this is wrong. Currency redenomination is different from both currency revaluation and currency appreciation. In strict terms, redenomination does not increase the “value” (or strength) of a currency in relation to other currencies per se. What happens when a currency is redenominated is that some zeros are dropped in the official exchange rate at “conversion” date, e.g. one US dollar = 1.25 new Naira (NN) = 125 “old naira” (N) on August 1, 2008 (i.e. NN1.0  = N100.00).  On the other hand, currency revaluation is an increase in the value of a currency vis-à-vis other currencies under a fixed exchange rate system, i.e. when the government or monetary authorities arbitrarily fix the exchange rate. For instance, the naira is revalued when the exchange rate is changed from IUS$ =N130 to 1US$ = N125, i.e. increase in the value or strength of the naira because you now need fewer naira to buy a dollar. Devaluation is the opposite of revaluation, i.e. a decrease in the value of a currency via-a-vis other currencies under a fixed exchange rate system, e.g. change from 1US$=N125 to 1US$ to N130, meaning a decrease or fall in the strength or value of the naira because you will need more naira to buy a dollar. The terms currency appreciation and depreciation are used to describe a decrease and increase, respectively, in the value or strength of a currency vis-à-vis other currencies under a floating exchange rate system, i.e. when market forces generate changes in the value of the currency.   However, it is possible for currency redenomination to occur (pari passu) with revaluation or appreciation, for instance, if on the day of redenomination in August 2008, the new exchange rate is fixed 1US$=NN1.25 when the exchange rate just before the redenomination was 1US$=N128 (with NN1.0 = N100). Similarly, redenomination can occur with devaluation or depreciation if the exchange rate is fixed at 1US$=NN1.25 when the exchange rate just before the redenomination was 1US$=N123.

It appears that the CBN is aiming for both redenomination and revaluation or appreciation (depending on how they intend to go about it) in August 2008 since the official exchange rate is likely to be above 1US$ =N125 by that time.[ii]

What will push a country to redenominate its currency and risk the costs and uncertainty associated with the exercise? The answer to this question is implicit in the technical definition of redenomination offered above. Most countries redenominate their currencies because of prolonged high inflation (or hyperinflation) coupled with significant devaluation/depreciation of the currency resulting in a situation where hundreds or thousands of their currency is exchanged for a unit of major international currencies. For instance, almost 10,000 Ghanaian cedis were exchanged for 1 US dollar before the redenomination of the cedi in July 2007.  However, not all countries suffering from high inflation and/or are having very high local currency dollar ratios find it necessary to redenominated their currency. Some countries are very cautious about redenomination. Still, other countries with relatively low currency/dollar ratios (less than 200) and relatively low inflation rates (less than 30%) still go ahead to redenominate their currency for variety of reasons. The latter appears to be case of Nigeria.

In an Press Release issued on October 13, 2004, Robert Mundell, Professor of Economics at Columbia University, cautioned South Korea on its planned redenomination, noting that “the redenomination the Korean government pursues should not be considered as a cure for all currency issues….the 1923 German Currency Reform… was pushed through because the German currency unit back in 1923 was a `trillion' and the elimination of zero triggered significant economic repercussion... Korea does not have to rush the introduction of a currency redenomination because the Korean currency unit is not in jeopardy, as was witnessed in Germany… Asian countries should put priority on creating `Asian common currency'…Korea should make the economy more productive,…in order to heighten productivity, it is of great importance to take excellent advantage of human capital. It includes increasing quality human capital, expanding work force by reducing unemployed and encouraging active participation of female workers."

So, why should a country with moderate inflation rates (say less than 15% p.a.) and/or has a relatively stable currency redenominate its currency? This is the question the CBN must answer because Nigeria’s rate of inflation and exchange rate have been relatively stable over the past five years.[iii]  Under these conditions, there is need to exercise caution to ensure that the cost of redenomination does not outweigh the benefit. This is why many countries with exchange rates of less than 200 units of their currency to the US dollar do not deem it necessary to embark on redenomination. For instance, Japan with an exchange rate of 117Yen = 1USdollar has resisted the temptation and pressures to redenominate the Yen. Clearly, there may be other compelling reasons why a country may decide to go ahead to redenominated its currency even when less than 200 units of its currency is exchanging for the dollar. In his speech, the CBN alluded to some of these reasons such as: a) to restore the value of the Naira (in the short-term) close to what it was in 1985 before the commencement of the SAP in 1986; and b) to lay the foundation for the convertibility of the Naira as well as make it the ‘Reference currency’ in Africa.  The later reason is based on the fact that “The African Union has granted Nigeria the right to host the Headquarters of the African Central Bank when the common currency in Africa materializes. Nigeria must therefore lead the way in terms of properly aligned currency structure and sound monetary policy framework”. What is not clear is when the ACB will be established and when the common African currency (which I will call “Afro”) will materialize. It is also not clear what is meant by “reference currency” in Africa.

To further examine the underlying factors for the proposed redenomination of the naira, it is necessary to examine the applicability of Mosley’s hypotheses to Nigeria. Layna Mosley has formulated and tested some hypotheses to explain some of the reasons why countries opt for redenomination[iv]. Below are the hypotheses (in italics) and my assessment of their application to the Nigerian case.

Hypothesis 1: Both authoritarian and democratic governments may have political reasons for redenomination. Democratic governments are likely to redenominate in response to high inflation. Authoritarian governments may redenominate even without high inflation, particularly in the presence of civil conflict.  

This hypothesis does not apply to the Nigerian case because the Nigerian government is democratic, even though elections are heavily rigged, and the proposed redenomination is not a response to high inflation. Furthermore, it is not in response to a civil conflict. The fact the decision was made by the CBN (not the Federal Government) means that the reason is not political unless we are “feeling the hands of Esua but hearing the voice of Jacob”.                           

Hypothesis 2: Redenomination is more likely following a period of high inflation and a subsequent stabilization. A dramatic downward movement in inflation increases the probability of a redenomination. This is particularly likely in countries that are more open to international capital flows, that are under an IMF adjustment program, and that have politically independent central banks.                                                                                                                                    

A cursory examination of Nigerian data indicates that this hypothesis is applicable to the Nigerian case. For example, in the two decades before 1999 (i.e. from 1979 to 1998), with the exception of 4 years, Nigeria recorded double digit inflation rates and the average rate of inflation during the period was about 27% per annum. Between 1986 (when SAP was introduced) and 1999, the average rate of inflation increased to about 35% per annum with very high rates such as 56% in 1987, 50.5% in 1988, 57.2 % in 1993, 57.0% in 1994 and 72.9% in 1995.   However, the rate of inflation has dropped significantly since 1999 following the series of IMF and World-Bank endorsed stabilization actions taken since then. Between 2000 and 2006, the average rate of inflation was about 13.5% and dropped further to 10.1% between 2003 and 2006. In fact, the rate of inflation would have been considerably lower but for the frequent increases in the prices of petroleum products.     

Hypothesis 3: Redenomination is more likely immediately after an election (or with many years remaining until the next election), less likely immediately before an election, and more likely in more fractionalized political systems.

This hypothesis is true in the case of Nigeria because: a) the CBN announced the proposed redenomination of the naira barely four months after the general election, and b) the Nigerian political system is factionalized. About 50 political parties were registered by INEC for the April 2007 elections!  It is usually unwise for a ruling party to announce a planned redenomination of the currency before an election because it could become an election issue and the “opposition parties” could highlight the disadvantages of the policy, cite it as an indication of failed economic policies of the ruling party and mobilize the citizens against it.

Hypothesis 4: Redenomination is less likely, all else equal, when left-leaning parties are in office, and more likely when right-leaning politicians hold office.

This hypothesis is also true of Nigeria because the ruling People Democratic Party (PDP) is more right-leaning than the major “opposition” parties such as the ANPP, AC and PPA. It is very unlikely that any of the opposition parties would have considered redenomination of the naira as a priority economic policy.

Hypothesis 5: Redenomination is more likely in nations where it has been used in the past. The total past experiences with redenomination increases the hazard of its use.

This is not true of Nigeria because it has never redenominated any of its currencies (the Nigerian pound and its successor, the naira) since its independence in 1960.

Hypothesis 6: Redenomination is more likely, all else equal, where foreign currency substitution is more prevalent in the domestic economy. This is more likely in nations with high inflation, with high local currency/dollar ratios; and foreign currency substitution is more likely after 1989 (as financial globalization expands) than before.

This is not true of Nigeria because: a) the rate of foreign currency substitution is still relatively low; b) the rate of inflation is relatively low; and c) the local currency/dollar ratio  (currently about 125) is relatively low  in comparison to other countries that have redenominated their currencies.

It is clear from the above hypotheses that the decision to redenominate a national currency is influenced by both economic and political factors. What then are the benefits of currency redenomination?

Benefits of Redenomination

The following are some of the standard benefits of currency redenomination.

1. Generally, redenomination leads to a more efficient local currency by knocking off some zeros. When there are too many zeros, many transactions are conducted in thousands, millions, billions and trillions which make counting and calculation difficult and put stress on book-keepers and electronic calculators. For instance, many traders in Nigeria hire people to count money for them in banking halls. In Ghana, before the recent redenomination, the rent of an average apartment was about 4,950,000 cedi (i.e. US$500) a month or about 59,400,000 cedi ($6,000) a year which landlord usually demanded upfront. Imagine paying almost 100,000,000 (100million) cedis for a Kia Rio sedan car!

2. Redenomination facilitates business transactions because it leads to the use of smaller units of money. For instance, Ghanaians now pay only 10,000 New Ghanaian Cedi to buy a new car instead of 100,000,000 cedi previously. In Nigeria, we will pay only about 5,000 New Naira to buy a used car instead of 500,000 naira currently. Such a reduction in the unit of money required for transactions will relieve both buyers and sellers of the burden of counting large sums of money.

3. Redenomination leads to a more portable currency and a significant reduction in the dead weight of the money people carry and the associated risk, e.g. attack by robbers. For instance, before Germany redenominated its currency in 1923, people carried currency (money) in bags to the market and returned home with the items purchased in their pockets. In other words, the money was bulkier than most items purchased. Although Nigeria has not reached that stage, many traders now carry money in the so-called “Ghana-must-go” bags.  Most people are afraid to withdraw large sums of money (say N500,000) from the bank because they have to put the bales of money in a bag and whenever they step out of the bank it is clear to people outside that they have withdrawn large sums of money. Robbers are known to have trailed people as soon as they come out of the banks with bags of money. After redenomination, it will be possible to put NN5,000 (=N500,000) in a small wallet or in your breast pocket.

4. Redenomination reduces the phenomenon of money illusion that people suffer from when there are many zeros. Money illusion tends to generate inflationary pressure.

5. Redenomination leads to greater confidence in the currency. When there are many zeros, people loss confidence in the local currency and some people, especially the rich, substitute the weak local currency in their portfolios with more stable and internationally traded currencies, such as dollars and euros. When there is a high local currency/dollar ratio, many businesses quote prices in dollars or other international currencies. This leads to an increasing “dollarisation” of the local economy which in turn weakens monetary sovereignty and the effectiveness of monetary policy. After redenomination, businesses and citizens may be more willing to shift their preference to the local currency rather than to an international currency. Hence, the dropping of zeros restores credibility and confidence in the local currency and enables the government and the central bank to reassert their monetary sovereignty. It also enhances the effectiveness of monetary policy because it enables the local currency to better serve as a “true legal tender”.  Before the recent redenomination of the Ghanaian cedi, it was ranked as the 5^th  in the list of 26 least valued (i.e. “most unwanted) currencies in the world.  With the redenomination, it has left this list. The Nigerian currency, the naira, is not yet in the list of “most unwanted” currencies in the world.

6. Redenomination can sometimes reduce inflationary tendencies in an economy if the underlying causes of chronic or hyperinflation and low valued local currency are resolved before the redenomination exercise and if the process is well managed. This is why re-denomination should be implemented in the latter stages of an economic stabilization package or reform. Historical evidence suggests that redenomination had been very successful in an environment of macroeconomic stability, declining inflation, stable exchange rates, fiscal restraint and prudence and rational expectations of policy credibility.

7. Redenomination is sometimes used to indicate that era of failed economic policies has come to an end and that the economy is poised to start on a new slate. This helps to increase confidence in the economy and sends a signal to both the local community and the international markets that high inflation and general macro-economic instability are a thing of the past. In the case of the Nigeria, the CBN intends to use the redenomination exercise to signal the “burial”(and reversal) of the post 1986 SAP policies.
8. Multiple zeros complicate statistics and transactions and increase the length of time spent in lines at banking halls. Thus, dropping zeros enhances book-keeping and reduces the drudgery in transactions, record keeping and banking activities.

Costs and Risks of Currency Redenomination

The main costs and risks of currency redenomination include the following:

1.       Cost of printing new notes and minting new coins. In the long-run this cost may be offset by the reduced number of notes that will be printed in future due to the reduction in the amount of notes for transactions.

2.       The cost of disposing of the old notes and coins. This is likely to be small but there is a risk that some of the old notes may be re-circulated or round-tripped. It has been reported in some countries that officials who were charged the responsibility of destroying the exchanged (old) notes and coins secretly “smuggle” then back into circulation to be re-exchanged into the new currency. This could result in multiple “round-tripping” of the old currency which can fuel inflation. Therefore, the banking authorities must ensure that notes and coins withdrawn do not find their way into circulation.

3.       The cost of public education and advertising the change to citizens. This could be substantial.

4.       The cost of exchanging the old currency for the new currency in terms of man-hours lost in waiting in banking halls, changing records and dual accounting in both old and new currencies during the “interim” period.

5.       Risk of massive disruption in the pricing mechanism in the economy and short-term inflationary pressure arising from the “announcement effect”. No matter the assurances from the CBN, a major economic policy like currency change is bound to trigger inflationary pressure due to the uncertainty such changes generate. However, the inflationary impact may be curtailed with effective public education and anti-inflationary policies, e.g. ensuring abundant supply of petroleum products and stable prices of petroleum products and government-provided services. In a country with a low level of financial literacy like Nigeria, determining new prices for goods and services could be a challenge for many traders, farmers and operators in the informal sector.

6.        If there is change to proposed ECO currency (for the West African Monetary Zone) or “AFRO” (for the proposed “African Union Monetary Zone”) within the next  five years, then the whole exercise of naira redenomination would have been unnecessary and the associated costs would have been an “avoidable cost” to the nation. However, it is not known yet if and when the ECO or AFRO will be introduced given the fact that the proposed ECO currency has been deferred several times already. It took the European Union about five years from the decision to introduce the Euro currency to its full implementation, i.e. from 1998 to 2002.[v]  

7.       The uncertainty and instability that is inherent in major changes in economic policies in  most developing countries could lead to increased speculation, capital flights, drop in foreign remittances, increased risk aversion, adoption of “wait-and-see” attitude by investors and increased sharp practices.

8.       Likely short-term increase in the rate of armed robbery because robbers will flood banking halls and trail those who have exchanged large sums of old money for new ones. There is also a likely increase in other fraudulent activities and financial “scams” (popularly know as “419” in Nigeria). For instance, since the announcement of the redenomination of the Ghanaian currency I January 2007 and the introduction into circulation of the new notes and coins in July 2007, several cases fake new Ghanaian cedis have been reported under spectacular headlines in their newspapers such as “Three Arrested for Printing New Currency”, “Fake Ghana New Currency Notes in Circulation” and “Two Nigerians Arrested with Fake New Cedi Notes by Customs at Aflao Border”. You can trust that Nigerian fraudsters are already at work perfecting their strategies to take advantage of the proposed redenomination of the naira.      

Conclusion and Recommendations

Although we have not been able to quantify the likely benefits and costs/risks of the proposed naira redenomination, from the above analysis we can heuristically conclude that the benefits may outweigh the costs/risks. However, the margin between the benefits and the costs/risks is likely to be small because the redenomination exercise is being undertaken under a situation of relatively low level of naira/dollar ratio (about 125) and the relatively low rate of inflation (less than 20%). This position defers from my initial reaction to the policy when I heard about it (before reading the speech of the Governor). In response to an e-mail on the subject in which the writer used the term revaluation, I noted that “But all said and done, I still believe it will be better to implement policies that will ensure stability of the naira at the current level instead of pursing a revaluation exercise which could be disruptive and costly”. However, after reading the Governor’s speech and studying the experiences of other countries, I am increasingly confident that the Nigerian economy may derive a net positive benefit from the proposed redenomination exercise in the long-run. If nothing else, we must not wait until the naira joins the list of “most unwanted” currencies before we embark on redenomination. Sooner or later, we must redenominate the naira; it is a question of when and at what naira/dollar ratio, but there is nothing like an optimal local currency/dollar ratio and/or rate of inflation for redenomination.   

From media reports, it is clear that the CBN announced the Strategy without the approval of the Federal Government and/or the National Assembly. Apparently, the CBN relied on the autonomy granted it under the CBN 2007 Act. However, given the far-reaching impact this policy will have on all Nigerians, it is essential that it should be subjected to public scrutiny and debate. The debate will expose the weak areas and fault lines of the policy as currently proposed, and thus lead to necessary fine-tuning before implementation in August 2008. In this regard, the decision of the Federal Government to ask the Federal Economic Management Team to review the policy is a step in the right direction. The National Assembly should also conduct hearings on the policy, and various professional bodies and industry groups should also submit memoranda to the appropriate authorities for the fine-tuning of the policy before implementation. Whilst recognizing the autonomy (and respecting the professionalism) of the CBN in the conduct of monetary policy, I think it will be wise for the CBN to listen to and consider alternative or complementary views on this issue.

There are at least tree possible outcomes of the reviews, debate and consultations, viz:

1. The Federal Government (FG) may direct the CBN to go ahead to implement the policy as announced by the Governor without modifications.
2. The FG may reject the policy and direct the CBN to abandon it.
3. The FG may direct the CBN to modify/fine-tune the policy before implementation.

I think that outcomes 1 and 2 are unlikely. The most likely outcome is the last one (3), based on the evidence of the desirability for denomination and some of the weaknesses of the strategy as proposed by the Governor.  I therefore make the following suggestions for the fine-tuning the policy.

1. If Nigeria is interested in achieving the goals of the strategy as suggested by the Governor, redenomination of the naira is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition.

2.  The new currency should be called New Naira (NN) instead of retaining the old name “naira” in order to avoid confusion.  Better still, the CBN should adopt a completely different name for the new currency such as Nigerian Dollar (N$) or Nigeria Pound (N#) or any other name such as OKE (O from Owo, K for Kudi and E for Ego, all representing money in three Nigerian main languages) with N100 = I unit of new currency.

3. The  proposed currency structure (COINS:1 kobo, 2 kobo, 5 kobo,10 kobo, 20 kobo and NOTES: 50 kobo, 1 Naira, 5 Naira, 10 Naira, 20 Naira) is “inefficient” and “insufficient” because it will have some of the problems associated with the current currency. I therefore suggest the following alternative structure which is more closely in line with the structure of some major international currencies:

COINS:  1 new kobo (NK), 5 NK, 10 NK, 20 NK, 50NK, and 100NK)

NOTES: 1 new naira (NN), 5 NN, 10 NN, 20 NN, 50NN and 100NN.

This alternative structure is more transactions-friendly.[vi]

4. The date for implementation of the policy should be brought forward (fast-forwarded) to January 1, 2008 to coincide with the 2008 financial year/budget and reduce the period of anxiety and speculation. Thus, the period from now till end September should be used for the debate and fine-tuning while public education and printing of the new notes should be done between October 1 and Dec 31, 2007. Effective Jan. 1, 2008, the new currency should become a legal tender. The old currency should be exchanged to the new ones between Jan. 1 2008 and June 30, 2008 during which period the old currency (naira) will also remain a legal tender. In other words, there will be dual circulation of both currencies until June 30, 2008 when the old naira will cease to be a legal tender.

Postscript

 After writing this article, on August 22, 2007, the CBN published a FAQ explaining some aspects of the proposed denomination exercise. On August 24, 2007, the Federal Government announced the suspension of the planned re-denomination of the nation's currency for lack of due process. According to news report, “the Attorney General of the Federation and Minister of Justice, said the public pronouncement of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) Governor, Prof. Chukwuma Soludo on the issue contravened a section of the CBN Act which requires the CBN helmsman to obtain a written approval of the President before embarking on such action…the plan remained suspended until the President gave written authorisation to the CBN.” “I as the chief law officer of the federation, hereby stop all actions on the re-denomination of the Naira. This is because the actions of the CBN governor violated Section 19 of the CBN Act 2007,'' the minister said. Let us hope that the suspension will not mean the end of the proposed redenomination.

Endnotes