Babangida – His Life And Times (Part 2)

By

Max Siollun

maxsiollun@yahoo.com

 

 

 

Continued from Part 1: http://www.gamji.com/article6000/NEWS7936.ht

 

 

THE CIVIL WAR YEARS

 

Babangida got his first taste of live battle when Nigeria tore itself apart at the seams and civil war broke out in 1967.  During the Nigerian civil war he commanded the 44th infantry battalion (nicknamed “The Rangers”) and was promoted to Captain in August 1968.  One of his neighbouring battalion commanders was his childhood buddy Mamman Vatsa who commanded the 21st infantry battalion.  Both Babangida and Vatsa served under Colonel Mohammed Shuwa’s 1st division.  Babangida was wounded during the civil war in April 1969 and a bullet remains lodged in his body till this day.  He got married in September 1969 to a lady named Maryam King.  Although her father was from Asaba, Maryam was the cousin of Babangida’s school classmate and army colleague Garba Duba, and was the daughter of Duba’s aunt.  Although originally from Asaba she had spent most of her life in Kaduna having attended the Queen Amina College and Federal Training Centre.  The irony was that Maryam’s father was killed during the war shortly before his daughter married Babangida.  The couple subsequently had four children named Mohammed, Aminu, Aisha and Halima.  Babangida was the best man when his old school classmate and childhood friend Mamman Vatsa got married to a lady from Calabar named Nwaeza Onwuka (who later changed her name to “Safiya”). 

 

Babangida was promoted to Major in 1970 and was sent to a company commanders’ course at Warminster in the United Kingdom from October to November 1970, and on his return to Nigeria, he was appointed an instructor at the Nigerian Defence Academy (NDA).  One of his students at the NDA was a young blue blooded Fulani cadet named Abubakar Umar.  Babangida made an immense impression on Umar who would later attend Harvard University and risk his life to raise Babangida’s profile further.  This was the beginning of a common theme of Babangida's personality.  His adroitness at winning the loyalty and affection of junior officers would later serve him well as these junior officers would protect and propel him to political power in the future.  Once again keeping up their military equivalence, his friend Vatsa was also appointed an instructor at the NDA.

 

THE DIMKA AFFAIR

 

After his NDA posting Babangida was sent for further training in the U.S. where he attended the Advanced Armoured Officers’ Course at Fort Knox from August 1972 to June 1973.  When he returned to Nigeria he was appointed commander of the 4th reconnaissance regiment and promoted to Lt-Colonel in 1974.  1975 was a pivotal year for Babangida.  On July 29 of that year he and other Colonels including Shehu Musa Yar'Adua, Joseph Garba, Abdullahi Mohammed and Anthony Ochefu led a bloodless military coup which overthrew the regime of General Gowon.  Gowon was replaced by Brigadier Murtala Muhammed who was a role model to Babangida and his colleagues.   Babangida’s buddies were conspicuously present around the center of power at Dodan barracks.  The lessons and experience these Colonels gained as young officers during the mutiny of July 1966 were invaluably put to use in deposing Gowon.  In the post-coup distribution of the spoils, Babangida was rewarded for the role he played in the coup, by being appointed commander of the strategically important armoured corps (composed of the former reconnaissance squadrons of the Nigerian army).  He was also appointed to the new military government as a member of the Supreme Military Council (SMC).  His cohort Lt-Colonel Paul Tarfa was appointed Provost-Marshal and was tasked with “Operation Ease the Traffic” which was aimed at reducing traffic congestion in Lagos.

 

Babangida's star was rising. In January 1976, he was promoted to full Colonel. Babangida's rising profile was not universally acclaimed in all factions within the army.  Disgruntled middle belt soldiers interpreted the coup which deposed Gowon as a deliberate attempt to marginalise them.  The middle belt soldiers planned a counter-coup which aimed to restore the pre-July 29, 1975 status quo.  The coup plotters drew up a list of senior government figures who were to be assassinated.   Babangida’s name was among the names on their death list.  General Muhammed was assassinated on February 13, 1976 during the abortive coup led by middle belt soldiers.  Babangida’s old friend Mamman Vatsa was one of the first loyalist officers to disassociate himself from the coup.  The drama was not over.  The officer who announced the coup over the airwaves (Lt-Colonel B.S. Dimka) was a close friend of Babangida going back several years.  Babangida was sent to neutralise Dimka by Lt-General Danjuma.  An unarmed Babangida bravely confronted a gun toting Dimka inside the radio station.  In circumstances that have never been fully explained Dimka also managed to escape from the radio station despite the fact that it was surrounded by loyal troops.  Danjuma was reported to have been irate with Babangida and scolded him for letting Dimka escape when his orders were to flush him out dead or alive.  The coup was eventually put down by loyal troops. (the circumstances leading up to and during this coup will be extensively discussed in a forthcoming book by the author)

 

Dimka and the other coup accomplices were arrested, tried and convicted of treason by a special military tribunal.  Babangida's old friend Mamman Vatsa was on the board of inquiry that investigated the coup, as was Lt-Colonel Joshua Nimyel Dogonyaro who would have an immensely profitable association with Babangida for several decades into the future.  Some of the suspects were sentenced to death.  The tribunal's verdicts could not be appealed but were subject to confirmation by the SMC, which Babangida was a member of.  Given that several SMC members such as Babangida, Obasanjo and Danjuma were marked for death by the plotters, there was little prospect that the SMC would take any action other than confirm the death sentences.  40 officers were executed and several others imprisoned for alleged complicity in the coup.  Babangida survived and emerged with his stature enhanced from the Dimka saga.  His position was consolidated as he was increasingly surrounded by a cadre of officers including his old school classmates from Bida and the NMTC.  He and these officers such as Buhari, Vatsa, Gado Nasko, and the so far inconspicuous Abacha, would collude to form an indefatigable military cabal for years to come.  However his experience of being marked for death by his friends implanted a security conscious paranoia in his psyche which would last for several decades. 

 

FROM COURSE TO COURSE

 

From January – July 1977 he attended a senior officers’ course at the Command and Staff College in Jaji.  Babangida remained in the SMC throughout July 29, 1975 and October 1, 1979 when Lt-General Obasanjo returned the country to civilian democratic rule October 1, 1979.  An elaborate parade and handover ceremony was conducted as Obasanjo handed over to the new President Alhaji Shehu Shagari.  The commander of the military parade during the handover ceremony was Babangida's childhood friend, the now Lt-Colonel Abdulsalam Abubakar. 

 

He was also promoted to Brigadier in 1979.  Following this promotion he attended the Policy and Strategic Studies Course at the Nigerian Institute of Policy and Strategic Studies in Jos, followed by the Senior International Defence Management Course at the Naval Post Graduate School in the U.S. between January and June 1980.  On January 5, 1981 he was appointed the Director of Army Staff Duties and Plans at army headquarters in Lagos.  This was the last military posting he held before the return of military rule.  He was promoted to Major-General on March 1, 1983.

 

MKO ABIOLA, OBASANJO AND “COUP BAITING”

 

The corrupt incompetence of the civilian democratic government of Shehu Shagari gave some politically ambitious military officers an excuse to abandon the barracks for another political rescue operation.  A cabal of the officers that handed over to President Shagari (including Babangida) resolved to depose Shagari and replace him with another military regime.  Overthrowing the government involved extremely subtle operations within the military and in civil society.  Babangida and his colleagues required the collaboration of their civilian friends.  President Shagari reported that several frustrated politicians engaged in what he termed “coup baiting”.  Shagari’s ruling party, the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) had an elaborate zoning system for the distribution of government portfolios - including the presidency.  Since the presidency had been zoned to President Shagari (from the north), the multi-billionaire businessman, Moshood Abiola hoped he would benefit from the NPN’s zoning system.  Abiola assumed that when President Shagari’s term of office expired, the NPN would “zone” the presidency to the south, and he would be allowed to run for President.   He was wrong.  When Abiola articulated his presidential ambition, he was rebuffed by the powerful Minister of Transport Umaru Dikko who told him that “the presidency is not for sale to the highest bidder”.  Abiola “retired” from politics soon after – totally exasperated with the NPN.  Abiola would have his revenge.  He had been a close friend of Babangida since 1974 when Abiola was selling radio systems to the military.  Back then Babangida was sent to evaluate the quality of devices being sold by Abiola.  According to Babangida “From that time the relationship developed and he was always around”.

 

Abiola’s publishing empire was used to launch frequent vitriolic attacks on the government with the intention of discrediting it sufficiently to psychologically prepare the public for its replacement by a military regime.  In his memoirs (Beckoned to Serve), President Shagari later obliquely referred to the financing and support given to military conspirators by an unnamed “well known business tycoon”.  Although he declined to name this tycoon, contextually it was an obvious reference to Abiola.  Babangida went further in unequivocally confirming Abiola’s role in financing the plot against Shagari and using his influence to destabilise Shagari’s government.  He later revealed that Abiola:

 

“was also very good in trying to mould the thinking of the media.  We relied on him a lot for that.  So there was both the media support and the financial support.” (Karl Maier – Midnight in Nigeria)

 

An overlooked aspect of the plot against President Shagari is the role played by former Head of State General Olusegun Obasanjo.  Many have speculated that the coup which overthrew Shagari was carried out with the connivance, or support of retired military officers.  In his memoirs President Shagari also accused Obasanjo of engaging in “coup baiting”.  Shagari alleged that Obasanjo and other retired officers severely criticised his regime with the aim of inciting the military to overthrow Shagari.  Senior serving military officers were reported to have frequently visited Obasanjo at his Ota farm.  Shagari’s observations are given credence by a recent interview with Babangida.  In that interview Babangida claimed that the original aim of the coup plot was to bring Obasanjo back to power.  However on being informed of the plan, Obasanjo refused as he felt it would destroy his credibility as a statesman.  Babangida himself was then approached to become the new Head of State but he too declined.  The text from this part of the interview is reproduced below:

 

Question:  “It was also said that those of you who ousted Shagari actually wanted to bring back General Obasanjo as Head of State in 1984. Is this true?”

 

Babangida: “It is true. But to be very fair to General Obasanjo, he rejected the offer. He said no. He said it would destroy his integrity, that he handed over to Shagari and that it is not right for him to get involved. But he (Obasanjo) said he was not stopping us from going ahead with the plot”.

 

(Pointblanknews Friday, 25 January 2008)

 

Next Part: “We in the military waited for an opportunity.  There was the media frenzy about how bad the election was, massively rigged, corruption, the economy gone completely bad, threat of secession by people who felt aggrieved.  There was frustration within society and it was not unusual to hear statements like, the worst military dictatorship is better than this democratic government.  Nigerians always welcome military intervention because we have not yet developed mentally the values and virtues of democracy.”

 

maxsiollun@yahoo.com

 

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