Is Military Victory Possible in

Is Military Victory Possible in the Niger-delta Conflict?

W. Ernest Etim-Bassey

Preface

The renewed military onslaught against a motley crew of non-state actors once again brings into full focus the over-dependence on conventional military force in what has been colloquially termed the Niger-delta conflict. As if this is not damaging enough, even the application of military force is conducted in good part inappropriately because our military is ill equipped and unprepared to wage irregular warfare in terms of ideas, doctrine, trained people, organization and equipment. Additionally, it is extremely frustrating to find out that no singly exhaustive, categorically conclusive document exists which states coherently what Nigeria’s grand-strategy is for the conflict plagued Niger-delta conflict.

To “win” in the Niger-delta region, and I use this word with reluctance because there is neither a comprehensive nor acceptable framework for determining victory against irregular enemies who apply unconventional or terrorist tactics, one must first understand and appreciate the complexities of this conflict and then seek to win the “Hearts and Mind” of the local populace whose allegiance or acquiescence is the stake in the struggle. The British campaign in 1951, in Malay, best exemplifies the successful application of what is termed in the “enclave strategy.”

Context

The strategic history of the twenty-first century shows that the absence of a better alternative to military force is a particular source of frustration for policy makers and defense planners confronted by irregular enemies. This unpalatable truth brings into focus the role of conventional military force and, in particular the issue raised is if military victory is possible in the Niger-delta conflict since that context is literally unknown to Nigerian defense planners and policy makers. Far from focusing on the inadequacies of the Nigerian Armed Forces which falls far short of its strength, equipment and capabilities requirement because of politically motivated cutbacks since the mid 1980’s. This analysis has at its core the unstable interactions among terrorism and security, strategy, geopolitics and the difficult to determine concept of victory against irregular enemies or non-state actors.

Through a strong thesis, which argues that conventional military force cannot win - peace, security and freedom – without the establishment of local legitimacy through a ‘Hearts and Mind’ campaign that addresses the core issues at the heart of the Niger-delta conflict, a logical argument is developed to prove that all current civil or military gains will prove premature and securing the peace will prove unsustainable. But, firstly, it is prudent to recognize the limitations of conventional military force against irregular enemies as a foundation for the thesis. So several existing definitions for conventional and irregular warfare are reviewed before past and recent employment of military force is examined in a regular and irregular context. Broadly, several challenges limiting the effectiveness of conventional military force in the Niger-delta conflict is examined along side the concept of victory; inherently we must be mindful of the political nature of the conflict.

The Persisting Dialectics of Conventional and Asymmetric Warfare

Colin C. Gray defines conventional warfare as a form of warfare carried out by employing conventional military weapons and battlefield tactics between two or more states in open confrontation; the forces on each side are well defined and these forces fight using weapons that primarily target the opposing army. On the other hand, The North Atlantic Treaty Organizations (NATO) military concept for defense against terrorism describes asymmetric warfare, as “…[the use of] unconventional methods and means that attempt to circumvent or negate an opponents’ strengths whilst exploiting his weaknesses with potentially disproportionate effects.” Conventional warfare therefore is distinct from asymmetric warfare because it conforms to established practices, accepted international standards, and customary norms; value is not placed on attrition except against its intended targets in reality.

Examples in History: Conventional Forces against Irregular “Enemies”

Theoretically irregular enemies can easily be defeated by conventional military force in direct combat because they typically lack sophisticated weaponry, adequate military training and discipline. But this theory is not ironbound because irregular enemies often don’t fight conventionally, which makes them highly difficult to contain or defeat. For example, the German Army that was wonderfully competent in the conduct of fast-moving operations in the restricted but still largely accessible terrain of the Western, Central and, much of East-Central Europe during World War Two (WWII), was unable to act with breathtaking decisiveness and suffered unexpected defeat, when committed to the conduct of continental warfare on the widest scale against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) in the later phases of the war. Ultimately their assumed edge in technology, speed and experience in maneuver warfare was susceptible to the irregular tactics based on relentless physical and psychological attrition that was adopted by the Soviet forces. But why are irregular enemies so difficult to defeat?

Irregular enemies are difficult to defeat because they are unstructured and promote chaos, uncertainty and overreaction by the forces of order through inexpensive means. Additionally, the battle space in irregular warfare is often the public mind. And so victory or defeat in irregular warfare is all about the beliefs, attitudes, and consequent behavior of the public. For example, consider the fear of being kidnapped in Port Harcourt or Aba. That fear becomes an exploitable asset to irregular enemies. And until that fear is replaced with renewed confidence in the security forces, then anarchy and ungovernance will prevail because the populace lives in perpetuated fear. Is there a great distinction between victory in a regular and irregular context?

The Fog of War and The Ambiguity of “victory” in Irregular Warfare

The concept of conventional military victory means often that the state has achieved a fraction of its strategic objectives - military, territorial and economic - that is consistent with the classic definition of limited war. But clearly policy makers and military leaders must get beyond what Colin. C. Gray calls the narrow confines of traditional “military victory” to appreciate the complexity of winning in an irregular context. Hindsight, of course, has demonstrated that military force may defeat an irregular enemy’s ability to conduct campaigns, or, as exemplified by Operation Enduring Freedom, lead to regime change and a wholesale shift in government and economy. But military force is never able to truly achieve definitive victory against irregular enemies; at least not on its own.

As such it is very difficult to define victory in an irregular context let-alone anticipate military victory. And all assumptions are surrogates to this fundamental fact. In this context, the task of ensuring sustainable peace or “winning” the conflict in the Niger-delta region may well be beyond the standard military means of the day. Even though there is the temptation by our local political leaders looking for a popular boost during this election season to over-depend on conventional military force at all cost. And this is not to say that there is no utilitarian value for military force in the Niger-delta region.

The Utilitarian Value of Conventional Military Force

Conventional military force can have utilitarian value in the Niger-delta conflict if it is used principally as a policy multiplier or enabler. But the focus must be on the extent of advantageous changes it can precipitate in relation to the conflict as a whole, since it is difficult to assess its strategic utility in a stand-alone context. Consequently the task of tracking and bringing to justice, General Togo and other warlords should be led by federal intelligence agents backed by small and highly mobile rapid reactionary units; especially in our low-intensity context. Now, I know, this proposition is against the general wisdom of our policy makers and defense planners who have wrongly concluded that conventional military force defeated the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka. But what they overlook is the simple but consequential fact that the conditions that enabled the successful use of conventional military force against the LTTE in Sri Lanka and the tactics deployed by the force commanders, who actually were backed by the Chinese military establishment, are not the same in the Niger-delta conflict. And I will present some analysis to drive home my point since over-dependence on military force in most low intensity conflicts is tenuous at best and goes against the modern theory of counter insurgency warfare that emphasizes the use of intelligence and, the need to win over populations as the key to long-term peace.

Victory Assumptions on the Defeat of the LTTE is Flawed

Politically, there is merit to the argument that the global and national dynamics that sustained the LLTE changed in favor of the Sri Lankan Government after the 9/11 attacks on the United States of America and, the LTTE leadership failed to adapt strategically by developing broader political goals. Fast-forward to the 2008/2009 military campaign, and evidently, the vaunted 57^th Division, the main strike force of the Sri Lankan Armed Forces relied heavily on its Special Forces units and adopted irregular tactics to overwhelm the LTTE.

Remarkably, the 57^th Division was not bogged down in positional warfare but fought a war of mobility and maneuver based on the Strategy of Indirect Approach - best articulated by BH Liddell Hart. In many instances, Special Forces units tracked the LTTE front line elements through their phone calls - pinpointing their jungle lairs. The implication was that at any given time during the campaign, Sri-Lankan forces were fighting at 30 different points, forcing the LTTE to spread out its defenses while federal forces operated on their flanks and rear, turning places like Mullaitivu into a killing-zone for the Tigers. But how does this relate to the Niger-delta context?

Fighting Irregular Enemies

Consider that the conflict in the Niger-delta of Nigeria is a low–to-mid intensity one entailing residual acts of terrorism. Undeniably this has resulted in ungovernance with the long-term possibility of a full-fledged insurgency. But unlike the LTTE in Sri Lanka, the non-state actors of the Niger-delta region lack fully developed operational structures and hold no territories. Additionally, they are unsupported by a mobilized citizenry and are without a safe rear area like the Vietcong’s had, for example. This amorphous nature makes them difficult to predict and defeat like the LTTE in Sri Lanka. Furthermore, having reviewed literature on several counter-insurgency operations including Turkish Army missions against the PKK in south-east Turkey and northern Iraq. There is over-whelming evidence that a socio-political solution is the best route to resolving the Niger-delta conflict. The reality is that military force cannot truly bring about long-lasting peace because it ignores political, social and economic factors. Neither will it achieve “victory” since victory is at best still ambiguous in an irregular context. So why is the Niger-delta conflict so difficult to contain or win militarily?

Operational and Tactical Failures

Strategically, because our policy makers fail to see war or conflict as a continuation of policy by other means. Operationally, because of the inability of our intelligence agencies and military planners to develop intelligence, forecast threats, protect critical infrastructure and prepare appropriate force structures to disrupt subversive activities in the region. Tactically, because the Nigerian Army isn’t equipped or trained for 4th generation warfare, which sometimes involves fighting around dense civilian or urban areas. For example, the army is incapable of sending a combination of large and small ‘deep penetration’ units into defined battle-spaces without causing colossal destruction to the local communities. And this was evident in the recent operations against General Togo in Ayakoromo and Ogodobri. Essentially, to redress these deficits and make the armed forces a more effective asset against irregular enemies, it will take a lot of funding and invariably a fundamental doctrinal shift to arrive at the required level of readiness. So what will be the likely outcome of the ongoing military operation in the Niger-delta region?

In the Context of History

If we are to believe the evidence of history which is the most reliable record, then the most significant characteristic of the evolving security environment in the Niger-delta region is the likelihood that once the artillery barrages cease, the warlords of the Niger-delta will leverage the increasing affordability of irregular warfare to narrow the current military gap between themselves and the federal forces and ferment even more anarchy. This strategic outcome indeed is inevitable; at least such is the evidence of history. And there is ample evidence to validate this fact although a large percentage of those I have discussed this topic with in Nigeria have argued that this viewpoint is exclusively based on Western assumptions that should be ignored.

Contrarily, I argue that this thinking perhaps exposes a persisting strategy deficit in our defense and security thinking since the use of history, or should one say the past, is the only potential evidence available. The challenge then is that if we deny the past, the result has to be analysis and prognosis resting entirely upon current concerns and the nostrums of today. That might be good enough, but it would seem to me to be a gratuitously reckless self-impoverishment.

Fundamentally, irregular enemies like the MEND and NDVF will continue to be uncontrollable and unpredictable, and their impact will continue to be a threat to national security if the core issues proliferating ungovernance in the Niger-delta are not addressed. And for those who argue that military victory is possible in the Niger-delta. They obviously the hard to forget lesson that military force cannot be used in a vacuum, especially as the scope of the Niger-Delta conflict has broadened beyond the security issues.

Conclusion

It is rather too monocausal for comfort to think that the non-state actors perpetuating anarchy and conflict in the Niger-delta region can be wished away through unsustainable treaties and ambiguous amnesty declarations. And this historical reality is uncontestable. Strategically, the key to sustainable peace and development in the Niger-delta region is a better understanding of the conflict itself, the limited use of military force and the employment of a better conflict management strategy that does not focus on the actual conduct of regular or irregular war. Context specifically, for military force to prove a valuable asset in the Niger-delta conflict, the focus should be on the consequences of its use in the conflict in general. For example, while tactical and operational excellence by the military or security agencies are always desirable and championed by politicians and security personnel. Tactical excellence is quality wasted if it is not employed purposefully to advance political goals.

Calabar, January, 2011