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Constitutional Reform as a Pliable Road to Peace and Progress in Nigeria By Lesky Manlesky
Preamble The shameful and arrogant brigandage in Rivers State we all saw on video would easily have been passed for another unfortunate brouhaha by some uncouth dishonorable men who should not be involved in the business of lawmaking in a civilized society like ours. Not that we would have overlooked their reprehensible actions.
The tacitly copious involvement of the Presidency and the First Lady give the crisis a different bloom. The reality of a too-powerful emperor-like Presidency stares us in the face once again. And can no longer be ignored. Like our iconic Professor Wole Soyinka said in relation to same event and the involvement of the First Lady, “too much is already too much”! If we must defend our democracy and reclaim power from the hands of those who hold it hostage, there is urgent need to reform the laws of a land that makes one man the most powerful in the world, constitutionally speaking that is.
I am one of those who attest to the need for the convocation of a Sovereign National Conference where representatives of peoples of Nigeria will come as equals on the table of brotherhood and reason. Considering the often-quick rejection of the very idea of such august gathering by the political elites, obviously in fear of the erosion of their ill-gained political capital, it becomes part of our reality that the convocation of an SNC may be a deadbeat project, at least for the immediate now. But the National Assembly has the powers to review and recommend replacement laws for our polity. It is to them we must urgently appeal.
The Problem It is common knowledge that there is a dangerous lopsidedness in the way power is constitutionally shared across the three tiers of governments in Nigeria. With regards to power sharing and governmental relationships between the Federal Government and the federating states especially, too much is concentrated at the center, paving the way for a Nero-like President who solely decides which way the power pendulum swings. He easily manipulates himself away from the pinhole of oversight by the National Assemble. He controls both the instruments of Force and the treasury of the land. Not in the hands of no one else has the carrot and the stick been so well amenable.
The 1999 Constitution is a democratic instrument with a military detail. The reference to state governors in Nigeria as Chief Security Officers of their states is a mere praise-song that latches on to aspirations of how things should be. In reality, a state governor in Nigeria is a victim of power siege by the center. Amongst all his commissioners, the Commissioner of Police is loyal to and takes orders from no one but the Inspector-General of Police and, by extension, the President. This is why shameful situations like the arrogant deployment of federal might against a sitting governor in a federal arrangement will be completely inveterate in our body polity. It did not start with Rivers; we witnessed it in Anambra State on July 10, 2003 when a sitting governor in the person of Chris Nwabueze Ngige was brazenly abducted by forces loyal to then president Obasanjo. Tough times indeed call for tougher measures, and our representatives at the federal level must brazen up for the challenge at hand.
In his article, “Rivers State Crisis: Issues, Sense, and Nonsense,” Comrade Bamidele Aturu bemoaned the fate of our “endangered federalism.” He touted the establishment of state police forces as a solution to the incessant power-show between the federal and state government bodies, but was quick to aver that we must “first deal with the feudal culture that is ingrained in the consciousness of our politicians. Unless we uproot one way or the other in this culture nothing stops the State Governors from also using State Police to intimidate the minority within the State.” So how exactly do we reorient the mindset of the political class? I strongly support a structural repair of the constitution such that the system is afforded opportunities for automatic checks and balances as at when necessary.
Cracks on Our Constitutional Walls Comrade Aturu dealt extensively with the visible problems created by Section 215 of the 1999 constitution with regards to the duties of the State Commissioners of Police vis-à-vis their relationships with the governors of the states where they serve. Section 215 (1) (a) of the 1999 Constitution allows for the appointment of an Inspector-General of Police by the President. Section 215 (1) (b) also makes for the appointment of a Commissioner of Police for each state of the Federation by the Police Service Commission. Note that the President appoints the chairman and members of the Police Service Commission by virtue of Section 154 (1). Section 215 (2) places the command of the Nigeria Police force, including the Commissioners and other rank and file members of the Force, under the Inspector-General of police (who is appointed by, and therefore serves at the behest of, the President).
Section 147 (1) of the 1999 Constitution allows for the establishment of the Offices of Ministers of the Government. Section 147 (2) stipulates for the appointment of such Ministers by the President, subject to confirmation by the Senate. The searchlight at this time is not per se on how easy it is for the President to assure the confirmation of any persons he so wishes for public offices. That the President can, at own whims, remove such officers without recourse to any persons or organs of state makes the holders of such offices loyal and accountable only to the President, and not the Nigerian people.
In tandem with Section 147 (1), Section 150 (1) of the 1999 Constitution also gives legal backing to the establishment of the Office of the Attorney-General, constitutionally designated as the Chief Law Officer of the federation, who also doubles as a Minister of Government. The President not only appoints the Attorney-General, he is empowered by virtue of Section 151(1) to appoint Special Advisers for the Attorney-General. Section 151 (3) expressly stipulates that all persons appointed under Section 151 of the constitution ARE serving at the pleasure of the President. Again, the President holds the constitutional hire and fire power in this case. It is important to underscore the importance of the unfettered functions of the Attorney-general in the promotion of the ideals of Freedom, Equality and Justice as enshrined in Section 17 (1) of the Constitution. Both Federal and State Attorneys General are the Chief Law Officers of their respective jurisdictions, and can therefore institute and undertake criminal proceedings against any person or institution before the courts of the land. The wheels of justice can only spin at equitable gyre where the prosecuting and presiding judicial officers are free from all encumbrances and are truly independent in the discharge of their duties. The President has untold capacities to manipulate other public officials both through his constitutional powers of hire and fire and through his control of party structures.
Reformed Checks and Balances as Solution to Abuse of Power The intention of the drafters of the 1999 Constitution seemed clearly to ensure checks and balances in the polity. The operations of each of the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial branches of government were supposed to provide respective systemic checks and balances on one another in the daily discharge of the constitutional duties emanating from such offices. Owing to the nature and manner of appointments and other issues mentioned elsewhere in this write-up, it becomes clear that it is almost impossible for either the legislature or the judiciary to be truly independent in the discharge of their duties. There is need to fathom other means of injecting checks and balances into the process of governance in Nigeria.
Repositioning Political Parties as a Guarantee for Effective Checks and Balances Per Sections 13-18 it is unarguably obvious that the guarantee for Freedom, Equality and Justice forms the fulcrum of the constitutional document. In order to ensure this however, there must be systems in place, other than the seemingly failed watchdog relationships between the three branches of government at all levels. I believe that a deliberate alteration of the electoral laws, for instance, with stipulations for how, which and when political parties can field candidates for what political offices may serve our much desired yearning for independent functioning of relevant organs of government.
To this end, I postulate as follows:
1. Considering our experiences with power-play since return of democracy, it becomes clear that certain offices or positions are too important to be left at the direction of one person, be it the President of the country or any of the state governors. Such offices include:
a) Attorney General of the Federation or States, and
b) Inspector-General of Police.
2. Occupation of the two offices listed in a-b above (we can add to the list as necessary) should be constitutionally amended to become by election rather than appointment by either the President (as is the case of Federal Attorney-General) and Governor (as currently is the case with State Attorneys-General and Ministers of Justice).
3. There are other positions, though elective in nature, the independence of which must be systematically guaranteed by taking their control away from the Executives. These include such legislative offices as:
c) the offices of the Senate President and the Deputy Senate President, and
d) Speakers and Deputy Speakers of the Federal House of Representatives and the State House of Assemblies. I strongly believe, for emphasis, that speaker Tambuwal would have been more effective in checkmating the shenanigans of Aso Rock if he was not from the PDP stock.
The idea here is basically to ensure that the party that produces the President at the Federal level is constitutionally disallowed from fielding candidates for election into the offices enumerated in a) – d) above. For instance, if the APGA was successful at the presidential polls, only other qualified parties (excluding APGA) will be eligible to field candidates for the offices of the Inspector-General of Police, Attorney-General of the Federation, Senate and Deputy Senate Presidents, and Speaker and Deputy Speaker of the Federal House of Representatives. The same condition will apply at the state level where the party that produces the Governor will constitutionally become ineligible to field candidates for the offices of the Attorneys-General and Commissioner of Justice, and the Speakers and Deputy Speakers of the Houses of Assembly.
To ensure smooth electioneering process, the polls timetable can be drawn in such a way that ensures adequate time limit for campaigns into the offices listed in a) – d) above. While the current one-week-apart timetable of elections into Legislative (Federal and State), Governorship, and Presidential elections can still be honored, the positions highlighted above should be removed from electioneering process within the time other elective positions are held. While the terms of office may necessarily remain the same as it is for others, the election period could be altered such that elections into such offices come at a much later period, say 6 or more months after the general elections. This not only gives room for the resolution of litigations that almost always trail elections, it will also allow for a clearance of doubt as to which party will be eligible to field candidates for the excluded offices and positions.
It is well understood that the resolution formula expounded in this document may contain some grey areas that must necessarily be further expounded. What do you think your own amendment of the document presented herein, or your own outright solution to the aforementioned problems would be? By coming together as a people we can develop a formidable think-tank through which theoretical and practical solutions to everyday problems in our body polity can be holistically addressed. You can répondez, s'il vous plait to
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· Dr. Adeleke Otunuga, a former Students Union leader at the University of Lagos, is currently the President of the Ijebu Association of the United States of America (Washington DC Metro area) and a Senator of the Alliance of Yoruba Organizations & Clubs, USA (Washington DC Metro area).
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