|
A Proactive Approach to Pipeline Security By Kòmbò Mason Braide (PhD; FNSChE)
Port Harcourt, Nigeria. Tuesday, 27 September 2005 @ 12:27 pm. Preamble: Meeting Nigeria’s energy needs—today and tomorrow—is an issue that concerns all of us. It is only by sharing ideas and working together that we can meet those challenges. This is your chance to join in constructive discussions, interact with opinion and thought leaders, and contribute to the solutions of the myriad problems of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. I therefore welcome your comments via e-mail, and encourage this article to be freely reproduced, published, photocopied, dubbed, scanned, faxed, reprinted, reformatted, broadcast, digitised, uploaded, or downloaded, in whatever manner or form, with or without acknowledgement, or further permission. Executive Summary: Globally, crude oil, natural gas, and petroleum products pipelines are assumed relatively secure because most of their mileage is sub-surface: i.e. below ground level. Typically, operators have in place effective security measures for protecting pipeline facilities from vandalism or intrusion. This includes the employment of such measures as static and/or mobile security guards, fences, and electronic surveillance around oil movement facilities. In the USA, Japan, and the EU, operators provide additional protection against pipeline security concerns by conducting employee background checks, and carrying out effective communications and liaisons with residents living along pipeline rights-of-way (ROW), with police authorities, and with emergency responders in affected communities. However, in Nigeria, several decades of military dictatorship and/or centralised economy have created a mentality in which ordinary Nigerians do not feel any responsibility for public property. A glaring absence of initiative and mobilisation skills at the grassroots level discourages Nigerians from joining their resources to help protect the pipelines. This, in turn, creates perhaps the most dangerous threat to the pipelines – a complete lack of any feeling of ownership of the pipelines among the people. PPMC Systems 2E & 2EX constitute a strategic network of petroleum products pipelines in the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The pipeline systems were commissioned in 1980 and 1995 respectively, to move petroleum products from the Port Harcourt Refining Company (PHRC), to the target storage depots at Aba, Enugu, Makurdi, Yola, and Suleja via Auchi, and also interconnect PHRC with the other two NNPC-owned refineries at Warri (WRPC), and Kaduna (KRPC). The combined length of Systems 2E & 2EX pipelines network is 1,419 kilometres. Although the pipelines are buried underground, this does not secure them from pipeline vandals. Given the high frequency of vandalism of petroleum products pipelines, particularly along the Aba-Enugu segment of Systems 2E & 2EX, the target depots at Aba, Enugu, Makurdi and Yola, including Suleja depot (for distribution to the Federal Capital Territory) face frequent disruptions to petroleum products supply and distribution. Some of these supply threats are related to criminal activities. Criminal gangs repeatedly vandalise petroleum products pipelines, while some political pressure groups threaten to destroy petroleum infrastructure. Additionally, the unresolved conflicts in the Niger Delta region, Abia South, as well as the presence of criminal gangs in the hinterland, increase the risk of attacks on PPMC Systems 2E & 2EX pipelines. NNPC is saddled with the responsibility of protecting its pipelines. However, it is clear that by sole attention to the military aspects of pipeline protection, it will be impossible to guarantee their full protection. Indeed, NNPC can upgrade its pipeline protection units and patrol teams, and purchase the most advanced technology in the world, yet experts argue, and our experiences show, that it is also vital that the communities along which the pipelines pass, are involved in the protection process. PPMC Systems 2E & 2EX pipelines pass through rural communities where thousands of people have been living for centuries. The older residents of the communities along the products pipelines right-of-way (ROW) are nostalgic about the NNPC pipeline construction projects of the late 1970s and early 1990s. Some of them were employed directly, or indirectly, in the construction process. They had big hopes and expectations that the pipelines would bring much desired social and economic improvements to their communities. It is therefore imperative that the communities see the economic and social benefits of the pipelines, and that such benefits trickle down to the ordinary folks. This would significantly reduce the risk of misdirected aggression and communal unrest: major threats to the pipelines. Conclusion: In many ways, PPMC Systems 2E & 2EX could become a test case for a new approach at effective protection of critical petroleum pipelines and related infrastructure nationwide. Traditional methods of utilizing high-tech hardware and military units to safeguard the pipelines often do not yield desired results. It is the involvement of the communities in the decision making and protection process that can ensure the long-term safety of those pipelines. Feeling ownership over the pipelines and being sure about the positive impact to their communities can encourage people to take an active role in the protection of the pipelines, and serve as a support resource for the physical defence of those pipelines. The resources of ordinary people, particularly rural Nigerians, should not be underestimated in this case. Kòmbò Mason Braide (PhD; FNSChE) Tuesday, 27 September 2005 @ 12:27 pm.
|