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The Joy of Toxic Leadership By Kòmbò Mason Braide, Ph.D. Port Harcourt, Nigeria. September 27, 2003 Travel Advisory For Frequent Flyers: According to the
CIA, the Democratic Republic of Sao Tome & Principe (Republica
Democratica de Sao Tome e Principe) was discovered,
and acquired by Portugal in
the late 15th century, (probably
conveniently devoid of human beings, as some other Eurocentric sources
claim). Sao Tome’s sugar cane-centred economy gave way to coffee,
and cocoa plantations in the 19th century, some four hundred (400) years
after the arrival of the first batch of Portuguese pirates, adventurers,
explorers, discoverers, slave traders, Christian missionaries, settlers,
and colonial administrators. Today, the Democratic Republic of Sao Tome
& Principe is an independent, potentially oil-rich
island nation state. The country is located in the Gulf of Guinea, just
1o north of the Equator, west of Gabon, and south-east of the
Bight of Biafra, off the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, with a GDP per
capita that is about 1.5 times greater than that of Nigeria. Historically,
the cultivation of beet roots for the production of (brown) sugar in Europe began in Cyprus and Sicily, long before the
Portuguese contemplated exploring the coastal fringes of western and
southern Africa. For centuries, Italians were in full control of the (brown)
sugar business. They actively financed its production throughout the
ancient Mediterranean region. They brought the techniques and know-how
of sugar production, plantation estate management, and commercial
organisation, firstly, to Spain and Portugal, and then, to the Atlantic
Islands of Madeira, the Azores, Canary Islands, and Sao Tome, and much
later, to the Caribbean Islands, and the Americas. With Italian funding,
the Portuguese developed massive sugar cane plantations, and
subsequently controlled (white)
sugar production worldwide. From all
indications, Sao Tome was used for pilot-testing the feasibility of
transcontinental human trafficking, and large-scale deployment of
African slave labour in the management of the massive sugar cane
plantations that were later established in the tropical portions of
North, Central, and South America. For close to 500 years, the economy
of Sao Tome was predicated on slave labour, a form of which lingered
right into the 20th century. Although Sao Tome gained independence from
Portugal in 1975, the first ever free elections in Sao Tome were held in
1991, some 16 years after independence, and over 500 years after its
rather patronising discovery
by some sugar-loving Portuguese visitors. It will be recalled that Sao
Tome was a principal transit base en-route Biafra, for all manner of
aircraft used by international humanitarian agencies, mercenaries, and
gun runners alike, during the First Nigerian Civil War (1967~1970).
Furthermore, Gabon, along with Cote D’Ivoire, Tanzania, and Haïti,
recognised the independence, and sovereignty of the Republic of Biafra.
Of course, with a population of 170,372 people, the Democratic Republic
of Sao Tome & Principe is less, both in size, and population, than
most local government areas in Nigeria! Incident
At Sao Tome & Principe: Mr. Fradique de Menezes,
President and Commander-in-Chief of the 900 officers, men, and women of
the armed forces of the Democratic Republic of Sao Tome & Principe, was
attending the 2003 Leon Sullivan
Summit at Abuja, Nigeria, when a bunch of rag-tag soldiers, and
retired mercenaries struck, and subverted the constitution of Sao Tome
& Principe. Twenty-eight (28) years ago, General Yakubu Gowon (GCFR),
then Head of State and Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of the
Federal Republic of Nigeria, was attending an OAU meeting at Addis
Ababa, Ethiopia, when a bunch of ex-Nigerian Civil War GOCs, who
incidentally were all duly rewarded with “lucrative”
ministerial appointments after the civil war, while still in active
military service, including obtaining general immunity and privileges of
national policy-making, in collaboration with their “boys”,
struck, and subverted the authority of their Commander-in-Chief,
with military despatch, and quixotic alacrity. By the way, Chief (General)
Olusegun Aremu Mathew Okikiolahan Obasanjo (GCFR) was a war front
commander in the First Nigerian Civil War, a one time Federal Minister
of Works and Housing, post-civil war, and is now, the civilian
the Honourable Minister of Petroleum Resources, President, and the
Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of the Federal Republic of
Nigeria, for the third time, some thirty-three (33) years after the
collapse of the Republic of Biafra, whose final asphyxiation, and
eventual extermination, he personally ensured. President Fradique de
Menezes of Sao Tome & Principe, born of a White Portuguese colonial
plantation settler father, and a Black Sao Tomean plantation labourer
mother, has accused some disgruntled local politicians in Sao Tome, and
certain groups who fought in South Africa as mercenaries during the
apartheid era, of masterminding a coup d’état that temporarily
removed him from power recently. He said the ex-mercenaries were seeking
certain favours from him (i.e. to
aid their resettlement in the country), and that the local
opposition groups in Sao Tome were very bitter that the coup d’état
did not succeed, mainly due to the interference of the Nigerian
President, Chief (General) Olusegun Obasanjo. President Fradique de
Menezes revealed that, prior to the rebellion, there were rumours that
Nigeria was planning to overrun the tiny island nation state. It was the
propaganda that the coup plotters and their (political
and business) allies used
to whip up sentiments against Nigeria. He told some invited Nigerian
journalists in his palatial private residence in Sao Tome that former
South African mercenaries, known as The
Buffaloes, provided logistic support for the coup plotters, led by a
disgruntled soldier called Major Fernando Pereira, while opportunistic
politicians gave the rebels financial, and moral backing. In fact,
immediately after the maiden broadcast of the bungled coup d’état,
some local politicians went to the army barracks to give assistance,
ideas, and suggestions to the coup plotters about what to say to the
press, and so on, and so forth. In short, everything was stage-managed.
However, he acknowledged that the military had “hinted”
about “neglect” prior to
the coup d’état. The Thrills &
Contagion Of Coup Plotting: According to President de
Menezes, some disgruntled Sao Tomean politicians started to sensitise
their compatriots that Sao Tome would lose out in the recently proposed
oil and gas Joint Development Zone (JDZ) agreement between the
governments of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the Democratic
Republic of Sao Rome & Principe, and that Nigeria would intervene
militarily. Note that the leader of
Nigeria’s representation in that JDZ deal, is the one time “Godfather” of Anambra State power politics, Chief (Sir) Emeka
Offor (Jerusalem Pilgrim), a
presidential “paddy man”, local
“core investor”, key
financier of presidential, gubernatorial, and other assorted
election campaigns nationwide, and a major government contractor
handling the programmed
obsolescence of Nigeria’s moribund refineries, in the name of “turn-around
maintenance” (TAM). Observe that, the Sao Tomean coup plot has
links with the JDZ deal, which has links with a “Godfather”
of Anambra State politics, who has links with another “Godfather” of Anambra State politics, who has links with
another failed coup d’état that took place, at that material time, in
Anambra State, in Nigeria, as in Sao Tome & Principe. (Oh!
what a beautiful coincidence!). Definitely, Nigeria’s intervention,
which, incidentally, came after
the prompt intervention of the acting Chairman of the African Union
(AU), President Joachim Chissano of Mozambique, was over-dramatised,
given Sao Tome’s JDZ treaty
with Nigeria. Interestingly, the engagement of Nigerian soldiers in
peace enforcement operations in Liberia, the provision of political
asylum for a hardened war criminal, unrepentant“Nigeriaphobe”,
and trans-national terrorist, called Mr. Charles Taylor, the
pseudo-messianic interventions
in the internal affairs of Cote D’Ivoire, Sao Tome, and Guinea Bissau,
and the JDZ treaty with Sao Tome, were
never deliberated upon by the National Assembly, before the President
committed Nigeria to disquieting external obligations. Judging from his experiences
from the first coup d’état was staged in Sao Tome, President de
Menezes asserts forcefully that Sao Tome is not cut out for coups.
However, he admitted that his return to power did not in any way mean
that the country is politically stable yet, as the coup had far-reaching
consequences on diplomatic and economic relations with other countries.
It will be recalled that in 2002, President Obasanjo alerted Nigerians
of certain far-reaching
consequences of the wholesale implementation of the so-called
“onshore-offshore dichotomy” on Nigeria’s diplomatic and
economic relations. Blah, Blah, Blah! In early-1847, some forty-three (43) years after the Haïtian
Revolution, both the Liberian Constitution, and flag were modelled sheepishly
after the Constitution and flag of the United States of America. In July
1847, exactly 71 years after the United States of America became
independent of “Old Europe”, Liberia, in turn, became independent of the USA.
Although the country was founded over 150 years ago by freed
African-American slaves, today, over 95% of Liberians are indigenous
Africans, with the descendants of the returnee slaves comprising less
than 5% of the population. In 1917,
seventy (70) years after its independence, Liberia declared war
on Germany, thus providing the USA and its European allies a convenient
excuse for establishing a strategic military base in the mid-Atlantic
region, west of Africa. Liberia remained relatively calm until 1980 (some 133 years after independence), when one indigenous African
Master Sergeant, called Samuel Doe, overthrew the democratically elected
government of the African-American Liberian President, Mr. William
Tolbert, after fierce street battles that were precipitated by the
escalating cost of rice. Indeed, Sergeant Samuel Doe’s coup d’état
marked the end of the anachronistic dominance of an African-American
Liberian minority settler class, and the beginning of an era of overwhelming
national entropy, verging on anarchy. Subsequently, the Republic of Liberia was
shredded to smithereens ever since the start of a gruelling civil war
that one Mr Charles Taylor, an African-American Liberian Baptist pastor,
former US jail breaker, diamond smuggling baron, and hard-core
trans-national terrorist, inflicted on Liberians, sequel to the macabre
assassination of Samuel Doe, and the eventual ascension of Mr. Charles
Taylor to megalomania. So far, over 250,000 people have died in that
conflict. Indeed, the UN has accused Mr. Charles Taylor of grievous
crimes against humanity, including the overt promotion of cross-border
terrorism in the ECOWAS sub-region. Hopefully, Mr. Moses Blah, Charles
Taylor’s successor, will hand over power to a supposedly neutral
businessman (Mr. Gyude Bryant), as head of a transition
government, in October 2003. Despite a peace deal, fighting continues
outside Monrovia. In the Liberian interior, bands of armed marauders
still spread general mayhem, forcing thousands of ordinary Liberians to
flee their villages. Meanwhile, Mr. Charles Taylor, in continuation of
his life of brazen impunity, despite his pathological malevolence
towards Nigeria, Nigerians, and anything Nigerian, is enjoying a
blissful life in exile, with close to 300 dependants and loyal
praise-singers, (some of them
probably HIV/AIDS positive), living fine and cool in Calabar, a
former major slave trading post in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, at
the expense of the Nigerian treasury, and at the personal pleasure of
Chief (General) Obasanjo, but to the total revulsion, consternation and
bewilderment of over 127 million Nigerians worldwide. Just recently, tens of thousands of
Liberians cheered Chief (General) Olusegun Obasanjo (GCFR) to high
heavens, massaging his ego, and applauding him as he drove triumphantly
through the pot-hole-riddled streets of Monrovia. Crowds of shell-shocked and awed
Liberians waved little Nigerian flags as Chief (General) Mathew Obasanjo
and Liberia’s caretaker President Moses Blah cruised triumphantly
through the battle-scarred city in a long convoy of jeeps, complete with
the usual complement of siren-blasting acrobatic despatch riders,
smoke-screened limousines, 4WDs, SUVs, well-fed Federal Guards,
fierce-looking, and armed to the teeth, with bazookas, grenades, mounted
heavy machine guns, in pick-up vans, armoured personnel carriers, and
tanks, in the usual “Nigerian way”. Predictably, every now and then, the
presidential convoy stopped, while His Excellency Chief (General)
Olusegun Aremu Mathew Okikiolahan Obasanjo (GCFR) got out of his
stretched limousine, waved, and blew charming kisses at the Liberians, basking in
the euphoria of his self-inflicted burden as the “Godfather of African power politics”: a long-held personal
agenda and fixation, which the office of President of the Federal
Republic of Nigeria has finally afforded him the liberty to pursue with
singular vigour, and unbridled obsession Handcuffing
A One-Armed Bandit: From Sao Tome
& Principe to Liberia, from Maputo to Guinea Bissau, and from
Zimbabwe to the UN, the emerging scenario is one in which Nigeria,
through its President, Chief (General) Olusegun
Obasanjo, freely indulges in diplomatic
schizophrenia, appearing, on the one hand, to be fervently appealing
for assistance with his
bogus “loot
recovery” efforts, obviously targeted obsessively at the person,
and/or family of General Sani Abacha (GCFR), or to help combat HIV/AIDS
in Nigeria, or to facilitate debt
cancellation/forgiveness/amnesia/rescheduling, or US logistics support
for containing the pent up
anomie in Liberia, and in the swamps of the Niger Delta, while
simultaneously revelling in the role of the archetypal “Big
Brother of Africa”, on the other hand.
Most disturbing is the undisguised institutionalisation of predatory
autocracy (with fanfare, and impunity) across the African continent, at the
personal instigation of the President of the Federal Republic of
Nigeria. Since Saturday,
1 October 1960, political control, and by extension, economic clout in
Nigeria have tended to be perceived in rather narrow
regional, religious, or/and ethnocentric (rather
than in occupational or class) terms. This has led to a belaboured
search for an acceptable constitutional framework for holding the
Nigerian Federation together, including the paranoid insistence on the “indivisibility”, “unity”, or “the
continuity of the corporate existence” of Nigeria, coupled with
the nagging clamour for so-called “true
federalism”, and “resource
control” (i.e. the equitable allocation
of petroleum derived revenues). Worldwide, most petroleum-endowed
nations, like Nigeria, have performed far less than some resource-poor
countries, given the massive revenue gains they made since the early
1970s. Why, for example, has the overall record of such petroleum
exporting countries been so disappointing? Why, for instance, did
Indonesia manage so much better than Nigeria, in terms of effectiveness
of public spending? The answer lies in the glaring difference in their
respective political
economies. Glorifying Predatory
Autocracy: Over the past
thirty (30) years, knowledge has accumulated on the effective management
of petroleum revenues, as well as the adverse consequences of failure to
use petroleum revenues to catalyse national development. Definitely, the
key success factors in the developmental strategies of petroleum
exporters like Nigeria are less likely to be technical, and more likely
to be related to the politics of managing petroleum earnings prudently. Petroleum
represents a significant proportion of Nigeria’s GDP and consolidated
government revenues. Over the years, the management of Nigeria’s
petroleum resource has been driven mainly by political expediency.
Petroleum resources are controlled by the Federal Government, and have
traditionally lubricated an extensive network of treasury looters, and
patronage-addicted politicians. Petroleum has also been used, with some
success, to hold together a fragile “national
consensus” of diverse ethnic and religious lobbies in Nigeria. Public
expenditures, and treasury looting have gone haywire, especially during
periods of so-called “oil
boom”, creating considerable destabilisation of the country’s
social and economic fabric. Knee-jerk adjustments have often followed.
Generally, there is neither the desire for, nor the capacity to achieve
either political or economic sanity. In fact, it is estimated that some
US$300 billion in crude oil sales have enriched a tiny clique of
influence-peddlers, and clout merchants in Nigeria, over the past 30
years. Nigeria’s economy has been stagnant, and per capita income
today is estimated to be less than over 40% of earnings in the early
1980s. During the 29
cumulative years under various military dictatorships in Nigeria, the
leaders of the respective juntas alone determined how the country’s
petroleum industry was managed. After an initial lag in 1973 and 1974,
when large surpluses were accumulated overseas by the government of
General Yakubu Gowon (GCFR), public capital spending escalated so much
that, by 1976, the Federal Government had spent more than the entire
increase in oil revenue. Incidentally, Chief (General) Olusegun Obasanjo
was either part of the decision-making military elite of Nigeria, or was
the leader of the military junta in power in that period. Increased
government spending between 1973 and 1979 did not accelerate growth. One
explanation is that Nigeria’s potential gains were absorbed in the
growing inefficiency of an abysmally corrupt, mindlessly wasteful, and
progressively distorted economy. Both agriculture and industrial
capacity utilisation became atrophied, as Nigeria was systematically de-electrified
under the direct supervision and control of successive of military
dictators. Today, things
are more complex in Nigeria’s emerging transition to democracy, under
Chief (General) Olusegun Obasanjo. Following the micro-oil
boom of 2000~2001, fiscal policies have not been much different from
those of the mid- and late-1970s. States and local governments now
control a larger share of crude oil and natural gas revenues. Over the
past couple of years, constitutionally backed state and local government
demands that all oil proceeds be distributed to them to fund
their increasingly insatiable spending habits, have frustrated the
Federal Government’s efforts at instituting a workable mechanism for
managing Nigeria’s oil windfalls transparently. Between 1999 and
2001, as Nigeria’s oil receipts almost doubled from about US$8 billion
to US$15 billion, while consolidated government
spending increased from about US$12 billion to $22 billion. The
fundamental drivers of the process (i.e.
the politics of patronage, the wages of a large bureaucracy which, by
May 2000, had more than doubled, and the maintenance of a disparate and
often irritable polity together) remain the same. Over time, this
has created a dynamic that has not only led to massive government
spending, but also to a widely-shared belief in Nigeria that grandiose (and often “white elephant”) projects and large public spending
are normal and politically correct. Unfortunately,
the need to deliver the
so-called “dividends of
democracy” is seen as a clarion call for larger public sector
spending, including the risk of downloading
the entire national treasury into a few
private piggy banks. Overall, it is estimated that the Federal
Government may itself absorb some 80% of Nigeria’s petroleum income,
leaving less than 20% for the rest of the pauperised population. The consequences
of the mismanagement of Nigeria’s petroleum resources in the
country’s transition from predatory autocracy, (hopefully), to a stable democracy, are not much different from the
previous scenario, given that Nigeria’s political institutions are
shaped by a longer history of executive recklessness than the current
political dispensation would want to accept. The key attributes of
today’s “nascent predatory autocracy” include arbitrary, excessive, and
unsustainable upsurges in public spending, which cause considerable
political and economic dislocations, with little, or nothing to show in
terms of measurable growth and
economic development, beyond stage-managed narcissistic frequent state
visits to failed states within the ECOWAS sub-region. Kòmbò Mason Braide
(PhD) Port Harcourt, Nigeria.
Saturday, 27
September 2003 @ 7:42 pm. References & Sources: 1.
The
CIA World Fact Book: “Sao Tome: Background”; Central Intelligence Agency, Washington DC,
USA; (2002); 2.
Madu Onuorah.: “Sao Tome President Names Forces behind Botched Coup”; Guardian Newspapers, Lagos, Nigeria; (25
August 2003). 3.
The
Vanguard:
“Obasanjo Gets Hero's
Welcome in Liberia”; Vanguard Newspaper; Lagos, Nigeria; (2 September 2003). 4.
Thisday: “Obasanjo Donates Computers to Ivorian Journalists”;
ThisDay Newspaper, Leaders & Company Ltd;
Lagos, Nigeria; (2 September 2003). 5.
The Champion: “Lessons from Guinea-Bissau”; The Champion Newspapers; Volume 16; No.191; (Wednesday, 24
September 2003) 6.
Benn
Eifert, Alan Gelb & Nils Borje Tallroth: “The Political Economy of
Fiscal Policy and Economic Management in Oil Exporting Countries”; World Bank Policy Research Working Paper
#2899, October 2002. In
comparing the performance of some selected petroleum exporting
countries, with widely differing political systems, we will try to
identify certain salient indices of underdevelopment that characterise
some of them as bad managers of their petroleum resources: the root
cause of the paradox of “scarcity
in the midst of abundance”. For example, both Nigeria and
Indonesia have had autocratic governments over most of the last 30
years, and both rank very low in terms of transparency, probity and
accountability. However, Nigeria and Indonesia offer contrasting
examples in the management of their petroleum resources and revenues,
with much of the difference traceable to political factors. What
follows is an overview of a World Bank research paper on the political
attributes and resource management styles of some oil-producing
countries: Predatory Autocracies: According
to a recent World Bank study, predatory
autocracies are often less stable than either reformist autocracies
or paternalistic autocracies.
In particular, predatory autocracies are exceedingly non-transparent and corrupt.
Indonesia, Nigeria (under
successive military and civilian dictators), and Yemen are globally
accepted models of predatory
autocracies. Politicians in predatory
autocracies tend to act like “roving
bandits” vis-à-vis the
“chopping of the national cake”. State
power does not brook even constructive opposition in predatory
autocracies. Impunity and the reckless abuse of both public
resources, and private funds, for the exclusive
benefit of selected cliques, are deeply embedded in institutionalised
practices. The civil
service in a predatory autocracy
runs entirely on patronage, since public office brings with it a host of
rent-seeking opportunities. Little
financial or/and human capital, if any, flows into productive
occupations, whose returns are, in turn, depressed by a patently
dysfunctional work culture, and a semi-comatose economy. Government
itself is a fundamental obstacle to fiscal discipline, restraint, or
reform. Petroleum revenue virtually breast-feeds
the status quo, perpetuating the exploitation, oppression and
pauperisation of the citizens. Though overt military dictatorship was
officially terminated on Saturday, 29 May 1999, Nigeria’s public
institutions have been shaped by a prehistory of unabashed executive
brigandage, and predatory autocracy. Basically,
reformist autocracies tend to
have autonomous, relatively competent, and politically insulated
technocratic elites. Their legitimacy rests on their success in tackling
underdevelopment through productive investment and economic growth,
ensuring a long-term planning horizon in policymaking. Constrained by
their political mandate to achieve measurable improvements in the
welfare of their citizens, such states may deploy revenues derived from
petroleum efficiently, so as to promote economic diversification and
growth, despite the lack of transparency inherent in autocratic rule.
Indonesia, in the earlier Suharto period, is an example of a reformist
autocracy. Taiwan, Singapore, Korea, and to some extent China, offer
examples of non-oil exporting reformist
autocracies. Paternalistic Autocracies: Paternalistic autocracies
initially derive their legitimacy from traditional or/and religious
authority. However, in the process of oil-driven modernisation, their
legitimacy is unavoidably co-joined with their capacity to effectively
manage the revenues derived from petroleum resources, so as to prop up
the living standards of their subjects. Paternalistic
autocracies can be stable for considerable periods. Typically, they
seek national consensus, and have a much longer lifespan than most democratic
governments. Examples of paternalistic
autocracies include Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United
Arab Emirates. However,
government spending for securing and sustaining political support
generates erratic and tremendous financial constraints, including
subsidies, unplanned employment into over-staffed low-capacity civil
service, inefficient state-owned business enterprises, and protected
bureaucracies, which in the long run, limit the scope of future
investments. Such commitments can ultimately push paternalistic autocracies towards acute fiscal crisis, mass
discontent, and/or bloody revolutions. The
Gulf States of the Middle East depend heavily on revenues from their
petroleum resources to finance development efforts, and generous welfare
policies. Over the past quarter of a century, most Gulf States have gone
through extensive social and economic transformations, while retaining
political power. Nevertheless, new challenges in the coming years will
test their capacity to contain the inherent conflicts and/or
contradictions between traditional institutions, and the demands of a
modern economy, within the context of an emerging trend of globalisation. In
the years following the First Oil Boom of the early 1970s, most traditional
autocracies within the Persian Gulf area embarked on massive
investment programs, with priority for basic infrastructure, targeted at
transferring part of the windfall to the population at large, as well as
to future generations. The citizens of the Gulf States benefited
immensely from generous welfare programmes in the form of access to
housing grants, as well as basic foodstuffs, fuels, water,
telecommuncations, and electricity at highly subsidised rates. Expansion
of the public sector served the dual purpose of providing public
services, as well as job opportunities for their citizens. Most of the traditional autocracies around the Persian Gulf also initiated
programs to enhance domestic industrial capacity, boosted by very
generous subsidies. Local
businesses amassed fortunes from lucrative government contracts. Since
the development programs designed by benevolent traditional autocracies ensured that everybody gained from the newly
acquired fortunes, the programmes received popular support. In many
ways, the programmes initiated during the s0-called oil boom years have met with considerable success in raising living
standards, including a massive expansion in education. However,
the Gulf States generally have not been able to translate the huge
investments in infrastructure and human capital into robust,
self-sustainable private sector growth. Instead, the efficiency of
investment has been steadily eroded, reflecting poor management. At the
same time, the socio-economic implication of the so-called “welfare”
strategies followed by the Gulf States also created severe unintended
structural discontinuities in the form of persistent dependence on
petroleum for export earnings, overgrown public institutions, whose
omnipresence in the economy stifles the private sector, distorted
incentives to work, and an over-dependence on government to provide
jobs. Factional Democracies: Relatively,
factional democracies rank quite high in terms of political
participation. However, they are rather deficient in terms of
transparency and corruption. Despite important differences, Ecuador,
Colombia, Venezuela, and Mexico share a tradition of nationalist
populism, and patronage, which have strengthened the political voice of
interest groups directly attached to the national treasury. In
factional democracies, both
politicians and businessmen tend have to show little regard for fiscal
restraint. Leaders who make honest attempts to rationalise public
spending, or/and stimulate private sector development, often risk
general strikes and widespread rioting: for example, the President
Febres Cordero of Ecuador kidnap by paratroopers. Countries
classified as factional
democracies have several features that distinguish them from mature
democracies. Income distribution is unequal, and social consensus is
elusive. Political parties are often weak, and formed around charismatic
leaders. Military intervention in politics is typical, and rampant. Factional
democracies are often unstable. Incidentally, Columbia is regarded
as the kidnap capital of the world. Where factional
democracies are stable, one-party
dominance underlies nominally democratic institutions. At any rate,
political support derives from patronage. The
short-term politics of competition for power and state-allocated
resources gives rise to unstable policy regimes, and non-transparent
mechanisms of resource control and allocation, encouraging the
proliferation of influence-peddling
networks, and aggressive rent-seeking behaviour. Earmarking
is pervasive in factional democracies, as powerful political interests attached
directly to state spending, (such
as bureaucratic and political elites, trade unions, and the military),
tend to ambush the state, and/or take the citizens to ransom. Such
rapacious interest groups can be stronger and more “continuous”
than political parties, or even governments. Without
a countervailing force, petroleum revenues injected into the political
system tend to recklessly aggravate inefficient government spending,
followed by fiscal chaos, and economic crisis. Ecuador, Venezuela,
Colombia, and Mexico represent this category of countries.
Paradoxically, interest groups have been more stable than the
personalized political parties in those countries. Ecuador, Venezuela,
Colombia, and Mexico also rank low in terms of policy stability, and
have performed rather poorly in terms of fiscal discipline and petroleum
revenue management. Mature
Democracies: In countries
classified as mature democracies,
policies are relatively stable, and are underpinned by a broad national
consent. Politics is dominated by a few parties. Such political
stability fosters long-term planning horizons and strategic behaviour.
Indeed, party reputation, and economic performance are key elements of
competition for political power in mature democracies. The resulting
policy regimes are generally based on transparent
information. Property rights are clear, and a swing in government rarely
leads to sweeping changes. The civil service and other national
institutions are competent, and relatively insulated from partisan
politics. Professional systems promote de-personalised functioning of
markets, with reasonable stability in policies, procedures, and
standards. Government-owned investment tends to complement, rather than
substitute for private investment. These features
facilitate the efficient management of resources, and help to contain rent-seeking
behaviour in mature democracies. They also give citizens the opportunity
to provide a critical counterbalance against the influence of vested
interests attached to government spending. Norway, the UK, the United
States of America, and Canada can be seen as prototypes of mature
democracies. Botswana shares many of the characteristics of the
mature democracies, despite its lesser level of development, and
complete lack of petroleum resources. Earmarking,
Interest Groups, and Instability: Political
developments in Nigeria have striking similarities with those of Ecuador
and Colombia in recent years. Political parties have lost their hegemony
almost completely, and politics has become more and more personalised
around the egos of certain local superheroes, so-called “Godfathers”,
and/or “money bags”, who
are mostly expired dictators, former coup plotters, and top government
contractors. Petroleum
resource control has caused deep intra-party schisms, and rivalries
within the ruling party, as the Federal Government has become
increasingly strategic as the sole purveyor of goodies (also
known as “dividends of democracy”). Lacking a consensus on
transparent budget allocation, interest groups have resorted to earmarking for asserting their interests, further weakening overall
budget management-. In Ecuador,
Columbia, and Nigeria, the governments have made several feeble attempts
at fiscal restraint, and structural reform, but repeatedly fail to hold
up to social pressure long enough to significantly alter their political
economy. According to the World Bank, in 1989, about 14.5% of all oil
revenues were earmarked
exclusively for the Ecuadorian military; while 67.6% were allocated to
salaries of civil servants and other politically juicy sources of
patronage such as rural road construction/repair projects. The earmarking
system demonstrates the potency of networks of entrenched interests,
vis-à-vis an unstable central government. Its complexity and
non-transparency have produced unanticipated and absurd distributions of
oil revenues, the major beneficiaries of which have historically been
the inefficient and overstaffed bureaucracy of the national oil company,
the military, and the civil service. |