SPECIAL BRANCH REPORT: "Military Rebellion of 15th January 1966"Forwarded By
Nowamagbe Omoigui
This is an incomplete Police Report on the official investigation into the events of 15 January 1966, entitled: "Military rebellion of 15th January 1966". It was prepared by Police Special Branch Interrogators based on interviews with soldiers, other ranks and some officers who had been arrested after the January 15, 1966 mutiny. None of the soldiers and officers involved had come to formal trial in a court-martial as of the time of the July 29 1966 "counter-coup". Indeed the fact they were not court-martialed was one of the grievances listed by those officers who carried out the unfortunate operations of July 28-August 1, 1966.
This draft was released to a highly restricted circulation of certain persons in government and outside the country in very early August 1966 - and then leaked.
The remainder of the report which allegedly implicated certain other persons has apparently never been released widely to this day. I am told that it exists. I am on its trail - and shall publish it once I get a hold of it
Regards,
NAO
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1. Due to unforeseen circumstance it has not been possible, so far, to inform the nation fully of events which took place in the Federation on 15th January 66 at Lagos, Ibadan, and Kaduna, events which were directly responsible for further military action on the 29th July 66.
2. It will be appreciated that events of this nature require prolonged, painstaking investigation. It is realized that the absence of legitimate information on this subject has produced a flood of undesirable rumours and speculation. It is, however, pointed out that without thorough investigation, the wisdom of any premature releases, unsupported by fact, was questionable.
3. Investigations have not yet been completed but it is now possible to put the nation, and the world, in possession of the facts so far collected. The civilian involvement and influence in the whole affair is not as far as possible, included in this report.
4. It has been established that sometime during August 1965, a small group of army officers, dissatisfied with political developments within the federation, began to plot in collaboration with some civilians, the overthrow of what was then the Government of the Federation of Nigeria. The plan which eventually emerged from their deliberations was that on a date not yet decided at the time, the following action would be taken by troops from selected units, led by the ringleaders of the plot:
a). The arrest of leading politicians at Lagos, Ibadan, Kaduna, Enugu and Benin. The plan stipulated that wherever resistance was encountered, the individuals concerned were to be killed.
b). The occupation of key points such as radio and TV stations, telephone exchange and other public utilities, police headquarters and signal installations, by carefully selected troops who were not, however, to be informed in advance of the true nature of their operations.
c). The movement of troops and armoured fighting vehicles to Jebba and Makurdi to hold the Benue and Niger Bridges with a view to preventing the movement of any troops, opposed to the plotters' aims, to and from the North.
d). The assassination of all senior army officers known to be in a position to foil, successfully, the conspirators' efforts to topple the governments of the federation.
e). The eventual take-over of the machinery of government by the rebels.
5. Although the original plan stipulated that the action intended by the plotters should take place, simultaneously, in all the Regional capitals, no arrangements were made to implement these intentions in Benin and Enugu.
6. The date on which the plot was to be put into execution was decided by several factors. These include the return of the Premier of Northern Nigeria from Mecca and the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' conference held at Lagos between the 11th and 13th January 66. An additional factor was the possibility that details of the plotters intentions might have leaked out, necessitating early implementation of the plot. In this manner, the night of 14th to 15th January was finally selected.
7. The action which was well planned and conducted like a military operation was, in its first stages efficiently carried out.
8. Immediately before "H" hour, which has been set for 2am on the 15th January, a number of junior officers were taken into the confidence of the ringleaders of the plot. It is known that a number of these were reluctant to comply with the wishes of the plotters. Confirmed information indicates that it was made clear to these junior officers that those who were not with the conspirators would be regarded as being opposed to them and might suffer death as a consequence.
9. Non commissioned ranks involved in the night's activities at Lagos, Kaduna and Ibadan, were given no previous information of the true nature of the action in which they were about to be engaged.
10. The activities of the rebels, commencing at 2am on 15th January 66, resulted in the deaths of the following personalities:
AT LAGOS
a. Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, Prime Minister of the Federation of Nigeria.
b. Chief F. S. Okotie-Eboh, Finance Minister of the Federation.
c. Brigadier Z. Mai-Malari, Commander of the 2nd Brigade NA
d. Colonel K. Mohammed, Chief of Staff Nigerian Army
e. Lieut-Colonel A. C. Unegbe, Quartermaster General.
f. Lieut-Colonel J.T. Pam, Adjutant General, Nigerian Army
g. Lieut-Colonel A. Largema, Commanding Officer 4th Battalion Ibadan
AT IBADAN
h. S. L. Akintola, Premier of Western Nigeria
AT KADUNA
i. Alhaji Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Sarduana of Sokoto and Premier of Northern Nigeria
j. Brigadier S. Ademulegun, Commander of the 1st Brigade NA
k. Colonel R. A. Shodeinde, Deputy Commandant, Nigerian Defence Academy
l. Ahmed Dan Musa, Senior Assistant Secretary (Security) to the North Regional Government
m. Sergeant Duromola Oyegoke of the Nigerian Army
n. The senior wife of Sir Ahmadu Bello
o. The wife of Brigadier Ademulegun
11. In addition to the foregoing, four members of the Nigeria Police, one junior NCO of the Nigerian Army, and an estimated number of six civilians lost their lives during the night's events. One major of the Nigerian Army was accidentally shot and killed at Ibadan on the 17th January 66, bringing the total loss of life to twenty-seven.
12. Apart from the aforementioned killings, a number of political leaders and civil servants were arrested by the plotters and detained in military establishments at Lagos and Kaduna. These included:
a. Sir Kashim Ibrahim - at the time Governor of Northern Nigeria
b. Alhaji Hassan Lemu - Principal Private Secretary to the Premier of Northern Nigeria.
c. Aba Kadangare Gobara - Assistant Principal Private Secretary to the Premier of Northern Nigeria.
d. B. A. Fani-Kayode - at the time Deputy Premier of Western Nigeria.
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DETAILS OF THE EVENTS ARE AS FOLLOWS:
13. In August 1965, three officers, Major Okafor, Major Ifeajuna and Captain Oji who were already dissatisfied with political developments in the Federation and the impact of these developments on the Army, held series of discussions between them about the matter and set about the task of searching for other officers who held views similar to their own and who could, eventually, be trusted to join them in the enterprise of staging a military coup d'Etat.
14. In September 1965, Major I. H. Chukwuka of Nigerian Army Headquarters Lagos was persuaded to join the group of conspirators, followed in October 1965 by Major C. I. Anuforo, also of the Army headquarters. Major C. K. Nzeogwu was brought in around that time through the efforts of Major Anuforo, an old friend of both Majors Nzeogwu and Okafor. Major Nzeogwu in turn secured the support for the plan of Major A. Ademoyega who had worked with him in the Nigerian Army Training College Kaduna.
15. By early November the recruiting activities of the group were completed and an inner circle of conspirators emerged, consisting of the following officers:
Major CK Nzeogwu
Major A. Ademoyega
Major EA Ifeajuna
Major CI Anuforo
Major IH Chukwuka
Major D. Okafor
Captain O. Oji
Planning for the execution of the plot started in earnest in early November 1965 at a meeting of the inner circle which took place in Major Ifeajuna's house in Lagos.
16. The plan which eventually emerged from their deliberations was broadly as follows:
a. The arrest of VIPs at Kaduna, Ibadan, Lagos, Enugu and Benin. The plan stipulated wherever resistance to arrest was encountered, the individuals concerned were to be killed
b. The occupation of vulnerable points such as Radio and TV stations, telephone exchange, police signals installations, airfields and civilian administrative establishments, by carefully selected troops who were not, however, to be informed in advance of the purpose of their operations.
c. The movement of troops to Jebba and Makurdi to hold the Niger and Benue bridges against any movement of troops opposed to the plotters' aims, to and from the North.
d. The killing of all senior army officers who were in a position to foil successfully the conspirators efforts to topple the Governments of the Federation and who resided in the areas of operations.
e. The eventual take-over of the machinery of Government by the Army.
17. Amongst the civilian VIPs scheduled for arrest, the following have been named:
a. The Prime Minister of the Federation
b. The Federal Finance Minister
c. The Premiers of Northern, Western, Midwestern and Eastern Nigeria.
18. Additional personalities scheduled to be arrested in Lagos were the following:
a. K. O. Mbadiwe
b. Jaja Wachuku
c. Inua Wada
d. Shehu Shagari
e. T. O. Elias
f. Ayo Rosiji
g. M. A. Majekodunmi
h. Mathew Mbu
i. R.A.O. Akinjide
j. Waziri Ibrahim
19. Other ranking politicians were to be placed in house arrest pending a decision as to their disposal and eventual fate.
20. Events have shown that other political figures including the Deputy Premier of Western Nigeria, the Finance Minister and the Governor of Northern Nigeria were scheduled to be arrested.
21. The conspirators further decided that the following senior army officers represented a threat to their plans and must be killed during the first hours of the rebellion:
Brigadier Z. Mai-Malari - Lagos
Brigadier S. Ademulegun - Kaduna
Colonel K. Mohammed - Lagos
Colonel R. A. Shodeinde - Kaduna
Lt. Col. A. Largema - Ibadan
Lt. Col. A. C. Unegbe - Lagos
Lt. Col. J.T. Pam - Lagos
NOTE: Lt. Col. Largema was the CO of 4th Battalion NA stationed at Ibadan. On 15th January 66, however, this officer was on temporary duty at Lagos, staying at the Ikoyi Hotel
22. For the actual execution of the plan, three commanders were nominated, namely:
a. Northern Nigeria Major C.K. Nzeogwu
b. Lagos Area Major E. A. Ifeajuna
c. Western Nigeria Captain E. N. Nwobosi
23. The latter officer was not a member of the inner circle and was not approached until either the 13th or 14th January 66. He was, however, well known to the conspirators who were certain that when the time came he could be relied on to cooperate.
24. The execution of the plan was to take place in three areas only, i.e. Kaduna, Ibadan and the Lagos area, although many of the participants believed the insurrection to be nation wide. It is a matter of established fact that no violent action took place in either Benin City or Enugu. It has been suggested that these areas were spared because the plotters found it impossible to recruit reliable co-conspirators in these regions. None of the officers has indicated under interrogation that any efforts to recruit collaborators in either Benin or Enugu were made. Indeed subsequent action of some of the leading officers indicated collaboration with the then Premier of Eastern region.
25. For the purposes of this report, the execution of the plan is dealt with in three main sections, namely Lagos Area, Ibadan and Kaduna. Each section is divided into incidents, showing the identities of officers and men involved.
LAGOS AREA:
26. The execution of the plan commenced by the calling of a meeting late on 14 January 66 of the Lagos members of the inner circle and, for the first time, of junior officers previously selected to take an active part. A number of those present had attended a cocktail party that very evening in the house of Brigadier Mai-Malari in Ikoyi. The following attended this meeting which was held in the Apapa House of Major Ifeajuna:
a. Major EA Ifeajuna
b. Major CI Anuforo
c. Major D Okafor
d. Major A. Ademoyega
e. Major IH Chukwuka
f. Captain O Oji
g. Captain GS Adeleke
h. Lt. G. Ezedigbo
i. Lt. BO Oyewole
j. 2/Lt. ES Nweke
k. 2/Lt. BO Ikejiofor
l. 2/Lt. NS Wokocha
m. 2/Lt. Igweze
27. Major Ifeajuna addressed the meeting on the subject of the deteriorating situation in Western Nigeria to which, he contended, the politicians had failed to find a solution. He added that as a result the entire country was heading toward chaos and disaster. He next acquainted the junior officers with the inner circle's plans and asked them if they were prepared to assist to put an end to this state of affairs. Major Ifeajuna claims that all present pledged their support for his plans with the exception of Captain Adeleke who was, however, later persuaded to join. It was made clear to these junior officers that those who were not with the conspirators would be regarded as being opposed to them and might suffer death as a consequence.
28. When, at the end of the meeting, it was clear that all present were in support of the rebellion, tasks and targets were issued as follows:
a. Abduction of the Prime Minister and the Federal Finance Minister: Major Ifeajuna, 2/Lt. B. Oyewole, 2/Lt. Ezedigbo
b. Killing of Colonel Mohammed and Lt. Col. Unegbe: Major CI Anuforo, 2/Lt C. Ngwuluka
c. Killing of Brigadier Mai-Malari: Major D. Okafor, Capt. O. Oji, 2/Lt. C. Igweze
d. Killing of Lt. Col. Pam: Major IH Chukuka, 2/Lt. G. Onyefuru
e. Occupation of the Control Room at FT Police HQ Lion Building: 2/Lt NS Wokocha
f. Occupation of P & T Telephone Exchange: , Lt. PM Okocha, 2/Lt. CC Anyafulu
g. Occupation of N.E.T. Building: 2/Lt DS Nweke
But there were apparent last minute change of the plans as will be shown later in this paper.
29. Troops selected for these various tasks were to be drawn from the following units (all stationed or accommodated at Apapa and Dodan barracks, Ikoyi):
a. No. 1 Signal Squadron
b. Camp - HQ 2 Brigade NA
c. Lagos Garrison Organization
d. The Federal Guard Unit
30. The Federal Guard Officers Mess at Ikoyi was named as the rallying point for all teams on completion of their tasks.
31. All other officers and other ranks to be involved, either consciously or unconsciously in the operations were called out for alleged Internal Security operations between midnight and 0100 hours to allow time for the issue of arms and ammunition and the provision of the necessary transport. With the exception of other ranks of the Federal Guard, they were all ordered to report to Headquarters of No. 2 Brigade NA in battle order, with their arms. Ammunition was issued to them by Lt. Okaka, assisted by Major Ifeajuna, RSM Ogbu of Camp 2 Bde and others.
32. Officers and men moved off to their various assignments at around 0200 hours as planned.
ABDUCTION AND ASSASSINATION OF SIR ABUBAKAR TAFAWA BALEWA
33. The party charged with the abduction of the Prime Minister (PM) left HQ 2 Bde at approximately 0200 hours. The following have been identified as members of that group:
OFFICERS
a. Major EA Ifeajuna (in command)
b. 2/Lt. G. Ezedigbo (Federal Guard Unit)
c. 2/Lt. Oyewole (2 Brigade Transport Company)
NO. 1 SIGNAL SQUADRON
NA 84254 Cpl C. Madumelu
NA 18149591 L/Cpl . O. Achi
NA 18159447 S/Sgt. A. Ogbogara
NA 18150401 Sgt. L. Onyia
NA 500147 Sgt. BS Odunze
NA 18150392 Sgt. F Impete
NA 18150400 Sgt. I Ndukaife
NA 1856 Sgmn. S. Onwuli
NA 18149817 Cpl. P. Okoh
NA 18149084 Cpl. U Eduok
NA 18150345 Cpl. Z. Chukwu
NA 18150206 L/Cpl FI Okonkwo
NA 3775 Sgmn FN Chukwu
NA 18150443 L/Cpl RC Amadi
NA 18159121 WO II J Onyeacha
CAMP - HQ 2 BRIGADE NA
NA 3339 Pte NA Evulobi
NA 18150137 L/Cpl S. Kanu
NA 502724 WO II L. Okoye
NA 124643 WO I (RSM) J. Ogbu
ARMY HEADQUARTERS (LGO)
NA 504299 Sgt. J. Nwakpura
NA503865 Sgt. B. Iberesi
NA 149820 Sgt. E. Okonkwo
NOTE: The above named were not all, of necessity, directly involved in the abduction of the PM. A number of them operated on the premises of the Federal Finance Minister, adjacent to the residence of the Prime Minister
34. The small convoy reached the Onikan roundabout at approximately 0230 hours and halted near the PM's residence. Major Ifeajuna ordered all troops to leave their vehicles and divided them into three groups with targets as shown:
PRIME MINISTER
Major EA Ifeajuna - in command
Sgt. B. Iberesi
Sgt. J. Nwakpura
Sgt. BS Odunze
Cpl. P. Okoh
Cpl C. Madumelu
Sgmn FN Chukwu
Sgmn. S. Onwuli
2/Lt. Oyewole
FEDERAL FINANCE MINISTER
2/Lt. G. Ezedigbo - in command
WO I (RSM) J. Ogbu
L/Cpl FI Okonkwo
Cpl. Z. Chukwu
Cpl. U Eduok
Sgt. F Impete
S/Sgt. A. Ogbogara
Sgt. I Ndukaife
WO II L. Okoye
ON GUARD OVER VEHICLES AND APPROACH ROADS
WO II J Onyeacha - in command
L/Cpl RC Amadi
Pte NA Evulobi
L/Cpl S. Kanu
Sgt. E. Okonkwo
35. The latter group was given the task of stopping and turning back all vehicles approaching Onikan road. There is no record concerning their instructions as to what action they were to take in the event of any of the drivers refusing to obey the order to turn back.
36. The Major knocked on the gate and was answered by a policeman who was on guard inside. The Major identified himself as an Army Officer whereupon the PC (Police Constable) granted them access. The Major asked the PC how many men were on guard with him and was told that there were six. The Major then ordered the PC to show where they could be found. The PC agreed whereupon the Major seized his rifle and passed it to one of his men. The PC then led the group to round up the remaining members of the Police guard. At the back of the house, ie. at the creek side, they found a PC armed with a rifle and accompanied by a Police dog. The Major ordered the PC to surrender his rifle, which he refused to do. He was then hit in the face by Sgt. Odunze whereupon he capitulated and surrendered his firearm. Major Ifeajuna ordered Sgt Odunze and Cpl. Okoh to stand guard over the PC and his dog with orders to shoot both if they made an attempt to abscond or raise the alarm. All the other members were disarmed and taken to the main gate where they remained guarded by Sgt Iberesi and 2 others. They were all informed that they would be shot if they attempted to escape or raise the alarm.
37. Major Ifeajuna and few of his men then approached the back entrance to the Prime Minister's residence having secured the police orderly, and the stewards under arrest, and broke into the lounge and thence to the Prime Minister's bedroom. A voice from the inside asked who was there. The Major replied by kicking the door open, entering the room and pointing his gun at the Prime Minister and thereafter led out the PM wearing a white robe with white trousers and slippers. The PM was then led away by Major Ifeajuna along Awolowo Road where Ifeajuna had parked his car adjacent to the Onikan swimming pool.
ABDUCTION AND ASSASSINATION OF FS OKOTIE EBOH
38. On arrival at the Onikan roundabout, at approximately 0230 hrs on 15 Jan 66, Major Ifeajuna divided his force into three groups as shown in para 34 of this report. Major Ifeajuna and his group proceeded towards the PM's residence and 2/Lt Ezedigbo took his men to the compound of the Finance Minister. When they arrived at the front gate, they found this locked and were compelled to gain access by jumping over the wall. Inside they found a number of civilian guards, about 5, who were armed with bows and arrows. These offered no resistance and were disarmed and placed under guard. At least one policeman was encountered in the compound. He too was disarmed and escorted to the 3-Ton truck by RSM J. Ogbu.
39. 2/Lt Ezedigbo then attempted to open the front door but found this also to be locked. He broke one of the panes of glass in the door with his SMG but even failed to open the door which he finally broke down by kicking it with his boot. He then entered accompanied by the following other ranks:
WO II L Okoye
Sgt. I Ndukaife
Sgt. E. Okonkwo
Cpl. U. Eduok
Sgt. F. Impete
Before entering 2/Lt Ezedigbo ordered his men to walk quietly and to make no noise, a rather superfluous caution considering the noise which must have been made when the door was broken open. They mounted the stairs to the first floor. Having arrived there, the 2/Lt posted one man on the balcony and 3 on the landing.
40. The officer then shouted twice "Okotie-Eboh", come out". When this met with no response he entered a bedroom where he found the Minister dressed only in a loin cloth. He ordered the Minister to precede him down the stairs, and the Minister was escorted to the 3-Ton lorry. Rumors that the Minister was beaten and otherwise ill-treated on the way to the vehicle have been stoutly denied by all who took part in the operation.
41. Whilst the Finance Minister was being loaded into the 3-Tonner, the PM was escorted from his house and placed into Major Ifeajuna's car. 2/Lt Ezedigbo joined Ifeajuna whilst the ORs (other ranks) re-entered their respective vehicles. The convoy then moved off to the Federal Guard Officers' Mess, stopping en route at a point in Ikoyi where Major Ifeajuna and 2/Lt. Ezedigbo killed Brig. Mai-Malari. (editors comment: Maimalari had escaped from the team that had been sent to kill him at home)
ARREST AND ASSASSINATION OF COLONEL K. MOHAMMED AND LT. COL. A. UNEGBE
42. Meanwhile Major CI Anuforo, assisted by 2/Lt. C. Ngwuluka and the following other ranks:
NA 173629 WO II B. Okugbe - No. 1 Signal Sqn
NA 18149383 Sgt. J Oparah - No. 1 Signal Sqn
NA 1641 Cpl. C. Egwim - No. 1 Signal Sqn
NA 18149792 Cpl. E. Nwoke - No. 1 Signal Sqn
NA 18150530 L/Cpl. J Nwankpa - No. 1 Signal Sqn
NA 18151259 Pte C. Unegbu - Military Hospital, Yaba
proceeded in the two private cars of Anuforo and Ngwuluka to No. 1, Park Lane Apapa, the residence of Colonel K. Mohammed. This was then being guarded by unarmed nursing orderlies of a Field Ambulance stationed in Apapa.
43. On arrival Major Anuforo ordered all his party to leave the cars, which had stopped some distance from the house. They then advanced towards the house led by Major Anuforo. They were challenged by Pte L. Onyegbule, then on sentry-go. Major Anuforo told the sentry to "shut up" and to put up his hands. The Major then gave orders that the sentry and the other 3 members of the guard be banded together in one place in the custody of Pte. C. Unegbu, who although a member of a medical unit, was then bearing arms.
44. Major Anuforo then went to the front door of the house and knocked. It would appear that he received an answer, because he was heard shouting "You first come out and see who is knocking". With the Major at this stage was WO II B. Okugbe. When he received no further answer to his knocking, Anuforo ordered his men to cock their weapons. He then kicked open the door and entered accompanied by Cpl. E. Nwoke, WO II Okugbe and Cpl Egwim.
45. The house was searched until the Colonel was found, in night attire, in his bedroom. The Colonel was forced out of the house by Major Anuforo and the other ranks who had accompanied him, and put into Anuforo's car. It is believed that before being put into the car, the Colonel's wrists were tied with a rifle sling which was still in place when later, his body was discovered along the Abeokuta road.
46. Before leaving, Major Anuforo instructed the Colonel's guard to return to their unit and not to discuss what they had seen with anyone. Sgt. J Oparah and Cpl. E. Nwoke could not get into the car of Major Anuforo because of the presence of the Colonel and were odered to follow on foot to the house of Lt. Col. Unegbe, situated on Point road, Apapa, not very far away.
47. On arrival at Lt. Col. Unegbe's house, Major Anuforo entered the house alone. They heard SMG fire inside the compound and were later ordered to bring out the dead body of the Lt. Col.
48. Whilst the men were inside collecting Lt. Col. Unegbe's body, Col. Mohammed was compelled to leave the car by Major Anuforo. The latter told the Colonel to say his prayers as he was going to be shot. The Colonel did not plead for mercy or remonstrate in any other manner, but quietly prayed until he was shot in the back by Major Anuforo, using his SMG.
49. Colonel Mohammed's corpse was stowed into the boot of Major Anuforo's car while the body of Lt. Col. Unegbe was placed on the floor in the back of the car. Anuforo and his men then entered the vehicle which was driven straight to the Federal Guard Officers' Mess. At the Mess the two bodies were unloaded on the ground.
ASSASSINATION OF LT. COL. PAM
50. Major Chukuka assisted by 2/Lt G Onyefuru and the other ranks
NA 160152 Sgt. NN Ugongene - No. 1 Signal Squadron
NA 18150196 Sgt. H. Okibe - No. 1 Signal Squadron
NA 154544 Sgt. B. Anyanwu - Camp - HQ 2 Bde NA
NA 403298 Sgt. L. Egbukichi - Army HQ (LGO)
NA 18150416 Sgt. P. Iwueke - HQ 2 Bde NA
had by then accomplished the arrest of Lt. Col. JY Pam and was being guarded inside a landrover in the Mess premises. Majors Chukuka and Anuforo held a brief discussion after which both Majors entered the Landrover. The driver was ordered to proceed to Ikoyi.
51. At a point inside Ikoyi the landrover was stopped and both Majors descended. Major Anuforo ordered Lt. Col. Pam to leave the vehicle, which he did. Major Anuforo then spoke to him and told him that he was going to be killed and would do well to say his prayers first. Lt. Col. Pam pleaded but Major Anuforo remained adamant, stating that he was carrying out orders. Then without warning Major Anuforo fired a burst from his SMG into Lt. Col. Pam's body killing him on the spot.
52. Major Anuforo then ordered the NCOs in the landrover to come down and load the dead body into the vehicle. The men, who were shocked and frightened by the killing were reluctant to comply with this order and refused to leave the vehicle until Major Anuforo pointed his SMG at them and threatened to kill them unless they did as they were told. They then obeyed and loaded the corpse. The party then drove back to the Federal Guard Officers Mess where the body was off-loaded and placed alongside the bodies of Col. Mohammed and Lt. Col. Unegbe.
ASSASSINATION OF BRIG. MAIMALARI
53. The assassination of Brigadier Z. Mai-Malari as originally conceived in the conspirators Master plan failed.
54. Major DO Okafor and Captain Oji were present at HQ 2 Bde when troops were being mustered and issued with arms and ammunition. When these arrangements had been completed these two officers entered Major Okafor's personal car accompanied by the following ORs from No. 1.
Signal Squadron:
NA 500611 L/Cpl B Okotto
NA 18150074 L/Cpl P Esekwe
55. They drove direct to the Federal Guard Unit in Dodan Barracks, Ikoyi, where, in the meantime, Lt. Ezedigbo and 2/Lt. Igweze had roused additional troops and arranged for the issue of arms and ammunition. By the time the troops were ready for the alleged IS operations, Major Okafor and Captain Oji had arrived at the barracks and were at the Unit guardroom. Major Okafor ordered that troops mount into 2 Federal Guard Landrovers detailed for the operation by Ezedigbo
56. Federal Guard personnel detailed for this operation were the following:
NA 3785 Sgt. SA Umch
NA 18150997 Sgt. N. Ibundu
NA 18149870 L/Cpl N. Noji
NA 3995 L/Cpl HH Okeke
NA 18149870 L/Cpl P. Nnah
NA 1706 Pte. J. Ogu
NA 18149723 Pte. S. Eke
NA 18141571 Pte. I. Onoja
NA 18148787 Pte. JF Enunehe
NA 18149970 Pte. J Abaye
NA 3695 Pte. CS Dede
NA 18151261 Pte. S. Adekunle
57. The following vehicles were used:
Landrover NA 773 - driven by Pte. I Onoja
Landrover NA 957 - driven by L/Cpl N. Noji
58. The party drove direct to the house of Brigadier Z. Mai-Malari at 11 Thompson Avenue, Ikoyi. This is a corner house and situated at the point where Brown road runs into Thompson Avenue. On arrival at their destination, the troops were dismounted and divided into three sections commanded as shown:
No. 1 Section - Captain Oji
No. 2 Section - 2/Lt C Igweze
No. 3 Section - Sgt. SA Umch (in reserve)
59. The reserve section under Sgt. Umch was ordered to take post in a dark place opposite the house. The three officers, followed by their men then entered the compound which was guarded by NCOs and men of the 2 Battalion NA. Major Okafor ordered the Sentry to call the Guard Commander whom he informed that the situation was bad and that he, Okafor, had come to take over the guard. He instructed the Guard Commander to assemble his men and to take them back to his unit. The Guard Commander, according to some of the ORs interrogated, replied that he could not obey this order as he had received no instructions to that effect. Major Okafor and Captain Oji overruled the Guard Commander's objections and entered the compound
60. Whilst Major Okafor was pre-occupied with the guard the telephone in the downstairs lounge of the Brigadier's house started to ring. Some of the men present, including 2/Lt. Igweze, have stated that the Brigadier came downstairs to answer the telephone. No sooner had he picked up the receiver than a burst of SMG fire was heard in the compound. This was Captain Oji firing at a member of the Brigadier's Guard, a L/Cpl of 2 battalion. The L/Cpl was killed and his body later placed into Major Okafor's Landrover. At the same time, L/Cpl Paul Nwekwe of 2 Brigade Signal Troop who was on guard in the front of the main gate to the compound, was hit in the neck by a bullet, thought to be a richochet.
61. Brigadier Mai-Malari, alerted to the presence of Major Okafor's force in his compound by Captain Oji's burst of fire dropped the telephone and, followed by his wife, was observed running into the boy's quarters. From there he escaped into the road, and it is thought, tried to make his way to the Federal Guard Barracks.
62. According to the ORs interrogated, Major Okafor flew into a rage when he discovered that the Brigadier had escaped and bitterly blamed the men of the Federal Guard for not shooting the Brigadier when they saw him running towards the boy's quarters. He then ordered all present that the Brigadier must be shot on sight.
63. Major Okafor then jumped into the landrover driven by L/Cpl Noji. He informed 2/Lt Igweze that he was going to get "that man" and to arrange for more troops to come to the Brigadier's House. He drove around the area for some time but failed to find the Brigadier. By the time he returned to 11 Thompson Avenue, Major Ademoyega and Captain Adeleke had arrived there in a landrover driven by L/Cpl D. Omeru. Major Ademoyega had already informed Captain Oji that the Brigadier had been killed and that he had seen his body at the Federal Guard. Captain Oji was overheard telling Okafor that "the Jack had been killed". It is presumed that by "the Jack" Oji meant the Brigadier. Major Okafor then informed the troops with him that Brigadier Mai-Malari had been killed by men from another unit.
64. The time, by then, was nearly 0400 hrs. captain Oji was ordered by Major Okafor to proceed to 2nd Battalion in Ikeja to check the situation there. The Captain left in landrover NA 773 accompanied by Sgt. H. Irundu, L/Cpl H Okeke, Pte. S. Adekunle and Pte. I Onoja.
65. As stated elsewhere in this report, Major Ifeajuna and his convoy, after the abduction of the PM and the Finance Minister, drove towards the Federal Guards Officers mess where he made a brief stop and then proceeded toward Ikoyi Hotel, still with the PM in the car. At a point in the Golf course, adjacent to a petrol station Brigadier Mai-Malari was walking towards Dodan Barracks when he saw Major Ifeajuna's car. The Brigadier recognized his Brigade Major Ifeajuna and shouted and beckoned him to stop. Then Ifeajuna stopped the car and accompanied by 2/Lt Ezedigbo went towards Brig. Mai-Malari and killed him.
66. After the Brigadier had been killed, his body was loaded into the 3-Tonner and driven to the Federal Guard Officers' Mess.
ASSASSINATION OF LT. COL. LARGEMA
67. Although not initially alloted to Major Ifeajuna as a target for assassination, Major Ifeajuna proceeded to Ikoyi Hotel to kill Lt. Col. Largema. On arrival at the hotel Major Ifeajuna told the receptionist on duty that he had an urgent message for Lt. Col. Largema of Room 115. The time was between 0330 and 0400. He then asked the hotel receptionist to supply him with the master key which can open all doors in the hotel but was told that this was not available. He then ordered the receptionist to lead him to the room in which Lt. Col. Largema was staying, warning the receptionist on the way that he would be shot if he refused to comply with whatever he might be ordered to do.
68. On their arrival on the first floor Major Ifeajuna, accompanied by 2/Lt Ezedigbo instructed the hotel receptionist to knock on the door of Lt. Col. Largema and to inform him that he was wanted on the telephone. It should be pointed out here that rooms in this hotel have no telephones. There are situated in small alcoves in the corridors. In the case of Room 115, the telephone alcove is only a few paces away.
69. Lt. Col Largema responded and came out dressed in pyjamas and slightly dazed by sleep. In the meantime the two armed soldiers had stepped back into the corner near the lifts from where they could not be observed by Lt. Col. Largema when he came out of his door. The Lt. Col. then picked up the receiver, which was off the hook. At this moment both the soldiers near the lift opened fire with their SMG. Lt. Col. Largema fell down and died.
70. The killers went downstairs and called the third man to come up. Between the three of them they then carried the dead body down the stairs and deposited it on the floor. They then called yet another soldier from the Mercedes car who helped the other three to carry the body to the car. The whole party then drove off.
71. When Major Ifeajuna and party returned to the Federal Guards Officers' Mess he learnt that the GOC was in town and was organizing 2nd Battalion NA at Ikeja to attack the rebels. He was then joined by Major Okafor and they drove off together in Major Ifeajuna's car. At the Yaba Military Hospital they dropped 2/Lt Ezedigbo who had been wounded in the encounter with Brigadier Mai-Malari. The time was about 0400 hrs. Major Ifeajuna drove away on to the Abeokuta road. On the way they stopped and Ifeajuna asked the PM out of the car whence he shot and killed him. When he and Okafor became certain that the PM was dead they left the body in the bush at a point beyond Otta on the Lagos to Abeokuta road. They then opened the boot of the car and dropped the body of Lt. Col. Largema near that of the PM. They then drove on to Abeokuta. On the way after Abeokuta two other soldiers in the car were dropped and told to find their way back to Lagos whilst Ifeajuna and Okafor proceeded to Enugu. They arrived Enugu at about 1415 hours and proceeded to the Premier's Lodge where they held discussion with Dr. MI Okpara, then Premier of Eastern region, after which they separated and went into hiding. Ifeajuna eventually escaped to Ghana where he was received by the former President Kwame Nkrumah who sent him to Winneba to stay with SG Ikoku.
72. At the Federal Guard Officers' Mess the corpses of Brigadier Mai-Malari, Col. Mohammed, Lt. Col. Pam and Lt. Col. Unegbe were loaded into a 3-tonner lorry in which was sitting Chief Okotie-Eboh still alive. The time was then about 0330 hours.
73. By this time Major A. Ademoyega and Major CI Anuforo were present on the Mess premises. Major Ifeajuna having departed, these two officers took command of his men and vehicles. They mounted into Major Anuforo's Peugeot car accompanied by 2/Lt Igweze. Major Ademoyega entered the landrover.
74. On the instructions of Major Anuforo, the little convoy moved off with Anuforo leading. They traversed Lagos and went along Abeokuta road. At a given point, unidentifiable by the men interrogated, Major Anuforo stopped the convoy and he, 2/Lt Igweze and Major Ademoyega left their vehicles. They came to the tailboard of the 3-Ton truck and detailed a number of men to take position in front and to the rear of the convoy with instructions to stop and turn back all approaching traffic.
75. Major Anuforo then ordered the four corpses to be unloaded onto the road. The bodies were then carried into the bush on the left hand side of the road. Major Anuforo then observed FS Okotie-Eboh still seated in the truck and asked the question: "Who is that man"?, which leads to the belief that, until then, Anuforo was unaware of the presence of Okotie-Eboh in the truck. The Finance Minister replied "I am Okotie-Eboh". Major Anuforo then ordered the Minister to step down. The latter complied, whereupon Major Anuforo informed him that he was going to be shot. The Minister commenced to plead for his life. This met with little or no response from Anuforo who is reported as having confined himself to stating that he was acting under orders. The Minister was then forced to go into the bush, pushed along by Major Anuforo and Major Ademoyega and followed by 2/Lt Igweze and Sgt. Ndukaife to the spot where the bodies of the 4 senior officers had been deposited. Arriving there, without hesitation, Major Anuforo killed Okotie-Eboh with a short burst from his SMG.
77. Major Anuforo then returned to the road followed by the others but leaving 2/Lt Igweze, Cpl. Egwim, L/Cpl Nwankpa and Cpl. Nweke on guard over the five bodies.
78. The convoy drove off and returned later, accompanied by 3 Ferret scout cars which had been obtained from 2 reconnaisance Squadron at Abeokuta. Four spades were brought out from the landrover and used to dig graves for the burial of the corpses. The graves were dug by Cpl. C. Egwim, Cpl Z Chukwu, L/Cpl J Nwankpa and private N.A. Evulobi. When this task had been completed, they all boarded their respective vehicles and drove off to Lagos.
OCCUPATION OF P & T TELEPHONE EXCHANGE, N.E.T., AND LION BUILDING
79. These three cases have been treated jointly as they are of lesser importance and because the officers and men involved left Apapa together in the same vehicle
80. Although it is probable that the officers concerned in the occupation of these vulnerable points were fully aware of the purpose of their activities of that night, they have all denied this. It is certain that none of the ORs involved received any advance information on this subject.
P & T AUTOMATIC TELEPHONE EXCHANGE
81. After the distribution of arms and ammunition at HQ 2 Brigade, 2/Lt PN Okocha and 2/Lt OC Anyafulu were allotted a Landrover and 3 Ors and instructed to proceed to the P & T Exchange by Major A. Ademoyega and to wait there until he, Ademoyega, joined them
82. They drove there and, after waiting for a very short time, Major Ademoyega arrived in another Landrover accompanied by other officers and men. The Major went straight to the main door and knocked. The door was opened by one of the employees and Major Ademoyega, 2/Lt Okocha and 2/Lt Anyafulu entered, accompanied by the Ors. The Major sent the 2/Lieutenants upstairs with orders to bring down all the workers from the Exchange, whilst the 3 soldiers were ordered to guard the three entrance doors of the building.
83. When all the workers were assembled, Major Ademoyega addressed them and ordered them not to pass any calls. He reassured them that there was no danger and advised them not to panic. He told them that he was leaving the two 2/Lts and the soldiers at the Exchange to ensure that his orders were obeyed. After speaking to the officer in charge of the exchange, Major Ademoyega instructed the 2/Lts not to molest any of the workers leaving instructions that they must not leave there until he, Ademoyega, returned to collect them.
84. Neither of these officers have admitted that they took any steps to ensure that the automatic exchange would cease to function. An automatic exchange does not depend upon any human agency to continue functioning and it must, therefore, be accepted that one of these officers interfered with the installation.
85. At 0500 hours 2/Lt Okocha complained that he was unwell and left in the landrover that had brought them there. 2/Lt Anyafulu and the 3 ORs remained in the exchange until about 0645 hours. Seeing no sign of Major Ademoyega, Anyafulu became worried. The workers of the day shift began to arrive but were prevented from entering by the soldiers. He then decided to return to his unit. He gave the soldiers some money to enable them to travel back to Apapa by bus. He too returned to Apapa in a commercial bus and remained in his office until arrested.
NIGERIAN EXTERNAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS (N.E.T)
86. After the distribution of arms and ammunition at HQ 2 Brigade, Major A. Ademoyega ordered the following officers and ORs to enter with him into a landrover driven by L/Cpl Umoru:
Captain GS Adeleke
2/Lt NS Wokocha
2/Lt ES Nweke
NA 18149089 Sgt. E. Ogbu - Army HQ (LGO)
NA 18150419 Cpl. H Nwegu - 1 Signal Squadron
NA 504344 Cpl. B Nwuogu - Army HQ (LGO)
NA 18150320 L/Cpl R Ejimkonye - 1 Signal Squadron
NA 504221 Sgt. F Agonsi - 1 Signal Squadron
NA 18151015 Sgt. F. Eke - 1 Signal Squadron
NA 18150647 Cpl. JC Iroegbulam - 1 Signal Squadron
NA 1810641 Cpl. Esonu - 1 Signal Squadron
NA 18150599 Cpl. D. Oharuzike- 1 Signal Squadron
87. From Apapa the party drove straight to Lion Building where 2/Lt ES Nweke, Sgt. E Ogbu, Cpl. H Nwegu, Cpl B Nwuogu and L/Cpl B Ejimkonye left the vehicle and entered the building. Major Ademoyega spoke to the officer in charge and ordered him to cease receiving or transmitting all messages. He introduced 2/Lt Nweke as the officer who would see to it that his orders were obeyed. Major Ademoyega and Capt. Adeleke then drove away.
88. 2/Lt. Nweke posted his men in strategic positions to prevent anyone entering or leaving the building and remained inside the building with L/Cpl Ejimkonye to ensure that no messages were received or transmitted. The party remained there until 0820 hours when, in the absence of any further instructions, 2/Lt Nweke and his men traveled to the Federal Guard Barracks in Ikoyi by taxi. On arrival there they were arrested.
89. There is no doubt that 2/Lt Nweke was fully aware of the fact that his occupation of the NET was connected with the rebellion of which he was informed at the meeting of officers late on 14 Jan 66 in Major Ifeajuna's house in Apapa.
FEDERAL TERRITORY POLICE HEADQUARTERS, LION BUILDING, LAGOS
90. As shown in paragraph 85 of this report, Major Ademoyega, accompanied by 2/Lts Wokocha and Nweke left HQ 2 Brigade at Approximately 0200 Hours in a landrover driven by LCpl Umoru, which also contained 9 ORs
91. They arrived at Lion Building around 0220 hours where Major Ademoyega, 2/Lt Wokocha, Sgt. F Agonsi, Sgt. F. Eke, Cpl Iroegbulam, Cpl S. Esonu and Cpl. D. Ohazurike left the vehicles and entered the building. Cpls Ohazurike and Esonu were posted downstairs at the security desk. Major Ademoyega spoke to the policemen on duty there and told them that they were engaged on military operations. He ordered them not to answer the telephone nor transmit any telephone messages. The two corporals were instructed to ensure that the police obeyed the Major's orders.
92. Major Ademoyega, 2/Lt Wokocha and the others then proceeded upstairs to the Police Control Room. Here they found 4 PCs and one WPC on duty. A SPO, rank not identified was also on duty there. Major Ademoyega spoke to the police and ordered them not to receive or transmit any telephone or radio messages. He informed the SPO that they were engaged in military operations and that the soldiers were there to protect the Police.
93. At approximately 0320 hours. The GOC, Major General Aguiyi-Ironsi arrived at Lion Building in a Jaguar car. He entered the lobby holding a pistol in his hand and asked the two soldiers on duty what they were doing there. They replied that they did not know why they were there and that they had been brought by Major Ademoyega. They also told the GOC that 2/Lt. Wokocha and some others were upstairs. The GOC then ordered Cpl. Esonu to go up and to bring down the 2/Lt. Esonu complied but could not find the control room. He came down again and informed the GOC of his failure.
94. The GOC, after having asked the men to which unit they belonged, then ordered them to return to their barracks immediately. He added that he did not know what was happening but that he was turning out 2 Battalion to attack the men then engaged on unlawful operations in Lagos. After this, the GOC left.
95. Cpl. Ohazurike then ordered Esonu to go upstairs again, accompanied by a PC, to find 2/Lt Wokocha and to tell him of the visit of the GOC. Esonu complied and passed the message to 2/Lt Wokocha. The latter then decided that it would be wisest to comply with the GOC's orders. He collected all his men and went to the Ministry of Defence where he succeeded in obtaining transport to take the entire back to Apapa where they arrived around 0430 hours.
IBADAN - WESTERN NIGERIA
ABDUCTION OF R.A. FANI-KAYODE AND ASSASSINATION OF S.L. AKINTOLA
96. As has already been demonstrated, Captain E. Nwobosi, OC 2 Field Battery NNA, was taken into the confidence of the conspirators either on 13 or 14 Jan 66, whilst he was attending a Brigade Training Conference at Apapa. During the afternoon of 14 Jan 66, he was given a set of written instructions by Major Ifeajuna. It is probable that these instructions included the arrest of the Premier and Deputy Premier of the West and an order to bring these VIPs to the Federal Guard Officer's Mess. The instruction also probably included an order to make arrangements for a 105 mm Howitzer to be brought to Lagos after the operation. This written instruction has not been recovered and was probably destroyed by Capt. Nwobosi after his arrest.
97. Capt. Nwobosi was further instructed by Major Ifeajuna to stand by his telephone in Abeokuta to await a message giving the all clear and "H" hour.
98. Capt. Nwobosi returned to Abeokuta, where he arrived around 1800 hrs. Since the battery which he commanded was in the process of being formed and had not, as yet, been supplied with vehicles, Capt. Nwobosi went to 2 Recce Squadron, also stationed at Abeokuta, where he spoke to Capt. Remawa and 2/Lt. Orok. He gave them a message purporting to have come from Major OBIENU, CO 2 Recce Sqn, instructing these two officers to supply him, Nwobosi, with one 3-Ton truck and a landrover. Capt. Remawa agreed and arrangements were made for the vehicles to report to Nwobosi at midnight, with drivers. Later that evening, Capt. Nwobosi received a telephone call from Major Ifeajuna giving him the all clear and giving "H" hour as 0200 hours.
100. Around midnight, Capt. Nwobosi, woke up 2/Lt. A. A. O. Egbikor of his unit and Sgt. T. Ibolegbu, the acting Battery Sergeant Major (BSM). He ordered the latter to turn out 25 men for IS operations and to tell the Battery Quartermaster Sergeant (BQMS), Ambrose Chukwu, to prepare all the Unit's stock of small arms and ammunition for immediate issue to the men. Although Capt. Nwobosi claims that he gave no intimation to anyone about the night's operations, the interrogation of the ORs involved has made it clear that around 1930 hours he instructed certain key NCOs to stand-by for IS operations.
101. After the men had been roused, they were issued with arms and ammunition by the BQMS. A total of 15 SLRs and 12 Sterling SMGs were issued. The two officers drew SLRs. When issued, each SLR magazine contained 20 rounds of ammunition, whilst each SMG magazine contained 28 rounds.
102. After the issue of arms, the men now marched to the parade ground where they were addressed by Capt. Nwobosi who informed them that they were proceeding to Ibadan for I.S operations. The men were then ordered to enbus. When this was completed the vehicles contained the following personnel:
(1) Landrover
Capt: E.Nwobosi
NA 504197 BQMS A. Chukwu
NA 2630 Gnr. D. Odiachi
NA 3330 Gnr. I. Ajao
NA Gnr. S. Adefi
NA 5117 Lbdr E. Uloh
NA 5479 Gnr. R. Nwabuisi
NA 5145 Gnr. B. Akau
Driver: NA 2215 Tpr. A. Itodo (2 Recce Sqn)
(2) 3-Ton Truck
2/Lt. A.A.O. Egbikor
NA 502193 Sgt. T. Ebelegbu {acting BSM)
NA 18147640 Sgt. M.E. Ogaga
NA 4175 Gnr. G. Njeku
NA 4266 Gnr. B. Ifezue
NA 18144875 Lbdr. A. Aghar
NA 5792 Gnr. (lllegible)
NA 3208 Gnr. J. Echenim
NA 4195 Gnr. O.Onyekwe
NA 4337 Gnr. S. Ukelenye
NA 18151782 Gnr. B. Mba
NA 5498 Gnr. R. Gbongbo
NA 3094 Gnr. D. Ugbemoiko
NA 5789 Gnr. 0. Dasheet
NA 5675 Gnr. J. Gwaske
NA 4338 Gnr. s. Anukam
103. When all were seated, the convoy moved off to Ibadan. Whilst still in Abeokuta, Capt. Nwobosi stopped to pick up a pregnant woman in labour and take her to the nearest hospital. After this incident, the convoy continued on its way uninterrupted, reaching Ibadan around 0200 hours as planned.
104. They drove straight to the P & T automatic telephone exchange in Agodi, where Capt. Nwobosi and 2/Lt. Egbikor ordered all the employees to leave the building, believing that this would stop all telephone communication in and out of Ibadan. In the event, this was not the case, as the automatic exchange continued to function and telephone communication continued unimpaired throughout the night.
105. From the P&T the force drove to the Eleyele ECN Power Station. Here the employees were ordered to stop the generators and to leave the building. A number of the employees prevailed on Capt. Nwobosi to give them a lift into the town. He obliged and dropped them near Dugbe Market, on his way to the house of R.A. Fani-Kayode.
106. Arrived at the Deputy Premier's residence, the 3- Tonner remained outside and the landrover drove into the compound. Of two policemen on guard at the gate, one escaped and the other was overpowered and put into the landrover. A number of persons believed to have been thugs were seen in the compound, but these absconded when they caught sight of the armed soldiers.
107. All the men were ordered to take up defensive positions around the house. Capt. Nwobosi then shouted "Fani-Kayode: Come down you are for lawful arrest by the army". A voice from upstairs replied affirmatively to the Captain's summons, but nothing stirred. Nwobosi repeated his call once or twice and eventually fired a round from his SLR into the ground. When this failed to produce any reaction from Fani-Kayode, the Captain ordered the following to accompany him into the house:
(1) 2/Lt. A.A.O. Egbikor
(2) BQMS A. Chukwu
(3) Gnr. I. Ajao
(4) Gnr. S. Adefi
(5) Sgt. T. Ibelegbu
108. To gain entrance, Capt. Nwobosi was compelled to break a glass panel in the door with his SLR. He reached in, turned the key and opened the door. The small party then entered and mounted the stairs where they found Fani-Kayode in a bedroom. He raised his hands above his head and said "I surrender". Capt. Nwobosi replied "you have wasted a lot of time - we could have shot you. This is a lawful arrest by the army". Fani-Kayode was then escorted downstairs and put into the landrover after his hands had been tied together, with a rifle sling. From upstairs a-woman's voice was heard shouting "Don't kill him".
109. All the men were then assembled and mounted into their respective vehicles. They drove straight to Premier's Lodge, directed by Fani-Kayode. When they arrived, they had to overpower the police guard consisting of 1 Corporal and 5 PCs. These were put into the 3- Tonner under guard. The landrover then drove in and was parked facing the main entrance porch. At this time the security lights were burning and the lodge emergency generator was running.
110. The men were disposed around the building in strategic positions whilst Capt. Nwobosi went to the generator room to switch off the lights. Whilst he was there according to the landrover driver, Tpr. A. Itodo, a shot was fired. It was believed that this was the shot fired by Capt. Nwobosi, which killed the generator attendant. His body was later found with a bullet wound in the back of the head.
111. It is known that by the time S.L. Akintola had been informed by the wife of R.A. Fani-Kayode of what had happened by telephone. Akintola had returned from Kaduna only a short time before the arrival of Nwobosi and his men. He had been to the North to greet the Sardauna when the latter arrived from Mecca. Akintola must have been further alerted by the commotion caused by the overpowering of the police guard and the killing of the generator attendant.
112. All dispositions having been taken, Capt. Nwobosi stood in the middle of the courtyard and shouted "Akintola come down - you are for lawful arrest by the army on orders from HQ 2 Brigade. A voice from upstairs, presumably that of Akintola, replied "Yes, I am coming" Nothing further happened. Capt. Nwobosi repeated his summons a number of times without reaction from Akintola. He then fired from his SLR one round at the building. When this produced no result, the Captain ordered the following to accompany him into the lodge:
(1) 2/Lt. A.A.O. Egbikor
(2) BQMS A. Chukwu
(3} Gnr. S. Adefi
(4} Gnr. I. Ajao
{5) Gnr. B. Akau
(6) Gnr. J. Gwaske
(7) LIBdr E. Uloh
113. To gain entrance, Captain Nwobosi was compelled to force the main door to the lodge. They all entered and mounted the stairs. On the first floor they searched a number of rooms without encountering anyone, until they came to S.L. Akintola's bedroom which was locked. When Nwobosi was about to force this door, Akintola opened fire from inside the room with an SMG, shooting through the closed door. This first burst of fire immediately wounded Gnr. S. Adefi in the hand, 2/Lt. Egbikor in the head and Capt. Nwobosi on the left cheek. None of the injuries were sufficiently serious to impede them. Nwobosi and his men immediately returned the fire whilst retreating down the stairs. They then left the house in a hurry and sought cover amongst the flowerbeds facing the back building.
114. Two of the men, L/Bdr. Uloh and, Gnr. Ajao remained upstairs and sought refuge in one of the other rooms. Akintola came to the room covering the entrance porch and continued to fire at his assailants with his SMG without, however, hitting anyone. Capt. Nwobosi ordered his men to return the fire which they did, massively. Akintola continued firing until he ran out of ammunition.
115. Around this time R.A. Fani-Kayode was heard shouting from the landrover to Akintola urging him to surrender. Akintola, now defenceless, decided to surrender and was next seen coming out of the front room, by Gnr. Ajao. When Akintola saw Ajao and Uloh he raised his hand in surrender and went downstairs. Capt. Nwobosi in the meantime, was heard shouting repeatedly "bring him out, bring him out".
116. Capt. Nwobosi then ordered 2/Lt. Egbikor and BQMS A. Chukwu to shoot the Premier. These two opened fire on Akintola with their SLRs, joined, shortly afterwards, by Nwobosi himself. S.L. Akintola fell down dead or dying with several bullets in his body.
117. After the killing of Akintola, Capt. Nwobosi assembled his men, released the captured policemen and drove off. This time he was joined in the landrover by 2/Lt. Egbikor. They stopped at a roundabout near the Central Police Station, where Capt. Nwobosi ordered Sgt. T. Ibelegbu to proceed independently to Abeokuta with orders to collect a 105 mm Howitzer from the battery gun park together with a team of 12 gunners, and to drive to 2 Battalion, Ikeja. There, Ibelegbu and his party were to await the arrival of Capt. Nwobosi.
118. On the way out of Ibadan, R.A. Fani-Kayode begged Capt. Nwobosi to be released. The Captain refused this request and informed Fani-Kayode that he had orders to bring him to the Federal Guard Officers' Mess in Lagos.
119. The party drove direct to Dodan Barracks where they arrived around 0700 hours, having left Ibadan at approximately 0400 hours. On their arrival they were all arrested.
120. The party travelling in the 3-Tonner with the 105 mm Howitzer was arrested on arrival in 2 Battalion lines, Ikeja.
KADUNA, NORTHERN REGION
121. Major C.K. Nzeogwu of the Nigerian Military Training College (NMTC) at Kaduna was appointed by the "inner circle" as the commander of the rebellion in the North. The manner in which this was to be organised appears to have been left entirely to him.
122. The record does not show that any officers, other than Major Nzeogwu, in the North were taken into the confidence of the inner circle. It is, however, probable that some time before the rebellion Major Nzeogwu obtained the co-operation of Major T. Onwatuegwu and Captain G. Ude, both of the NMTC.
123. Whereas in the West and in the Lagos area military movements by night were not unusual as a result of the disturbed conditions then prevailing, this was not the case at Kaduna. It was, therefore, necessary that a cover be provided for the proposed rebellious activities, at the same time creating a reason for bringing troops out of barracks by night without alerting the senior officers of 1 Brigade to Nzeogwu's intentions.
124. It has been established that Military night exercises in the Kaduna area, organized by the NMTC, then under the command of Major Nzeogwu commenced in early December 65, leading up to Exercise Damissa on 13 and 14 Jan. 66. By then the population of Kaduna and the Police were accustomed to troop movements after dark.
125. The master plan of the inner circle made provision for the arrest of a number of leading political personalities who were not to be killed unless they offered resistance. This may well have been true as far as the West, Mid-West and the East were concerned. In view of Major Nzeogwu's activities at the Premier's Lodge in Kaduna, however, it is thought that this officer had no intention of abiding by these decisions but was determined, from the start, to kill the Premier of the North at any cost.
PART 111- EXECUTION:
126. The details of exercise DAMISSA are not relevant to this report. Suffice it to say that the night exercise of 13 Jan 66 took place in the area of the Ministers' quarters in Kaduna, whereas that of 14 Jan 66 was held in the bush some 5 or 6 miles outside Kaduna along the Zaria road.
Units involved
l27. On 14 Jan 66 troops from the following units took part in Exercise DAMISSA:
(1) 3rd Battalion NA -"C" Company
(2) N.M.T.C.
(3) No. 1 Field Squadron NAE
(4) No.2 Field Squadron NAE
(5) 1 Brigade Transport Company NASC
(6) lst Field Battery NAA
Arms and Ammunition
128. Troops proceeding on military training exercises by night or by day were normally issued with their arms, either without ammunition or with blanks.
129. As far as can be established, this practice was first deviated from on Jan 13 66 when, at approximately 0900 hours Major Nzeogwu handed the Acting RQMS of the NMTC, Ssgt. J. Daramola, a list of live ammunition required for Exercise DAMISSA. This NCO handed the list to Cpl. E. Aiyikere, the arms storeman, with instructions to draw this ammunition from the NMTC Magazine at Kawo. This was done and the ammunition was issued in bulk at approximately 1730 hours on 14 Jan 66 by Ssgt. Daramola and CMS Oko (also of NMTC).
130. This list of ammunition issued is not available but it has, however, been established that at least 6 x 84 mm projectiles for the Carl Gustav Anti-Tank gun were issued to Sgt. Yakubu Adebiyi, an instructor in the Tactical Wing of the NMTC. These were loaded into a landrover whilst the bulk of the small Arms Ammunition drawn was loaded into a 3-Tonner driven by NA/ 18266054 Pte. Clement Agbe of 1 Bde. Transport Coy. This driver subsequently transported the ammunition to the DAMISSA exercise area.
Briefing
131. Exercise DAMISSA terminated at approximately 0130 hours on 15 Jan 66. Around that time all officers engaged in the exercise with the exception of the officers of 1st Field Battery NAA, were called by Major Nzeogwu to attend an "O" Group in the bush at which, they believed, the success or otherwise of the exercise was to be discussed. Identified as present at this discussion are the following:
(1) Major C.K. Nzeogwu )NMTC
(2) Major T. Onwatuegwu )NMTC
(3) Captain G. Ude ) NMTC
(4) 2/Lt. S. R. Omeruah )3rd Bn NA - "C" Coy
(5) 2/Lt. D.K. Waribor )
(6) Capt. B. Gbulie )at the time in command of lst and 2nd Field Squadron NAE
(7) 2/Lt. Ileabachi )
(8) 2/Lt. Kpera ) lst Field Sqn NAE
(9) 2/Lt. P. Ogoegbunam Ibik )
(10) Lieut. E. Okafor )
(11) 2/Lt. Ezedima ) 2nd Field Sqn NAE
(12) 2/Lt. H.O.D. EGHAGHA )
132. The officers of 1st Field Battery NAA were not called to the "O" Group for reasons which are not altogether clear. No direct use in connection with the rebellion was made of this Battery that night.
133. When all the officers were assembled, Major Nzeogwu addressed then on the subject of the rapidly deteriorating political and security situation in the Federation. He claimed that a stage had been reached at which the politicians should be told to quit. To accomplish this, he announced, the army had decided to take over power by force of arms. He compared the incomes of the politicians with those of Nigerian workers and urged the officers to support the rebellion. He further announced that the revolt was taking place simultaneously in all regional capitals and at Lagos and that, therefore, they need fear no repercussions as a result of the activities in which they were about to participate that night. It would appear that none of these present raised a dissenting voice. In fact, their subsequent actions showed, in most cases, enthusiastic support for the plan.
134. Major Nzeogwu then proceeded to issue set tasks to each officer present. Events have shown that, subsequently, last minute changes in these plans were made. The tasks allotted have been established as follows:
Occupation of Vulnerable Points
135. The officer in over-all charge of this part of the operation was Capt. B. Gbulie. He claimed to have distributed tasks as shown below on the spur of the moment:
(1) Ammunition Service Depot (ASD) -2/Lt. Ileabachi
(2) P & T Telephone Exchange -2/Lt. P. Ogoegbunam Ibik
(3) N.B.C. House -2/Lt. Kpera
(4) BCNN Radio & TV Station -2/Lt. Ezedima
(5) State House -2/Lt. Okafor
(6) Road Blocks on Kachia Road near PMF Barracks -2/Lt. Eghagha
136. In addition, Capt. Gbulie was instructed to rouse the following officers to inform them of what was taking place and to ask for support:
(1) Capt. P. Anakwe - 1 Bde Staff Capt. "A"
(2) Major A.A. Keshi - Brigade Major
(3) Capt. L. Dillibe - 1 Bde Staff Capt. "Q"
(4) Lieut. J.C. Ojukwu - 1 Recce Squadron NA
(5) Lieut. Ikeachor
(6} Lieut. Mohammed Eandiya
Capt. Gbulie has stated under interrogation that he complied with this order and caused these officers to foregather at HQ 1 Bde where he informed them of the situation.
137. As far as has been established, the following officers were then detailed for tasks as shown:
(1) Assassination of Alh Sir Ahmadu Bello
Major C.K. Nzeogwu
2/Lt. K.D. Waribor
2/Lt. S.E. Omeruah
Capt. G. Ude
(2) Assassination of Brigadier S. Ademulegun
Major T. Onwatuegwu
(3) Assassination of Colonel R.A. Shodeinde
2/Lt. K.D. Waribor
(4) Abduction of Sir Kashim Ibrahim
Major T. Onwatuegwu
(5) Abduction of Makaman Bida - Regional Finance Minister
Major C.K. Nzeogwu
138. After the officers had been briefed they were sent to join their men and to proceed immediately with the execution of the tasks allotted to them. It is not clear whether or not Major Nzeogwu instructed the officers to inform their men of what was afoot. It is certain that the men of 3rd Battalion who were to be used for the attack of the Premier's Lodge were not briefed. It is equally certain that Capt. Gbulie addressed all the men of the Engineers under his command and spoke to them along the lines in which Major Nzeogwu had briefed the officers.
139. Immediately after the "O" Group, senior NCOs of all units represented were sent to the 3~Tonner containing the ammunition and order to draw ammunition for their men. In the case of the "C" company this raised a problem. The men believed the exercise to be finished and a number of them queried the reason why they should be issued with live ammunition. This was explained to them by 2/Lt. Waribor who told them that they were proceeding on Internal Security Operations.
140. After the issue of ammunition had been completed, the entire force left the exercise area and proceeded to its allotted targets.
141. The following officers and ORs have been identified as having been involved in the attack on the Premier's Lodge:
Officers
(1) Major C .K. Nzeogwu - NMTC
(2) 2/Lt. K.D. Waribor - "C" Coy, 3rd BN NA
(3) 2/Lt. S.E. Omeruah - "
(4) Capt. G. Ude
Other ranks
(1) NA 18147406 Sgt. Husa Kanga - NMTC
(2) NA l8149900 Sgt Yakubu Adebiyi - NMTC
(3) Sgt Duromola Oyegoke . NMTC
(4) NA 5888 Pte. Ogbole Agwu - 3rd Bn NA
(5) NA 2405 Pte Bello Mbulla - 3rd Bn NA
(6) NA 18151763 L/Cpl . Samuel Amajo - 3rd Bn NA
(7) NA 18151319 L/Cpl Danyo Mbulla - 3rd Bn NA
(8) NA 5684 Pte. Abu Odiedier - 3rd Bn NA
(9) NA 18148998 Pte Lekoja Gidan-Jibrin - 3rd Bn NA
(10) NA 163287 Cp1. Bako Lamundo - 3rd Bn NA
(11) NA 5860 Pte. Joseph Wadu Goji -3rd Bn NA
(12) NA 1982 Pte. Alexander Agbe - 3rd Bn NA
(13) NA 18151864 Pte Lagwin Goshit - 3rd Bn NA
(14) NA 18266006 Pte Augustine Oguche Agbo - 3rd Bn NA
(15) NA 634212 Pte Effiong Atkinson - 3rd Bn NA
(16) NA 18147284 Cpl. Tunana Bangir - 3rd Bn NA
(17) NA 18l49368 Cpl. Abibo Elf - 3rd Bn NA
(18) NA 18151873 Pte. Uguman Monogi - 3rd Bn NA
(19) NA 1562 Pte Felako Kwa - 3rd Bn NA
(20) NA 18149363 Cpl. Reuben Nwagwugwu - 3rd Bn NA
(20) NA 502542 Cpl. Yakubu Kaje - 3rd Bn NA
(21) NA 505092 L/Cpl. Mamis Hundu - 3rd Bn NA
(22) NA 18151861 L/Cpl Thaddens Thamyil Tsenyi1 - 3rd Bn NA
(23) NA l8148269 L/Cpl Issna1m Tayapa - 3rd Bn NA
(24) NA 18148272 L/Cpl Ali Shendam - 3rd Bn NA
(25) NA 18151771 Pte. Usuman Gabure - 3rd Bn NA
(26) NA 18149613 Pte Emmanue1 Ekwueme - 3rd Bn NA
(27) NA 4887 Pte Erastus Nakito - 3rd Bn NA
(29) NA 3659 Pte Jonathan Anahiri - 3rd Bn NA
142. When this force left the DAMISSA exercise area, it was led by Major Nzeogwu who was travelling in a landrover accompanied by a driver and two OR's. He was followed by another landrover containing Sgts. Adebiyi, Manga and Oyegoke who were armed with two 84mm Carl Gustav Anti-Tank Guns and 6 projectiles.
143. Following this were a number of other vehicles, landrovers and 3-Tonner containing 2/Lts. Waribor and Omeruah and troops from "C" Coy 3rd BN NA.
144. On arrival at the main gate to the compound, Major Nzeogwu found 4 PCs on guard in front of the gate. They were the following:
(1) No.8301 L/Cpl. Musa Nimzo
(2) No. 10674 PC. Akpan Anduka
(3) No. 18913 PC Hagai Lai
(4) No. 18920 PC Peter Attah
145. Major Nzeogwu, who was armed with a sterling SMG, ordered the constables to face the wall. Attah complied with this order but the three others refused. Without further ado, Major Nzeogwu immediately opened fire on them with his SMG killing all three on the spot.
146. Immediately after the killing of the policemen, Major Nzeogwu ordered the two men with the guns and the 3 NMTC Sergeants to follow him into the compound, bringing with them the Carl Gustav guns and the projectiles for these weapons.
147. Immediately inside the compound, Major Nzeogwu stationed the Carl Gustavs some 10 yards apart facing the lodge. The gunners were Sgts. Oyegeke and Manga, whilst Sgt. Adebiyi acted as ammunition number. As soon as both guns had been loaded, Major Nzeogwu ordered the NCOs to open fire at the Lodge. Both fired their projectiles bursting inside the ground floor rooms of the building. Sgt. Adebiyi stated that he then ran towards Sgt. Manga to help this NCO reload. Whilst he was with Manga he heard Major Nzeogwu shouting repeatedly "Fire you bastard, fire". Immediately after this both Manga and Adebiyi heard a burst of SMG fire. They turned round and observed Sgt. Oyegoke slumped on the ground bleeding from multiple wounds. It was clear to both that their colleague had been killed by Major Nzeogwu either for refusing to obey or because he attempted to run away.
143. After the killing of Oyegeke, Major Nzeogwu ordered Sgt. Adebiyi to take over Oyegeke's gun and to continue firing at the house. Both Adebiyi and Manga, frightened by Oyegoke's killing, continued to fire as ordered. They used a total of 5 projectiles. As a result the building caught fire.
149. Whilst all this was happening, 2/Lst. Waribor and Omeruah had arrived with the men from 3rd BN who were rapidly deployed around the outer perimeter wall of the lodge. Although these men heard the bursting of the Carl Gustav projectiles, the SMG and SLR fire and the screaming of women and children inside the compound, they were in no position to observe what was happening.
150. 2/Lt. Waribor, whilst deploying his men, instructed them to shoot anyone they observed attempting to leave the compound. A number of civilians, including women, however, were seen running and crying and Major Nzeogwu firing at them with his SMG.
151. NA 502342 Cpl. Yakubu Kaje of 3rd BN NA reports that, at a given moment, he observed a civilian coming out of the Lodge armed with a sword. The corporal and the men with him stopped the civilian and ordered him to drop the sword. At this moment, according to the corporal, Major Nzeogwu arrived on the scene and asked the civilian, in Hausa, for the whereabouts of the "master of the house". The man replied that he did not know, whereupon Major Nzeogwu threatened to kill him unless he led him to his master. The man then agreed and led Major Nzeogwu to the back of the building. A shortwhile afterwards, the corporal states, he heard a number of shots fired. Assuming that Kaje is telling the truth, it is probable that the Sardauna of Sokoto died at that moment.
152. Cpl. Kaje has further reported that when the firing ceased, Major Nzeogwu came from the compound and was met at the gate by 2/Lt. Waribor, who asked the Major: "Did you get the man?", to which Nzeogwu answered, "Yes". When Major Nzeogwu left the compound he stated for all to hear, exultantly, "I have been successful, he is dead".
153. It has not been possible to establish the circumstances in which the senior wife of the deceased Premier was killed. The same applies to the death of one Zaruni, the Premier's personal body-guard. It is presumed that they died at the same time as the Premier.
154. With regards to the killing of Ahmed Ben Musa, Senior Assistant Secretary (Security) in front of the Lodge, none of the men interrogated has admitted to having witnessed this. Ahmed Ben Musa was shot dead in his car by a number of unidentified soldiers, having arrived at the Premier's Lodge after being alerted by the police. Presumably the soldiers had ordered Musa to drive away but he could not do so for some unexplained reason. They then killed him.
ASSASSINATION OF BRIGADIER S. ADEMULEGUN
155. The following have been identified as having been involved in the killing of this senior officer and his wife at No.1, Kashim Ibrahim Road, Kaduna at approximately 0200 hours on 15 January 1966:-
(1) Major Timothy Onwatuegwu (NMTC)
(2) NA 18265005 Spr. Yakubu Dungo 2 Fd. Sgn. NAE
(3) NA 18266079 L/Cpl . Lawrence Akuma 2 Fd. Sgn. NAE
(4) Spr. Raphael O1atunde 2 Fd. Sgn. NAE
(5) James Aluta 2 Fd. Sgn. NAE
(6) Emmanuel Udo 2 Fd. Sgn. NAE
(7) Simon Agi 2 Fd. Sgn. NAE
(8) Felix 0. {Snu) 2 Fd. Sgn. NAE {now NMTC)
(9) L/Cpl . Mu1i {Snu) 2 Fd. Sgn. NAE {now NMTC)
(10) NMT Cp1. Yakubu Bako 1 Fd. Sgn. NAE
(11) Spr. Mathew Asanya 1 Fd. Sgn. NAE
(12) Joseph Odion 1 Fd. Sgn. NAE
(13) Spr. Henry Va1ia 1 Fd. Sgn. NAE
(14) NA 18149929 Pte. Geofrey Eborendu 1 Bde. Tpt Coy NASC
156. After the briefing at the DAMISSA "O" Group by Major Nzeogwu at 0130 hours l5 Jan 66, Major Onwatuegwu entered a landrover driven by No. NA 18149929 Pte. G. Eberandu of Bde. Tpt. Coy. With the exception of L/Cpl. Lawrence Akuma all the men mentioned were made to enter this vehicle and another landrover.
157. Before leaving the exercise area these men drew ammunition from the 3-Tonner already referred to in this report. They had already been briefed as what was expected from them that night by Capt. Gbulie, the OC. The two vehicles then moved off to the junction of the Lagos Zaria roads where they stopped. Here the men from one of the landrovers were transferred to a 3-Tonner whilst the empty landrover containing only the driver and L/Cpl. Muli was despatched to the Air Force Base by Major Onwatuegwu.
158. When L/Cpl. Muli returned, the convoy, now consisting of 2 landrovers and one 3-Tonner, proceeded to the residence of Brigadier Ademulegun. At some distance from the house, variously estimated at between 100 and 400 yards, all three vehicles stopped. Major Onwatuegwu ordered a section of men under L/Cpl. Muli to accompany him towards the house.
159. The Brigadier's house was guarded by L/Cpl. Lawrence Akuma and three sappers of 2 Field Squadron NAE. When the Major and his party arrived, L/Cpl. Akuma and the two sappers were on the verandah of the house whilst one sapper was patrolling the grounds. The latter challenged Major Onwatuegwu when he approached. He was disarmed and escorted to the house where he was made to join the guard commander and the other two members of the guard. They were all placed in the custody of a number of soldiers.
160. Major Onwatuegwu, accompanied by a number of soldiers entered the house. A short while after this, the guard heard several shots fired upstairs after which the Major and his men returned. The guard were placed into the 3-Tonner truck and driven to HQ 1 Brigade where they remained until released in the morning.
ASSASSINATION OF COLONEL R.A. SHODEINDE
161. The only persons positively identified as having been involved in the murder of this senior officer are the following:-
(l) Major C.K. Nzeogwu - NMTC
(2) Major T. Onwatuegwu - NMTC
(3) Lieut. G.E. Nwokedi - NMTC
162. It will be recalled that at the briefing by Major Nzeogwu, it was 2/Lt. Waribor who was allotted the task of killing the Colonel, after the attack on the Premier's Lodge 2/Lt. Waribor has stated that after the completion of his task at the Premier's Lodge, he was ordered by Major Nzeogwu to effect the arrest of Makaman Bida before proceeding to Col. Shodeinde's residence. He was unable to do so, because he did not know the address of the Colonel, and therefore, returned to Brigade Headquarters.
163. Mrs. Shodeinde has stated that at approximately 0300 hours on Jan 15. 66 she heard the sound of three vehicles stopping in front of her house. Immediately afterwards she heard a voice which she identified as that of Major Nzeogwu, calling her husband's name. The Colonel was fast asleep. She left her bed and switched on the lights. As she did so, the men outside started to shoot at the doors and windows of the house and she was immediately wounded in the left hand. The door then flew open and about ten soldiers rushed into the room. Amongst these she identified Major Nzeogwu, Major Onwatuegwu and Lieut. Nwokedi.
164. By this time the Colonel was awake and sitting up in bed. Mrs. Shodeinde started to cry and beg for her life. Nzeogwu assured her that they had not come to kill her but her husband the Colonel. When she continued shouting, the other soldiers shot at her legs, wounding her several times.
165. Major Nzeogwu and the others then commenced firing at the Colonel whilst still in bed, who fell down dead or dying by the side of the bed. Mrs. Shodeinde then fled from the room and ran for shelter to the servant's quarters where she remained until the attackers left.
ABDUCTION OF SIR KASHIM IBRAHIM -GOVERNOR OF NORTHERN NIGERIA
166. This abduction was accomplished by the persons involved in the assassination of Brigadier S. Ademulegun. Their names are, therefore, not repeated here.
167. After killing the Brigadier, Major Onwatuegwu ordered his men to re-enter their vehicles and drove straight to the Governor's residence. On arrival a number of men were deployed around the house whilst the Major entered accompanied by a number of unidentified soldiers.
168. The house was then being guarded by the following police constables:-
(1) No.11258 PC Benson Sihindatiya
(2) No.185 " Yohana Garkawa
(3) No.1391 " Johnson Lamurde
(4) No.18909 " Warzar
169. At approximately 0245 hours Major Onwatuegwu and his party reached the residence, according to PC Lamurde. The Major was then in the landrover. The first landrover containing some 7 men stopped. The man jumped out and overpowered the PC on duty. The Major then entered the building.
170. Whilst the Major and his party were inside, the military personnel who remained outside the building heard a burst of SMG fire. It is certain that this burst of SMG fire killed PC Yohana Garkawa. PC Sihindatiya was disarmed by 4 soldiers and dragged to the police guard room where he saw the dead body of PC Garkawa. The soldiers pointed at the body and said "Do you see your brother?". They then instructed him to lead them to the bedroom of the Governor. When he stated that he did not know where the Governor was sleeping they threatened to kill him. By that time, however, the Governor had been found by other soldiers reaching the residence. He was brought out and made to enter the 3-Tonner and was driven to HQ 1 Brigade.
171. Simultaneously with the Governor, his two ADC's Messrs. Noman Dikwa and Garba Lango, were abducted and driven to 1 Bde HQ in the landrover containing Major Onwatuegwu.
ABDUCTION OF MAKAMAN BIDA - NORTH REGIONAL FINANCE MINISTER
172. This attempted abduction (or assassination) failed because the Minister was not in his house that night, having traveled to Bida, his home town, the previous day. The incident is, however, worth reporting, because during the search of the Minister's residence one man, Ahmadu Pategi, a Government driver, was killed by Lieut. Waribor who mistook him for the Minister.
173. Among those taking an active part in this incident the following have been identified:-
(1) 2/Lt. Waribor - NMTC (other names are illegible)
174. After the completion of the operation at the Premier's Lodge, 2/Lt. Waribor met Major Nzeogwu near the main entrance to the Lodqe. The Major had been wounded during the attack and had bloodstains on the right side of his face and his shirt. The Major ordered Waribor to take his platoon to the house of Makaman Bida, to arrest the Minister and to take him to Brigade Headquarters.
175. Waribor complied with the order, and drove straight to the Minister's house. On arrival he deployed his men around the house and called in a loud voice upon the Minister to surrender. This brought no reaction so he forced open the door with the intention of searching the house. At this moment Major Nzeogwu arrived. The Major ordered Waribor to search the ground floor whilst he, accompanied by a number of men from 3rd Brigade NA went upstairs.
176. Waribor's search downstairs proved fruitless. He collected about 3 house servants and questioned them as to the whereabouts of their master. They claimed that the Minister had traveled to Bida and was returning in the morning. Whilst he was questioning the servants outside the house, Waribor observed a man running from the house with his face covered. Believing this to be the Minister, Waribor fired at the man and killed him. He then went to the body, and after removing the cloth from the man's face, found that he was mistaken. It was later established that the body was that of Ahmadu Pategi, a Government driver attached to the Minister.
177. Major Nzeogwu, having failed to find the Minister upstairs then came down and enquired from Waribor why he had fired his SMG. Waribor explained after which Nzeogwu ordered him to accompany him to the house of Colonel Shodeinde, who according to the plan was to be killed that night. The Major then drove off before Waribor had a chance to assemble his men and to mount into the vehicles. Since Waribor did not know Col. Shodeinde's address and the Major had departed without him, he had no choice but to return to Brigade Headquarters.
OCCUPATION OF OTHER VULNERABLE POINTS
178. This was carried out by the officers named in paragraph 135 of this report without producing any incident of interest to this enquiry. 2/Lt. H.O.D. Eghagha whose task it was to set up a road block on the Kachia Road near the Police Mobile Force Barracks was instructed to prevent the PMF from travelling into Kaduna. This, it is thought, implied that he and his men were to attack the PMF should they move out in strength. It has been established, however, that 2/Lt. Eghagha instructed his men not to molest the PMF as these were too few in number to affect materially the rebellious operations of that night. It is a fact that the majority of the Northern PMF were, at that time, serving in Western Nigeria.
THE NIGERIAN AIR FORCE
179. Although not directly involved in any of the incidents reported on in this document, there is no doubt that the Nigerian Air Force played a comparatively important role in the rebellion under the command of 2/Lt. Godfrey Ikechukwu Amuchienwa of the Military Training and Security Squadron NAF at Kaduna.
NOTE: At this point the (incomplete) report ends.
__________________
NOTES
ACRONYMS: If you have any questions about some of the acronyms used in the report please contact me by email at nowa@prodigy.net
SPELLINGS: Please excuse some of the spelling errors. The original documents from which these were culled had a few areas that were not very legible