The
Orkar Coup of April 22, 1990
By Dr. Nowa Omoigui
[SOUTH CAROLINA, U.S.A.]
Shortly after dawn broke on April 22, 1990, the following broadcast was heard
over the Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria (FRCN) in Lagos:
"Fellow Nigerian Citizens,
On behalf of the patriotic and well-meaning peoples of the Middle Belt and the
southern parts of this country, I , Major Gideon Orkar, wish to happily inform
you of the successful ousting of the dictatorial, corrupt, drug baronish, evil
man, deceitful, homo-sexually-centered, prodigalistic, un-patriotic
administration of General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida. We have equally
commenced their trials for unabated corruption, mismanagement of national
economy, the murders of Dele Giwa, Major-General Mamman Vatsa, with other
officers as there was no attempted coup but mere intentions that were yet to
materialise and other human rights violations.
The National Guard already in its formative stage is disbanded with immediate
effect. Decrees Number 2 and 46 are hereby abrogated. We wish to
emphasise that this is not just another coup but a well conceived, planned and
executed revolution for the marginalised, oppressed and enslaved peoples of the
Middle Belt and the south with a view to freeing ourselves and children
yet unborn from eternal slavery and colonisation by a clique of this country.
Our history is replete with numerous and uncontrollable instances of callous and
insensitive dominatory repressive intrigues by those who think it is their
birthright to dominate till eternity the political and economic privileges of
this great country to the exclusion of the people of the Middle Belt and the
south.
They have almost succeeded in subjugating the Middle Belt and making them
voiceless and now extending same to the south.
It is our unflinching belief that this quest for domination, oppression and
marginalisation is against the wish of God and therefore, must be resisted with
the vehemence.
Anything that has a beginning must have an end. It will also suffice here
to state that all Nigerians without skeleton in their cupboards need not to be
afraid of this change. However, those with skeleton in their cupboards have all
reasons to fear, because the time of reckoning has come.
For the avoidance of doubt, we wish to state the three primary reasons why we
have decided to oust the satanic Babangida administration. The reasons are
as follows:
(a) To stop Babangida's desire to cunningly, install himself as
Nigeria's life president at all costs and by so doing, retard the progress of
this country for life. In order to be able to achieve this undesirable
goals of his, he has evidently started destroying those groups and sections he
perceived as being able to question his desires.
Examples of groups already neutralised, pitched against one another or
completely destroyed are:
(1) The Sokoto caliphate by installing an unwanted Sultan to cause
division within the hitherto strong Sokoto caliphate.
(2) The destruction of the peoples of Plateau State, especially the
Lantang people, as a balancing force in the body politics of this country.
(3) The buying of the press by generous monetary favours and the
usage of State Security Service, SSS, as a tool of terror.
(4) The intent to cow the students by the promulgation of the
draconian decree Number 47.
(5) The cowing of the university teaching and non-teaching staff by
an intended massive purge, using the 150 million dollar loan as the
necessitating factor.
(6) Deliberately withholding funds to the armed forces to make them
ineffective and also crowning his diabolical scheme through the intended
retrenchment of more than half of the members of the armed forces.
Other pointers that give credence to his desire to become a life president
against the wishes of the people are:
(1) His appointment of himself as a minister of defence, his putting under
his direct control the SSS, his deliberate manipulation of the transition
programme, his introduction of inconceivable, unrealistic and impossible
political options, his recent fraternisation with other African leaders that
have installed themselves as life presidents and his dogged determination to
create a secret force called the national guard, independent of the armed forces
and the police which will be answerable to himself alone, both operationally and
administratively.
It is our strong view that this kind of dictatorial desire of Babangida is
unacceptable to Nigerians of the 1990's, and, therefore, must be resisted by
all.
(b) Another major reason for the change is the need to stop
intrigues, domination and internal colonisation of the Nigerian state by the
so-called chosen few. This, in our view, has been and is still responsible
for 90 percent of the problems of Nigerians. This indeed has been
the major clog in our wheel of progress.
This clique has an unabated penchant for domination and unrivalled fostering of
mediocrity and outright detest for accountability, all put together have been
our undoing as a nation.
This will ever remain our threat if not checked immediately. It is
strongly believed that without the intrigues perpetrated by this clique and
misrule, Nigeria will have in all ways achieved developmental virtues comparable
to those in Korea, Taiwan, Brazil, India, and even Japan.
Evidence, therefore, this cancerous dominance has as a factor constituted by a
major and unpardonable clog in the wheel of progress of the Nigerian state.
(Sic) It is suffice to mention a few distasteful intrigues engineered by this
group of Nigerians in recent past. These are:
(1) The shabby and dishonourable treatment meted on the longest
serving Nigerian general in the person of General Domkat Bali, who in actual
fact had given credibility to the Babangida administration.
(2) The wholesale hijacking of Babangida's administration by the all
powerful clique.
(3) The disgraceful and inexplicable removal of Commodore Ebitu
Ukiwe, Professor Tam David-West, Mr. Aret Adams and so on from office.
(4) The now-pervasive and on-going retrenchment of Middle Belt and
southerners from public offices and their instant replacement by the favoured
class and their stooges.
(5) The deliberate disruption of the educational culture and
retarding its place to suit the favoured class to the detriment of other
educational minded parts of this country.
(6) The deliberate impoverishment of the peoples from the Middle
Belt and the south, making them working ghosts and feeding on the formulae of
0-1-1- or 0-0-0 while the aristocratic class and their stooges are living in
absolute affluence on a daily basis without working for it.
(7) Other countless examples of the exploitative, oppressive, dirty
games of intrigues of its class, where people and stooges that can best be
described by the fact that even though they contribute very little economically
to the well being of Nigeria, they have over the years served and presided over
the supposedly national wealth derived in the main from the Middle Belt and the
southern part of this country, while the people from these parts of the country
have been completely deprived from benefiting from the resources given to them
by God.
(c) The third reason for the change is the need to lay a strong
egalitarian foundation for the real democratic take off of the Nigerian state or
states as the circumstances may dictate.
In the light of all the above and in recognition of the negativeness of the
aforementioned aristocratic factor, the overall progress of the Nigerian state a
temporary decision to excise the following states namely, Sokoto, Borno, Katsina,
Kano and Bauchi states from the Federal Republic of Nigeria comes into effect
immediately until the following conditions are met.
The conditions to be met to necessitate the re-absorption of the aforementioned
states are as following:
(i) To install the rightful heir to the Sultanate, Alhaji Maccido, who is
the people's choice.
(ii) To send a delegation led by the real and recognised Sultan
Alhaji Maccido to the federal government to vouch that the feudalistic and
aristocratic quest for domination and operation will be a thing of the past and
will never be practised in any part of the Nigeria state.
By the same token, all citizens of the five states already mentioned are
temporarily suspended from all public and private offices in Middle Belt and
southern parts of this country until the mentioned conditions above are met.
They are also required to move back to their various states within one week from
today. They will, however, be allowed to return and joint the Federal
Republic of Nigeria when the stipulated conditions are met.
In the same vein, all citizens of the Middle Belt and the south are required to
come back to their various states pending when the so-called all-in-all
Nigerians meet the conditions that will ensure a united Nigeria. A word is
enough for the wise.
This exercise will not be complete without purging corrupt public officials and
recovering their ill-gotten wealth, since the days of the oil boom till date.
Even in these hard times, when Nigerians are dying from hunger, trekking many
miles to work for lack of transportation, a few other Nigerians with complete
impunity are living in unbelievable affluence both inside and outside the
country.
We are extremely determined to recover all ill-gotten wealth back to the public
treasury for the use of the masses of our people. You are all advised to
remain calm as there is no cause for alarm. We are fully in control of the
situation as directed by God. All airports, seaports and borders are
closed forthwith.
The former Armed Forces Ruling Council is now disbanded and replaced with
National Ruling Council to be chaired by the head of state with other members
being a civilian vice-head of state, service chiefs, inspector general of
police, one representative each from NLC, NUJ, NBA, and NANS.
A curfew is hereby imposed from 8 p.m. to 6 a.m. until further notice. All
members of the armed forces and the police forces are hereby confined to their
respective barracks.
All unlawful and criminal acts by those attempting to cause chaos will be
ruthlessly crushed. Be warned as we are prepared at all costs to defend
the new order.
All radio stations are hereby advised to hook on permanently to the national
network programme until further notice.
Long live all true patriots of this great country of ours. May God and Allah
through his bountiful mercies bless us all."
__________
As is fairly typical with military rebellions,
by the time this broadcast was being made on the radio waves, much had already
transpired over the course of the night - and more violence was to come before
it was eventually crushed about 12 hours later.
In the days preceding the rebellion, seeing as planners felt that the plot had
leaked, military retirees were hurriedly recruited, predominantly from Benin
City in then Bendel state. They then mostly made their way to Lagos
unobtrusively in public transportation.
The uprising reportedly began at about 12.30am on April 22 when, having met for
final briefing, allegedly by Major S. Mukoro at a civilian warehouse in Isheri/Ikorodu
area (allegedly owned by Great Ogboru), the storm troopers farmed out to their
destinations. Mukoro, a Military Police officer with a PhD in Law,
was at that time the Military Assistant to the Director of Army Staff Duties and
Plans (DASP), a position second only to the Chief of Army Staff at Army
Headquarters. This insider leverage as a staff officer in the
headquarters may have given him "reach" in putting the plot together.
But it was also reported by newspapers that such was the degree of
compartmentalization ensured by Major Mukoro during the recruitment phase that
many of the plotters met for the first time that night. Nor did they
rely on normal military transportation. Instead they had civilian J-5
buses provided to shunt them around.
The first task under the circumstances was to secure weapons. This they
accomplished by first taking control of an armory at the military police
dominated barracks at Apapa. A Sergeant apparently accomplished this
crucial first phase. He then arrested Colonels Ajiborisha and Odaro
both of whom were transported to Ojo cantonment and detained along with Major
Said who was then commanding the Army HQ provost battalion at Ojo. [All
these officers were later rescued].
Next, subgroups headed for the FRCN radio station, Bonny camp, Dodan Barracks,
Ikeja cantonment and Ojo cantonment primarily to get additional heavy caliber
weapons and active duty soldiers as well as seize these locations as they
boot-strapped the operation. There are unconfirmed reports, for example, that
the armory of the 126 Guards Battalion at Bonny camp was "liberated"
by a small group of ex-servicemen led by Major Orkar himself.
Then there is the interesting angle of the case of one Lt. Obasi
(who later escaped). He allegedly went to a guardroom where some soldiers were
in detention for various unit offences and released them to participate.
Most did but some did not.
Some of the plotters were already pre-positioned on routine guard duty at both
the radio station and Dodan Barracks (formerly State House, Ribadu road) - the
seat and home of the President. Lt. Okekumatalo of 123
Infantry Battalion was on duty at the Radio Station. 2/Lt A. B.
Umukoro, was also on Armoured corps official duty at the radio station but was
not initially involved in the plot. Lt Okekumatalo arrested him and
most of his armored guard detail. Thereafter, Major Mukoro gave the
arrested armoured corps officers a pep talk and recruited most of them into the
scheme. Thus, with Okekumatalo's inside job, the Radio Station proved to
be a walkover initially for Major Mukoro, Lt. Col Nyiam and Captain Empere who
secured the use of one of the fully armed armored vehicles there. Lt. Col
Nyiam has been projected in the Press as being primarily responsible for the
seizure of Dodan Barracks and the arrest of the President but he has never
confirmed this. When the assault on Dodan Barracks began he had
reportedly already been in and out on a 'routine' visit to old friends and was
rumored to have been engaged in a game of draught with the President's ADC.
Those who know will hopefully someday reveal the details of how it was all
contrived.
Publicly available accounts, however, suggest that at the start of the
operation, one Lt. Uchendu reportedly grabbed an armored vehicle from the State
House and drove to the radio station. This may have been the
commotion that first alerted Babangida's household. When he arrived there,
he and Umukoro were then sent back (by Major Mukoro) in a convoy to attack the
residential quarters at Dodan Barracks. The shelling of the State House
apparently followed the shooting death of Lt. Col. UK Bello after he had openly
identified himself as the ADC to the President. Captain Empere (who was
actually a Military Police officer) reportedly took one of the armored vehicle
co-conspirators had secured from the radio station at Ikoyi back to Ikeja
cantonment and used it (almost single handedly) to practically take over the
cantonment, which froze in awe, paralyzed by the element of surprise and the
ferocity of the shooting. He is said to have shot at and maneuvered around all
opposition until he ran out of fuel. His main target, however, which
was to get a hold of keys to the Main Battle Tank transit shed, failed.
This failure to secure control of or neutralize the main battle tanks (such as
the T-55s) and get additional light tanks at Ikeja cantonment is thought to be
the primary reason the coup eventually failed because those same Tanks were
later used to provide superior firepower in support of loyal troops when General
Abacha bounced back.
Captain Dakolo on the other hand was reportedly an instructor at the Army Depot
in Zaria. However, he had only just been posted there from the 123
infantry battalion at Ikeja cantonment. Thus he was quite familiar
with many of the soldiers in the battalion. On the night of the coup, therefore,
he was able to approach the cantonment gate without suspicion whereupon he
allegedly opened fire on the guard detail. Some soldiers reportedly
fell, dead or dying, while others fled. The bus (or buses) carrying
other conspirators thus drove into the cantonment without resistance.
Incidentally, an innocent officer (of similar ethnic/state background) who just
happened to be passing by got into an argument over what had just transpired and
was also allegedly summarily shot.
Newspapers further reported that one Major Edosa and a Capt Tolofari of the
Military Police reportedly led the initial seizure of Ojo cantonment. They
both escaped when in the early hours of daylight they started losing control.
DODAN BARRACKS
The assault on Dodan Barracks was in two phases. First, several Tanks deployed
on the grounds were technically demobilized through the removal of firing pins.
Later, the assault on the main living quarters (using infantry and two armored
vehicles from the radio station driven by 2/Lts Umukoro and Uchendu) began.
Earlier, when certain movements were noticed, the ADC to the President, Lt. Col
Usman K. Bello came out to investigate. Without any supporting crew,
he reportedly tried to climb into one of the Tanks which, unknown to him, had
already been disabled. Having realized that he was in no position to use
the Tank he came out, and tried walking alone, wearing mufti, toward the radio
station, only to be summarily shot in circumstances that have never been fully
clarified. The details of what really transpired at the State House have since
become a source of minor controversy. During an interview with the
Vanguard on Sunday Feb 25, 2001, General Babangida (rtd) was quoted as saying:
"I had a routine and I went up, I was just about dozing when my wife said
something was happening and from my window I saw it all. I wasn't frightened. I
was a soldier and I took my rightful place on that fateful day.
It was, however, my wife and children who found the whole incident horrifying.
.."I have been at the war front and I know what it means. I have escaped a
lot of ambushes. In fact, there are a lot of pellets in my body.
What I have gone through in life has toughened my heart. So, there is no
question of fear, in fact it doesn't come in..".
More recently, General Babangida revealed on Galaxy Television, Ibadan that one
Captain Kassim Omowa insisted on him leaving or being evacuated from Dodan
Barracks. He is quoted as saying: "Omowa insisted that he would fly
me out. But on each mention, I told him no because he was too junior to command
me......But the young man said: "I am here to do my job. So I must move you
out of this place."
According to Babangida, Omowa evacuated him via a secret channel to a location
(ostensibly a private residence in Surulere) "where I was for some days
while the heat remained." Babangida did not shed light on other
accounts that he was physically "knocked down" or "grabbed",
smuggled via the Ribadu back gate and maze of adjoining buildings and compounds,
tucked inside a Volkswagen beetle and hidden at the National Arts Theater,
Iganmu from where he made contact with Abacha and others. It has also been
reported that one of his bodyguards was later captured by the plotters but did
not betray his location. None of this has been confirmed by
authoritative sources.
Babangida's former Chief Press Officer, Chief Duro Onabule, however, went public
with another version last year. According to him, while commotion was
brewing, Babangida "remained calm in the sitting room. All pleas for
him to leave the place by the security staff failed, he simply refused. Even
when the shots were coming closer from Obalende side, he still would not leave.
As I said, he remained calm under the fire, but the saving grace was his wife,
who physically dragged him out, and I mean physically dragged him out. Even
then, IBB did not leave the premises, he stayed at the gate of Dodan Barracks;
all pleas for him to leave the place, he refused. When the pressure
mounted, he then asked the security people, who were asking him to leave, 'okay
I appreciate your concern, but if I am to leave, how about these poor boys
defending me," so he stayed there, until the whole thing was brought under
control. Before he then left for the house."
Regarding the death of Lt. Col Usman K. Bello, Lt. Col. Gabriel Anthony Nyiam,
formerly of Nigerian Army Engineers, then a Directing Staff at the Command and
Staff College, Jaji, and the most senior officer involved in the uprising,
(who is said to have been Col. Bello's course mate and personal friend) was
quoted in an interview with the Sunday Vanguard Newspaper published on April 16,
2000: "Let me state clearly, may the soul of U.K.
Bello rest in peace. It's sad that U.K Bello had to die because he was in effect
used by IBB as a distraction and the poor chap was misled to be pushed out of
Dodan Barracks that night, when Babangida already knew that there was danger.
Babangida used U.K. Bello as a bait." But slightly over a
year later, with a slightly different spin, on Friday 17th August, 2001,
it was reported in the same Vanguard newspaper interview noted above that Chief
Duro Onabule, former Chief Press Secretary to President Ibrahim Babangida, told
correspondent Paul Odili that Babangida "was as
usual receiving visitors late into the night, but just as the last visitor left,
he heard one gun fire. Maybe that was a signal for the coupist to commence
operation, but he was the one who first got to know. And he summoned his
ADC (U.K. Bello) and demanded to know what was going on; the ADC said nothing
sir.' He told him 'don't be stupid son,' something is going on, go and find out.
And the ADC came back to report that they were under attack. Of course, the duty
of ADC was to counter whatever attack against them."
THE RESISTANCE
LAGOS
Flag Staff House
Flag Staff House in Ikoyi, Lagos, (now called Defence House) had
traditionally always been the official residence of the GOC, Nigerian Army and
later the Chief of Army Staff. However, when he added the
title of Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff to his Army title, Lt. Gen. Sani Abacha
held on to the residence. This was the position when the coup plotters
struck in the early hours of the morning of Sunday, April 22, 1990.
As was his usual nocturnal practice Lt. General Sani Abacha was wide awake but
busy with extra-curricular rest and recreational activities at a guesthouse
nearby. Thus, when the plotters (led by one Lt. Ogboru of Military Police,
then a Law student at Uniben) arrived at his official residence he was not
available. A quick follow-up check at his nearby guesthouse (which they
were aware of) was unproductive because although they fired heavily upon the
guards and building they did not do a room-to-room mopping up operation.
Abacha was inside, alive and well. This lack of close quarter follow-up
probably saved his life - and the regime.
The late Abacha's first son (the late Ibrahim) is rumored to have driven to find
his father at the guesthouse once the plotters left. With mayhem
around him, Abacha reportedly deliberated calmly for about 10 minutes, calmly
got dressed and emerged (in mufti) with two Uzi submachine guns - one of which
he handed over to his son whom he noticed was carrying a "mere"
pistol. Thereafter, Abacha ordered his son to sit in front as the driver
of a civil Peugeot 504 while, he, Sani, the Army chief, sat as the right side
front seat passenger. Two security operatives occupied the back seats.
Then, in what was clearly an extremely dicey move, Abacha ordered his son to
drive back to the Flag Staff House where Abacha gave orders to secure the
perimeter. At that point he knew that the plotters had not cut off
telephone lines nor had they disrupted nationwide army signals networks, so he
began making phone calls to other service chiefs and more specifically, Army
commanders in Lagos (particularly Bonny Camp and Ikeja Cantonment) and other
parts of the country to get information, alert those who were ignorant of
unfolding events, convince those who thought he had been neutralized that he
wasn't, and secure pledges of loyalty. Like a pilgrimage, officers
later began trooping to the Flag Staff House to account for themselves and
declare loyalty. Once fairly confident of the localized nature
of the threat, he then gave firm orders that the coup was to be resisted at all
costs. There is word that some officers specifically sought confirmation
about Babangida's state of health before clearly committing themselves to
Abacha's destiny in those tense and uncertain early hours. Others simply
ran away or lay low.
As word got around that both Abacha and Babangida were indeed alive, galvanized
by the curious and unprecedented "expulsion" of certain 'far' northern
states on radio, confidence was restored, wills stiffened, and officers and
units that would otherwise have been disposed to take a "wait and see"
attitude or perhaps even run away, tilted toward the regime.
Once armored vehicles at Ikeja were firmly under the control of pro-Abacha
elements, Ikeja cantonment was retaken (by Brigadier Ishaya Bamaiyi) and the
push to regain control of all other major military barracks in the Lagos area
began. A young Lt. of the Recce battalion, for example, led the operation
that went to Ojo cantonment to rescue those officers detained there.
In mustering troops to retake Dodan Barracks and the radio station, the 126
guard infantry battalion at Bonny camp under Lt. Col Ghandi Tola Zidon,
the 9th infantry Brigade under Brigadier Ishaya Bamaiyi, and the Recce unit at
Ikeja (armed with Scorpion Tanks, Panhard armored cars and some Main Battle
Tanks in transit to other locations in the country) reportedly formed the
spearhead. They were supported by key AHQ elements like the Corp
Commander, Artillery, Brigadier Chris Abutu Garuba and the Director of Armor,
Colonel Abubakar Dada both of whom placed additional units within and outside
Lagos on standby in case the need arose.
Lt. Col. GT Zidon in particular was said to be familiar with Major GG Orkar, a
fellow middle belter. It is said that he dressed in tracksuit and jogged his way
to the radio Nigeria station in Ikoyi to chat him up and lull him into a false
sense of security while actually using the opportunity to conduct an
appreciation of the troop and weapon strength and disposition of the plotters.
Having done so, he later returned with troops, supported by armor, to flush them
out from the radio station. I have no independent
official confirmation of this newspaper account. But to those familiar
with the history of coups in Nigeria, the Abacha-Zidon-Orkar liaison, if true,
was a similar - but not identical - replay of the Danjuma-Babangida-Dimka
liaison of 1976 and the Ironsi-Nwawo-Nzeogwu liaison of 1966. In each case
an officer friendly with the coup spokesman went to him on behalf of the Army
Chief making arrangements to crush him.
The first attempt to reach and dislodge the coupists at the radio station was
carried out by a group of soldiers from the 126 Battalion Bonny camp reportedly
led by one Lt. Jalingo. They were repulsed near the Obalende bridge
flyover, by 2/Lt Umukoro in an armored vehicle. At least one soldier died in the
hail of co-axial MG fire. The others were later co-opted at gunpoint by
Major Mukoro and made to make mini-broadcasts in pidgin English and vernacular,
praising the coup.
KADUNA, KANO, JOS, ENUGU AND IBADAN
Even though Orkar, Nyiam, Dakolo, and Idele, all principal plotters, were either
based in Jaji, near Kaduna, or Zaria, the April 22 plotters made no concrete
arrangements to neutralize units outside the Lagos area - probably because of
the stage of planning at which it was preemptively launched as a contingency to
avoid arrest (according to Nyiam). The coup plan was predicated on the
presumption that once Babangida and Abacha were out of the way and Lagos units
neutralized, the regime, based as it was on these "twin godfathers",
would implode like a pack of cards.
Nevertheless, in seeking to crush the plot, prevent a domino effect, and
reestablish the authority of the federal military government, Lt. Gen Abacha
reached for all operational elements in all Army divisions all over the country
directly (by phone) and indirectly through resident State Governors.
What transpired in the 1st Division is the most detailed account publicly
available.
In Kaduna, the GOC 1st Div, Major General Ike Nwachukwu was on leave. His
Colonel GS, (and acting GOC) Colonel Mohammed Dansofo began contacting Brigade
Commanders in the 1st Div area of responsibility (Kano, Sokoto and Minna).
In this manner he contacted the most senior officer in the Division, then
Colonel Mohammed Chris Alli, Commander of the 3rd Infantry Brigade in Kano, for
guidance. Dansofo knew then that there was a coup in progress in Lagos but
did not know who was involved or its political coloration. The Kano State
Governor, Colonel Idris Garba and Lt. Col Lawan Gwadabe calling in from Lagos
also independently contacted Alli. It was not long before Orkar's
broadcast on radio Nigeria resolved any initial confusion about the putsch.
All Brigades were placed on full standby combat alert and all passes cancelled.
Based on a dictation made over the phone by Col. MC Alli, Col Dansofo made
a counter-broadcast on Radio Kaduna thus:
"We of the 1st Infantry Division disassociate ourselves from the coup and
its aims and affirm our loyalty to the President and Commander in Chief of the
Armed Forces, General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida."
MC Alli also made an unambiguous broadcast to the people of Kano dissociating
his Brigade from the Orkar announcement in Lagos.
In Jos, Enugu and Ibadan, the GOCsn apparently issued a similar radio message
but at least one announcement by one GOC was allegedly vague, avoiding the
specific mention of Babangida as C-in-C by name, pledging generic loyalty only
to the "Federal Military Government" rather than the regime.
Some pundits later interpreted this omission as a cunning, "wait and
see" safeguard in case the coup eventually succeeded.
GENERAL ABACHA's BROADCAST
After the radio station in Lagos was regained by loyal troops, there was a brief
announcement by Lt. Col. GT Zidon followed by the following broadcast by
Lt. Gen. Sani Abacha:
"I, Lieutenant-General Sani Abacha, Chief of Army Staff, Chairman, Joint
Chiefs of Staff, have found it necessary to address you once again in the course
of our nation's history. In view of the unfortunate, development early
this morning, I'm in touch with the CGS, Service Chiefs, GOCs, FOCs, AOCs, of
the armed forces and they have all pledged their unflinching support and loyalty
to the federal military government of General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida who is
perfectly safe and with whom I am in contact.
"Early this morning there was sporadic firing by a few disloyal and
misguided soldiers in some isolated parts of Lagos, followed by an embarrassing
radio broadcast.
"Fellow Nigerians, you will all agree with me that the reasons given for
this grave misconduct are significantly motivated by greed and self-interest.
The soldiers involved decided to constitute themselves into national security
nuisance for no other cause than base avarice.'
'Most of these disloyal elements have been arrested and are already undergoing
interrogation. The remaining dissidents are advised in their own interest
to report to the nearest military location and hand over the arms and ammunition
in their possession. All formation and unit commanders are hereby directed
to exercise effective command and control. "At this stage, let me
reiterate our commitment to pursue vigorously the transition programme. No
amount of threat or blackmail will detract the federal military government's
attention in this regard. We are set to hand over power to a
democratically elected government in 1992. I wish to assure all
law-abiding citizens that the situation is now under control and people should
go about pursuing their lawful interest.
"Long live the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
"Thank you."
______________________
GENERAL BABANGIDA'S BROADCAST
A broadcast was also made by President Babangida:
"Fellow Nigerians, I salute you all, first and foremost, let me assure you
further that the unfortunate situation of this morning in some parts of Lagos
has been brought under control by loyal troops as earlier stated by the chief of
army staff and chairman, joint chiefs of staff, Lieutenant-General Sani Abacha
with whom I have been in contact and he is with me this evening.
"I also want to seize this opportunity to commend all members of the
Nigerian armed forces the Nigeria police and security agents for the gallant and
professional manner the situation was contained.
"Let me also congratulate the civil populace for their continued support
for this administration. I wish to state that all law-abiding citizens
should go about their normal duties and their safety guaranteed. Let me
also assure the diplomatic community and all foreigners in the country that the
security of their lives and property is hereby guaranteed.
Long live the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
Thank you for your co-operation."
________________________
ESCAPE FROM RADIO NIGERIA
Isolated and surrounded, with the coup clearly headed for failure, the most
senior officers involved, Lt. Col Nyiam and Major Saliba Mukoro initially
contemplated a suicide pact, but then escaped from the radio station and
eventually left the country for exile in Britain and the US respectively.
Great Ogboru, the civilian alleged to be a key co-factor, also slipped out of
the country to Europe. Mukoro later became an Associate Professor of
Criminal Justice at a University in the U.S. Security agents detained and
hounded those elements of their respective families left behind. But
unconfirmed reports later suggested that on Major Mukoro's wife simply
walked away from supposed house arrest at Ikeja cantonment in Lagos and found
her way abroad. Great Ogboru's brother was jailed and it is
said that even after fully serving his jail term, General Abacha refused to
release him.
How did Mukoro and Nyiam escape from Radio Nigeria?
According to Col. Nyiam, in a 2000 interview with the Guardian: "At
the point of battle when we had, as it were, allowed all soldiers loyal to us to
engage, we decided that we would walk like officers out of that zone with the
resolve that it will be better to be shot standing than crawling. And we walked,
there was no disguise. How we walked out of the encirclement is what I called
the mystery and I give that glory to where it belongs....I will say that when we
left the zone of the conflict itself between 1.00 and 2.00 a.m., here again we
give credit to the poor Nigerians around the shore of the new third mainland
bridge. There were a lot of poor people who lived there, who lived in the
shanties. Those people immediately created a force to ferry anybody involved in
the action across the water to the other side and I must say that when we got
there they were so generous that even in the heat of it all when they were
giving us water to drink, they felt that their water was too dirty for me to
drink and they went and bought mineral - that shows you the generousity of the
poor. They felt we were too good to drink their water so they gave us soft
drink. It was these same poor people who became our scout and helped us to walk
through Isale Eko and thereafter when we got to a point on the old Carter
Bridge, we asked them to go back and we walked on foot. Again, there were
soldiers, how they did not see us - that credit goes to God. In cases where
soldiers, the police and other forces saw us, they ignored us and even helped us
to go through. In effect, people should not be over critical of the police or
disown soldiers because many of them have been suffering from the same problems
average people go through. In summary, the mystery and experience of this body
and mind talking to you and Mukoro is only but a demonstration of God's
power."
COURTS-MARTIAL
Major Gideon Gwaza Orkar was arrested along with about 300 other military
personnel and more than 30 civilians. In the usual Nigerian pattern of mass
arrests and reactive witch hunting, some journalists considered unsympathetic to
the regime were also detained and newspapers even closed.
Following a Board of Inquiry, cases were referred to a Military Tribunal chaired
by Major General Ike Omar Sanda Nwachukwu. The Chief Prosecutor was
Brigadier General Tunde Olurin while Lt. Col. Akin Kejawa led the defence.
In July 1990, Major GG Orkar and 41 others were convicted for treason and
executed by firing squad after confirmation of sentences by the Armed Forces
Ruling Council (AFRC). Nine other defendants were jailed while 31 soldiers
were acquitted.
Following a serious controversy inspired by allegations made by some of the
convicts - as they were about to be shot - that those acquitted by the first
tribunal were fellow putschists acquitted on ethnic grounds, the AFRC ordered
the retrial of 31 of the surviving accused by a new tribunal headed by Major
General Yohanna Yerima Kure. The Chief prosecutor this time around was Lt. Col.
Kemi Peters while Lt Col JOJ Okolagwu led the defence.
In September 1990, therefore, a second batch of 27 executions was carried out.
It has been said that the core Bendel (Edo/Delta) and Rivers (Rivers/Bayelsa)
plotters were not remorseful about the rebellion. Captain Empere in
particular was very defiant and identified the late Isaac Adaka Boro as his
mentor and hero. He and others were driven by deeply held feelings that
although their exploited lands produced Nigeria's oil wealth, their people had
little to show for it. It is fair to categorize the rebellion, therefore,
as a "resource control uprising".
__________________'
SOME ADDITIONAL BIOSKETCHES
Major GG Orkar
Major Gideon Gwaza Orkar was Tiv from Benue State. He started his officer cadet
training at the NDA in 1972 with the 12th Regular Combatant Course.
He was commissioned in December 1974 in the rank of Second Lieutenant and posted
to the Nigerian Army Armoured Corps School in Ibadan. He did particularly well
on the Armour Young Officers course and was later sent for some specialized
courses in gunnery. Indeed he was recognized as a gunnery expert by his
colleagues.
There is an unconfirmed story that as a subaltern, he was once granted six
months seniority over his colleagues based on outstanding performance
representing his commanding officer back in the seventies.
As a junior officer he also attended several courses in the Nigerian Army School
of Infantry. He was on the first Nigerian contingent that was sent to Chad
Republic and he later served in the 22 Armoured Brigade.
He passed both the junior and senior divisions of Staff College with flying
colours.
His last posting was as a member of the Directing Staff of the Command and Staff
College.
Major GG Orkar was said to have been recruited into the plot just a few weeks
before April 22, 1990.
_____________________
Lt. Col Gabriel Anthony Nyiam
GA Nyiam attended primary school in Lagos before going to the Nigerian Military
School in Zaria. He subsequently attended the Nigerian Defence Academy as
part of the 9th Regular Combatant Course, beginning in January 1971.
Upon completion of his program at NDA he was inducted into the Corp of
Engineers. He attended Earthwork University in Edinburgh and undertook a
second degree at the University of Aberdeen, Scotland. During this period he was
seconded to the British Army, where he says he imbibed the culture that
"soldiering is an honourable profession in the defence of the weak".
When he returned to Nigeria he joined General Babangida's staff at the AHQ. He
was a staff officer at the AHQ until just before the putsch when he was posted
to the Commmand and Staff College at Jaji as a Directing Staff.
___________________
Lt. Col UK Bello
Lt Col Usman K Bello was an indigene of Niger State. Gwari by tribe, he started
his Officer Cadet training with the 9th Regular Combatant Course in January 1971
at the Nigerian Defence Academy Kaduna. He was commissioned in the rank of
Second Lieutenant in June 1973 and posted to the Recce Regiment.
He attended several courses in the Nigerian Army School of Infantry and some
Armour officers' courses in Britain and the United States.
He was ADC to Brigadier SM Yar Adua when the latter was Chief of Staff Supreme
Headquarters. He was also the Brigade Major 24 Armoured Brigade before he
proceeded to the Command and Staff College (CSC) for his Senior Division Course.
At CSC he did very well and came first in order of merit.
Bello was not a university graduate but he put all his energy into making a
career of the army. His last posting before being deployed to Dodan
Barracks was as the CO of the Recce Battalion in Kaduna. As a Lt Col, he
replaced Major MS Dasuki as ADC to President Babangida. Even as ADC he sought
permission to undergo airborne training in the Nigerian Army School of Infantry.
This was not a normal practice for one at his age and rank
Bello commanded tremendous amount of respect from all ranks. The President had a
lot of confidence in him.
________________________
REFLECTIONS ON THE UPRISING BY LT. COL. GA
NYIAM
(For full details, see Guardian and Vanguard newspapers dated April 15 & 16,
2000)
What was the objective of the April 1990 rebellion?
According to Lt. Col. G Anthony Nyiam, who was the most senior officer involved
in the uprising (but not the leader), the aim was "to have a caretaker
government with a view to do two things at that time. One was to do a proper
national census and a proper election and also set up a framework for a national
conference." In an interview with the Sunday Vanguard
Newspaper published on April 16, 2000, Nyiam also said
"With that in mind, we never had any idea that we were going to govern
anybody. It was just to restore power to the people. That is to restore
democracy. Our aim was that there was going to be a caretaker committee which
was going to be headed by a former minister under President Shagari."
How did Nyiam get involved?
Nyiam volunteered information that he was recruited into the conspiracy in
February 1990 "when some junior officers approached me to
express their discontentment with the system...Because, I did not completely
trust them, I did not give any word whether I would support the plan or not.
Instead, I started to watch them. I watched them for about one month to see if
they were serious or the intention was to set me up. These were young officers
who really meant business because they were full of zeal. Because of their
enthusiasm and anger, they were anxious that the coup be carried out almost with
dispatch. But, I continually urged restraint as what they wanted would not have
given room for much planning. Eventually, we came in to try to reorganize and
look at things, how we could do it better. But, along the line, the action
leaked. We had envisaged the possibility of a leakage and had, as a result of
that, put in place contingency plan so that we would not be arrested like
General Mamman Vatsa and co."
How did the plot leak?
"The details of the contingency plan was that we would move if the coup
plot leaked. And true to what we thought, several days before action was to be
carried out, our intelligence reports indicated that the plan had leaked. This
obviously forced us to immediately take up arms." He went on:
"In fact, another senior officer, a mate of mine who was the link between
the young officers and myself, eventually sold out, that is, he was the source
of the leakage. When we realised that our plans had leaked, that led to the
pre-emptive action we took. I remember we took our action without any arm, it
was in that night that our resources were got by first of all taking over Apapa."
Why was the so called "Far" North excised from Nigeria?
On the question about the excision of some far northern states, Nyiam said:
"If you read our speech (on the coup), you will find out that our position
was based on the presumption that the then Sultan was imposed on the people of
Sokoto and that the act was the beginning of the destruction of the traditional
institution. The act ostensibly destroyed the Sokoto caliphate by causing
division between the two houses. It was on the basis of this that we said that
state would not be re-absorbed (if we had succeeded in taking over government)
into the country until that traditional stool had been restored to the proper
person. If you read the conditionalities, you are likely to discover that what
we were saying was that sultanate would not have fitted into the new order that
we envisaged. We did not see the action as a coup but as an uprising, to correct
some anomalies."
But in a separate interview with the Sunday Guardian newspaper, Nyiam was also
reported as having 'defended the coup broadcast in which some states in the far
North were exercised from the country, saying he is more convinced now that the
action was proper. He said: "We saw it coming [excision]. After the Mamman
Vatsa's coup attempt, I travelled with Abacha within the country to meet
traditional rulers and Army Commanders to speak to soldiers. Anytime we went to
the Hausa areas in the North, we were given Hausa and Islamic regalia and if you
didn't wear it, they would not be happy with you. It got to a stage that if you
were in the Army, you have to speak Hausa. What I am saying in effect was that,
there was a gradual acculturation of other people who have superior
culture." '
What was Nyiam's relationship with General Babangida?
Nyiam was reported (by the Sunday Guardian) to have admitted being an "IBB
boy". The newspaper said: 'The former military president, he added,
commissioned him to work on a diarchy based on Egypt's Abdel Nasser model where
the military, produced the president while the civilians produced the prime
minister. Explaining that it was part of the self-succession agenda of Babangida
and the late Abacha, he said that being so close to Babangida, he had access to
privileged information which showed that the former military president was not
at all in a hurry to quit the political stage except by an uprising.'
Further, Nyiam, explaining his initial attraction to the former President, also
stated that: "In a nutshell, we all came in to help Babangida whom we
thought was a man who meant well. If one goes back to his earlier contribution,
he was doing very well and we all gave him our support. But then, when we saw
the things that were coming up; things like the way people from the South were
being maginalised, in NNPC; how Ebitu Ukiwe was thrown out of power to make room
for Abacha, and a host of other things that happened. It was also at this period
that the OIC thing started. All these put together made one reason that one
cannot just be an officer in name and watch his people being marginalised or
being made victims or killed. At the time also, Dele Giwa was murdered."
___________________________
CONSEQUENCES OF THE APRIL REVOLT
Like all failed coups before it, the April 1990 coup led to certain reactive
(i.e. witch hunting) measures by the military against the services, units or
corps that were thought to have been deeply involved in it. Military Police
Battalions were downsized. A similar phenomenon occurred after the Vatsa
conspiracy. However, this angle is outside the scope of this article.
In his seminal work "The Federal Republic of Nigerian Army", Major
General Mohammed Alli, former Chief of Army Staff, who as a Colonel in Kano had
dissociated himself and his Brigade from the coup, described the Mukoro/Orkar et
al coup as one "imbued with undue radicalism." He opined that in
execution, the revolt "suffered communication disconnection" (whatever
that means) but that it had nevertheless "shaken the nation and the
northern hegemony to their very foundation and fabric." Alli
says that the 1990 coup, "like its predecessor in 1966" opened
"a more precarious and frightening chapter, pointing to and crying for
fundamental changes in the nation's political structure and the basis of
existence and control of the Armed Forces." However, "as
soon as it was subdued and suppressed, the nation went back to business as
usual." One obvious consequence to civilians was the acceleration of the
movement of the federal capital from Lagos to Abuja in 1990 by the Head of
State, General Ibrahim Babangida. It was also reported
by some pundits that he was rattled by the experience and lost a considerable
amount of self-confidence for quite some time. This temporary newfound
humility extended to some of his apologists but it was also mixed with
passive-aggressive behaviors driven by fear and insecurity.
The failure of the coup, however, marked the beginning of the rise of Lt. Gen.
Sani Abacha who was now increasingly being referred to in the Press as the
Khalifa (successor). Whatever anyone said of him, few could doubt
his ferocity and deliberate calm under conditions of extreme danger that befell
him on April 22. He had proved his mettle. As former
Panamanian dictator General Noriega once said: "The ultimate sign of
virility is the ability to hold on to power." It was widely
acknowledged that Abacha could quite easily have taken power for himself if he
wanted - although he was not highly thought of by so called 'IBB boys'.
Clearly, Babangida owed him plenty and became increasingly beholden to his
attitudes - particularly since there was some discussion of the merits and
demerits of Babangida's abandonment of Dodan Barracks - albeit involuntarily.
Another officer who benefited from the failure of the April rebellion was
Brigadier Ishaya Bamaiyi of the 9th Brigade. He was
rewarded with the Command of the Brigade of Guards and it marked the beginning
of his eventual ascendancy into the rarified atmosphere of service chiefs.
It is also possible that Major General Chris Alli's eventual emergence as the
first Chief of Army Staff under General Abacha may have been influenced by the
standing he gained with the "caucus" during this coup attempt.
According to Kunle Amuwo, who carried out a research project on General
Babangida's "personal rulership" project, the 1990 rebellion, coming
as it did in the setting of Babangida's "permanent transition"
undermined his credibility and may have been a factor in the way the public
reacted to the deaths of over 150 middle grade officers in a subsequent C-130
plane crash in 1992. Amuwo holds the opinion that 'Even
though Babangida lamented that "a whole generation of young officers
(mainly Majors) has been wiped out" by the air crash, the public thought
his government may have had a hand in it. During their trials, Major Gideon
Orkar and his men reportedly told the military tribunal that their coup was in
three layers; that unless all young officers were killed, there was no hiding
place for the regime. Over 160 officers perished in the crash. That the public
tended to give credence to this story is, itself, a measure of lack of trust in
the General as his "tenure" dragged to an end.' The public's
reaction to the gutting by a suspicious fire of the Ministry of Defence building
in 1993 followed similar lines.
But there were other consequences. Although most people dismissed the so
called conditional expulsion of the "far" north as a silly gamble,
according to Professor Julius Ihonvbere, the coup forced certain
"deep-rooted" conflicts and "critical issues" to the front
page of the national discourse. Never too distant from national
institutional memory anyway, right from the days of the 1957 Willink Commission
report, the Ifeajuna/Nzeogwu insurrection of January 15, 1966, the Isaac Boro
"Niger-Delta" rebellion, the Petroleum and Land Use Acts, these were
to play out in later years as the Ogoni crisis, small concessions by Babangida
on the 'onshore-offshore' issue, creation of OMPADEC, June 12 imbroglio, and
more recent undercurrents of the "Sovereign National Conference",
"Power Shift", "Resource Control", "Federalism",
and "Sharia" polemics. There are observers who say that these
fault lines in Nigerian politics portend an inevitable earthquake.
I prefer the nuanced Chinese interpretation (as was once observed by the late
President Kennedy) - that every crisis presents both danger and opportunity.
CASUALTIES OF THE REBELLION
A full accounting of the dead and injured from the April 1990 rebellion is not
yet possible, in part because of the secretive nature of events surrounding the
incident. However, it is widely assumed to be the bloodiest attempt to
seize power in the history of Nigeria.
EXECUTED (incomplete list)
Major Gideon Gwaza Orkar
Captain N Harley Empere
Captain Perebo A Dakolo
Capt AA Nonju
Lt. AE Akogun
Lt. CN Odey
Lt. Cyril O Ozualor
Lt. NEO Deji
2/Lt AB Umukoro
2/Lt EJ Ejesuku
SSgt Julius Itua
Sgt Martins Ademokhai
Sgt. Pius Ilegar
WO2 Monday Bayefa
L/Cpl Francis Ogo
L/Cpl Jepta Inesei
Cpl. Sunday Effiong
L/Cpl Sam Mbakwe
L/Cpl Albert Ojerangbe
L/Cpl Godfrey Deesiiyira
L/Cpl Emma Oyemolan
Sgt. Stephen Iyeke
Cpl. Joseph Efe
WO Afolabi Moses
L/Cpl Idowu Azeez
WO Jonathan Ekini
S/Sgt Solomon Okungbowa
Private Richard Iseghoei
Private Egwolo Makpamekun
L/Cpl Edogamen Friday
S/Sgt Jolly Agbodowi
Sgt. Etim Umoh
L/Cpl Sam Obasuyi
Ex. Serviceman LC Otajareiri
Ex. Pvt Osazuwa Osifo
Ex. Pvt CP Wasiu Lawal
Ex. Pvt Peter Unuyoma
Ex. Pvt Synalman Goodluck Emefe
Ex. S/Sgt Samson Idegere
Pvt. Emmanuel Onoje
Trooper Roland Odogu
Corporal Lateef Awolola
Pvt. Dickson Omenka
Corp Ehietan Pius
Private Iroabuchi Anyalewechi
Private Henry Eguaoyi
L/Cpl Martins Odey
L/Cpl Sunday Asuquo
Trooper Celestine Ofuoku
Pvt. Anthony Korie
Pvt Thomas Angor
Pvt Edem Basi
Pvt Joseph Odey
Trooper Obioma Esiworo
L/C Magnus Ekechi
WO2 Godwin Donkon
Sgt. Ojo Adegboyega
Pvt Peter Abua
Pvt. Phillip Akamkpo
Sgt. Shehu Onleje
Corp Olanrewaju Ogunshola
L/Cpl Luka Yang
Trooper Malkily Ayogu
L/Cpl Andrew Onah
Michael Ebeku
OTHERS (At least 69 were officially executed, so this
list is incomplete)
************************
KILLED DURING FIGHTING
Lt. Col. UK Bello (General Babangida's ADC)
Lt. killed during altercation at Ikeja cantonment gate
3 - 5 soldiers at Ikeja
Captain Charles Idele (Idele was one of the coup leaders. He
was Military Assistant to the Commandant, School of Infantry, Jaji.
He left Jaji and came to Lagos to partake in the coup. His corpse was
reportedly found wearing the uniform of a Major on the grounds outside Ikeja
cantonment gate where he was shot by loyal troops. )
OTHERS (numbers unknown, from fighting at Dodan Barracks, Obalende and the Radio
Station)
************************
JAILED
L/Cpl Ezekiel Akudu
Pvt Ibrahim Egwa
Sgt. John Alilu
Sgt. Andarich Eladon
L/Cpl David Amo Amo
L/Cpl Vitalis Udzea
************************
DISMISSED
L/Cpl Celestine Nebo
L/Cpl Wapami Adigio
L/Cpl Mike Odeniyi
L/Cpl Kingsley Aromeh
Sgt. Lawrence Ademola
Signal Man Fatai Daranijo
Pvt. Godwin Airomokha
Sgt. John Benson
L/Cpl Vincent Ozigbo
L/Cpl David Oke
********************
RETIRED OR DISCHARGED FROM THE MILITARY
An unknown number of soldiers and officers were discharged or retired from the
military in a subsequent purge. The highest ranking of these
was a Brigadier (from Bendel) who held the office of Director of Army Staff
Duties and Plans. His career ended by virtue of the fact that Major Saliba
Mukoro (widely presumed to be the leader of the rebellion) was his Military
Assistant. The Brigadier was never charged, never found guilty of
involvement, and was even reportedly involved in putting down the revolt. But in
the Byzantine world of dog eat dog military politics; the so-called
"caucus" organized his departure from the Army.
SOME SOURCES
1. BBC Monitoring (Radio broadcasts)
2. VANGUARD Newspaper - "Man as myth" Aug 17, 2001
3. IHONVBERE J.O., 1991. "A Critical Evaluation of the Failed 1990
Coup in Nigeria", The Journal of Modern African Studies, 294: 601-626.
4. Kunle Amuwo: General Babangida, Civil Society and the Military in
Nigeria. Anatomy of a Personal Rulership Project. http://www.dawodu.com/amuwo1.htm
5. Personal communication (confidential sources)
6. M. Chris Alli. The Federal Republic of Nigerian Army. Malthouse
2001
7. Vanguard Newspaper Interviews April 15 & 16, 2000: Nyiam -
Why we failed; IBB not our target;
8. Nyiam: Orkar coup, a popular uprising. Guardian Newspapers April 15,
2000
9. Onabule: IBB managed June 12 crisis well.
http://www.vanguardngr.com/news/articles/2001/August/17082001/pl5117801.htm
10. MY ESCAPE ON COUP DAY IS A MYSTERY.
http://www.ngrguardiannews.com.
Sunday, April 16,
2000
11. Mukoro Tasks Nigerians on Democracy - by Collins Edomaruse. This
Day. Aug 27, 2001
12. US Library of Congress
13. Vanguard . Sunday Feb 25 2001. ' What I've gone through in life
toughened my heart - IBB' by Remi
Kareem
14. 10 years in history By Muyiwa Adeyemi. The Guardian Online - http://www.ngrguardiannews.com.
Saturday, April 22 , 2000
15. Agbese: Fellow Nigerians. Turning Points in the Political
History of Nigeria. Umbrella Books 2000
16. Microfiche archives of Nigerian newspapers at the Hoover Institute at
Stanford