HISTORY OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN NIGERIA (6)*: THE CURRENT TRANSITION
By Dr. Nowa Omoigui
[SOUTH CAROLINA, U.S.A.]
Before we begin to examine and track current transitional efforts, let us take stock once again of some conceptual issues.
Civil-military relations reflect larger society. Therefore, merely asking 'civilians' to replace 'soldiers' in high political positions, dissolving special military governing bodies and limiting political involvement of the military elite, without addressing deep underlying structural distortions will not necessarily lead to the consolidation of democracy. The 'rubber meets the road' when norms are accepted, common objectives of the civilian and military elite are served, the negative professional experience of the military in power acts as a source of self restraint, and politicians come to understand the self defeating costs of inviting military intervention by acts of omission or commission.
Challenges include decreasing the risk of coups, reducing the residual influence of a strong military that has withdrawn from direct rule, redefining new roles and missions, while at the same reducing military isolation. The importance of economic development as an enabling factor for successful democratization needs to be recognized. But whether such democratization then leads to a decreased risk of coups or an increase in violence is a different matter, particularly when social forces long suppressed by a strong dictator like General Sani Abacha are unleashed in tandem with the professional degradation of the National Police. The emergence of ethnic militia and apparent increased frequency of ethnic clashes in Nigeria come to mind.
The importance of economic development as a marker for many other indices in society cannot be under-emphasized. There is impressive data to show that coup attempts have not occurred in countries with per capita GNP of more than $3000 while coups may have been attempted but have not succeeded in countries with per capita GNP of $1000 - $3000. On the other hand countries with per capita GNP of less than $1000 often have successful coups. Nigeria 's per capita GNP from 1996-98 was $240 - $300. From 1999-2000 it increased from $310 to $319 reflecting increases in the price of oil. In 2001, however, it dropped to $294.
Ideally, civil control should be evident in the military budgeting process. Personnel holding key positions at the Ministry of Defence and legislative oversight committees should be civilians. Matters pertaining to force structure and military privileges as well as handling of past human rights abuses should be overseen by civilians. In addition to the fact that the C-in-C is an elected official, these factors help establish primacy of civilian authority over the formulation and implementation of defence policy. The Executive arm (in our Presidential system) should primarily be responsible for preparing budgets, setting force levels, formulating defence strategies and priorities, acquiring weapons, and developing military curricula and doctrine. However, the legislative arm SHOULD have the capacity, authority and power to monitor and review ALL aspects of defence policy, while the Judicial arm sets the larger framework within which military jurisprudence operates. Integral to this process should be the basic maintenance of trust and respect for professional military autonomy while convincing the military that neither national security nor institutional prestige would be compromised. The status, honor and income stream of the military should be sacrosanct. If politicians as a group can maintain their prestige, honor and stature while local, state and federal governments of the federation promote development in an atmosphere of law, order and justice, using legitimate public institutions, without misusing the military, they have little to fear.
The management of the transition, however, is crucial, not only in content but also time and timing. Early in the life of the current civilian government, exploiting the "honeymoon" period of all new regimes, the purge of potentially disloyal officers, for example, was very popular although certain special interests still managed to read meanings into it and stultify a more complete divestment of politically tainted officers from the services. The next stage was to remove military officers and troops from roles such as board memberships, surveillance, policing, mediation, crime prevention while limiting opportunities for the intimidation of domestic life. This was not really successful because the upsurge in armed robbery, ethnic and religious clashes, resource control and environmental agitation over taxed the Police. This means that parallel efforts to enhance the Police as a crime prevention and fighting organization have lagged behind dangerously, exposing the military to repeated (and occasionally highly controversial) interventions for internal security. Very recently, the creation of an intermediate National Guard force for riot control, counter-terrorism, search and rescue has been mooted. The idea is not entirely new and has been kicked around for years by different regimes for different agendas. Its value will depend on the transparency with which it is pursued and the uses to which such a force will be put. Lastly the possibility of involving the military in certain image enhancing "civic" activities in which they support but do not supplant civil organizations should be honestly negotiated. Beyond traditional external defence and international peace-keeping, however, it must be noted that internal security, counter-terrorism, anti-narcotics operations, social welfare and nation-building activities in addition to humanitarian relief, while doable and acceptable on an ad-hoc basis can threaten the core capabilities of the military if mishandled.
A number of observations are in order at this point. First there is tension in balancing an approach based on a historical examination of civil-military relations over time with that based on an assessment of theoretical and policy matters. I have sought to strike a balance between both. Secondly, one has avoided getting into the polemic of definitional debates regarding 'civil control', 'civilian control' and 'democratic control'. My basic assumption here, without getting bogged down, is that democratic control and behavior is the ideal, no matter who gets into office democratically.
Practically speaking, most "civilian" leaders in the West African sub region, for example, are former soldiers - although this was not always the case historically. But whether democratically elected government which then oversees the military is the only legitimate structure of "civil supremacy" is an entirely different matter which is beyond the scope of this paper. In the final analysis, legitimacy of relationships between actors is a function of the history, culture and traditions of the environment under reference. Thirdly, 'civil-military' relations are only a part of a larger 'civil-security sector' context. While there is merit in evaluating the big picture, I have restricted myself to the civil-military component except where passing reference is important. Fourthly, one cannot discuss a phenomenon such as "civil-military" relations without recognizing the fact that it is multi-dimensionally dynamic. Civil society or government per se changes in quality, quantity over time, as does the military institution and the relationship between them. Thus, transition is organic to the civil-military discourse, be it transition associated with decolonization (1949-66), war to peace (1970-74), military to civilian government (1976-79, 1984-99), or initiation to consolidation of civil rule (1999 - ?) and the cumulative effects of transitions over time. Managing the transitional process bears all the hallmarks and tensions of managing any kind of major organizational change. Inherent to this process is how to gain formal and informal consensus between stake-holders that leads to defence and security sector reform in the larger context of reconciling contradictions in State Structure and ethnic relations in a democratic system. Concurrently, issues of constitutionalism, professionalization, role and mission definition, legitimacy, civil-military institutional and "rule of law" arrangements, societal perceptions of one for the other, all set against the pressures of emerging security challenges in an era of globalization need to be factored in.
PRELUDE TO MAY 1999
After sixteen years of often abusive military rule led by Generals Buhari, Babangida, Abacha, and Abubakar, Nigeria ushered in another experiment in civil rule in May 1999. During this period the military witnessed several coups and conspiracies and was involved in many violent internal security operations. It also became embroiled in a protracted peace-enforcement conflict, first in Liberia and then Sierra Leone. During the same period the Babangida regime organized a never ending 'military-civil' transition which culminated in an election in June 1993 which he then nullified to pre-empt the apparent victory of Chief MKO Abiola. Subsequently, an interim government was appointed and then shoved aside - with the connivance of the political elite - by General Abacha in a complex game of pre-programmed musical chairs.
As has been noted by others, the deceit, bad faith and evil perpetrated during intervening years, completely destroyed the confidence of civil society in government as an institution and seriously undermined the self esteem of the average Nigerian. Corruption became officially legitimized as an instrument of State. The officer corps evolved into a cesspool for kleptocracy. Both the military and civil society took part in the carnival. Any pretence to the rule of law was abandoned. Human values were nearly totally destroyed as the culture of violence became institutionalised. The destruction of the civil service which began during the purges of the Murtala Mohammed era was completed. Critical State institutions like the Central Bank became irrelevant. The Ministry of Defence was burned and crucial records destroyed. The Judiciary was compromised. Military professional, organizational, technological and operational development, regimentation and esprit de corps were severely undermined and the Army, as described by former Chief of Army Staff Lt. Gen. Saliu Ibrahim, became an institution where "anything goes". Another former Army Chief, Major General MC Alli aptly pointed out that camaraderie was replaced with suspicion, fear, rivalry, intrigue and vampirism.
After 35 years of military rule, in which the character of coup regimes evolved from reactive and transient to deliberate and radical and then pervasive and outright political, there were more officers outside than inside the service, courtesy of various coups, the civil war, purges, military trials and executions. The decline of state structures and institutions, like the police, the armed forces and the judiciary, combined with the "reduction of the civil population to a state of civic surrender" was to provide the backdrop to civil-military relations during the current transition. President Obasanjo himself made a similar observation during a church sermon in Abeokuta back in June 1998. But he did take the view then that there were 'still good apples within the military' which seems to be the basis of his preference for reformation, rather than total demobilization and depoliticization as occurred in Japan and Germany after World War 2.
Major General Mohammed Alli (rtd) went further to express strong opinions about certain characteristics of Nigeria's political and civil-military discourse: According to the former Army Chief, "The Nigerian federal system is a colossal deception of the highest order, a colonial, political construction inherited by the elite in 1960 ..............The fears are deeper than political, Northern political leaders are wary of non Moslem leaders. Their clerics and political opinion leaders often voice this openly, with impunity. It is really nothing new. The North has ruled the nation for thirty-five years of its independence. Even non-northern leaders from the South and Middle Belt, have carried on with a decisively more northern mentality even core northerners can often not match. Northern hold on power had been predicated on four strategic leverages, namely: geography, the Ahmadu Bello s 'north for the north or northernization, language which eases intra-regional communication, religion which provides political connection and rally, and finally, the military as a fall-back position should these demographic advantages be neutralized. The latter explains the sophisticated design of a military high command that is exclusive and responsive to northern interests. The North's dilemma began with, and was crystallized by General Ibrahim Babangida s reign. His annulment of the June 12 election, his succour within the northern hierarchy, and his presumed involvement with the Islamization of Nigeria put paid to the confidence the North had garnered over the years, for itself in the control of power."
Expressing a view remarkably similar to what was expressed at the Oputa panel by Brigadier Ibrahim Sabo, who, like Alli, was also a one time Director of Military Intelligence, the General further wrote: "The struggle among the contending interests for the control of the central government is the major source and cause of Nigeria's cut-throat politics and recurring instability. There is also a very strong linkage between the military barracks, oil resources and coups d' etat as soldiers ravage the nation to assuage personal and group appetite for power and wealth".
Ibrahim Sabo was more blunt. As This Day newspapers (July 20, 2001) put it, "former head of the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI), Brigadier-General Ibrahim Sabo (rtd.) alleged that the primary aim of seizing power by military men was to steal money."
Given this background to May 1999, provided by officers who were well placed within the system and have not been rebutted, one can venture an opinion that the main threats to development and consolidation of appropriate civil-military relations include the overwhelming role of government in social mobility and wealth creation, regional and ethnic tensions, economic instability, restiveness in the military and corruption. There is a school of thought (which includes scholars like Professor Omo Omoruyi) that holds that - given the scale of professional decay and ethnic distortion - a truly apolitical military (whatever that means) may not be a practical short term goal of reformation, short of disbandment.
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* This is an excerpt of a much larger publication by the author. References will be listed at the end of the last installment