Preventing Coups in Nigeria* (Part 4)
By Dr. Nowa Omoigui
[SOUTH CAROLINA, U.S.A.]
OFFICER AND SOLDIER RECRUITMENT INTO THE MILITARY
In order to have a serious and professional military organization worth its salt, three basic criteria must be met. It must be properly trained, appropriately equipped, and populated by quality soldiers, NCOs and Officers in the right quantity. However, just as in statistics, where the quality of results of analyses depends on the quality of the original data input, the recruitment of "junk material" can only ultimately result in a "junk Army".
As far back as 378 B.C. this basic truth was recognized by a Roman military philosopher called Vegetius (De Re Militari), who wrote that 'An army raised without proper regard to the choice of its recruits was never made good by length of time.' If, therefore, acceptance of the primacy of civil authority is an essential ingredient of what our society regards as a quality military, we must pay particular attention to those who enter it.
Along these lines, I recall the comment made by a
former teacher of mine at the University of Ibadan
when I graduated from medical school in 1981. Excited
that I was now a "Doctor", Professor Cole put a
fatherly blanket over the fire of my youthful
exuberance by pointing out that the only thing my
successful 'graduation' meant was that the University,
in its wisdom, had decided that I had the mental
attributes and character to be trainable. He said the
'graduation' was only the beginning of a long process
of continuous training and education which would never
end. Looking back now 21 years later, with the
benefit of hindsight, I can see what he meant.
Unfortunately, however, when it comes to the military,
what seems to preoccupy us as a nation is the
superficial concept of religious and ethnic diversity,
otherwise known as 'federal character', of
recruitment efforts rather than the quality of those
inducted and commissioned. We seem to assume that
once "federal character" is reflected, we can go to
sleep confident that we have a professional Army that
will protect us against all enemies, foreign and
domestic. It appears though, particularly in recent
years, that an unstated cynical assumption in the roll
of the dice is that if the military comes to power we
can be assured that whatever configuration emerges
will also reflect "federal character".
The military on its part, operating in a volunteer
recruitment environment, limited not just by
constitutional requirements for "geographic spread",
but also by the specifics of those who actually
present themselves for selection, has to fashion a way
to create an effective and cohesive fighting force out
of the "bloody civilians" who show up at its gates for
induction. Theoretically, thereafter, it tries to
foster national values in the way recruits are
educated as they make their way up the chain of
command. The commonality of military training,
constant exposure to a disciplined environment,
relative isolation in barracks from the civilian
population , and shared experiences as "buddies" in
actual or threatened combat are expected to break down
ethnic and religious consciousness. Periodic
postings are meant to help ensure that personnel
serve in multiple locations outside their core areas
of origin over the course of their careers.
Promotions and appointments are presumed to be based
on competence rather than on personal, ethnic and
religious links even though we still peak in from time
to time to make sure our ethnic enclaves are
"represented". At the same time even when civil
society is polarized along ethnic, religious and
regional lines (as it often is) our disciplined
soldiers, sailors and airmen - as 'citizens in
uniform' - are not expected to be impacted by our
mundane proclivities, which we don't bother to hide
from them as we jockey among ourselves for political
advantage. These are some of the contradictions
inherent in maintaining armed forces in a pluralistic
society.
None of this should necessarily affect geographic
spread (Federal character) of recruits. There are
plenty of good quality civilians who are "soldier
material" across ALL ethnic boundaries in Nigeria.
As former Head of State General Abdulsalami Abubakar once observed, it is no secret that quite a few
deliberately entered the military in the last 15-20
years or were sent to enter the military by their
parents and other relations to do so for no other
purpose but to become "Governors" and "Ministers" in
the future, presumably by planning and executing or
and/or benefitting from successful coups. How they
can be identified and rooted out or contained deserves
the attention and reflection of all Nigerians. At the
same time, only officers of the highest professional
and ethical standards should be allowed to serve at
choke points in the recruitment and training system. Those postings should not just be used to "punish"
officers who are out of favor. It may also be that
if and when foreign military training agreements are
negotiated, close collaboration in staffing such
military institutions for appropriate conditioning of
recruits, may be helpful. Another option may be to
airlift entire units (platoons, companies, and
battalions) abroad for "system" training and
exercises, rather than the piecemeal approach of
training "individual trainers" who then return, only
to collapse under the weight of the constipated
Nigerian system. The other advantage of composite
unit training abroad is that it avoids the political
sensitivities of alien looking soldiers in the
Nigerian countryside.
THE BRIGADE OF GUARDS CONCEPT: DOES IT WORK IN NIGERIA
AS A COUNTER-COUP MECHANISM?
In some countries, the police is larger than the
military while in others paramilitary elements are
integrated into the party structure. The Police coup
against Dauda Jawara of Gambia showed that even the
police can attempt to seize power as they had
previously done in Ghana and Somalia. One thing that
has been tried in Nigeria (with mixed but largely
ineffectual results) is the development of competing
(or elite) security force elements woven around
usually ethnic soldiers.
Nigeria, as is well known, is a British creation. The
concept of a Guards regiment in Britain dates back to
1642 when the Life Guards of the Army of Scotland was
created by the monarchy. It was disbanded when
Charles II escaped to France after the Battle of
Worcestershire in 1651.
In 1650, just before the fall of Charles, the
Coldstream Guards was originally formed by Col. Monck
as part of the Army of Oliver Cromwell.
In 1660,
however, Monck advanced at the head of his unit from
Coldstream, Scotland to London in support of the
return of Charles II to the English throne, switching
sides.
In 1659, a regiment of Guards was created by Charles
II while he was in exile. When he returned home in
1660, he created yet another regiment of Guards which
was later combined with the one he created in exile to
form the Royal Regiment of Foot Guards. It later
became known as the First Regiment of Foot Guards,
which was subsequently changed to Grenadier Guards in
1815, following the battle of Waterloo.
The original Life Guards unit was reactivated by
Charles in 1660. When Scotland and England became a
union in 1707, the Scots Guards became the Third
Regiment of Foot Guards in Britain. Over the years
these units have become primarily ceremonial although
they rotate out to maintain readiness as regular
combat formations.
The permanent nucleus of what is now known as the
Brigade of Guards of the Nigerian Army was formed in September 1962 as the
Federal Guards for the purpose of carrying out ceremonial and security duties in
Lagos similar to the role of the British Guards regiments in London.
However, the immediate precipitating factor was the arrest on September 22 of
Chief Awolowo on suspicion of a civilian militia plot to overthrow the Balewa
government. The first group of soldiers to
serve were drawn from a company seconded from the 1st
Battalion in Enugu under the command of Lt. Col. W. Bassey. Between 1962 and 1964 it was led by several
officers, including Lt. Col. Ogunewe and Captains
Mobolaji Johnson and Obioha before Major D. Okafor
assumed command in early 1964. When Okafor left for a
course in Britain in 1965 temporary command fell on
the shoulders of Captain JN Garba who ceded command
back to Okafor when the latter returned from the UK. Personal VIP security for the Prime Minister was not
its primary task, although it took up just such a role
for the first time during the chaos of the 1964
federal elections after which it was withdrawn to the
barracks.
With this background, Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa,
with only six Police Guards at his residence, may have
thought he was also 'protected' by the Guards Company.
When General Ironsi declared Nigeria a unitary state
in May 1966, he renamed the Federal Guards, the
National Guards. The soldiers who killed him (and Col. Fajuyi) near Ibadan
on July 29, 1966 belonged to his security detail, drawn from the National Guards
unit in Lagos and supported by elements from the 4th Battalion in Ibadan.
General Gowon had an 'elite' ethnic based Brigade of
Guards under Colonel JN Garba (which eventually
removed him in July 1975, was initially left intact by
General Muhammed, but disbanded after the abortive
coup of February 1976, only to be reconstituted using
fresh troops).
Lt. Gen. Obasanjo's government subsequently
established the National Security Organization (NSO)
after being taken by surprise by Lt. Col. Dimka. He
and his colleagues felt that the "E" branch of the
Police and "Army Intelligence", were insufficient for
the demands of the modern state. Curiously, in the
sixteen-year period from 1960-76 (prior to the
establishment of the NSO) there were four coups. In
the twenty-four year period from 1976-2000 (after the
establishment of the NSO), there have been three (3)
successful coups, three aborted conspiracies and one
unsuccessful coup attempt. Since the number of coups
"prevented" or "nipped in the bud" quietly during the
period are unknown, it would be unfair to draw any
conclusion from these numbers, interesting though they
appear.
As noted before, President Shagari tried to build up
the Police with armored vehicles but was interrupted
in December 1983 by Brigadier Abacha and his fellow
conspirators. The 6th, 19th and 123rd Guard
battalions, along with the 20th Guard Garrison of the
Guards Brigade were either neutralized or co-opted
even though there were individual officers who stood
by the government. The only full Guards Battalion
commander who outright refused to take part in the
coup was the one at Ojo cantonment. Shagari's Guards
Brigade Commander in Lagos who tried to resist (then
Colonel Bello Khaliel) was arrested and subsequently
retired, along with the battalion commander in Keffi
(Lt. Col Eboma) whose detachment at Abuja had
initially frustrated the coupists.
Maj. Gen. Buhari maintained the Guards Brigade, but
having been penetrated and undermined, it was not of
much use to him in August 1985 (although the acting
Commander, Col Sabo Aliyu as well as Buhari's ADC
(Major Jokolo) tried in vain to stand by him, only to
end up being severely beaten).
With Israeli assistance, General Babangida's
government split up the NSO into the SSS and NIA and
began plans to establish a National Guard, (in
addition and parallel to the Guards Brigade). He later
tried to decentralize (regionalize) the headquarters
of the Army, Airforce and Navy by moving them to
Minna, Lagos and Kano respectively, a decision that
was stoutly resisted by many (including Gen.
Interim National Government Leader Earnest Shonekan
was essentially a passenger on a ship, the design of
which he did not understand. Once his government was
declared illegal by a Lagos High Court, General Abacha
(who had already made preparatory moves supported by
the "Lagos Group" in the Army) shoved him off the ship
in what was described by former Army Chief General MC
Alli as a "walk over".
Other than a series of carefully targeted purges,
directed at "IBB boys", Abacha initially lay low
(exploiting public frustration with IBB) but then
later established his own personal security outfits,
assisted by Libya and North Korea. They included the
Special Bodyguards, Strike Force etc. which functioned
separately from the Brigade of Guards and had a
different command structure independent of the Army.
General Abubakar disbanded some of Abacha's private
units but kept the traditional Brigade of Guards,
along with the SSS, NIA, DIA all of which were
inherited by the current civilian regime.
I am unfamiliar with the current state of affairs. But
in some previous Nigerian governments, the 'real chain
of command' of the Brigade of Guards had been direct
to Army Headquarters rather than through the formal
divisional structure (at various times called the
Lagos Garrison Organization, 4th Division, and Lagos
Garrison Command.) Supporting units from other
formations (e.g. Artillery and Armor) were typically
integrated (ad hoc) into the basic infantry command
structure based on rotations. Naturally, some of these
units with 'access, firepower, mobility and
protection' (like the former 245 Recce Armored
Battalion in Ikeja) provided a fertile target for
coupists seeking recruits.
In November 1983, for example, Major Owonibi was
suddenly replaced as the CO of the 245 Recce Battalion
by Major Gwadabe who had not even been fully inducted
into the armored corps. A month later in December,
the former 9th Infantry Brigade HQ in Ikeja (under
Brigadier Abacha) provided motorized infantry many of
whom were trucked in from Lt. Col. Madaki's battalion
in Owode in Ogun State to seize road junctions in
Lagos, while light armored vehicles led by Lt. Peter Bamidele from the 245 Recce Battalion Ikeja
(under Gwadabe's direction) acted as the vanguard in
the assault on Dodan Barracks ("State House, Ribadu
Road") through Ribadu and Obalende Roads. Unable to
enter State House for several hours because of a
reluctant Infantry Captain and some subalterns from
the Armored corps (who had not been recruited
beforehand), orders were actually given (by one of the
Brigadiers involved in the plot) to "bring down the
buildings" even though President Shehu Shagari was far
away in Abuja ostensibly being accosted by late
Brigadier Bako's group, along with Col. Tunde Ogbeha.
Surrounded and cut off from a credible chain of
command, the Captain of the Guard at State House,
Ribadu road, Lagos eventually gave in but not until
the evening after Captain Bamidele's group had broken
down the gates. Much later that morning, the Brigade
Major (Major Michael Iyorshe) and his Commander (Col.Bello Khaliel) could not to push the envelope in part
because they were disconnected not only from the
service chiefs (who had all been arrested after their
guards had been changed) but also from competent
civilian authority (some of whom, like Vice-President
Ekwueme had also been picked up). The reliability of
some of their own units was also suspect. Bonny Camp
in Victoria Island, home to the 6th Battalion (and
several unrelated Army HQ formations) was actually the
operational base of the coup planners.
In other African countries, examples of fierce
resistance by Guards Units on behalf of civilian
regimes, long enough to allow the mobilization of
other loyal units exist. The failed coup attempts
against Paul Biya of Cameroun (1984) and Arap Moi
(1982) of Kenya fall into this category. On the
other hand the exact oppossite occurred in Niger
republic where Guard Commander Major Dauda Malam Wanke
ordered the assassination of President Mainasara.
In Nigeria's case, after over 40 years, it is time for
the civilian regime to seriously re-evaluate the
utility of the Brigade of Guards in VIP security. It
seems from newspaper reports that the SSS does have a
greater role in VIP security in this government than
in the past but it does so as part of a concentric
ring which still includes the military. Abuja is
still packed with military institutions and units,
initial concern in 1999 by legislators
notwithstanding. The responsibility for the personal
protection of the President ought not to directly
involve corporate military units in peacetime as is
the case in most countries in the world. The
British, American and Indian Armies are not
responsible for the personal protection of their
leaders. The independent role of the Secret Service
in the US, supervised by the Treasury Department,
comes to mind. That experienced conspirators like
Generals Abacha and Babangida chose not to rely on the
Guards Brigade for their protection speaks volumes.
It must also be pointed out that the tendency of
President Shagari to shuttle between Lagos and Abuja
created some of the confusion (among plotters) in the
early hours of the December 1983 coup. Although most
Nigerians assumed that the government had been
overthrown once they heard Brigadier Abacha's address
on radio, the truth is that things remained quite
fluid for another 24 to 48 hours. Some have suggested
that it may be well worth considering retaining
federal status for parts of Lagos (along with Abuja)
in the Constitution, as another element of
decentralization. Some countries, proponents say, have
summer and winter capitals. Others, like South Africa,
have the executive, legislative and judicial branches
of government located in different cities. But how
such an idea will play in Nigeria, given the usual
regional suspicions, is unclear.
TO BE CONTINUED