Operation Aure (2): Planning to Overthrow General Ironsi
By
Nowa Omoigui
continued from Part 1 [see http://www.gamji.com/nowa/nowa25.htm]
PLANNING TO OVERTHROW GENERAL IRONSI
There is no doubt that fairly soon after
January 15,
the motive for a northern counter-coup also known as
"return match" was established. What remained were
the means and the opportunity. In Kaduna, the Platoon
Commanders Course at the NMTC provided an opportunity
for young northern subalterns to come together to
share ideas and vent frustration. These officers
included Lts. Shelleng, Hannaniya, Muhammadu Jega,
Sani Abacha, Sali, Dambo and others. They held secret
meetings and even wrote a letter of protest to the
Chief of Staff (Army) - Lt. Col. Gowon - openly
stating that if senior northern officers did not take
action within a certain time frame, they would, and
that senior northern officers would have themselves to
blame for the catastrophe. Indeed, the Ironsi
government was sufficiently alarmed that on at least
two occasions the course was suspended. For a brief
period, thereafter, things were relatively quiet, but
not for long. Matters began to stir in Lagos.
Although it is said that practically all northern
officers serving in Lagos, Abeokuta, Ikeja and Ibadan
eventually became involved, three officers formed the
innermost circle of the plot to overthrow Major
General Aguiyi Ironsi. They were T/Lt. Col. Murtala
Muhammed (Inspector of Signals), T/Major TY Danjuma
(General Staff Officer II, SHQ) and Captain Martin
Adamu (2nd Battalion, Ikeja). The coup leader was
T/Lt. Col. Murtala Muhammed.
According to late Major General Garba (rtd), others
involved in planning in the South include Captain JN
Garba, Lt. William Walbe and Lt. Paul Tarfa (Federal
Guards), Lts. Muhammadu Buhari and John Longboem (2nd
battalion), Lts. Pam Nwatkon (Abeokuta garrison,
Recce), Lts Jerry Useni, Ibrahim Bako and Garba Dada
(4th battalion, Ibadan), and Lt. Shehu Musa Yar'Adua
(Adjutant, 1st battalion, Enugu). Air force
conspirators included Majors Musa Usman and Shittu
Alao. However, other officers were clearly involved
because Muhammed compartmentalized the planning and
also encouraged officers to recruit additional local
conspirators and storm troopers. Examples include
Lts. Nuhu Nathan and Malami Nassarawa at Ikeja, IS
Umar in Abeokuta, Abdullai Shelleng, Haladu, Magoro,
Obeya and Onoja in Ibadan and Captains Jalo and
Muhammadu Jega in Enugu, among others.
Active planning for the coup began after the
promulgation of the Unification decree. In fact there
was a brief scare in Kaduna when false rumors of Lt.
Captain Garba was recruited in Lagos by being told
that northerners were planning a coup to "pre-empt" an
expected one by Igbo officers. This so called
expected Igbo coup was also known as "Plan 15" - part
2 of the so called final solution to the northern
problem perhaps (as the propaganda went) made all the
more urgent by the killings of Igbos in the North
during the May riots. Lagos conspirators, who were
being closely watched, met in various locations,
including their private cars, Muhammed's house,
Garba's house, and during games at Abalti barracks.
At Ibadan, Lt. Col. Muhammed would often drive into
town from Lagos, pick up Ibrahim Bako and Abdullai
Shelleng at a pre-arranged location and drive around
without stopping while they discussed.
The Kaduna group was not as formally organized as the Lagos-Ikeja-Abeokuta-Ibadan axis at this stage
although it later consolidated and was in the habit of
having meetings at Lugard Hall with northern
civilians. However, Capt. Ahmadu Yakubu was the
liaison who would drive from Lagos to Kaduna with
messages from Lt. Col. Muhammed for Lts ADS Wya,
Ibrahim Babangida, Garba Duba, BS Dimka, Dambo, Sani
Abacha, Hannaniya, Salihi and others. Messages were
also passed to the 5th battalion in Kano under Lt. Col
Shuwa primarily for reasons of coordination. But Lagos
was to be the fulcrum.
In order to keep tabs on what was going on inside the
government, Lt. Col Murtala Muhammed maintained
contact with northern civil servants in Lagos (like
Muktar Tahir), while Captain Baba Usman of military
intelligence provided insights into what the Army knew
and did not know. Nevertheless, the Ironsi government
had other mechanisms of information gathering outside
official channels. For example, at least one officer,
Lt. Jasper, then the intelligence officer at the 4th
battalion in Ibadan, was suspected of passing
information directly to Supreme HQ and perhaps even to
Ironsi himself, bypassing the Army. All sorts of self
appointed civilian informants were also known to mill
in and out of Army formations passing rumors to Igbo
commanders who would then find ways to get it to
Ironsi. Major Danjuma, at that time a staff officer,
was attached to General Ironsi as a military scribe,
dutifully taking notes at his public hearings.
At the outset of planning for the coup, late General
Garba says in his book '"Revolution in Nigeria",
Another View', that "We intended explicitly to kill no
one. The aims were, firstly, to get Decree No. 34
abrogated; secondly, to bring the coup makers of
January 15 to trial; thirdly, to accord due honour to
the military and political leaders - especially the
Prime Minister - who had been killed."
However, as we now know, the rebellion was anything
but bloodless as other agendas took center stage when
all hell broke loose. Garba insists that there was no
specific plan to annihilate all Igbo officers and
soldiers - although it appeared so to neutral
observers from the way many northern NCOs (aided by
some officers and civilians) were carrying on with
reckless abandon and total disregard for life and
property. Garba himself admits that they went
"berserk". The late General says, though, that had
there been such a formal plan, specific Igbo officers
would have been targeted and "no one would have
escaped".
In my view, it is hard to know what to make of this
comment, seeing as it means little considering the
scale of killings. Nevertheless, thankfully to God,
although many died, most Eastern officers, the vast
majority being completely innocent of any connection
either to the January 15 coup or to the Ironsi
government, survived the July 29 rebellion.
As planning developed, loose as it was, it was
influenced (as are all coups) by issues of timing and
opportunity. It is said that at least four plans were
discussed. The first was to seize State House and
place the Head of State under arrest. However, this
would have entailed much bloodshed because of the
security set up inside the State House grounds,
bristling with weapons. In any case the General was
also fond of leaving without warning to sleep on a
Boat along the Marina which, on occasion, would set
for sea. A decision was, therefore, made to stage the
coup when he was outside Lagos to minimize bloodshed.
On July 14, however, the government announced plans
for General Ironsi to undertake a Nationwide tour. The
tour would take him first through Abeokuta, Ibadan,
Kano, Kaduna, Zaria, Jos, and Benin. He would return
to Ibadan from Benin for a meeting of traditional
rulers on July 28, spend the night, return to Lagos on
July 29 and then resume his tour in early August to
the East. The third plan, therefore, was to abduct
General Ironsi during a visit to the North on July
19th. It too was put off, some say in deference to
northern traditional leaders, while others say it was
for reasons of military coordination. For one, Ironsi
hardly slept outside Lagos thus reducing the window of
opportunity to get him, and secondly, then Captain
Garba, who was practically in command of the Federal
Guards company in Lagos was scheduled to be in
Fernando Po for a basketball game and would not be on
the ground to help seize the capital.
The fourth plan, therefore, was to take place on July
28/29 during Ironsi's visit to Ibadan for the National
conference of traditional rulers when he would be
arrested by troops from the 4th battalion. His
decision to spend the night there, guarded by the 4th
battalion, provided a perfect opportunity. The code
word for the coup was "Aure", a Hausa word for
"marriage". Conspirators in southern Nigeria made
coded reference to it by talking about "Paiko's
wedding", Paiko being the nickname for (and hometown
in Niger Province of) one of the northern subalterns
at the 4th battalion who was to be the spearhead.
But even this plan was put off by Lt. Col. Muhammed
when it became apparent to him and Captain Martin
Adamu that it had leaked, likely through Lt. Jasper.
A rough plan for early August when Ironsi would be in
the East was thus discussed but not finalized.
ABEOKUTA GARRISON, THURSDAY, JULY 28, 1966
Shortly before 2300 hours on July 28, 1966, Lt. Col.
Gabriel Okonweze, Commander of the Abeokuta Garrison
was tipped off by Lt. Col. Patrick Anwunah, General
Staff Officer (1) for Intelligence at Army HQ in
Lagos, that the long anticipated Northern counter-coup
was scheduled to begin that night. What Anwunah did
not know for sure was that the coup had in fact, once
again, been put off by its chief planners on account
of a leak.
Earlier that evening Anwunah had confronted Lt. Col.
Murtala Muhammed in Yaba, Lagos with information that
he was behind a planned counter-coup, leading to a
mean-spirited (some say violent) exchange between
them. Anwunah initially thought this confrontation
would in fact deter the plot from going forward, and
planned to do nothing. But having been prompted by Lt.
Col. Alexander Madiebo to take some precautionary
steps, and perhaps being in receipt of additional
information, he took it upon himself to alert some
unit commanders, one of whom was Okonweze. (An
alternative account says Okonweze was also alerted by Njoku)
Lt. Col. Okonweze, therefore, called a meeting in the
mess of all available officers (Igbo and non-Igbo) at
the Abeokuta Garrison where he made the following
announcement:
Gentlemen, I have just been informed that there is
going to be a coup tonight. Anyone of you who knows
anything about the coup should please tell us. You
may know the beginning but you never know the end. I
am not ambitious. My only ambition is to become a
full Colonel. If you know anything, please let me
know; I am not going to report anyone. What we are
going to do is to avoid what happened in January where
officers were taken unawares. We are going to wake up
all soldiers, ask them to go to the armoury to get
issued with arms and ammunition.
Officers present included Okonweze himself, Major John
Obienu (Recce Commander), Lt. Gabriel Idoko, Lt. DS
Abubakar ("Datti Abubakar", Recce), Lt. IS Umar, and
Lt. AB Mamman (Arty). Lt. E.B. Orok (Recce) later came
in his Volkswagen. Captains M. Remawa (Recce 2ic) and
Domkat Bali (Artillery Battery Commander) were at the
Abeokuta club. Captain Ogbonna (Infantry company
commander) was also in town.
Thereafter, an Igbo NCO went around the barracks,
waking soldiers excitedly and saying "Come out, come
out, there is trouble; go to the armoury and collect
your armour."
This alert woke up Sergeant Sabo Kole, an NCO from the
Bachama area of Adamawa State. In the charged
atmosphere of prevailing rumors at that time, Kole
wrongly interpreted the Igbo NCO's actions as an
attempt by Okonweze to selectively wake up Igbo
soldiers who would thus have an advantage in what was
alleged to be an effort to finish what they did not
finish in January. He, therefore, woke up another
neighbor, Corporal Maisamari Maje, also Bachama, who
happened to be the armourer of the unit. He told Maje
to go to the armory and ensure that only northerners
would be issued weapons. Meanwhile, assisted by
Corporal Inua Sara, he mobilized a small guard of
northern soldiers to protect the armory against any
attempt to dislodge them while he made arrangements to
disarm the quarter-guard. Having secured the armory,
Sgt. Kole issued weapons and ammo to a section of
assault troops. Assisted by Maje, and including
Corporal J. Shagaya, the group advanced to the
Officers Mess under the direction of the duty
officer, Lt. Pam Mwadkon, younger brother of the late
Lt. Col James Pam who was shot in Ikoyi by Major
Christian Anuforo in January.
Once in the mess they ordered all officers present to
raise their hands. When Okonweze challenged them, he
was summarily executed right there and then. Major
John Obienu, Commander of the Recce Squadron, sitting
next to Okonweze, was also shot dead. Lt. E Orok,
driving in to join them, saw what was happening,
shouted at the soldiers, and was himself shot dead
right under the tree where he parked his car. In
the chaos, some northerners were shot too, notably Lt.
INITIAL CONTACTS WITH IBADAN, LAGOS, ENUGU, AND KADUNA
Not all Igbo officers in the Abeokuta garrison were
killed. Ogbonna escaped and was the one who initially
made urgent informal phone calls to Lagos (2nd
Battalion), Ibadan (4th battalion) and much later to
Enugu (to Lt. Cols Ogunewe - 1st Bn - and Ojukwu at
the State House).
Almost simultaneously, Lt. Pam phoned Lt. Garba Dada (Paiko), the Adjutant of the 4th Battalion in Ibadan
at Mokola Barracks saying "Look, we have done our own
oh! If you people just siddon there, we have finished
our own.......We have finished the Igbo officers here.
When Captains Remawa and Bali returned to the Barracks
from town, they met the dead bodies of Okonweze,
Obienu and Orok in or around the mess. They changed
quickly into combat dress and got themselves armed.
Captain Remawa then contacted Army HQ in Lagos to
notify Lt. Col. Gowon of events. Gowon ordered Remawa
to collect the corpses, secure the garrison, and await
further instructions. This order from Gowon to Remawa
sent shivers down the spines of the junior northern
officers at Abeokuta like Lt. DS Abubakar who feared
that they would all be arrested for the killings in
the Mess. Therefore, they decided that come what may,
they would fight to finish to ensure the end of the
Ironsi regime. The impulse was primarily self
preservatory.
Gowon then contacted Brigadier Ogundipe, then Chief of
Staff, SHQ and got orders to mobilize Army units in
Lagos. Both Ogundipe and Gowon initially tried to
reach Ironsi directly in Ibadan and failed. (It was
when Gowon was trying to get Col. Njoku at the guest
house that he spoke to Major Danjuma). Ogundipe then
notified the Police hierarchy, including the
Commissioner in Ibadan, whose first attempt to
investigate events at the 4th battalion was strongly
rebuffed by the Battalion adjutant who told him to
steer clear. "Flying Policeman" Mr. Joseph Adeola
eventually got through to Government House Ibadan,
sometime around 1 am (some say 0030), to notify
General Ironsi of events. (Adeola replaced Timothy
Omo-Bare as the Commissioner of Police in the Midwest
and was one of those kidnapped by Biafran forces to
Enugu in August 1967.)
By this time Major Danjuma, Lt. James Onoja and
elements of the 4th battalion were in process of
arriving to cordon off the building.
Before he was finally arrested shortly before 8am,
Ironsi had made requests for a Police helicopter from
Lagos and made other efforts, as are described
elsewhere in this essay, to mobilize loyal units. By
the time a helicopter arrived, though, he and Colonel
Fajuyi had been taken away. General Ironsi's last
formal military contact was with Kaduna to mobilize
the 1st Brigade. The commander, Lt. Col. Wellington
"Papa" Bassey was not around so he spoke to Major
Samuel Ogbemudia, then the Brigade Major, telling him
"All is not well." Unfortunately, the Brigade was too
far away to be of immediate tactical value, even if it
wanted to be.
Ogbonna's call to Lt. Col. Igboba at the 2nd battalion
in Ikeja preceded Remawa's call to Army HQ.
Meanwhile, Muhammed began making rounds of Army units all over Lagos to see things for himself and wake up other coupists in the Lagos area asking them to "adjust to the new situation". Two of those he woke up himself were Captain JN Garba and Lt. Paul Tarfa at the Federal Guard. As they were dressing up, the call from Gowon came in. By the time Muhammed got to Ikeja, Captain Martin Adamu, Lts. Nathan, Nassarawa, Muhammadu Buhari, Alfred Gom, Longboem and a bunch of NCOs were already in control of the battalion, having executed several Igbo soldiers and officers (including Major B Nnamani, one of the company commanders) and arrested many others by cordoning off the quartermaster section of the barracks or grabbing soldiers as they came out for morning PT. The battalion commander, Lt. Col. Henry Igboba, narrowly escaped a dragnet deployed around his house by Lt. Longboem and got away.
Muhammed reportedly gave orders to stop the killing, and focus instead on securing the perimeter as well as approach roads and taking measures to ensure the eventual success of their activities. Captain Martin Adamu went to Army HQ and placed himself in the intelligence center to monitor information and disseminate disinformation. Muhammed then contacted Abeokuta garrison directly and asked Lts. DS Abubakar and Pam Nwadkon to fuel up, arm a troop each of armoured vehicles (ferrets) and head out for Lagos and Ibadan respectively, accompanied by a section of assault troops to provide support in case of any shoot out with loyal troops being mobilized by Lt. Col. Gowon, Lt. Col. Anwunah, Major Mobolaji Johnson and Brigadier Ogundipe from SHQ. Sergeant Paul Dickson, a fearsome Idoma NCO who was later to acquire a reputation as a bloodthirsty savage, was despatched to take Ikeja Airport. A typical example of a coded order (in Hausa) for the murder of an Igbo captive was: "Take him to the house of chiefs."
Later that morning, after Abubakar and Pam had left for Lagos and Ibadan, northern NCOs from the Abeokuta garrison set up check points in town and decided to pay a visit to the Abeokuta Prison where Major DO Okafor, former Federal Guards Commander, January 15 co-conspirator and alleged co-executioner of the late Prime Minister was held. He was tortured and killed in the courtyard, some say buried alive. The soldiers did not stop there. At one of the checkpoints, 2/Lt A.O. Olaniyan, oblivious of events, was stopped. As he tried to identify himself, he was summarily shot dead. The situation was clearly out of control.
LAGOS, JULY 29, 1966
After being alerted, first by Lt. Col. Muhammed, then
Lt. Col. Gowon, Captain Garba and Lt. Tarfa secured
the Federal (then known as 'National') Guards Barracks
at Obalende, better known as 'Dodan Barracks'. It is
named after a town called Dodan in the Arakan
peninsula in Burma where Nigerians fought back in
World War 2. They rounded up all Igbo soldiers and
locked them up in safety. Not a single Igbo soldier
in that unit lost his life. Garba and Tarfa overcame
a challenge by a northern soldier called Adamu Lamurde
who emotionally threatened to kill them both if he was
not allowed to avenge the death of Brigadier Maimalari
by liquidating the Igbo soldiers in the unit. Indeed,
this achievement was one of the very few successes of
northern officers against northern NCOs seeking
revenge. Garba later got a letter of commendation
and appreciation from Col Hilary Njoku, his erstwhile
Brigade Commander, when all the Igbo soldiers
including Sergeant Vidal, Private Oligbo, Private
Calistus Chukwu and others in the unit eventually
arrived back safely in the east.
After Lt. Col. Gowon completed the first round of
calls to Army commanders in Lagos early that morning,
a decision was made to establish an operations room at
the Police HQ on Moloney Street in Lagos. Brigadier
B. Ogundipe, then Chief of Staff, SHQ, was joined by
acting Police IG Kam Salem, Commodore Wey of the Navy,
Lt. Col. Gowon (Army COS), Lt. Col. Anwunah (PSO I),
and Major Mobolaji Johnson. Although he had
previously served as DAQMG at the 2nd Brigade in Apapa
under late Brigadier Maimalari, on this day Johnson
was a fish out of water because he was supposed to be
the second-in-command to Lt. Col Akahan at the 4th
battalion 100 miles away in Ibadan where junior
officers had run amock. However, he had long since
settled down as Lagos military administrator. The
commander of the 2nd battalion at Ikeja could not be
reached.
Meanwhile, Lt. DS Abubakar had arrived from Abeokuta
with his troops of ferrets, only to run into an ambush
mounted by troops from the 2nd battalion under Lt.
Longboem at Ikeja from which he was very lucky to
escape. Longboem had recognized him at the last
minute when he stuck his head out of the hatch.
After a quick appreciation, a decision was made by
Brigadier Ogundipe to scrap together a fighting force
from Army HQ elements commanded by an Igbo Captain.
Lt. Col. Gowon volunteered to go to Ikeja Barracks to
negotiate with the rebellious troops. By this time he
and Brigadier Ogundipe were already aware from reports
coming from Ibadan that General Ironsi and Colonel
Fajuyi had been snatched from Major Danjuma and were
probably dead. When he arrived at Ikeja some reports
say he was initially detained, but there is no
corroborative evidence that this really occurred.
About this time, first Major Johnson and then Brigadier Ogundipe himself gave an order to a northern NCO deployed to the Federal Guards Company. The soldier blatantly said he would not take orders from the Brigadier unless approved by Captain JN Garba. So, Captain Garba was sent for and came to the Police HQ. He was initially interrogated by Lt. Col. Anwunah, searching for information about what was happening in the country. Garba then aggressively confronted Anwunah with the grievances of northern soldiers and why they had struck. When Anwunah reported Garba's intransigence to Ogundipe, Ogundipe told Garba: "I wish you boys had waited. I have just received the report about the January coup this morning and it's on my table right now. Try to talk to your friends in Ikeja, and I am sure we can settle this matter, even at this stage."
Capt. Garba, now placed in a difficult position, went back to his office to make a call to Murtala Muhammed in Ikeja and brief him about what had just transpired. Muhammed endorsed Garba's actions and instructed him to maintain contact. Garba says he later discovered that Ogundipe had been bluffing about the report. Indeed, at the Military Leaders Meeting at Aburi, a full six months later, Commodore Wey said: "A decision has been taken on the boys of 15th January....They were to be dealt with in August but later on it was shifted to October."
Meanwhile, Brigadier Ogundipe made a public broadcast on Radio Nigeria at 2:30pm which was repeated in 30 minute cycles until about 8:30pm:
As a result of some trouble by dissidents in the army, mainly in Ibadan, Abeokuta and Ikeja, the National Military Government has declared a state of emergency in the affected areas. Consequently, the following areas have been declared military areas under the Suppression of Disorder Decree of 1966: Ibadan, Ikeja and Abeokuta. Military Tribunals have been considered and accordingly set up. Curfew has been declared in the affected areas from 6:30 pm. The National Military Government wishes to state that the situation is under control and hopes to restore peace and tranquility very soon. The government appeals to the public for cooperation in its effort to restore law and order in the affected areas.
At about 3pm, though, Ogundipe sent for Garba again
and instructed him to contribute a platoon to a second
assault force which he was sending to dislodge the
boys at Ikeja. Garba notified Muhammed at Ikeja and
then contributed a platoon to Ogundipe under one 2/Lt.
Osuma (then known as "Usman") with separate orders
that should he be ordered to shoot at fellow soldiers
he was to refuse and return to base. 2/Lt. "Usman"
did exactly as he was told before subsequently
escaping from Lagos on August 1st himself. When he
got back to the east, he used his real name (Osuma) to
request that his property be sent back to him there.
Needless to say that Ogundipe's second attempt to
establish military supremacy had failed.
Meanwhile phone calls and signals were coming in from
other parts of the country, including Enugu (from Lt.
LAGOS, SATURDAY JULY 30, 1966
At about 0600 hrs, Capt. JN Garba was ordered back to
Police HQ. Over the course of that day he made three
trips back and forth to Ikeja on behalf of Brigadier Ogundipe, including one trip in which his vehicle was
even shot at by northern troops. Emotional demands
were made back and forth, including initial
declarations that they no longer wanted to share
barracks with Igbo soldiers, and demands that either
the North be allowed to secede or that the Unification
decree be repealed with a return to the position
before January 15 under a civilian government. As
John de St. Jorre put it, "It was the northern
soldiers, roaming around outside the conference room
in their dark, satanic mood, who were the ultimate
arbiters of power".
It was during this back and forth ado that Gowon is
said to have been pressurized by the soldiers at Ikeja
to participate in the discussions and lead them as the
senior northern officer. This may have been assisted
by calls from Kaduna and Kano by Lt. Cols Hassan
Katsina and Mohammed Shuwa. Having been alerted
overnight of goings on, Ojukwu had now joined the
chorus of phone calls and signals coming in from other
parts of the country seeking clarification. He was
even able to speak to Lt. Col. Gowon at Ikeja. It is
said that Gowon told him that he was no longer a "free
agent". Ojukwu encouraged Ogundipe to keep fighting
even though he himself at one point escaped from Enugu
to Onitsha from where he was calling Ogundipe. Angry
about the phone calls from Ojukwu, Lt. Col. Muhammed
began making plans to march on Enugu - from which he
was eventually restrained.
Another authority (Kirk-Greene) claims that Gowon's
change of status from government messenger to rebel
representative occurred when Ogundipe declared that he
could not accept the proposals being put forward by
northern soldiers and wanted to remove himself from
the negotiation seeing as he could not exert his
authority over them. Indeed Captain Alfred Gom had
bluntly told him that they no longer wanted to deal
with him or the SHQ at all. More recently, Gowon has
revealed that main grouse the mutinous soldiers at
Ikeja had against dealing with and accepting orders
from Ogundipe was that he had sent two separate
assault teams to attack them. General Olusegun
Obasanjo, however, thinks an additional reason was
that Ogundipe "did not belong". According to Biafran
propaganda, a northern flag was even flown at this
point over the Ikeja Barracks, but no other
independent source, local or foreign has ever
confirmed this allegation.
Meanwhile Lt. DS Abubakar of the 2 Recce Squadron
Abeokuta and his troops of Ferrets were ordered from
Lagos to Ikeja Barracks. But he was first ordered to
secure Carter Bridge which was when he told the
notorious Sergeant Lapdam to man the checkpoint while
he left for Ikeja. Lapdam later shot Major Ibanga Ekanem, Provost Marshall, who was on his way to
SHQ,
allegedly with a list of northern officers who were
behind the revolt. [As a Captain, Ekanem survived
injuries sustained in combat as an officer in the 4QNR
in Katanga during Congo Operations in 1961]. Quite a
few other soldiers (and possibly civilians) were also
killed on Carter Bridge and at least two southern
airforce officers later rescued from him. When Lt. DS
Abubakar got to Ikeja, as reported in the Army's
official history, Col. DS Abubakar (rtd) recalls that
one of those who was most strident about separation
was Lt. Nuhu Nathan who reportedly told Gowon:
"Let us all leave now - we all go back if we cannot
form a confederation". Gowon replied: What is that
word you mentioned"? Nathan said "Confederation", to
which Gowon retorted: "What does that mean"? As
Nathan proceeded to explain, Lt. Malami Nassarawa
said "I have an encyclopedia". DS Abubakar explains
that "They brought an encyclopedia and Gowon saw the
meaning of confederation in it. He was about to buy
the idea - thank GOD the British High Commissioner and
some of the permanent secretaries advised against it."
DS Abubakar says 'the British High Commissioner said:
"If you dare do this kind of thing - confederation -
that is the end of you". So that is why we came back
to federalism.'
Others who were present include Lt. Col. Murtala Muhammed, Major Shittu Alao and Captain Baba Usman.
While Captain Garba was away on his second visit to Ikeja, Federal Permanent Secretaries met with
Brigadier Ogundipe at the Police HQ. He told them
that the soldiers at Ikeja were not willing nor ready
to assume responsibility for running the country at
that point. On his part he was not ready to do so
either unless he had both legal and military backing.
Although he had suspicions that Ironsi was already
dead he was not absolutely certain. To compound
Ogundipe's position, the Attorney General , GC Onyiuke
advised him that there was no provision for an acting
Supreme Commander in the Constitution, as amended by
Decree No. 1 of 1966. Having rendered this advice,
Onyiuke left Ogundipe at the Police HQ and then
proceeded to depart Lagos for safety. Others did too,
abandoning him and Wey there with no clear answers.
During Garba's third visit to the Ikeja Barracks he
was accompanied by the delegation of senior civil
servants including Musa Daggash, Abdul Aziz Attach, HA Ejueyitchie, Yusuf Gobir, BN
Okagbue, Ibrahim Damcida,
Allison Ayida, Phillip Asiodu, along with Justice
Adetokunbo Ademola, acting Police IG Kam Salem, Sule Katagum, Muktar Tahir, Justice Mohammed Bello, and Ali
Akilu. When Garba arrived at Ikeja with them, he
confirms that Muhammed was the "leading personality"
in the room, doing most of the talking until he
suddenly turned to Gowon and said: "You are the
senior, go ahead." This acquiescence may have been
influenced by other senior northern officers as noted
previously, citing seniority. DS Abubakar recalls
that there was certainly an argument about who should
take over and Major Abba Kyari was even briefly
mentioned. However, after Gowon took over the
discussions, Muhammed kept interrupting until Gowon
had to turn to Muhammed and say: "Look, it's either
you have deferred to me and will allow me carry on
this discussion, or you have not, and you can
continue." Garba pointedly recalls that Allison Ayida, permanent Secretary for Economic development,
forcefully insisted that Nigeria not be broken up and
kept repeating this view "despite the fact that
Murtala was from far from receptive to such a view;
instead he was constantly telling Ayida, his eyes red
with rage, in effect to shut up."
After complex informal negotiations brokered by Lt.
Col. David Ejoor, Military Governor of the Midwest,
involving Commodore Wey and Lt. Col Hassan Katsina,
Gowon was finally quietly sworn in late that day,
Saturday July 30, 1966, at Ikeja but he did not make
an announcement to the nation until Monday August 1st.
He spent the time notifying senior Police officers
like Kam Salem and Hamman Maiduguri, getting
information and consolidating his 'control' over other
parts of the country - except, as later became
apparent, the eastern region. In an interview with Elaigwu, Gowon described his emotions when he was
anointed as C-in-C as follows:
Honestly, I felt as if I was under a battle. I had a
feeling of death - virtually choking me. I felt my
throat go dry immediately. I was cold and yet
sweating. If I could then I would have run away. But
two things kept me on - one, a strong belief in God
who had seen me through the Congo and two, a number of
questions I kept asking myself - 'Are you not a man?
Are you not a soldier? 'What would people and history
say of you?' ..My first objective was to restore
discipline in the army and to prevent killings. I
called the soldiers, and as I stood on the rostrum,
tears were in my eyes. I was angry and at the same
time moved. I told myself that if I cried, the
soldiers would have had me. I took courage and
addressed them. I told them that if I heard of any
more killing, they should also remember that I was a
soldier, and that I could and would, kill.
In his speech to the nation on August 1st, Gowon said,
among other things:
This is Lt. Col. Y. Gowon, Army Chief of Staff,
speaking to you..I have been brought to the position
today of having to shoulder the great responsibilities
of this country and the armed forces with the consent
of the majority of the members of the Supreme Military
Council as a result of the unfortunate incident that
occcurred on the early morning of 29th July, 1966...
...As a result of the recent events and the other
previous similar ones, I have come to strongly believe
that we cannot honestly and sincerely continue in this
wise, as the basis of trust and confidence in our
unitary system has not been able to stand the test of
time. I have already remarked on the issues in
question. Suffice to say that, putting all
considerations to test - political, economic, as well
as social - the base for unity is not there or is so
badly rocked, not only once but several times. I,
therefore, feel that we should review the issue of our
national standing and see if we can help stop the
country from drifting away into utter destruction.
All members of the armed forces are requested to keep
within their barracks except on essential duties and
when ordered from SHQ. Troops must not terrorize the
public, as such action will discredit the new National
Military Government.."
"
I promise you that I shall do all I can to return
to civil rule as soon as it can be arranged. I also
intend to pursue most vigorously the question of the
release of political prisoners. Fellow countrymen,
give me your support and I shall endeavour to live up
to expectations. Thank you."
Shortly thereafter, on the same day, Lt. Col. Ojukwu,
Military Governor of the East, made a
counter-broadcast from Enugu. The next morning Gowon
signed an instrument of pardon for Chief Obafemi
Awolowo, Chief Anthony Enahoro, and others who had
been convicted and jailed in September 1963 for
treasonable felony, conspiracy to commit a felony and
conspiracy to effect an unlawful purpose in 1962 with
the object of forcefully removing Alhaji Tafawa Balewa
from office as Prime Minister.
On August 3rd, Lt. Col. David Ejoor made a public
speech as the Military Governor of the Midwest, in
support of the new regime. Likewise, on August 4,
Colonel Adeyinka Adebayo, Military Governor of the
West, broadcast his support for the new government as
Gowon was addressing a press conference at the Lagos
City Hall, having earlier that day released Isaac Boro
and others. Gowon was later to announce his plans for
return to civilian rule four days later, followed the
next day by a meeting of delegates representing the
Regional Military Governors.
However, Gowon or no Gowon, northern NCOs were still
running amock killing people arbitrarily, even
threatening northern officers who stood in their way.
Lt. DS Abubakar was very nearly shot at Ikeja airport
in this manner by one Edward William allegedly for
"hiding some Igbo people". Lagos Garrison Commander,
Lt. Col. Eze, barely escaped a mob of northern
soldiers on August 2nd but his staff officer, Captain Iloputaife, was not so lucky. Indeed, a few days
after the mutiny, a northern corporal at Ikeja
summarized his own motives for the mutiny by telling
Norman Miners: "The Ibos killed our leaders in
January; they were taking all the top jobs; we had to
get rid of them. Now we have only got Northerners in
this barracks; all the Southerners have run away." In
fact northern NCOs and soldiers were in the habit of
taking uniforms of dead Igbo officers and NCOs and
wearing their ranks. On August 8, all Igbo soldiers
at the Army workshop in Yaba were expelled. But as
the nation was to find out, the worst was yet to come.
But it would be simplistic to presume that some northern officers did not take part in the killings in Lagos. Lt. Nuhu Nathan, for example, was later personally credited in eastern publications with the execution of some Igbo soldiers at Ikeja. There were undoubtedly others.
... To be continued at: http://www.gamji.com/nowa/nowa27.htm