Operation Aure (4)
By
Nowa Omoigui
Operation Aure (3) [see http://www.gamji.com/nowa/nowa28.htm ]
Operation Aure (2) [see http://www.gamji.com/nowa/nowa26.htm ] and
Operation Aure (1) [see http://www.gamji.com/nowa/nowa25.htm ]
BENIN, JULY 29 WEEKEND, 1966
Benin-City was quiet during the weekend of July 29,
1966. It had hosted General Ironsi with fanfare on
the 27th. School children lined the routes and there
was pomp and pageantry. Underneath it all, however,
fate beckoned. It was from Benin that Ironsi departed
on his way to Ibadan where he met his death. In the
atmosphere of myths that evolved in the years after
1966, there was even a story that "Operation Aure" was
not launched in Benin because of the intercession of
the Oba of Benin. That story is false, although it is
true that the traditional institution offered prayers
for the country's stability. A strong delegation of
chiefs and traditional rulers from the Midwest region
attended the conference in Ibadan.
During the weekend of the mutiny there were no
rebellious activities within the small detachment of
the 4th battalion under S/Captain Adeniran stationed
in Benin. However, the tour of duty in Benin made it
possible for soldiers in that company to discover that
some of those detained for their part in the January
15 mutiny were at the Benin Prison. This information
was to take on greater significance, when on August
16th, there was a raid on the prison carried out by
those elements of the 4th battalion who had initially
been redeployed back to Ibadan, but then made a
special trip back to Benin just for the heist.
The immediate motive for the August 16 raid was to
release their more unruly northern colleagues from the
Battalion who had been detained there in early August
for their part in the events at Ibadan on July 29 in
which General Ironsi, Col. Fajuyi and some Midwestern
officers and soldiers in the 4th battalion (like Lt.
The rescuers did not stop at releasing their
colleagues. They removed Igbo soldiers who had long
been detained there for their part in the January
mutiny, including Major Christian Anuforo who had
personally executed Lt. Cols. Arthur Unegbe, Kur
Mohammed and James Yakubu Pam, as well as Federal
Finance Minister Chief Festus Okotie-Eboh. All of
these individuals - including Anuforo - were tortured
and then shot after private trials conducted by
northern NCOs along the Benin-Ore road, although
S/Captain Adeniran himself, pro-Akintola as he was,
and a lucky survivor of the January operations, may
not have been a neutral observer. Indeed, one of the
less well publicized activities of mutinous troops in
the 4th battalion was the release of NNDP supporters
who had been detained in Ibadan Prison by Lt. Col. Fajuyi back in January. It was a stroke of fortune
for Major Adewale Ademoyega, another one of the
January conspirators, who paired up with Anuforo for
Okotie-Eboh's execution, that soldiers from the 4th
battalion were unaware that he had been transferred to
Warri Prison from the East. Needless to say, the
Military Governor, Lt. Col. David Ejoor was very
embarassed and protested vehemently to Gowon.
IBADAN, FRIDAY, JULY 29, 1966 ("Paiko's Wedding")
The situation in Ibadan on July 28 was tense.
Northern civil servants, chiefs and traditional rulers
who had come for the Conference of Traditional rulers
were eager to get out of the South, fearful that they
would be targetted in the so called "Plan 15" Igbo
Plot. Indeed there were false rumors that the
conference Hall was slated to be blown up. At the
regimental parade for General Ironsi a small
controversy erupted in the Press about the observation
that northern troops refused to (or could not) sing
the National Anthem. Arguments went back and forth on
TV about whether their lips were moving.
Nevertheless, there was a grand reception in the
evening hosted by the Military Governor, Lt. Col.
However, following the call from Lt. Pam Mwadkon in
Abeokuta, Lt. Garba Dada (Paiko) woke up other
northern officers at the 4th Battalion, including
Major TY Danjuma, a staff officer at AHQ who was
temporarily staying at the Letmauk Barracks, having
accompanied Major General JTU Aguiyi-Ironsi from
Lagos. The Barracks is named after a town called
Letmauk, site of a bitter campaign in April and May
1944 to retake AN from the Japanese in Burma, by the
1st Nigerian Brigade of the 82nd West African
Division during World War II.
Dada told Danjuma: "Sir, we will have to do the same
thing. The most important target is the Supreme
Commander. For as long as he is there, everything we
are doing here is nothing. We should go there."
After a brief meeting with Lts. Ibrahim Bako and
Abdullai Shelleng, a quick phone call was made to Lt.
Col. Murtala Muhammed in Lagos, seeing as Muhammed had
earlier contacted the boys to stand down from their
group's pre-planned coup. But Muhammed initially
urged restraint, seeing as he was unsure whether his
earlier confrontation with Anwunah meant that Igbo
officers and soldiers in Lagos were already armed and
may well have the advantage - as Anwunah had
threatened. However, concerned that exposed northern
mutineers in Abeokuta would be isolated and thus
likely arrested and charged if they delayed action,
Danjuma, Dada, Bako, Shelleng, and the duty officer
(James Onoja) decided to overrule Muhammed and proceed
with operations in Ibadan. Because Danjuma did not go
to Ibadan with combat dress, he borrowed one from Lt.
(*Some accounts say it was Akahan's uniform, but the
Onoja version is likely more correct, confirmed by
Danjuma himself. In any case Akahan was out of the
loop until daybreak).
Soldiers were then hurriedly selected from infantry
companies at Mokola commanded by Onoja and Shelleng.
While Shelleng took one group to man checkpoints along
the Lagos and Abeokuta roads to protect the southern
approaches to the city, 24 soldiers under Lt. James
Onoja, some say in two landrovers mustered by the MTO,
Lt. Jerry Useni, accompanied Major Danjuma to the
Government House in the early hours of July 29, 1966.
THE TAKE-OVER OF THE GOVERNMENT HOUSE, IBADAN
Upon arrival there, having established that the
Supreme Commander was in, Major Danjuma was confronted
by two command problems. Both arose from the fact that
he neither belonged to the 4th battalion nor was he
part of the National Guard, although he was senior to
all the boys on the ground. First task, therefore,
was to ensure the cooperation of those elements of the
4th battalion who were on duty there. The second was
to secure the cooperation of the National Guard
Commander on the ground. In order to address the
first problem he asked the adjutant ("Paiko") to issue
a "legitimate" order that all his soldiers on duty be
disarmed by the duty officer (Onoja) who was there to
conduct a "legitimate" inspection. After being
disarmed by the Duty Sergeant, they were
illegitimately screened and those who could be trusted
(i.e. northerners), illegitimately rearmed. Then they
were supplemented by the pre-selected group Danjuma
brought along from the barracks with Onoja. To deal
with the second problem he confronted Lt. William
Walbe directly and secured his cooperation. This
wasn't too difficult. Although they were in different
cells, Walbe himself had been attending separate
meetings in Lagos with Joe Garba and others and was
well aware of the outlines of a coup plot although he
did not expect one that night.
Once the building was surrounded and the 106 mm gun
positioned in support, Danjuma came under pressure
from the boys on the ground to proceed with the
operation. There were fears, based on myths acquired
in the Congo, that General Ironsi was assisted by
"juju" and that he could disappear at anytime using
his "crocodile" (see note below on Ironsi's crocodile") Junior officers who had come to join
the party urged immediate attack, some even suggesting
a repeat performance of the Nzeogwu assault on the
Nassarawa Lodge in Kaduna in January. They wanted
the 106 mm weapon used to bring down the complex.
Lt. Col. Hilary Njoku, Commander of the 2nd Brigade in
Lagos, then emerged from the main building and was
walking right past the soldiers on duty moving toward
the gate. One account says he came up from Lagos with
Ironsi, had been staying at the guest house next to
the main lodge, but was at the main lodge where Ironsi
was staying, socializing with both Ironsi and Fajuyi.
At this point, Lt. Onoja asked for permission to
leave, saying he was going to get more ammunition from
the barracks. However, he panicked and ran away in
one of the landrovers, fearing that Njoku's escape
meant the coup would fail. He was later arrested at
Jebba.
When it became apparent that Njoku had escaped,
Danjuma, guarded by two soldiers, made rounds to check
all guard positions around the lodge and was moving
toward the guest house when he heard the phone there
ringing. He asked one of his guards to break the
window so he could reach in to answer the phone.
According to General Danjuma (rtd), this is how the
conversation went:
Danjuma: "Hello"
Gowon: "Hello. I want to speak to Brigade
Commander. I want to speak to Colonel Njoku.
Danjuma: "May I know who is speaking?"
Gowon: My name is Gowon. Yakubu Gowon."
Danjuma: "Ranka dede. This is Yakubu Danjuma."
Gowon: "Yakubu, what are you doing there? Where are
you?"
Danjuma: "I am in the State House here."
Gowon: "Where is the Brigade Commander?"
Danjuma: "He is not around."
Gowon: "Have you heard what has happened?"
Danjuma: "Yes, I heard and that is why I am here.
Gowon: (after a period of silence) "Can you do it?"
Danjuma: "Yes, we have got the place surrounded."
Gowon: "But for goodness sake we have had enough
bloodshed. There must be no bloodshed."
Danjuma: "No, We are only going to arrest him."
At this point Danjuma replaced the phone as yet
another command crisis with the soldiers on the
grounds was brewing. It is not clear from available
information what Gowon did with the explosive
information he had just gained from Danjuma or how he
and Ogundipe planned to deal with it. Danjuma does
not say that Gowon or any other senior officer
explicitly ordered him to desist from his activities.
This is an area which will attract considerable
attention of researchers in the future. Some have
used it to implicate Gowon in the coup but depending
on what other information he had at that point about
availability of loyal fighting units, this may be too
harsh a conclusion to draw without additional
clarification from Gowon himself. He may well have
been stalling to allow him time to make alternative
plans. Certainly, neither the National Guard company,
2nd (in Lagos) nor 4th (in Ibadan) battalions nor the
garrison at Abeokuta were usable at that point. Even
if they were willing, battalions in Enugu, Kaduna and
Kano were too far away to be useful, particularly
considering the lack of emergency strategic airlift
capability. In any case, any thinking along these
lines was quickly neutralized by Murtala Muhammed's
decision to seize Ikeja airport at dawn. Lastly,
Gowon may have viewed Danjuma as the lesser of two
evils - the other being an all out effort by mutinying
junior officers to get their hands on the General
(which is what eventually happened). In retrospect,
at that point only a foreign power could have mustered
the might to stage a complex night-time military
rescue operation to save Ironsi. But there is no
evidence that such an option was ever considered.
In any case, when Onoja ran away, TY Danjuma was
isolated. With no duty officer on ground, and no
other officer from the 4th battalion on the premises,
the NCOs began to wonder if they should take strange
orders from this Major they had never met, wearing a
mis-sized American satin combat uniform on top of
pyjamas and who wasn't even from their unit. They
began to wonder if Danjuma might even be an Igbo
officer based on his physique and bearing and perhaps
even his reluctance to destroy the building.
Other officers also arrived back on premises as
daybreak approached, including "Paiko" himself.
At 6:30 am General Ironsi's Army ADC, Lt. Sani Bello
emerged from the building to find out what was going
on. After a brief confrontation with Danjuma and a
group of hostile northern NCOs, he was arrested, told
to remove his shoes and sit down on the ground. As
members of the Head of State's convoy and delegation
began arriving from guest chalets they too were
detained and asked to sit on the ground. They include
many others like Colonel Olu Thomas, an army
physician, and Chief C. O. Lawson, Secretary to the
Government, arrested at about 7:30 am.
At this point, Lt. Col. Fajuyi personally emerged from
the building. Some accounts claim that his ADC had
absconded during the night and switched sides.
Danjuma describes his conversation with Fajuyi as
follows:
Fajuyi: "Danjuma come. What do you want?"
Danjuma: "I want the Supreme Commander"
Fajuyi: "Promise me that no harm will come to him"
Danjuma: words to the effect that no harm would come
to Ironsi and that he was only being arrested.
Fajuyi: "I will go and call him."
Chorus of northern NCOs: "No, Sir. Don't allow him to
go."
Danjuma: (talking to Fajuyi who had briefly turned
around) "Sir, you see what I have. This is grenade.
At this point Fajuyi led the way into the building
with the grenade bearing Danjuma and five armed
soldiers (including Lt. Walbe) right behind him,
essentially using him as a cover as they climbed the
staircase and went upstairs to meet General Ironsi.
Ironsi: "Young man"
Danjuma: "Sir, you are under arrest."
Ironsi: "What is the matter?"
Danjuma: "The matter is you, Sir. You told us in
January when we supported you to quell the mutiny that
all the dissident elements that took part in the
mutiny will be court-martialled. It is July now. You
have done nothing. You kept these boys in prison and
the rumours are now that they will be released because
they are national heroes."
Ironsi: "Look, what do you mean? It is not true."
At this point Ironsi and Danjuma began arguing, with
Fajuyi getting in between them and reminding Danjuma
again and again of his promise that no harm would come
to Ironsi.
Danjuma: "Fajuyi get out of my way. You, just come
down."
Danjuma: (to Ironsi) "..You organized the killing of
our brother officers in January and you have done
nothing to bring the so called dissident elements to
justice because you were part and parcel of the whole
thing."
Ironsi: "Who told you that? You know it is not
true."
Danjuma: "You are lying. You have been fooling us. I
ran around risking my neck trying to calm the ranks,
and in February you told us that they would be tried.
This is July and nothing has been done. You will
answer for your actions."
At this point Danjuma and Lt. Andrew Nwankwo, Ironsi's
AirForce ADC, had a fierce verbal exchange, with one
holding a grenade with the pin pulled and the other
holding a pistol. But with the fingers of five other
soldiers on the triggers of automatic weapons, Nwankwo
was outgunned.
IRONSI AND FAJUYI ARE KIDNAPPED
When the group got downstairs, Danjuma instructed the
4th battalion adjutant, Lt. Garba Dada ("Paiko"), to
arrange for both Fajuyi and Ironsi to be taken to the
guest house on the cattle ranch at Mokwa "pending date
of full inquiry". Lt. "Paiko", however, informed
Danjuma that he was not a party to the commitment he
made to Fajuyi (or Gowon) about their safety and a
fierce emotional argument erupted between Danjuma and
the others. At this point a northern soldier tapped
Danjuma on the shoulder with a loaded rifle and,
speaking in Hausa, said:
"These foolish young boys. That is the kind of
leadership you have given us and messing us up. They
killed all your elders and you are still fooling
around here. The man you are fooling around here with
will disappear before you know it."
The other soldiers agreed with this soldier and
pounced on both Ironsi and Fajuyi, wrestling them to
restrain any movement. Danjuma, faced with one command
crisis after another all night, had finally lost
control.
Fajuyi turned to Danjuma and said: "You gave us the
assurance."
Danjuma replied: "Yes, Sir. I am sure you will be all
right."
He was wrong.
Two landrovers took the captives away while Danjuma
hitch-hiked back to the barracks.
Both Ironsi and Fajuyi were squeezed into the front
seat of one vehicle while Ironsi's ADCs, Lts. Bello
and Nwankwo were behind. Two officers, Lts. Walbe and
Dada, accompanied the group with one joining the
driver of the lead vehicle. The command vehicle led
another vehicle full of armed troops. Among those
soldiers said to have been present include the 4th
battalion unit RSM Useni Fagge, Sergeant Tijjani (from
Maiduguri), Warrant Officer Bako, and other soldiers
including Dabang, Wali, and Rabo. Some of those
involved were later to come to prominence during the
unsuccessful Dimka coup of 1976. (Although Colonel
Yohana Madaki (rtd) was at that time an NCO in the 4th
battalion, there is no evidence that he accompanied
the soldiers that took Ironsi away).
They drove to Mile 8 on Iwo road, where the group
dismounted and went into the bush, crossing a small
stream. Ironsi and Fajuyi were subjected to beatings
and interrogation. General Ironsi acted a soldier as
he was questioned, refused to be intimidated and
remained silent, refusing to confess any role in the
January 15 coup. Indeed, according to Elaigwu, "It
was reliably learnt from an officer and a soldier on
the spot that it was Ironsi's muteness amidst a
barrage of questions that led to his being shot by an
angry Northern soldier." Other sources suggest that
the "angry northern soldier" may have been Sergeant
Tijjani. Details are murky.
Fajuyi was also shot. Although the western region
publication "Fajuyi the Great" published by the
Ministry of Information in 1967 after his official
burial said he had offered to die rather than "abandon
his guest", those involved in his arrest and
assassination insist that he was an even more critical
target than Ironsi and made no such offer to die with
Ironsi. Lt. Col. William Walbe (rtd) said:
"....We arrested him as we arrested Ironsi. We
suspected him of being party to the January coup. You
remember the Battle Group Course which was held at Abeokuta. Fajuyi was the Commander of the Battle Group
Course. All those who took part in the January coup
were those who had taken part in that course. It gave
us the impression that the Battle Course was arranged
for the January coup, so he had to suffer it too. I am
sorry about that but that is the nature of the life of
a military man...."
General Danjuma confirms this opinion. He says that
at another training camp in Kachia commanded by Lt.
Col. Fajuyi, Major Nzeogwu rehearsed the assault on
Sardauna's house in the presence of some northern
mortar officers who did not appreciate the
significance of the exercise until after the coup. In
Danjuma's words, "The chaps could not stomach Fajuyi
such that if there was anybody who should die first,
as far as they were concerned, it was Fajuyi, not even
Ironsi."
How true are these claims about Fajuyi's role in the
January coup? I found an answer in the book "Why we
Struck" by Major Adewale Ademoyega, one of the January
mutineers and a Yoruba officer like Fajuyi. Ademoyega
states that Fajuyi supported the first coup, knew of
it and made suggestions to plotters on how it could be
best carried out. According to Ademoyega, that he did
not actively participate was only as a result of his
posting at the time the coup was launched. However,
Ademoyega eulogizes the late Colonel for opposing all
efforts in the Supreme Military Council to bring the
January 15 coupists to trial.
IRONSI'S ADCs ESCAPE
Major General Ironsi had two ADCs, Army Lt. Sani Bello
and AirForce Lt. Andrew Nwankwo. Speaking Hausa,
Bello, whose ethnic origin is Kontagora, appealed to
'Lt. Paiko', who was an acquaintance from the same
Niger province in the North, to let him and his Igbo
colleague off the hook since they were not the targets
of the soldiers and were only performing official
functions as ADCs.
According to Madiebo:
"While Ironsi was being shot, Nwankwo said he ran into
the bush and escaped. He emphasized that his escape
was not due to his cleverness, but because his
colleague, the Hausa ADC who was also present, wanted
him to escape. Nwankwo explained that during the
month of June, 1966, he and his Northern colleague had
discussed the possibility of another coup. The
Northern officer was emphatic the Ibos were going to
do it again, but Nwankwo swore it was going to be done
by Northerners. According to him, at the end of a long
but heated argument, they came to an agreement that
whichever side did it, the man on the winning side
should save the other's life. Based on this agreement,
the Northern ADC whispered to Nwankwo to escape while
Ironsi was being shot, and also discouraged the
soldiers from chasing after him. Nwankwo said he later
made his way to Lagos and contacted this Northern
officer again, who not only hid him for a couple of
days, but eventually took him out of Lagos in the boot
of a car."
BACK AT THE 4th BATTALION
Later that morning, on Friday July 29, back in the
barracks, T/Lt. Col Joe Akahan, Commander of the 4th
battalion , who had essentially been ignored all night
by junior officers, tried to reassert control. He (or
someone acting in his name) apparently called a
meeting of all officers at 10am which Akahan did not
attend. By this time, Lt. Pam Nwadkon's Ferret group
had arrived from Abeokuta bringing more inciting news
about how Igbo soldiers there had been hunted down and
killed. At this meeting surviving Igbo soldiers were
allegedly rounded up by NCOs and later killed, some
say by being packed like sardines into a tailor's shop
and then blown up with grenades. The intelligence
officer of the battalion, Lt. Jasper, from the delta
part of the Midwest, was killed based on an allegation
that he had been an informant for senior Igbo officers
in Lagos. NNDP detainees at the Ibadan prison were
released.
Later in the afternoon around 4 pm, weary from
negotiations with rebels at Ikeja, Gowon called from
Lagos and spoke to Akahan, seeking to establish the
status of the Supreme Commander. Akahan passed the
question on to Danjuma who then informed Gowon that
Ironsi had been snatched from him by officers of the
4th battalion. When Danjuma confronted the Battalion
adjutant with the same question, he says the adjutant
"told me one story after the other. But I saw the
officers in twos and threes whispering to each other
and it was running to about 7pm."
At this point let me address a pertinent question. Is
there is any independent corroboration for Danjuma's
story that he arrested Ironsi but did not order or
partake in his torture and execution? Yes, at least
two. In the book "Power with Civility", Rear Admiral
Ndubuisi Kanu says: "In fairness to Danjuma, his
mission was to arrest the Head of State in a bloodless
coup, but having accomplished it successfully, he was
shoved aside by a mob who had reserved a fatal fate
for their captive." General Gowon (rtd) also
confirmed in an interview with Elaigwu that then Major
Danjuma was very sad when he later learnt about the
deaths of both Ironsi and Fajuyi, having given his
word that no harm would come to them.
On Saturday, July 30, T/Lt. Col. Akahan finally came
to grips with the situation, albeit temporarily,
ordering all soldiers to be disarmed in response to
direct orders from Lagos.
But the 4th battalion, incidentally the direct
descendant of "Glover's Hausas", was not done yet. In time it would acquire a reputation as the most
unruly battalion in Nigerian history. On August 16, a
detachment of the unit staged a raid on the Benin
Prison, followed by an all out battalion-wide riot in
Ibadan. Later that month when a decision was made to
transfer the battalion en bloc, now under Major
Danjuma's command, to Kaduna, NCOs and junior officers
again went berserk. Using tactics reminiscent of the
Japanese in Burma, they went to hospitals all over
Kaduna to look for sick Igbo officers, one of whom was
killed. Another officer, then Major Alabi (later
renamed Alabi-Isama) of the NMTC, who had actually
served with the 4th battalion before the January coup
narrowly escaped back to the Midwest. He was smuggled
out of Kaduna by a team of officers led by the
Military Governor, Lt. Col. Hassan Katsina.
Detachments of the 4th battalion deployed to other
northern towns continued their acts of lawlessness
everywhere they went. Soldiers in the infantry
company deployed to Makurdi (under S/Captain Adeniran
who replaced T/Major Daramola of the 3rd battalion)
were instrumental to the outbreak of systematic
killing in September of Igbos fleeing from other parts
of the North. It is not for nothing that the vehicle
and railway bridge over the River Benue at Makurdi was
nick-named the "Red Bridge". In a pattern established
by the preceding unit, easterners (particularly those
with low Military or Police style crew hair cut) were
allegedly screened out at the Train station, or hunted
down in joint Army-Police-Militia house to house
searches, then taken to an open field in Makurdi North
where they were allegedly executed. All of these
alleged activities could not have escaped the
attention of the local Police Special Branch officer,
then ASP Shettima, but it is unclear what steps were
taken by authorities to bring the situation under
control, assuming they were even aware of what was
going on. Those easterners who escaped the Makurdi
railway bottleneck had to contend with molestation and
looting by rural opportunists along the Makurdi-Otukpo
road, if they thought going by road was safer. If
they escaped that, they had to survive a final
checkpoint at Otukpo, allegedly manned by one Lt.
In addition to hair style, all sorts of criteria were
used to screen out those marked for execution.
Soldiers or Policemen who were multilingual would
speak English or vernacular to the "suspect" and then
listen for tell-tale accents in the way certain words
were pronounced. Another popular screening method was
one's tribal marks. Yorubas with large tribal marks
would often be jokingly referred to as "Akintola" and
let go. Not to have obvious identifiable tribal
marks, however, was an invitation to trouble, which is
how many got killed, whether they were Igbo or not -
including some local Idoma and Tiv people, merely on
account of their physical features. It used to be
quite effective for some time for southerners without
prominent tribal marks to escape by claiming they were
from "Benin" in the Midwest, until the soldiers began
demanding that the alleged "Benin people" speak or
sing in the Edo language. But there were other ways
one could get into difficulty. For example, not even
the Benue Provincial Police Officer, Mr. Agbajor, an
Itsekiri from the Midwest, was safe. He barely
escaped ambush at the Makurdi club after attracting
attention to himself by driving around in a car with
license plate number EW 1, which stood for 'East,
Owerri, 1'. Agbajor was to come to public attention
again, when, in August/September 1967 he agreed to
serve the short-lived Biafran administration in the
Midwest as Chief of Police. His career in the
Nigerian Police ended shortly thereafter.
About 5 days after their deaths, the corpses of Major
General Aguiyi-Ironsi and Lt. Col. Fajuyi were
retrieved by the Police Special Branch (including CSP
J. D. Gomwalk) from a makeshift grave near the town of
Lalupon outside Ibadan and transferred to the Military cemetery where they were specially marked for future
identification. It was not until after the Aburi
conference in January 1967 that their deaths were
announced (by Lt. Col Ojukwu), following a pattern
that had originally been established by General
Ironsi. Ironsi refused to announce the deaths of or
allow official funerals for most of the victims of the
January coup (including his military colleagues)
throughout his six month long regime.
After yet another exhumation, however, General Ironsi
was finally reburied with full military honours at
Umuahia on January 20, 1967 while a few days later Lt.
Col Fajuyi was reburied at Ado-Ekiti.
CASUALTIES OF JULY 29, 1966 REBELLION AND AFTERMATH
According to an Eastern Regional Government
publication titled "January 15: Before and After;
No. WT/1003/3674/40,000, 1967", the casualty list of
the counter-rebellion included 33 Eastern, 7
Midwestern, and 3 Western Officers and 153 Eastern, 14
Midwestern and 3 Western Other ranks. Of the 33
Eastern officer deaths, there was one Major General,
one Lt. Col, nine Majors, eleven Captains, eight Lts.
The grand military total, according that report was
213 casualties. However, names of newly trained or
single soldiers who were killed could not be
ascertained, so the figures will always remain an
estimate. In any case the Eastern list was contested
by the Federal Government and to this day no-one has
publicly confirmed the full reconciled list of all
those who lost their lives. Most observers, though,
feel the list provided by the Eastern regional
Government was as close to the truth as any list will
ever get. Pensions and gratuities have been paid over
the years to many families. Indeed those spouses who
did not remarry and maintained their dignity as widows
continued to be supported for many years. In special
cases children were awarded special scholarships up to
University level.
Over the years, I have been able to gather a list of
the officers who were confirmed killed. It includes
two names (Musa and Drummond) missing from the Eastern
list and excludes two names^ on the Eastern list (Ibik
and Waribor):
1) Major Gen. J.T.U. Aguiyi-Ironsi`
2) Lt. Col. F.A. Fajuyi`
3) Lt. Col. I.C. Okoro
4) T/Lt Col G. Okonweze
5) Major Christian Anuforo~
6) Major Donatus O. Okafor ~
7) Major T.E. Nzegwu (NAF) `
8) Major J.K. Obienu`
9) Major Ibanga Ekanem
10) Major P.C. Obi (NAF)
11) T/Major C.C. Emelifonwu
12) T/Major B. Nnamani
13) T /Major J.O.C. Ihedigbo
14) T/Major O.U. Isong
15) T/Major A. Drummond
16) T/Major A.D. Ogunro
17) Capt. J.I. Chukwueke
18) Capt. H.A. Iloputaife
19) Capt. A.O. Akpet
20) Capt. S.E. Maduabum
21) Capt. G.N.E. Ugoala
22) T/Capt P.C. Okoye
23) T/Capt. I.U. Idika
24) T/Capt. L.C. Dilibe
25) T/Capt. J.U. Egere
26) T/Capt. T.O. Iweanaya+
27) T/Capt. H.A. Auna
28) T/Capt. R.I. Agbazue
29) Lt. G. Mbabie
30) Lt. S.E. Idowu
31) Lt. E.C.N. Achebe
32) Lt. S.A. Mbadiwe
33) Lt. F.P. Jasper+
34) Lt. P.D. Ekedingyo+
35) Lt. S.E. Onwuke+
36) Lt. J.D. Ovuezurie+
37) Lt. A.D.C. Egbuna
38) Lt. E.B. Orok
39) Lt. J.U. Ugbe
40) Lt. Francis Musa*
41) 2/Lt A.O. Olaniyan
42) 2/Lt. A.R.O. Kasaba
43) 2/Lt. F.M. Agronaye+
44) 2/Lt. P.K. Onyeneho+
NOTES:
*Some of the names here (like Musa) appear northern in
origin but are actually names of Igbo officers who had
joined the Army using northern names.
~Active participant in January mutiny
` Major T.E. Nzegwu was the airforce officer allegedly
approached to help organize a plane (along with
Captain Udeaja) to fetch Chief Awolowo from Prison in
the event that the January 15 coup should succeed.
Major John Obienu is alleged by Major Ademoyega to
have initially agreed to take part in the January coup
but changed his mind at the last minute. Although
there was a rumor that it was Obienu who tipped Ironsi
off about the January plot, Ironsi himself said he
found out about the mutiny from the wife of Lt. Col.
James Pam (some say Pam himself) when he returned home
between 2 and 3 am on January 15 from a second party
following the earlier one at Brigadier Maimalari's
house. Others claim it was either Lt. Col. Ojukwu
(CO, 5th Bn) and/or Hilary Njoku (outgoing CO, 2nd Bn)
that tipped Ironsi off, having been directly contacted
themselves by the conspirators. Lt. Col. Fajuyi is
confirmed by one of the January 15 plotters
(Ademoyega) to have provided ideas on how it should be
carried out although he did not take part directly.
+2/Lt Agronaye is not reflected on the Eastern List.
Instead a similar name, spelled differently as 2/Lt.
Agbonaye is listed. T/Capt. T.O. Iweanaya is also
spelled differently as Capt. T.O. Iweanya on some
versions of the Eastern list. Lt. S.E. Onwuke is
spelled Lt. S.E. Onwukwe on the Eastern list. Lt. F.P. Jasper is identified as 2/Lt. F. P. Jasper and
said to be from the 3rd Bn in Kaduna on the Eastern
list. However, federal sources place this officer in
the 4th Battalion at Ibadan, as a full Lt.. In fact
the eastern list does not identify any officer
casualty whatsoever from within the 4th battalion,
Ibadan which can't be true. Lt. P.D. Ekedingyo is
spelled Lt. P.D. Ekediyo on the Eastern list. Lt. J.
D. Ovuezurie is spelled Lt. J. D. Ovuezirie on the
Eastern list.
^Lts. P. O. Ibik and K. D. Waribor are listed on the
Eastern list of casualties of the July
counter-rebellion, but not on my list because I have
not been able to confirm the date and circumstances of
their alleged deaths in the July counter-rebellion and
after. However, according to the Special Branch
report, 2/Lt. P. Ogoegbunam Ibik of the 2nd Field
Squadron, Nigerian Army Engineers occupied the P & T
Telephone Exchange under the supervision of Captain
Ben Gbulie during Kaduna operations on the night of
January 15, 1966. 2/Lt. K.D. Waribor of the "C" Coy,
3rd BN NA played a peripheral role securing the outer
perimeter in the assault on the Nassarawa Lodge in
Kaduna, as well as the attempt to arrest Alhaji
Makaman Bida on the same night - during which Ahmadu
Pategi, a Government driver was killed. They were,
therefore, likely detained by General Ironsi unless
they escaped (as Ifeajuna - initially - and Nwokedi
did). Strangely, neither officer was ever listed on
either the Federal or Eastern region lists of officers
detained for alleged complicity in the January coup -
supporting the "escape" theory, unless they were
killed soon after that mutiny in circumstances similar
to the deaths of 2/Lt Odu and Major Adegoke. It is
also possible that Ibik's case was handled like those
of other 2 Field Engineer subalterns like 2/Lts. S.E. Omeruah, Ezedima, Ileabachi, Atom Kpera and Harrison
Eghagha who all claimed they were merely obeying
"internal security" operational orders, the illegal
significance of which they were unaware. However, the
Eastern region list of detainees was not complete
because Major Ademoyega, for example, was never listed
as a detainee when, in fact, he was. He had been
transferred from an eastern prison to Warri in the
Midwest. The dynamics of updating Prison lists as
detainees were being moved around may have affected
the accuracy of various lists. What is clear,
however, is that if they were either at the Abeokuta
or Benin Prisons in the weeks following the July 29
mutiny, they are very likely now dead. However, all
said and done, the most accurate thing one can say
about Lts. P. O. Ibik and K. D. Waribor is that they
are unaccounted for.
================================
POST-SCRIPT
The officers (and civilians) who planned and carried
out the January 15 and July 29 1966 military
rebellions have never been tried or convicted before
any military court-martial although there was an
agreement at Aburi that this should occur. This, as
we know, was overtaken by events leading up to and
including the Nigerian Civil War.
The only exception made among the January 15 group was
for those surviving officers who not only took part in
the January 1966 coup but also participated in the
Biafran invasion of the Midwestern region in
August/September 1967. Most officers in this
overlapping group were brought before a Military Board
of Inquiry, jailed until October 1974, and all -
except Lts. J.C. Ojukwu and Ijeweze (?Igweze) who
were retired - eventually dismissed. They include
Major A. Ademoyega, Captain Ben Gbulie, Capt. E. M. Udeaja, Lt. F.M. Okocha, Lt. B.A.O. Oyewole, Lt.
N.S. Nwokocha, Lt. G.B. Ikejiofor, Lt. G. G. Onyefuru, Lt. A.R.O. Egbikor, Lt. A. N. Azubuogu, and 2/Lt.
C.G. Ngwuluka. Interestingly, prominent surviving January
15 mutineers like Captain Emmanuel Nwobosi (rtd), who
did not take part in the Midwest invasion, but played
other roles in the civil war (as a Colonel in the
Biafran Army, Field Commander and later Chief of Staff
in General Ojukwu's HQ) were spared in a general
amnesty covering both the January and July 1966
rebellions.
What used to be known as Race Course in Lagos was
renamed Tafawa Balewa Square after the late PM. A
prominent street in Jos is also named after him. The
street in Victoria Island, Lagos, straddling the Bar
Beach, is named after the late Sir Ahmadu Bello. A
prominent street in Kaduna is also named after him.
Streets in Lagos (Ikeja) and Abuja are named after
Samuel Ladoke Akintola, late Premier of the West.
When he came to power in 1975, late General Murtala
Muhammed - coup leader of the July 1966 uprising -
went to great lengths to look after the family of the
late Major General Aguiyi Ironsi. In 1993, General
Ibrahim Babangida - a participant in the July 1966
revolt - named an Army Barrack after the late General
and post-humously awarded him the Great Commander of
the Federal Republic (GCFR). A street in Abuja was
also named after him. A Barrack in Abuja is also
named after Ironsi's successor, General Yakubu Gowon
(rtd). The International Airport in Lagos is named
after General Muhammed while the one in Abuja is named
after former President Nnamdi Azikiwe, and the one in
Kano after late Malam Aminu Kano.
Some streets in Lagos (Ikeja) and Ibadan are named
after the late Lt. Col. F. Fajuyi. The Barracks where
the Headquarters of the Nigerian Army Armored Corps
and School is based in Bauchi is named after Major
John Obienu. NAF Majors Nzegwu and Obi have names of
streets within certain AirForce Bases named after
them. In 2001, President Obasanjo, on the other hand,
named certain streets and monuments in Abuja,
Nigeria's new capital, after the military officers who
were assassinated during mutiny-coup of January 15,
1966 - a long overdue gesture. In a separate essay,
I shall preview the outcome of the lives of some of
the key players in the January and July 1966
rebellions.
Note:
The Ironsi's crocodile
During the UN Peace-Keeping operation in the Congo (ONUC) myths were woven
around some Nigerian personalities. At that time Brigadier JTU
Aguiyi-Ironsi was an acting Major-General and commanded the entire UN
multinational force in its last six months (1964). As a Lt. Col., he had
previously commanded a battalion in 1961 (around Kivu) before being posted to
London as Defence Attache.
To be continued....
All sorts of stories gained credence among soldiers and other ranks (many of
whom were rural folk) about Ironsi's alleged ability to survive live bullets.
Like many Generals, he often carried a swagger stick, but his had a crocodile
design - likely a traditional form of artwork from the Congo. Very soon,
this innocuous ornamented baton became the focus of tales of "juju" in
various versions. The story became embellished such that it was even said
that the "swagger stick" was actually a live crocodile which served
the purpose of sucking up all ammunition fired at the General and when necessary
would mediate his disappearance from a particularly difficult situation.
These rumors were so strong that they were believed by both his admirers and
opponents. It was a factor in the way he was treated by fearful soldiers
at the Government House on July 29, 1966. It was also a factor in the
decision by some Igbos to return to the North in late August 1966 claiming that
there had been 'live sightings' of the General in Umuahia walking around with
his 'crocodile'. Since his death was not officially announced until much
later, myths took hold. Conventional wisdom was that he had disappeared
from among the soldiers who arrested him and Fajuyi and that there was nothing
to fear.
Ironsi was not the only one who had such myths woven around him. Even
Fajuyi did too, particularly after his gallantry at the head of his troops in
1960/61 in difficult situations against Katanga tribesmen.
Maimalari also had similar myths told by his admirers who were in denial about
rumors of his death in January 1966.
A similar phenomenon has been described among fans of Elvis Presley who kept
sighting him many years after he died from recreational drug overdose while
sitting on the toilet.
References: http://www.gamji.com/nowa/nowa30.htm