Omoigui, MD, FACC
...CONTINUED FROM The Bakassi Story [10/14/02]
the first installment titled "The Bakassi Story", we reviewed a very
brief summary of the history of the dispute starting from the Treaty between
England and Old Calabar in 1884 all the way through to the ICJ judgement of
October 10, 2002. Those who want
more information about the fall of Calabar should consult “Politics and
Society in South Eastern Nigeria” by KK Nair or “Old Calabar 1600-1891” by
AJH Latham. A nice summary is available in “The Fall of Nigeria – The
British Conquest” by Obaro Ikime (Heinemann, 1977).
TO THE UN PLEBISCITE
we noted previously, following the Second World War, League of Nation mandates
were replaced by UN mandates. Dr.
E. M. L. Endeley became President of the Cameroon National Federation in 1949.
At that time southern Cameroons (including Bakassi peninsula) was
administered with Nigeria. Following a dispute within the Eastern House of
Assembly in Enugu in May 1953, nine out of thirteen delegates from the Southern
Cameroons, who had originally been elected on the platform of the National
Council for Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC), opted for ‘neutrality’,
claiming that they were not Nigerian.
Mr. S. T. Muna, the only Southern Cameroonian in the Eastern Executive
Council at that time was actually dismissed.
This crisis led to the name change from “National Council for Nigeria
and the Cameroons”, as the NCNC was then known, to “National Council of
the July 1953 London Constitutional Conference, Endeley, citing fear of
“Nigerian domination”, requested the unconditional withdrawal of the
Southern Cameroons from the Eastern Region of Nigeria, and its transformation
into a separate region of its own in line with its trusteeship status. Britain
agreed and implemented separation in 1954, making the Southern Cameroons
(including Bakassi peninsula) a semi-autonomous quasi-region of the Nigeria
Federation with its own House of Assembly and Executive Council located at Buea. Endeley was called the Leader of Government
Business, not Premier, primarily because Southern Cameroons was not yet a full
region. Importantly, the Bakassi peninsula which was part of Kamerun/Cameroon
since 1913, as inherited in the league of Nations mandate after World War 1, was
also excised from co-administration with the eastern region along with the rest
of the southern Cameroons at that time. There
is no evidence that anyone made an issue of the matter then (Nigeria Gazette No.
53 vol. 41, B389-408; [D440-59]).
1955 there was a split in Endeley’s party which was then allied with the
Action Group (AG) and John Ngu Foncha emerged as his rival on the platform of
the new Kamerun National Democratic Party (KNDP).
This party’s goal was complete secession of southern Cameroons from
Nigeria and eventual reunification with Francophone Cameroun.
Endeley was accused of abandoning his former stance of pro-unification in
favor of integration with Nigeria. At about the same time the Union des
Populations Camerounaises (UPC), a Bamileke based radical leftist party in
Francophone Cameroun led by Felix Moumie was being banned by the French
Governor. As they fought a bitter
and violent guerrilla war against ruthless French troops, they would often cross
over to Bamileke sections of British Cameroons (i.e. “Nigeria”) for
mid 1957, there was a Constitutional Conference in London to resolve issues
preparatory to Nigeria’s independence which was initially proposed for a date
in 1959, but "not later than April 2, 1960."
In August that year, Tafawa Balewa became Premier in an All Nigeria
Federal Executive Council. Among
the first three Federal Ministers from the Eastern region was a gentleman called
Okoi Arikpo. He would later feature
in the post-independence Gowon government.
September 25th the Willink Commission was set up to deal with the
case of Nigerian minorities. Interestingly,
no submission was made to the panel regarding the case of Bakassi peninsula,
considered then to be part of southern Cameroons. The Willink report was
published in October 1958 – recommending against the creation of new regions
in Nigeria. Shortly thereafter the
Constitutional conference resumed in London – and once again the Bakassi issue
was not discussed, nor was the status of Calabar as a former “protectorate”
rather than “colony” as some have said, an issue.
the January 1959 southern Cameroons election (in which Bakassi residents
participated), Endeley was voted out of power and replaced by Foncha, a man with
even less disguised anti-Nigerian instincts.
In October that year, the Enugu based 1st Queens Own Nigeria
regiment (1QONR) was temporarily deployed to southern Cameroons for
“Training”. However, Bamileke
UPC sympathizers in Bamenda viewed this as a counter-insurgency deployment in
support of the hated French colonial administration.
In early 1960, responding to more violence in the area, the 1QONR again
returned to Bamenda area in full force, followed shortly thereafter by the 4QONR
from Ibadan who were deployed further south to Kumba near the coast.
The 5QONR and 3QONR later replaced both battalions respectively –
followed later by the 2QONR. These
shows of military force did not endear Nigeria to certain opinion leaders in the
October 1, 1960 Nigeria became independent.
Our first Prime Minister, Alhaji Tafawa Balewa signed an exchange of
notes with the United Kingdom saying (inter alia), that
is the understanding of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Ireland that the Government of the Federation of Nigeria agree to the
all obligations and responsibilities of the Government of the United
Kingdom which arises from any valid international instrument shall, henceforth,
in so far as such instrument may be held to have application to Nigeria, be
assumed by the Government of the Federation of Nigeria.
the rights and benefits heretofore enjoyed by the Government of the
United Kingdom in virtue of the application of any such international instrument
to Nigeria shall henceforth be enjoyed by the Government of the Federation of
customary international law, therefore, “Nigeria” inherited (and agreed
without question) all the present international boundary regimes of Nigeria –
with Dahomey (Benin), Niger, Chad and Cameroon - as originally defined by
various colonial Anglo-French and Anglo-German Treaties.
Therefore, the southern Cameroons (inclusive of the Bakassi peninsula),
which was now under separate direct British rule as a trusteeship territory,
asked Nigerian troops to leave. A
British Battalion replaced them.
1QONR, supported by the new Recce Unit of the newly independent Nigerian Army
were then deployed in an internal security precaution along the frontier to
prevent spill-over of violence. The
old Anglo-German border of 1913 was resurveyed at this time by Nigerian military
foot patrols to confirm the location of old beacons and new Police Posts were
constructed along it for clarity. [NJ Miners: The Nigerian Army 1956-1966,
Methuen 1971, page 73-74]
was against this background that most southern Cameroonians favored
self-determination – independent of BOTH Nigeria and Francophone Cameroun.
However, conflicting interests on the international scene subverted their
political will. The pan-Africanist
movement, led by Nkrumah, for example, was opposed to the emergence of small
African states. Britain was initially afraid that an allegedly economically
unviable “Southern Cameroons” would be an albatross around its taxpayers and
thus preferred that it join with large Nigeria next door.
Although southern Cameroonian leaders preferred that the plebiscite
provide a simple choice between "integration with Nigeria" or
"secession and independence", the UN imposed different
questions on the electorate. In October 1959, General Assembly Resolution 1352
XIV, composed the choices as follows:
(I) Do you wish to achieve independence by joining the independent Federation of Nigeria?
(II) Do you wish to achieve independence by joining the independent Republic of Cameroun?
popular opposition to these choices compelled both Foncha and Endeley to request
that southern Cameroons simply be granted independence.
Initial momentum in this direction and talks in London in November 1960,
however, collapsed in acrimony and the UN had its way.
In the countdown to the plebiscite, reunification with Francophone
Cameroun was marketed by well-funded Francophone groups as a loose union in
which the Southern Cameroons would maintain self-rule.
The most prominent among these pro-unification forces were elements of
the Bamileke tribe who was split by the post-World War 1 partition into British
and French territories. Its
own arrangements for independence in 1960 and infighting among its leaders in
the meantime distracted Nigeria, following the controversial federal elections
the refusal of Britain to create new regions for ethnic Nigerian minorities at
the London constitutional talks of 1958 made it easy for pro-unification forces
in southern Cameroons. They
mischievously advertised integration with Nigeria as a reunion with the Eastern
region from which it had “broken away” in 1954.
The effect of this was amplified by short-sighted Nigerian politicians
who were afraid that the integration of southern Cameroons would provide the
eastern region based NCNC with a larger geographic and political base in the
tri-regional rat race to control Nigeria.
October 1961, therefore, following the UN Plebiscite of February 11th,
the Southern Cameroons (including the Bakassi peninsula) was federated with the
Republic of Cameroun, while the Northern Cameroons joined Nigeria [
results of the plebiscite in the North were heavily influenced by the
single-mindedness, leadership and strategic genius of the Sardauna of Sokoto,
the late Alhaji Ahmadu Bello, assisted by Mr D.J.M. Muffett, then Resident
General in the Northern Cameroons. Cameroun
reacted unfavorably to it and even went to the ICJ to file a complaint that
voting was irregular. However, the complaint was not sustained.
The results in the south reflected personal, ethnic and political
rivalries within southern Nigeria and Cameroon, confusing interpretation of the
plebiscite questions on the part of villagers, background influence from
Francophone interests, and failure of the Nigerian intelligentsia and government
to appreciate the strategic implications of what was going on. It would prove to
be a costly oversight down the road.
Nigeria, perhaps not wanting to rock the boat, having successfully staved of
Cameroun’s challenge to the northern Cameroons plebiscite, voted at the UN to
approve the results of the southern Cameroons plebiscite, oblivious to certain
subtle issues of legality, due process and self-interest that were lurking in
the background. Never too comfortable with the idea, but thinking it could win
autonomy, anglophone Southern Cameroon (along with Bakassi in the southwestern
district) departed on an uncertain journey to its future with Francophone
1962, Nigeria confirmed its approval of the results of the plebiscite in a
Diplomatic Note No. 570 of March 27, 1962 to Cameroun, which included a map
showing Bakassi in the newly unified Cameroun. From then on, until the 1990s
Nigeria would have no serious administrative or military presence in the
peninsula. [Even the much-touted ‘Bakassi local government’
was only created in 1997, a full three years AFTER the case at the ICJ had
begun]. During the first republic,
in addition to the Embassy in Yaounde, however, Nigeria opened a consulate in
Buea, capital of the Southern Cameroons - now Western Cameroun. Presumably this
was in recognition of the large number of Nigerians living in the region, even
after the plebiscite.
OF AFRICAN UNITY (OAU)
1963, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was established.
Article III, paragraph 3 of the founding Charter states:
"Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state
and for its inalienable right to independent existence."
Nigeria ratified this Charter.
1964, Nigeria approved the Cairo Declaration of the Organization of African
Unity of July 1964, committing African States to the inviolability of colonial
borders. Specifically, AHG/RES
16(1) states: "Solemnly declares that all Member States pledge themselves
to respect the borders existing on their achievement of national
ratified this declaration, and by implication restated its commitment to the
Nigerian-Cameroun colonial border, as it had done in 1960 (Exchange of Notes
with the UK) and again in 1962 (Diplomatic Note 570).
AND DANARE DISPUTE
1965, a number of border incidents took place between two villages - Boudan and
Danare - near Ikom, in a forested area of the old boundary. A joint Nigeria-Cameroun
boundary demarcation team was set up and sent to the area. The late Surveyor O.A.
Aqua as well as Surveyor Dennis Mbata represented Nigeria. Cameroun was
represented, among others by late Surveyor G. Obenson (who later became a
Professor at the University of Lagos). As
had previously been confirmed in 1960, the area was well demarcated by the
colonial administration (based on the 1913 Treaty) but the beacons were too far
apart. Thus the purpose of the exercise was to place intervisible beacons along
the old 1913 boundary. This exercise was suspended on account of the military
coup of January 1966 - and never resumed until after the civil war.
late 1966, in the tense circumstances following the northern counter-rebellion
of July 29, a plane carrying weapons - allegedly ordered by Eastern region
Military Governor Lt. Col. Ojukwu - and headed for Enugu in Nigeria's eastern
region crashed over the Cameroun mountains. It remains unclear to this day
whether the crash was accidental or the plane was shot down. But Cameroun's
President Ahidjo, who was not informed beforehand of the flight's planned
overpass through Camerounian air space, was highly irritated and embarassed. He
would, from that point onwards, view the Ojukwu leadership in Eastern Nigeria -
and later Biafra - with suspicion.
the events of late 1966, but before the civil war actually broke out, Douala
airport in Cameroun was a favorite destination of foreign-based Ndigbo returning
to the Eastern region. It was also a favourite route for getting out of Nigeria
until the border areas were partially secured by federal Nigerian Troops during
the war. In late May 1967, following the mandate granted to Lt. Col. Ojukwu by
the Eastern Consultative Assembly to secede Lt. Col. Gowon created 12 new States
in Nigeria - including the South-Eastern State headed by Major U. J. Esuene, an
Ibibio officer in the Air Force. The creation of the South-Eastern State from
the former eastern region was not unnoticed across the border and was a factor
in rekindling interest in rejoining Nigeria among Efik and Ibibio residents of
Bakassi peninsula - many of whom had actually voted in 1961 not to pursue
integration with Nigeria. Indeed, Nigeria's Consul-General at Buea, SJ King,
transferred from the foreign service to his home South-Eastern State where he
later became the Permanent Secretary.
SECTOR DURING THE CIVIL WAR
In July, the Nigerian Civil War broke out - and lasted until January 1970. During the war, both Nigeria and Biafra were in an international rat race for support and recognition. Nigeria lobbied its neighbors to prevent Biafra from using their territory as either a staging point for military operations or through-put for weapons supply. Very early in the campaign a decision was made to create a vise around Biafra by attacking simultaneously from the North and the sea. During operations to take Calabar on October 17 - 19, the threat of the Bakassi peninsula being used to outflank and surprise the Nigerian task force and dominate the approach channel to the Calabar estuary became an issue, necessitating more specific diplomatic exchanges with Cameroun to clarify its intentions. The assault on Calabar ("Operation Tiger Claw"), used seven infantry battalions (8, 33, 31, 34, 35, 36 and 37), was led by Colonel Adekunle, Majors Anthony Ochefu, Ted Hamman, Ahmadu Aliyu, Ilori, and Abubakar, backed by Naval ships under Captain Soroh. It initially went well before being bogged down. Troops of the subsequently created 12 Brigade, 3rd Marine Commando under Major (later Lt. Col.) R. Aliyu, reporting to Colonel (later Brigadier) B. Adekunle, supported by naval and air bombardment, could not break out from Calabar for almost a month, only barely holding on to the town.
Ogbo Oji of the 9th battalion, 52 Biafran Bde, initially led the Biafran
resistance at Calabar (until he was badly wounded). The Brigade had no Commander
after Colonel Eze was removed in curious circumstances (Madiebo: The Nigerian
Revolution and the Biafran War, Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1980). Lt. Col. David Okafor who was later reinforced by Lt. Col.
Adigio of the 7th battalion replaced Oji. They
were both later replaced - in controversy - by Majors Odigwe and Omerua under a
newly formed 56 Brigade under Lt. Col Festus Akagha who had barely escaped - in
controversial circumstances - from the Midwestern theater. European mercenaries
later took over that front. To show
its importance to Biafra, nearly all-available ammunition - which was never
enough to begin with - was sent to that front.
Nigeria got assurances from Cameroun that the Bakassi peninsula - which
Nigeria had acknowledged as far back as 1962 was in Cameroun and, therefore,
outside its control - would not be used by hostile elements. This pre-empted
contingency plans for "hot pursuit" operations across the border and
safeguarded the rear as federal troops slowly pushed east of the Cross river
against initially determined Biafran troops who, nevertheless, were eventually
undermined by internal conflicts within the Biafran political, administrative
and military structure.
federal plan was to link up through Oban with 1st Division federal elements
coming down from Ikom against Biafran forces led by Lt. Col. Ochei.
The objective was to cut off the Biafran border point with Cameroun at
Ikang. This was finally achieved in
December. However, the road to Ikom
along with the towns of Ikot Okpara, Amolo Water Town, Mbabu Owa and Agobi-Iwolo
were not taken until the end of January 1968, courtesy of a controversial
Biafran withdrawal ordered by European mercenaries hired by Ojukwu.
Note that in his book "My Command" written by General Obasanjo
(rtd) and published by Heinemann in 1981, all the maps of that sector show the
Bakassi peninsula in Cameroun (page 93). In
his book “The Struggle for Secession, 1966-1970. Frank Cass, 1971” N.U.
Akpan, the Secretary to the Eastern Regional and later Biafran government, who
is himself of South-Eastern origin, also shows the Bakassi peninsula in Cameroun
in a map titled “Map of Eastern Nigeria declared Biafra, 30th May,
1967” (page 20). The war did not
begin until July 6th.
POLITICAL LEADERSHIP OF CAMEROUN AND ITS ATTITUDE TO THE NIGERIAN WAR
President Ahmadou Ahidjo of Cameroun was a Fulani man whose father was
originally from Kano in Nigeria. His mother was from Garoua in Cameroun. In fact
Ahidjo grew up around Yola and Mubi in Nigeria and was a playmate of Senator Iya
Abubakar. His former District Head in Nigeria, Ambassador Malabu, was made
Ambassador to Cameroun to cement the relationship. It is said that every time
late Alhaji Ahidjo saw late Alhaji Malabu he would genuflect. Thus, Nigeria
gained and sustained Cameroun's support during the civil war, not by territorial
concessions as have been widely and wrongly reported, but by manipulating
primordial links between Ahidjo and Northern Nigeria.
addition, Ahidjo and key elements in the francophone Cameroun bureaucracy were
afraid of the effect - on southern Cameroons - of a precedent for secession by
supporting Biafra. It was not
a secret that southern Cameroons had always preferred self-determination.
They were also in possession of french intelligence reports that Biafra
would someday annex the former Southern Cameroon along with Fernando Po in a
swath of territorial acquisitions in the area of the "Bight of
Biafra". Adult male
Ndigbo living in Cameroun at that time were, therefore, required every Saturday
to report to designated open fields and kept there for many hours before being
released by Police. In this manner Ahidjo kept a tight reign on their movements
and threw them off balance. Not to report usually led to unwelcome domestic
visits by Cameroun gendarmes. In supporting Biafra, France was interested in
breaking up Nigeria, the large threatening anglophone nation-state, but was not
interested in the balkanization of Cameroun which it, therefore, kept discreetly
informed of goings on inside Biafra. Such "intelligence" and
"rumors" about alleged future Biafran intentions, were never actually
officially confirmed by anyone but it played into old rivalries in the NCNC and
Eastern region going back to the days that Southern Cameroons was administered
alongside Nigeria as a Trusteeship territory.
Guinea, the country across from and next to Nigeria and Cameroun in the Gulf of
Guinea gained independence and supported the federal side in the Nigerian civil
war. The immediate effect of this was the termination of relief flights to
1969 a "Boundary Section" was established in the Federal Survey
Department of the Nigerian Federal Ministry of Works. The surveyor who was asked
to run the office as "Head of Boundaries", arrived from outside Lagos
to find that the rooms allocated to him had no chairs or desks. That was the
level of importance that "Boundaries" was given. No one knew then that
Nigeria would in due course be consumed by a bitter international boundary
dispute, not to mention all the domestic ones. Needless to say that the boundary
section soon became the databank, particularly for Nigeria’s International
boundaries and later for internal boundaries.
the war, General Gowon of Nigeria – with Ahidjo’s support - decreed that the
name “Bight of Biafra” be removed from maps of the Gulf of Guinea close to
the Nigeria-Cameroun-Equatorial Guinea border area. It was renamed “Bight of Bonny”.
raised by wartime policing of the border to prevent infiltration and
exfiltration resurrected the old quest to clarify the boundary.
It was amplified by reports that Cameroun had been exploring for Oil
along the undemarcated maritime border between both countries while Nigeria was
busy fighting its civil war. A
meeting of the Nigeria-Cameroun Boundary Commission, therefore, took place at
Yaounde, Cameroun from August 12-14. The Nigerian Ambassador as well as the
Cameroun Foreign Minister opened the meeting. However, they both subsequently
left and ceded authority to technical experts from the Surveys, Fisheries, Navy,
Immigration, Justice, External Affairs, Cabinet Office etc. departments of both
countries. The most senior Nigerian civil servant present who thus led the
delegation was Chief R. Oluwole Coker, Director of Federal Surveys. The
SouthEastern State (now Cross-River and Aqua Ibom) was strongly represented by
technical and legal experts from the State Government.
Neither General Gowon nor Alhaji Ahidjo was present.
the draft agenda submitted by Nigeria for consideration included fresh physical
and administrative considerations for delimiting the boundary, after
considerable deliberation, the joint commission agreed to use the 1913
Anglo-German Treaty. The
South-Eastern delegation for instance, had initially brought cartons of tax
receipts paid by residents of Bakassi area to the Nigerian government as a way
to make a claim over the peninsula. However,
it later became apparent that the same residents also paid taxes to the Cameroun
authorities. Many had homes on both
sides of the border. They even had
fishing villages with precisely the same name on both sides of the border.
both sides agreed to demarcate the border in three sectors, beginning with the
the Nigerian delegation got back to Nigeria, interested parties, unsatisfied
with the decision to use the 1913 Treaty as the legal paradigm (and unaware that
the Balewa government had long settled this issue), approached the Foreign
Minister, Dr. Okoi Arikpo. Arikpo, a sophisticated anthropologist and lawyer,
who was himself from South-Eastern state, asked then Attorney General Teslim
Elias for a formal legal opinion on the matter to guide him in making
recommendations to the Head of State, General Yakubu Gowon. The Nigerian Mission
at the UN was also contacted to clarify whether residents of the Bakassi
peninsula had taken part in the 1961 plebiscite. On September 3rd, 1970 Teslim
Elias, Nigeria's Attorney General who was also a Professor of Law at the
University of Lagos and former academician at Oxford University, wrote his
landmark legal opinion [http://www.gamji.com/nowa43.htm]. Unambiguously, he
stated "This Ministry has given a most careful consideration to the whole
question in the light of all the available evidence, and the conclusion is that
there is no legal basis for Nigeria’s claims to the Bakasi peninsula for the
reasons stated herein........According to the information received from the
Federal Directorate of Surveys, the Bakasi Peninsula has never been included as
part of Nigeria in the administrative maps of Nigeria since the then Southern
Cameroons ceased to be part of Nigeria in 1961. Also, the Northern Region,
Western Region and Eastern Region (Definition of Boundaries) proclamation 1954
(L. N. 126 of 154) showed the Bakasi Peninsula as forming part of the then
Southern Cameroons. Moreover, by a Diplomatic Note No, 570 of March 27, 1962,
from your ministry to the embassy of the Cameroons in Lagos, to which was
attached a map prepared by the Federal Surveys, Nigeria recognized the Bakasi
Peninsula as forming part of the Cameroons."
Arikpo supported Elias and recommended that Gowon not pursue the
peninsula itself as an issue during boundary meetings with Ahidjo. Gowon was
advised to focus on the maritime border - as defined by the 1913 Anglo-German
Treaty - whenever he eventually met with Ahidjo. That is what Gowon did.
the UN plebiscite report arrived from New York - accompanied by a ward and
polling station map - showing villages in the peninsula as locations of polling
stations during the 1961 plebiscite. In fact a majority of residents there voted
- along with the rest of southern Cameroons - not to join Nigeria.
This political information merely confirmed the legal views of those who
felt the matter should not be pursued. (Note
that there is no such thing as a “Bakassi Village”.
Bakassi is an area. Without
a map one would not know which villages fall where.
In interpreting it, the migrant nature of the fishing settlements should
also be noted.)
THE 1913 TREATY AS A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS
the Nigerian Ministry of Justice declared that the 1913 treaty was the legal
context for boundary discussions with Cameroun, and the Ministry of External
Affairs concurred, everything else was subordinated to that legal opinion.
Therefore, I strongly advise readers who want to understand what transpired
under Gowon, not to read this section without first reading the 1913
Anglo-German Treaty and reviewing a map.
Researchers in the Boundaries section of Surveys looking for technical guidance in interpreting the 1913 treaty searched many sources as well as Nigeria's National Archives Libraries for material. It turns out that then Dr. John R. Victor Prescott, now a Professor Emeritus at the University of Melbourne in Australia, used to be a Surveyor at Federal Surveys in Nigeria and later a lecturer in Geography at the University of Ibadan from 1956-61. He wrote a PhD thesis titled "The evolution of Nigeria's political boundaries", a copy of which was deposited at the University of Ibadan library. Most of the original PhD work can be found in the following book:
J.R.V., 1971: The Evolution of Nigeria's International & Regional Boundaries
1961-1971. (B.C. Geog. Series No.13), Vancouver: Tantalus Research Ltd.
had predicted that there would be considerable difficulty in determining the
navigable channel of the Nigeria-Cameroun maritime boundary in accordance with
the 1913 treaty.
to a "Dictionary of Geography" published by the Oxford University
Press, the german word "thalweg" (also written "talwec" or
"talweg") refers to "the line of the fastest flow along the
course of a river" which usually crosses and recrosses the stream channel.
From a geological point of view it refers to "the line defining the lowest
points along the length of a river bed or valley or subterranean stream".
In other words, the deepest part of a river or channel or lowest point of a
channel section is the thalweg. The thalweg affects the distribution of
sediments in a river because it gathers sediments from the bank on one side and
deposits them on the other side, forming point bars where the sediments are
deposited. With time it may even change the course of the river. These
principles explain why the 1913 Treaty contain the following provisions:
Should the thalweg of the Lower Akwayafe, upstream from the line Bakasi
Point-King Point, change its position in such a way as to affect the relative
positions of the thalweg and the Mangrove Islands, a new adjustment of the
boundary shall be made, on the basis of the new positions, as determined by a
map to be made for the purpose.
Should the lower course of the Akwayafe so change its mouth as to transfer it to
the Rio del Rey, it is agreed that the area now known as the Bakasi Peninsula
shall still remain German territory. The same condition applies to any portion
of territory now agreed to as being British, which may be cut off in a similar
the foregoing it is easy to see how the definition of a thalweg can be
problematic, particularly if there are seasonal changes in the size of the
river. During the dry season, for example, when water volume shrinks, the
residual channel may be assymmetrically located away from the middle of the
river valley. Indeed there is a case of a boundary river in Adamawa State which
changed course. Because the specifications of the boundary at that point did not
contain provisions for such an eventuality (as was written into the detailed
negotiations for Bakassi peninsula), the Camerounians hurried to plant crops on
the former riverbed to prevent it from redirecting itself. In the case of the
Nigeria-Cameroun maritime border (based on the 1913 Treaty), the Akpa Yafe river
is east of the Calabar Estuary into which both the Calabar and Cross rivers
empty. It is a small river, which intersects with the Calabar estuary low down
near where the estuary empties into the Gulf of Guinea. Ordinarily, if there is
only one approach channel to the Calabar estuary and if the position of that
approach channel does not change either seasonally or after major storms, a good
way to determine the location of the channel is on the basis of morphology (to
account for sediment shift). However, when one is dealing with a river per se,
the thalweg or deepest continuous channel used by vessels is typically used to
determine the boundary. A thalweg can also be used for an approach channel if
there are dangerous shoal waters on either side of it.
one combines the effect of three different rivers emptying into an estuary,
however, the question of dominant flow enters the equation. The flow channels of
the dominant rivers (Calabar and Cross) shift that of the smaller river (Akpa
Yafe) away. Thus, the true thalweg of the Akpa Yafe is very close to the banks
of the Bakassi peninsula. The British knew this when they specified in the 1913
From the centre of the navigable channel on a line joining Bakasi Point and King
Point, the boundary shall follow the centre of the navigable channel of the
Akwayafe River as far as the 3-mile limit of territorial jurisdiction. For the
purpose of defining this boundary, the navigable channel of the Akwayafe River
shall be considered to lie wholly to the east of the navigable channel of the
Cross and Calabar Rivers."
fact, as far back as 1907 the Germans had requested for the frontier to be
continued out to sea after reaching the mouth of the Akwa Yafe, all the way to
“the middle of the channel of the mouth of the Old Calabar River”.
The British, (according to minutes made by a colonial official by the
name Strachey) refused this request and told the Germans the line should follow
the shore of the Bakassi peninsula along the thalweg of the Akwa Yafe when the
actual mouth of that river was reached. In
exchange for not insisting on the impingement of the Calabar river channel the
British agreed to abrogate Article 3 of the old Anglo-German agreement of April
14, 1893 which had prevented the Germans from establishing trading settlements
on the Bakassi peninsula proper.
those interested, a detailed discussion of tidal waters can be found in the
book: " 'Water boundaries' by George M.Cole (1997) John Wiley: New York.
it did not feature during the negotiations, the innocuous phrases in the 1913
Treaty, which read "XXI.
From the centre of the navigable channel on a line joining Bakasi Point and King
Point, the boundary shall follow the centre of the navigable channel of the
Akwayafe River as far as the 3-mile limit of territorial jurisdiction." and
"XXII. The 3-mile limit shall, as regards the mouth of the estuary,
be taken as a line 3 nautical miles seaward of a line joining Sandy Point and
Tom Shot Point" can potentially be controversial if taken out of context.
As far back as 1903, European sailors had commented on the changing
nature and position of the coastline. The exact location of the Bakasi, King,
Sandy and Tom Shot points, therefore, were subject to change with time. In the
days before Global Positioning System (GPS) Technology, the location of rivers
and points was based on British Admiralty maps, updated at regular intervals.
Any clarification with regard to the original treaty, therefore, would be
meaningless if taken out of context of the original maps that accompanied the
October 1970, a joint meeting of the Committee of Experts from Nigeria and
Cameroun took place in Lagos, Nigeria. It was a tough meeting that ended with no
agreement on how to define the "navigable channel" of the Akpa Yafe
river up to where it joins the Calabar estuary, particularly since no Admiralty
map expressly delineated the navigable channel of the Akpa Yafe.
On the Nigerian side, the Nigerian delegation took the position that the
navigable channel of the Akpa Yafe river had to be seen to lie wholly east of
the channel of the Calabar and Cross-Rivers - as was stated in the Treaty.
Therefore, since the larger Calabar Estuary was bound to displace the flow of
the smaller Akpa Yafe river eastward toward the Bakassi shore, the maritime
boundary up to the 3-nautical mile limit had to be much closer to the
Camerounian Bakassi coast than to the Nigerian Calabar Estuary coast.
This is precisely what the British had originally intended when they
signed the treaty with Germany in exchange for ceding the peninsula.
though, the Head of Boundaries, who was nicknamed "The Hawk" by Okoi
Arikpo, did not have the support of higher authority at Federal Surveys who felt
that a compromise should be reached with Cameroun to allow negotiations proceed.
This internal technical disagreement within the Federal Surveys - which
would cost Nigeria several miles of maritime territory in the estuary and beyond
- did not come to the attention of General Gowon until it was too late.
April 1971, there was a summit meeting of General Gowon of Nigeria and Alhaji
Ahmadou Ahidjo of Cameroun in Yaounde. The Head of Boundaries did not attend the
meeting. It was at this meeting that Gowon and Ahidjo agreed to define the
navigable channel of the Akpa Yafe River up to Point 12. When Ahidjo asked his
Camerounian survey expert to stop arguing and told Gowon to draw the line where
he wanted it, Gowon turned to his own technical expert for guidance. The expert
marked a point on the map and Gowon drew the line toward that point.
Unfortunately, the line Gowon drew - on direct advice from the Director of
Federal Surveys - was not the true navigable channel of the Akpa Yafe river. Not
only did it run right into a ridge, the line criss-crossed the navigable
channels of the Calabar and Cross rivers, which the British had intended (with
German agreement) to be completely on the Nigerian side, west of the Akpa Yafe
channel. See Article XXI "...For the purpose of defining this boundary,
the navigable channel of the Akwayafe River shall be considered to lie wholly to
the east of the navigable channel of the Cross and Calabar Rivers".
Gowon and Ahidjo signed on both sides of the 3-mile line.
The line is what is referred to in the ICJ judgement as the
that he had stared down Ahidjo and negotiated a good deal, Gowon returned to
Nigeria initially unaware of the error.
months later in June, the Joint Boundary Commission met in Lagos, led by Chief
Coker for Nigeria and Mr. Ngo for Cameroun. They extended the already faulty
Gowon-Ahidjo "compromise line" outwards to sea in what is now known as
the Coker-Ngo line. Among those in the delegation were honorable Justice Sam
Endeley of Cameroun, Mr. SG Ukot, Permanent Secretary and Solicitor-General,
South-Eastern State, Mr. Jemiyo, Principal State Counsel, Federal Ministry of
Justice, Lagos, etc. The Head of
Boundaries at Federal Surveys – who was not on the delegation for the Yaounde
meeting - was back this time. Other
prominent experts from the Federal and SouthEastern State civil services were
also in attendance.
few weeks later, following the signing of the Coker-Ngo line, murmurs of
disapproval began filtering in through back channels and Gowon finally
discovered what had transpired. Thereafter, the Director of Federal Surveys was
not allowed to take part in Nigeria-Cameroun boundary negotiations until Gowon
left office in July 1975. The Head of Boundaries took over his technical role as
the principal government adviser at international summits involving both Heads
August, Nigerian experts, seeking ways to undo the damage visited Calabar and
toured the area in a Survey ship carefully taking measurements and looking for
low water marks based on certain provisions of the Law of the Sea.
May 1972, the joint boundary commission met, followed in August 1972 by a summit
meeting at Garoua - hometown in Cameroun of President Ahidjo's mother. At Garoua,
General Gowon tried repeatedly without success to get Ahidjo to agree to the
reversal and renegotiation of the Gowon-Ahidjo/Coker-Ngo line.
Earlier on, on May 20,
1972, Ahidjo had dissolved the federal structure of Cameroun and proposed a new
constitution. Cameroun became the
United Republic of Cameroon, a move which obliterated all pretenses about
Francophone intentions in former Anglophone Cameroon.
in December 1972, Frederick Forsythe, the former BBC reporter, got involved in
an unsuccessful 100,000 pound sterling scheme to take over Fernando Po Island
(across from the Bakassi peninsula), using mercenaries and former Biafran
soldiers, overthrow Macias Nguema and make Emeka Ojukwu the Head of State of
Equatorial Guinea. This was the historical basis of his 'fictional' book
"The Dogs of War." The Spanish Ministry of Defence foiled the plan –
which would quite certainly have invited a military response from Nigeria if it
had succeeded. [See the UK
Sunday Times, April 16, 1978; or Randall Fegley: Equatorial Guinea: An African
Tragedy (American University Studies. Series XI: Anthropology and Sociology, Vol
39) Peter Lang Publishing, 1989]
1973, the specification for the topographical mapping of Lake Chad area for the
Lake Chad Basin Commission was drawn up at Ndjamena, in Chad. The geographical
issue was the gradual reduction in the volume of the Lake forcing villagers to
move their fishing villages with the Lake - and by implication across old
1974, at the Head of States’ summit meeting in Kano, information was received
from the Nigerian delegation that Cameroun had established an oil rig near the
disputed channel. Somewhat embarrassingly, the construction of this rig has been
done in the full view of Nigerian Naval Boats on their way to and from Calabar -
but no-one bothered to investigate the nationality of the rig let alone report
it to higher authorities. Gowon tried unsuccessfully to get Ahidjo to remove the
rig - in what has been described by those present as a very fierce argument.
Obviously Ahidjo wanted to use the rig to stake a maritime claim and force the
maritime boundary westwards (towards Nigeria) in the outer sea. (One reason he
refused to budge was because he had “conceded” to Gowon back in April 1971).
Eventually, a highly reluctant compromise - short of war - was reached.
A small kink (or deflection) was made along the maritime boundary to
accommodate the rig but the line was then course corrected and extended
southwards to point G along the original angle (as if the rig was not there). An
arrow was placed at its end to make it a vector - to prevent Ahidjo from
constructing any further rigs across the yet unmarked boundary further south or
altering the axis of the maritime border – as the Camerounian legal team
desperately tried to do at the ICJ. The Camerounian effort failed because the
ICJ sustained the directionality of that subtle and farsighted arrow drawn
during the Kano meeting preceding Maroua, when it extended the border southwards
to the Equatorial Guinea line.
line stopped at point G only because the particular admiralty map that was
available did not extend further southwards.
It was also understood that Equatorial Guinea would have to be brought in
as the boundary moved southwards towards its sphere of influence.
that this tiny kink on the map around the oil rig, which conceded a tiny part of
Nigerian maritime territory to Cameroun, proved to be highly controversial
within the government and was the original source of the story that Gowon
“gave Bakassi” to Cameroun. Military
intelligence operatives amplified this story in the months before Gowon was
overthrown in order to undermine his legitimacy.
In truth, the maritime error began in 1971 – and as I have said before
- had nothing to do with the peninsula itself.]
June 1975, at Maroua in Cameroun, just over a month before his overthrow as
Nigeria's Head of State, Gowon and Ahidjo signed the maritime border up to point
G. As previously noted, the
vector of this line (implied by the previously noted arrow) was sustained by the
ICJ judgement of 2002 in extending the maritime border up to the
Nigeria-Equatorial-Guinea line. By so doing, a disputed triangle of oil
exploration near the Cameroun-Nigeria-Equatorial Guinea tri-border has been
granted to Nigeria. Thus, the
Maroua declaration of Gowon and Ahidjo turned out to be beneficial from that
standpoint – although most commentators seem to have missed this point.
should be noted, however, that once the original 3-mile ‘navigable channel’
maritime borderline of 1971 was in error, it affected subsequent negotiations up
to 1975. The Maroua line was
actually an exercise in damage control. If
the 3-mile line had indeed followed the shore of the Bakassi peninsula as the
1913 Treaty originally intended, the extension out to sea would have granted
Nigeria even more maritime territory. Nigeria
had the opportunity to challenge that line at the ICJ since the line violated
the 1913 treaty. However, she
did not because Nigeria went to the ICJ challenging the 1913 Anglo-German Treaty
itself (which Balewa accepted in 1960) and asking, instead, by implication, for
reliance on a previous 1893 Anglo-German Treaty, which identified the
“Rio-del-Rey River” as the border. She
predicated her entire maritime case at the ICJ on ownership of (or sovereignty
over) the Bakassi peninsula itself – on the basis of effectivities.
Nigeria, therefore, proposed another maritime line entirely, much further
eastwards on the other side of the peninsula along the navigable channel of the
Rio del Rey. By
predictably losing the high-risk, high stakes peninsula argument, Nigeria has by
default legally sustained the original erroneous 3-mile line (of 1971) and its
unavoidable extension out to sea (in 1975) both of which could have been
successfully challenged based on the wording of the 1913 Treaty.
Part of the underlying problem is the political pressure on the
government by both genuinely aggrieved people as well as mischief-makers to
“take back” or “claim” the peninsula proper, irrespective of previous
international legal commitments. It
is important to appreciate that when the Germans gained the Bakassi peninsula
from Britain in 1913 they “lost” a huge chunk of the inland parts of modern
Cross-River State of Nigeria. Most
Ekoi-speaking people of Nigeria used to be on the German side of the 1893 border
before Germany ceded them to Britain. I
have often wondered whether declaring the 1913 Treaty null and void – and thus
re-uniting the Efik - may open up controversies about other sections of the
border further north near Ikom in Ekoi speaking areas.
Would Ikom become Camerounian territory in that scenario?
July 29, 1975 General Gowon was overthrown in a coup.
The new regime decided to question the 1971 and 1975 Gowon-Ahidjo
maritime agreements – without really understanding the issues.
In no time the country got the impression that Gowon had given away the
“Bakassi peninsula”, an unfortunate and totally false notion which persists
in many quarters to this day. Many
commentators still do not understand the difference between the maritime and
land components of the dispute. Nor
do many realize that the peninsula had been ceded by a series of actions and
inactions beginning as far back as 1913, reconfirmed when Nigeria became
independent in 1960, finalized with the 1961 plebiscite and affirmed with the
1964 OAU declaration. That was the
geopolitical reality when Lt. Col. Gowon came to power in 1966.
late 1975, some Nigerian migrant workers were executed at the Nigerian Embassy
in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, allegedly prompting then Head of State General
Murtala Muhammed to order planning and preparation for an invasion and
subsequent annexation, which was eventually put off. (International Herald
Tribune, February 28, 1976)
Nigerian National Atlas was first published, again showing the Bakassi peninsula
in Cameroun - as all maps since 1961 had shown.
The forward was written and signed by then Lt. General Obasanjo, then
Head of State, who succeeded General Muhammed after the coup of February 1976
Chief R. O. Coker (of the Coker-Ngo Line) retired from the civil service in
1978. He was the recipient of a National Award from the Obasanjo-1 government in
1979 for meritorious service.
1979 constitution made no mention of a “Bakassi Local Government.” In any case local governments as listed in the present 1999
constitution do not have their borders defined by standard coordinates.
They are merely listed.
his book “Diplomatic Soldiering, Spectrum Books, 1987” which discusses the
conduct of Nigerian foreign Policy from 1975 – 79, late General Joe Garba,
then the Foreign Minister, describes several incidents of “rough handling of
Nigerians in the small fishing villages along the porous borders. The discovery of offshore oil in the area of Rio del Rey only
compounded our problems.” Garba
resisted the temptation to use force.” I
was convinced that Nigeria’s African policies would be seriously damaged if we
took any retaliatory action against border violations by either Cameroun or
Chad. Quiet bilateral diplomacy was the best course with essentially local
problems that were bound to keep recurring.”
Shagari government which came to office in October 1979, also refused to
recognize the “Coker-Ngo” line. However,
the Nigerian Ports Authority, oblivious to the sensitive nature of the Calabar
channel controversy and its effect on the definition of Nigeria's maritime
border, had begun dredging a new channel further west of the one in place at the
time of the 1913 treaty. They
placed a new line of buoys nearer the Nigerian side sometime between 1976 and
1982. The old channel is, therefore, no longer shown on the admiralty chart No.
3433 in the 1978 and 1982 editions. Those
unfamiliar with the history of the Cross-Calabar-Akwa Yafe river channel
controversy may thus be lulled into underestimating the error of the 3-mile
compromise line of 1971 and its Coker-Ngo extension particularly if they use the
new channel as the frame of reference.
the 1913 Treaty states:
Nothing in this Agreement shall prevent British or German vessels, whether
public or private, from using the most convenient course between the open sea
and the Akwayafe River, and from navigating that river without any differential
The marking, dredging, or buoying of the navigable channel of the Akwayafe River
from the 3-mile limit landward may be carried out, after agreement between the
two Governments, either by the German or British Government, or by both.
The marking, dredging, or buoying of the navigable channels of the Cross and
Calabar Rivers from the 3-mile limit landward shall be carried out by the
British Government at the discretion of that Government.
since the new channel on Cross/Calabar River is man-made, it does not preclude
the use of the disused channel for purposes of negotiation
May 16, 1981 Nigerian soldiers in three canoes were ambushed and killed by
Camerounian soldiers [Shehu Shagari: Beckoned to Serve", Heinemann 2001,
page 358]. Nigeria said the
incident took place on the Akpa Yafe (along the 1913 border) while Cameroun said
it took place on the Rio del Rey deep inside Cameroun on the other side of the
peninsula. Eventually, on July 20,
1981, Cameroun apologized, based presumably on the Nigerian insistence that
it’s soldiers were on the Akpa Yafe (although there are some who still feel to
this day they were actually on the Rio-del-Rey).
Nigeria did not press the case then that even if the soldiers had
been killed along the Rio-del-Rey, Cameroun still owed an apology, thus
signalling that the Shagari government – at least subconsciously –
recognized the 1913 Treaty as all previous governments had done.
Treaty considerations aside, African countries ought to avoid unnecessary
bloodshed over frivolous borders drawn by white men.
May 12, 1982 Professor Geoffrey Marston, LLB, LLM, Ph.D., of Cambridge
University, submitted a detailed report commissioned by Nigeria, to then
Attorney General and Minister of Justice, Chief ROA Akinjide representing the
government of President Shehu Shagari. The Professor advised that:
boundary regime established by the Anglo-German Agreements of 13 March 1913 and
6 July 1914 is binding on both Nigeria and Cameroun by virtue of a rule of
customary international law reflected in Article 11 of the Vienna Convention on
Succession of States in respect of Treaties, 1978, as well as in the Declaration
of the Organization of African Unity of July 1964 and, in respect of Nigeria,
the Exchange of Notes with the United Kingdom of 1 October 1960. This regime
cannot thus be abrogated or modified unilaterally by either Nigeria or Cameroun."
point of view was in line with the opinion of Teslim Elias back in 1970. No decisive action – except co-locating Nigerian Oil rigs
in the area and freely navigating the approaches to AkpaYafe - appears to have
been taken on the maritime aspects of the report until the government left
office in December 1983. Such
actions could have included any one of the following options, singly or in
Accept the 1975 Gowon/Ahidjo boundary line because of the benefits of its
Insist, backed by force, on the boundary line being moved at least to the
longitude of Point 12 on chart 3433 in order to be totally clear of the
traditional channel of Cross/ Calabar Rivers. The implication of this would have
been to accept part (but not all) of the Gowon/Ahidjo Agreement. Nigeria should
have declared its intention to dredge the old channel in accordance with
Articles 21 and 25 of the 1913 Treaty.
Reject the Gowon/Ahidjo Agreement altogether from Bakasi Point/King Point and
insist on fresh negotiations as a matter of urgency. For this option to have any meaning Nigeria would have had to
show physical presence in the area.
Move into the maritime area south of Point 20 to prevent Cameroun from taking
the initiative in oil exploration and exploitation in the area.
Delineate a zone of interest in the Exclusive Economic Zone vis-à-vis Camerouns,
Equatorial Guinea and Sao Tome Principe.
Realising that Cameroun is normally uncompromising in negotiations, Nigeria
should take a decisive stand in the area, considering its strategic and economic
however, according to former President Shagari,
relations between our two countries grew from strength to strength while the
border dispute was carefully buried in files, maps and legal documents.”
is possible that the departure from office in November
1982 of Cameroun President Ahidjo, allegedly after being tricked by his
physician about the state of his health, could have contributed to this
“improvement” in Nigeria-Cameroun relations. He eventually died in exile in
November 1989. However, the evil
day was only being postponed and the Nigerian public grew increasingly
misinformed about the details of the dispute, confusing the maritime aspects
with the land aspect.
the former President observed in his memoirs that minor border incidents
occurred with other countries neighboring Nigeria.
complicated the Cameroonian case, however, was that many Nigerians reside in
Cameroonian territory where they spend part of their lives to fish or farm.
While there in search of livelihood, they often criss-cross the
boundaries. Also fishermen and traders did not bother about the actual
position of the borders, while in the territorial waters of each of the two
countries, until they were advised or confronted as the case may be.”
would seem therefore, that at least as far as the land border is
concerned, President Shagari and the Nigerian government had no illusions about
the location (i.e. per the 1913 Treaty). The
problem seemed to be caused by those local villagers who did not know where the
borderlines really were.
BBC's Omer Songwe has just visited the Cameroonian side of Bakassi and says that
95% of the people in the area are Nigerians. "But they are ready to abide by the laws of
Cameroon... and feel that the ruling of the ICJ should be respected," he
said. “ [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/2361693.stm]
The Bakassi Story: Diplomatic Note No. 570 of 1962
TO BE CONTINUED
Some Useful References
1. Arrangement between Great Britain and Germany, relative to their respective Spheres of Action in portions of Africa (coast of Guinea; Cameroons: Victoria, Ambas Bay: Santa Lucia Bay; Coast between Natal and Delagoa Bay; Customs; and etc.), April-June, 1885. British and Foreign State Papers (BFSP, Vol. 76, 1884-5, pp. 772-778.
2. Arrangement between Great Britain and Germany, supplementary to the Arrangement of April-June 1885, relative to the respective Spheres of Action of the two countries in the Gulf of Guinea. London, July-August, 1886. BFSP, Vol. 77, 1885-6, pp. 1049.
3. Agreement between Great Britain and Germany, respecting Zanzibar, Heligoland, and the Spheres of Influence of the two countries in Africa. Signed at Berlin, July 10, 1890. BFSP, Vol 92, 1899-1900, pp. 35-47.
4. Agreement between Great Britain and Germany, respecting the Rio del Rey on the West Coast of Africa. Signed at Berlin, April 14, 1893. BFSP, Vol. 85, 1892-3, pp. 38-39.
5. Agreement between Great Britain and Germany, respecting Boundaries in Africa. Signed at Berlin, November 15, 1893. BFSP, Vol. 85, 1892-3, pp. 41-43.
6. Agreement between Great Britain and Germany respecting the Boundary between British and German Territories from Yola to Lake Chad (Nigeria and Cameroons). Signed at London, March 19, 1906, BFSP, vol. 99, 1905-6, pp. 366-370; also United Kingdom Treaty Series No. 17 (1906), Cd. 3260 (with 4 maps).
7. Exchange of Notes between the United Kingdom and Germany confirming Protocols defining Boundaries between British and German Territories in Africa: (1) Gorege to Lake Chad (February 12, 1907), (2) Uba to the Maio Tiel (March 11, 1907). February 22-March 5, 1909. Treaty Series No. 17 (1909). Command (Cd) 4699 (with map).
8. Agreement between Great Britain and Germany respecting (1) the Settlement of the Frontier between Nigeria and the Cameroons, from Yola to the Sea; and (2) the Regulation of Navigation on the Cross River. Signed at London, March 11, 1913. BFSP. Vol. 106, 1913, pp. 782-787; also Treaty Series No. 13 (1913). United Kingdom Cd. 7056 (with maps).
9. Detzner, V.H., "Die Nigerische Grenze von Kamerun Zwischen Yola und dem Cross-Fluss," Mitteilungen aus den deutschen Schutzgebeiten, Band XXVI (1913), pp. 317-38.
10. Nugent, W.V., "The Geographical Results of the Nigeria-Kamerun Boundary Demarcation Commission," Geographical Journal, 1914, pp. 630-51.
11. British Mandates for the Cameroons, Togoland and East Africa. January, 1923. United Kingdom Command (Cmd.) 1794.
12. British Order in Council providing for the Administration of the Mandated Territory of the British Cameroons. London, June 26, 1923. BFSP, Vol. 117, 1923, pp. 60-63.
13. Declaration made by the Governor of the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria and the Governor of the French Camerooms defining the Boundary between British and French Cameroons. France No. 2 (1930), United Kingdom Cmd. 3612.
14. Exchange of Notes between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the French Government respecting the Boundary between British and French Cameroons. London, January 9, 1931. Treaty Series No. 34 (1931), United Kingdom Cmd. 3936 (with map).
15. Order in Council providing for the Administration of the Nigeria Protectorate and Cameroons under British Mandate. London, August 2, 1946. BFSP, vol. 146, 1946, pp. 298-303.
1. Afrique Centrals (Republique Federale Cameroun): Scale 1:50, 000; published 1965-6 by Institut Geographique National (Paris and Brazzaville); sheets NC-33-XX-2b (Mora), NC-33-XIV-4c-4d (Mokolo), NC-33-XIV-4a (Mokolo), NC-33-XIV-2c (Mokolo), and NC-33-XIV-1b (Mokolo).
2. Republiques du Niger et du Tchad: scale 1:200,000; Published 1959 by Institut Geographique National (Service Geographique a Brazzaville); sheet ND-33-VIII (Boso).
3. Afrique Centrale (Republique du Tchad, Republique Federale du Cameroun); scale 1:200,000; published 1966 by Institut Geographique National (Annexe a Brazzaville; sheets ND-33-IX (Bol) and ND-33-III (Makari).
4. Nigeria: scale 1:500,000; published 1960 by Federal Surveys, Nigeria: sheets 4, 8, 12, 11, and 15 (indicates demarcation pillars).
5. Republique Federale du Cameroun: scale 1:500,000; published 1964-67 by Institut Geographique National (Annexe de Yaounde): sheets Nkambe (NB-32/33-N.O.,), Garoua (NC-33/34-SO), and Maroua (NC-33/34-NO).