Nigeria:
The Palace Coup of November 17, 1993 (Part 2)
By
Dr.
Nowa Omoigui
nowa_o@yahoo.com
The
complex military intrigues associated with the Sani Abacha led Palace coup of
November 17, 1993 and its aftermath reminds me of three lines in Chapter IV of
"The Art of War" by the Chinese Military Philosopher Sun
Tzu, under 'TACTICAL DISPOSITIONS':
“1.
Sun Tzu said: The good fighters of old first put themselves beyond the
possibility of defeat, and then waited for an opportunity of defeating the
enemy.
2.
To secure ourselves against defeat lies in our own hands, but the opportunity of
defeating the enemy is provided by the enemy himself.
15.
Thus it is that in war the victorious strategist only seeks battle after the
victory has been won, whereas he who is destined to defeat first fights and
afterwards looks for victory.”
When
Major General Ibrahim Babangida came to power after the Palace Coup of August
1985, he rewarded then Major General Sani Abacha, GOC of the Army’s 2nd
Division with the position of Chief of Army Staff - the position from which
Babangida had launched himself into power.
Abacha reportedly negotiated for this position as a condition for
supporting the coup. [https://www.gamji.com/nowa33.htm
]
However,
Abacha was not well regarded professionally.
He was thought of as a very dull officer, who was prone to late coming,
disliked staff meetings, kept odd hours, enjoyed exclusive private parties and
loved entertaining himself with curious personal interests.
There were rumors that he had not made it out of the Staff College at
Jaji with honor, that some of his old confidential reports were much below par
and that he had been saved on several occasions from retirement during his
military career. One such occasion was a controversial bloody clash with the
Police when he was the Brigade Commander in Port Harcourt in the late seventies.
Nevertheless, he was a key coup conspirator in December 1983 and August
1985 - which is what counted in the Nigerian Army of that era.
According
to sources, soon after he became Army Chief in 1985 one of the first things he
did was intimidate many local and foreign Army contractors into arrangements
from which he would benefit personally.
Some of those who met him then say he seemed to be driven by a fanatical
desire to compete financially with his rival and protégé, General Babangida,
who had been the immediate past holder of that office.
A source told me that Abacha - without providing any evidence - had a
mental fixation that Babangida was very wealthy and that he (Abacha) could also
be wealthy if contractors “do for me as you did for him”.
The dysfunctional manifestations of this rivalry dogged Abacha throughout
his career as a Service Chief and later Head of State.
Allegedly he always felt that he needed to stash away huge sums of money
as a way to guarantee his personal security.
It remains unclear to this day why he felt that way.
He
was also very state-security conscious and regularly took a hard line against
soldiers suspected of disloyalty. He
was party to the decision to execute General Vatsa and others in March 1986 - in
spite of numerous domestic and foreign pleas - and was not happy when the charge
against Major Akinyemi was changed from ‘Treason’ to ‘treasonable
felony’. His displeasure was that
the lesser charge guaranteed that even if guilty he would not be executed.
(Never a man to forget old grudges, he stubbornly refused to release the
Major from Prison ten years later, even after he completed his sentence!)
In
time, Abacha’s poor management skills and lack of professional respect
undermined him with the caucus of junior and middle ranking officers that
brought Babangida to power. As the
Chief of Army Staff, he was even allegedly personally insulted by then Major
Sambo Dasuki, a one-time ADC to the President - an incident that eventually led
to the Major’s first “protective exile” to the United States on course.
Clamour began that Abacha be removed as Army Chief to make way for a more
professionally sound officer. I
vividly recall an officer (now late) tell me back then that “Abacha is
spoiling the Army.” Naturally, once his blood was sensed in the water, other
ambitious senior Army Officers began eyeing his job, notably Brigadier (later
Major General) Joshua Dogonyaro who had also been a key insider in the coup that
propelled Babangida to power. Not
far behind were other Officers of the Regular One- (1) course at the Nigerian
Defence Academy who felt that their time had come to take over the leadership of
the Army from foreign-trained Officers. Such
Regular One Officers included Saliu Ibrahim, Aliyu Gusau, Oladipo Diya, etc.
Abacha’s
reaction to all this was to accuse Babangida of deliberately underfunding the
Army so as to make him (Abacha) unpopular with the troops.
Things were bad enough at one stage that a secret meeting of insiders
outside the context of the Armed Forces Ruling Council had to be held at Ikeja
Cantonment to smooth things over. Sources
claim special financial arrangements were made to placate Abacha and allay his
suspicions, while alternative mechanisms - like adhoc Task Forces - were
later created to ensure that funds actually reached operational units, bypassing
the Ministry of Defence.
Nevertheless,
clamour continued for Abacha’s removal. Eventually, General Babangida
concocted a dicey two step scheme to do so.
The scheme involved the initial removal of Lt. General Domkat Bali as
concurrent Chairman, Joint Chiefs
of Staff and Minister of Defence. In
this scenario, Babangida became the Defence Minister while Abacha was to
simultaneously hold the positions of Chief of Army Staff and Chairman, Joint
Chiefs of Staff. Step Two (2)
would involve Babangida giving up the Defence Minister position, and then later
enticing Abacha to take the Defence Minister position in combination with the
position of Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.
In exchange, Abacha would vacate the position of Chief of Army Staff.
This
delicate two step process, initiated on December 29, 1989, was complicated by
negative reactions to the step one removal of Lt. General Domkat Bali and the
perception that the changes affected the religious balance of power in the
military. Bali himself refused to
accept his demeaning redeployment as Minister of Internal Affairs, where he
would take over from Brigadier John Shagaya, a junior officer from the same
Langtang area of Plateau State. Instead
he chose to retire ten days later.
In
April 1990, citing a laundry list of complaints, junior officers led by Lt. Col.
G Nyiam, Major Saliba Mukoro and Major Gideon Orkar staged an attempted coup,
which eventually failed [https://www.gamji.com/nowa14.htm].
One of their complaints was “The shabby and dishonourable treatment
meted on the longest serving Nigerian General in the person of General Domkat
Bali, who in actual fact had given credibility to the Babangida
administration.“
By
all accounts, most of the credit for rallying the resistance and crushing this
coup attempt goes to Lt. Gen. Sani Abacha, who was at that time the Chief of
Army Staff and concurrent Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.
After the rebellion was crushed, Abacha went on radio to reassure the
country. Among other things, he said:
"I,
Lieutenant-General Sani Abacha, Chief of Army Staff, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staff, have found it necessary to address you once again in the course of our
nation's history. In view of the unfortunate, development early this morning,
I'm in touch with the CGS, Service Chiefs, GOCs, FOCs, AOCs, of the armed forces
and they have all pledged their unflinching support and loyalty to the federal
military government of General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida who is perfectly safe
and with whom I am in contact…………..
……….No
amount of threat or blackmail will detract the federal military government's
attention in this regard. We are set to hand over power to a democratically
elected government in 1992. I wish to assure all law-abiding citizens that the
situation is now under control and people should go about pursuing their lawful
interest.
Long live the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
Thank you."
General Abacha’s role in saving the Babangida regime in 1990 bought him huge
stock, not only with Babangida himself but also with a significant number of
other “IBB Boys”. It marked the
beginning of the rise of Sani Abacha and the beginnings of his own independent
client network, separate from the umbilical cord that tied him into the maternal
Babangida bandwagon. His own
independent network would later become known as “Abacha Boys”, based mainly,
but not exclusively, around officers from the Kano area.
After
a lull during which Babangida was very nervous and lacked confidence, he later
resumed the old plan to replace Abacha as Chief of Army Staff.
In September 1990, after two batches of executions of “Orkar coup
convicts” had been carried out, Babangida ceded his position as Minister of
Defence to General Abacha who was to combine it with his position as Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff. Some observers feel that an unwritten part of this new
arrangement was that Abacha would be left alone to do as he pleased with defence
funds while Babangida ran the rest of the government. To
crystallize the new “space” created for General Abacha as the “Defence
Czar”, he stayed behind in Lagos when Babangida moved to the new capital of
Abuja in 1991. It was as if the
country had two governments.
However,
rather than make fellow coup merchant then Maj. Gen. Joshua Dogonyaro the Chief
of Army Staff, Babangida prudently chose Major General (later Lt. Gen.) Salihu
Ibrahim, then the GOC, 82 Division. Ibrahim was a respected apolitical Armoured
Corps officer with no history of involvement in coups - except as a victim in
August 1985 when he was arrested in Jos during Babangida’s take over.
Dogonyaro was placated with command of ECOMOG in Liberia after the fiasco
during which President Samuel Doe was abducted right under the nose of Ghanaian
General Arnold Quianoo.
Abacha
retained the combined positions of Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and Defence
Minister until August 26, 1993. After
the events of April 1990, Babangida was often quoted as referring to him as “Khalifa”,
meaning “successor”. Meanwhile, it should be noted that although
Vice-Admiral Aikhomu was transitioned from the office of Chief of General Staff
and made the Vice-President in 1990 to President Babangida, that slot was
actually initially proposed to Chief Ernest Shonekan, a civilian United African
Company (UAC) Executive.
Others
have written extensively about the political countdown and endless transition of
the Babangida regime. As is well known, the date of the final handing over of
power was shifted from 1990 to 1992 and then 1993. I shall present a brief overview and highlight those
aspects that show the hand of General Abacha as a behind the scenes manipulator.
Based
in part on the report of the Political Bureau, which was originally set up in
1986, a two-party system (one "a little to the right" and the other
"a little to the left.”) was created in October 1989.
They were the National Republican Convention (NRC) and the Social
Democratic Party (SDP). Both parties were run and financed by the Government,
which also arrogated to itself the right to write their party constitutions.
The constitutional context was the 1989 Constitution (Decree #12 of
1989), based on work done by a Constitution Review Committee, ratified by the
Constituent Assembly and amended by the Armed Forces Ruling Council.
Among the eleven amendments imposed by the AFRC, three were defence and
security related. One removed the
National Assembly’s control over national security because, (according to the
AFRC), it "exposes the chief executives and the nation to clear impotence
in the face of threats to security".
The second deleted certain provisions establishing an Armed Forces
Service Commission to supervise implementation of the federal-character
principle. The third amendment
removed Section 1 (4) of the draft constitution, which had outlawed coups and
classified them as criminal.
Initially,
based on Decree #25 of 1987 amended
by Decree # 9 of 1989, there was a ban on all former politicians and top
officeholders since 1960, particularly those previously found guilty of abuse of
office. However, both decrees
were repealed in December 1991, initially under pressure from ‘northern
elders’ but ultimately to ‘create a level playing field for all ethnic
groups’. Similarly, based on
Decree #19 of 1987 and amended by Decree #26 of 1989, the plan was for
presidential elections in November 1992. However,
as a result of alleged malpractices during party primaries in Sept 1992,
primaries were canceled altogether in October 1992, major contenders frozen out,
and the timetable shifted to 1993. Local, State and National committees of both
parties were dissolved and replaced by caretaker committees. The Babangida
government later announced that they would be audited.
The
driving principle behind all of this was Babangida’s fear of powerful,
financially independent politicians and his secret desire to plant handpicked,
“controllable” newbreed politicians in state government houses and
legislative positions all over the country as a civilian base for a diarchy
which he would head at the center. Those
who lost out in the cancellation of the 1992 Presidential primaries and were
banned included late Major General Yar’Adua (rtd) who won the SDP nomination
hands down, and Chief Olu Falae; Alhaji Adamu Ciroma and Alhaji Umaru Shinkafi
were about to go in for a run-off for the NRC nomination.
They too were banned.
A
few weeks later, on November 17, 1992, General Babangida dissolved the AFRC and,
after a pregnant pause, created the National Defence and Security Council (NDSC)
on January 2, 1993. A civilian
Transitional Council was also set up to replace the Council of Ministers and win
back waning public confidence in the “transition program” following the
failed Presidential Primaries. Its
Chairman was Chief Ernest Shonekan, also known as “Head of Government”.
Empowered by Decree #54 of 1992 (Constitution (Suspension and
Modification) [Amendment], the Transitional Council shared joint responsibility
with the National Defence and Security Council to ensure a smooth and successful
handover to civilians. It was after
all of this that Alhaji Bashir Othman Tofa and Chief Moshood Kashimawo Olawale
Abiola later emerged as the Presidential contenders from the NRC and SDP
respectively. Strangely, though,
neither man internalized the bitter experience of men before them like Shehu
Yar’Adua, Olu Falae, Umaru Shinkafi, Adamu Ciroma and Bamanga Tukur, all of
whom had been led on by Babangida but ultimately betrayed at the end.
All
of this was being monitored by the security services - as well as General Sani
Abacha, who later told confidants that Babangida had been toying with the idea
of ruling Nigeria for 30 years. When
Chief Abiola first showed interest in running for the Presidency, certain “IBB
Boys” (including Abacha) expressed concern and approached Babangida to find
some way to ban Abiola from taking part. However,
based on a security report which falsely projected Alhaji Babagana Kingibe as
the likely winner of the SDP Presidential primary convention in Jos, Babangida
assured his concerned “military boys” that Abiola would not prevail and thus
there was no need for fear. On the
other hand he simultaneously assured Abiola that he could run for office if he
so wished and would have no problems if he won fair and square.
He did not, as far as is publicly known, tell Abiola at that early stage
that there were restive northern officers opposed to his political ambitions,
nor did he tell his “caucus” officers that he had given his word to Abiola
that he could run for office. Interestingly,
Abiola himself was independently familiar with most members of the Babangida
military caucus, either as business associates or as a financial sponsor of
previous coups (in 1983 and 1985) in which they had played key roles.
As
things turned out, to the consternation of military officers - like Abacha - who
were opposed to Chief Abiola, Abiola narrowly won the SDP nomination at the Jos
convention, overcoming determined opposition from a motley group of SDP
Governors and disgruntled former aspirants.
However, security sources reported allegations of massive vote buying.
Concerned officers approached Babangida to use the report as an excuse to
ban Abiola and stop the process at that stage before it evolved to formal
national elections. Meanwhile, as the June elections came nearer, against a
backdrop of anti-military agitation by students and workers groups, General
Olusegun Obasanjo and Chief Anthony Enahoro publicly expressed doubts over the
sincerity of military’s intention to leave power.
Caught between an undercurrent of public suspicions that he had a
“hidden agenda” and behind the scene pressure from some powerful elements of
his military caucus to scuttle the transition again, Babangida initially
resisted the military pressure. Alhaji
Baba Gana Kingibe emerged after difficult negotiations as Abiola’s running
mate while Dr. Sylvester Ugoh was chosen as Tofa’s Vice Presidential
candidate.
It
must be mentioned, however, that the voice of the military was by no means
uniform. There were officers, like Lt. Gen Salihu Ibrahim, General Ishola
Williams, Brigadier MC Alli, Colonel Abubakar Umar and a few others who
genuinely wanted a disengagement of the military from politics.
Some people claim Lt. General Oladipo Diya was also not in favor of the
military perpetuating itself at this stage.
Other officers preferred one candidate versus the other, while a small
clique did not want to leave power for either candidate.
This clique included Lt. Gen. Dogonyaro, Brigadier David Mark, Brigadier
Stephen Anthony Ukpo, Brigadier John Shagaya, Brigadier Halilu Akilu and a few
others, all of whom were “IBB boys”. What
is really fascinating is how General Abacha concealed his real motives and
intentions from most military officers. At
the few senior officer conferences he attended, Abacha would typically remain
quiet. He preferred to express his strong views to Babangida directly and
privately, while quietly mobilizing opinion behind the scenes and maintaining
discrete contact with civilian leaders of thought who were opposed to the
elections in general and to Chief Abiola specifically.
Meanwhile, to those unfamiliar with their inner tensions, he positioned
himself as the guarantor of the Babangida regime.
Further on in this essay, the strategic brilliance of Abacha’s
concealment will be apparent. Major
General MC Alli, for example, says that Abacha “had the patience of a
hook-line fisherman or a bush hunter, and the memory of an elephant and a native
cunning to match.”
In
addition to this cacophony of discordant but troubling military voices there
were powerful civilian pressures, notably from then Sultan of Sokoto, Ibrahim
Dasuki as well as other Emirs who allegedly did not like or trust either Tofa or
Abiola. In the background,
personalities who had been banned or schemed out from contesting as a result of
government fiat were also opposed to the elections. These included late Major General Shehu Yar’Adua and Alhaji
Abubakar Rimi. Funny enough Alhaji
Bashir Tofa who was a candidate, supported by some elements within the NRC, also
joined the bandwagon to boycott and/or cancel the elections.
Then there were mischievous campaigners, like the Association for Better
Nigeria (ABN) which wanted the military to hold on to power.
All these internal groups and persons working hard to scuttle the
elections altogether were opposed by foreign countries like Britain and the US
which wanted the military to leave power.
Nevertheless,
on June 10, 1993, ignoring ouster clauses in Decree #13 of 1993 and Decree #19
of 1987, Justice Bassey Ikpeme of the Abuja High Court granted a motion brought
by the ABN to restrain the Electoral Commission (NEC) from conducting the
election. However, citing lack of
jurisdictional authority, General Babangida initially chose to ignore the court,
which is why the NEC went ahead to conduct the election on June 12, which was
later said to be ‘free and fair’.
On
June 16, Professor Humphrey Nwosu announced - after results for 14 of the 30
states were already known - that
the NEC would suspend announcing election results.
The results increasingly pointed toward an apparent win by Chief Moshood
Abiola, pending appeals to higher courts against lower court injunctions.
The entire result was later released by a pressure group called the
Campaign for Democracy (CD) suggesting that Abiola won the majority of votes in
19 states while Tofa won 11 states. However,
pressure from key Army factions continued behind the scene.
General
Babangida left Abuja and retreated to Minna for urgent consultations with
elements of his original 1985 military coup ‘caucus’. The majority of these elements (including Abacha), had
become thoroughly fed up with his previous assurances that Abiola was not going
to make it past the Jos convention. They
were now faced with the reality of an impending Abiola Presidency.
Practically
holding him hostage, they reportedly gave him the option to choose between
annulling the elections or leaving office voluntarily short of which, it is
alleged, he and Abiola might be killed.
While all of this was going on, strange items of correspondence were
circulating alleging that if Moshood Abiola were to be allowed to take office,
he would purge the military, move the capital back to Lagos, and take other
actions deemed threatening to vested interests. Arguments were reportedly made in certain circles that
Babangida was, by act of benign neglect, about to destroy the legacy of the
Sardauna of Sokoto and yield political and ultimately military power to an
ethnic region that already dominated the country economically. This was amplified by interesting explanations that Abiola
could not be ‘controlled’, that he was owed large sums of money by the
federal government which he would now “unethically” control, that he had
many wives and concubines etc. Thrown
into the mix were arguments about the controversial Jos convention of the PDP at
which he allegedly bought votes, and the basic unfairness of preventing those
who won the party primaries in September 1992, from contesting.
One school of thought felt that in fairness, since Abiola had gone
through the electoral process and spent large sums of money, he ought to be paid
off for his expenses and then advised as a friend to avoid politics and stick to
business.
According
to Professor Omo Omoruyi, (The Tale of June 12, Press Alliance Network London
1999, page 165) General Babangida said:
“Sani
(meaning General Sani Abacha) is opposed to a return to civilian rule. Sani cannot stand the idea of Chief Abiola, a Yoruba,
becoming his Commander-in-Chief at all; Sani seems to have the ears of the
Northern Leaders that no southerner especially from the Southwest should become
the President of this country. Sani seems to rally the Northern Elders to
confront me on the matter. Where do
I go from here? They do not trust
me. Without Sani, I will not be alive today; without the North, I would not have
become an officer in the Nigerian Army and now the President of
Nigeria……..”
“I
don’t want to appear ungrateful to Sani; he may not be bright upstairs but he
knows how to overthrow governments and overpower coup plotters.
He saw to my coming to office in 1985 and to my protection in the many
coups I faced in the past, especially the Orkar coup of 1990 where he saved me
and my family including my infant daughter.”
“Sani,
you know, risked his life to get me into office in 1983 and 1985; if he says
that he does not want Chief Abiola, I will not force Chief Abiola on him….”
On
June 21st, Justice Dahiru Saleh of the Abuja High Court voided the
election even though the appeal by the NEC was pending at the Court of Appeal.
Formal announcement to the nation of the cancellation followed on June
23rd, after a nocturnal military meeting the day before of “IBB Boys” at the
Presidential Villa. During the
meeting most military officers rejected a negotiated compromise to resolve the
impasse, preferring all out annulment.
Shortly
thereafter, a state of Military Alert was announced, and the Chief Army Staff,
Lt. General Salihu Ibrahim went
around military formations in the country to explain the annulment.
According to Major General MC Alli (rtd), who was at that time Director
of Military Intelligence (DMI), most soldiers were unhappy about the annulment
for three reasons. Firstly, they were fed up with the domination of a small
clique of officers who had been in power since 1983. Secondly, “in spite of
General Babangida’s ‘settlement’ or material bribes, soldiers wanted to
return to their professional roles”. Thirdly,
many were upset about their deployment to Liberia to be killed like animals
without national consensus or proper logistic support.
But they had little choice, as a result of command influence, but to go
along with it, at least on the surface. Meanwhile, according to the former DMI,
security operatives were “busy constructing overt and covert threats to the
life of Chief MKO Abiola”.
Protests
and riots erupted, especially in Lagos and other parts of Chief Abiola’s home
region of the country. In response,
General Sani Abacha gave marching orders to the Governor of Lagos State, Sir
Michael Otedola, to restore order or risk exposing his citizens to the fury of
the Nigerian Army. Less than
twenty-four hours later troops poured into the streets of Lagos and shot
hundreds of unarmed demonstrators indiscriminately - on Abacha’s orders.
Meanwhile the military became very unpopular and officers even feared wearing
their uniforms publicly.
Following
the annulment, General Obasanjo (rtd) suggested that Babangida set up an interim
Presidential Council comprising former Heads of State (excluding Babangida) to
negotiate the transition to a future permanent form of government.
This plan would retain democratic structures at State and local levels,
as well as the National Assembly at national level, but the National Executive
would be an interim government responsible to the Presidential Council. Babangida did not like the idea of a Presidential Council
without him but liked the notion of an Interim National Government as an exit
strategy.
A
committee under Lt. Gen. Dogonyaro, meanwhile, urged new elections under new
rules as Babangida had indicated in a speech to the nation on June 26.
This proposed new Presidential election was allegedly to be conducted
before August 27, 1993, even though the government statement dissolved the NEC
which would have been charged to conduct such an election.
Babangida viewed this as a trap aimed at him and quietly maneuvered to
slip out of it.
Initially,
the SDP predictably rejected any plans for a new election and Abiola meanwhile
refused to give up his “mandate”. However,
after the usual Nigerian cajoling and bribing, political leaders of the SDP
independently distanced themselves from Moshood Abiola as well as Governors and
Legislators originally elected on SDP ticket.
The SDP, under Chief Tony Anenih and Alhaji Sule Lamido, then agreed on
July 7, 1993 to an unelected interim National Government in which they
would collaborate with the NRC under Hammed Kusamotu and Tom Ikimi as well as
President Babangida, to the exclusion of Abiola, the apparent winner of the June
12 elections. Anenih’s actions caused a rift in the SDP that was
later said to be resolved on October 11, well into the life of the ING.
This
development, which was the result of Babangida’s personal initiative, left
Babangida with the challenge of determining how he would tiptoe around his
military sharks to guarantee his personal safety and exit from power as well
provide military backing to the legitimacy of the ING.
The only way he could have done this successfully was to assume full
operational and policy control of the reigns of the defence and security
establishments which meant he had to find a way to continue as
Commander-in-Chief and Minister of Defence after August 27, 1993.
Unfortunately, he had dribbled his own military backers once too many and
was unable to get support for such a “Pinochet type” arrangement from them. He did not trust them; they did not trust him; and neither
did they trust themselves. It
increasingly became clear that Babangida’s personal political agenda and that
of the Nigerian military officers who brought him to power in 1985 were
divergent.
To
freeze Abiola out, the government released spates of decrees. These included,
but were not limited to Decree #39 of 1993, also known as Presidential Elections
repeal Decree; Decree #40, also known as Transition to Civil Rule (Amendment);
Decree #41, also known as
Presidential Election (Invalidation of Court Order) Decree. Media organizations
like The Punch, Concord Press, Sketch, Abuja Newsday, Ogun State Broadcasting
Corporation and The Observer were proscribed.
Then
a Tripartite Committee comprising Military, Government, and political Party
representatives was set up on July 31, 1993, to decide how to manage what was
left of the transition. The military was represented by Lt. Gen. Dogonyaro and
Lt. Gen. Aliyu Gusau Mohammed, along with Brigadiers Mark, Shagaya and Ukpo.
This configuration pointedly excluded most members of Abacha’s “Lagos
group” and provides some insight into Babangida’s thinking and Abacha’s
cunning. Dogonyaro and David Mark groups were neck deep in ING organizational
intrigues, which Babangida half-heartedly hoped to manipulate in order to
guarantee a military role for himself after August 27.
Meanwhile Abacha was quietly consolidating and networking within the
military, probing for weaknesses and lining up his ducks in a row.
But Abacha was crafty enough to allow some overlap. Brigadier David Mark, for example, was initially
simultaneously in Abacha’s “Lagos
Group” as well as being in the “IBB Group.”
In this manner a casual observer would superficially view the network of
groups as one continuum of “IBB-Abacha
Boys” while Abacha quietly worked underground to crystallize his own clique.
Abacha firmly believed in the concept of keeping one’s enemies even
closer to one than one’s friends, until he was ready to strike.
The
government was represented by Admiral Aikhomu (Vice President), Chief Ernest
Shonekan of the TC (as “Head of Government”), Mr. Akpamgbo of the Justice
Ministry and Alhaji Abdulraman Okene of the Ministry of Internal affairs, among
others. The NRC was
represented by Alhaji Adamu Ciroma, Alhaji Bashir Dalhatu, Mr. John Nwodo, Chief
Tom Ikimi, and Mr. Eyo Eyo Ita. The SDP was represented by Mr. Patrick Dele
Cole, Chief Jim Nwobodo, Alhaji Olusola Saraki, Chief Dapo Sorumi, Mr. Joseph
Toba, Alhaji Abubakar Rimi, and Major General Shehu Yar ‘Adua among others.
In
this confused situation, General MC Alli, then DMI says he raised the
possibility of overthrowing General Babangida with Army Chief Lt. Gen Salihu
Ibrahim, who was reluctant to support such a move for a variety of professional,
political and practical reasons, including his deep distrust of General Abacha.
Next, Brigadier MC Alli approached the Defence Minister General Sani
Abacha with the same idea. Abacha’s
main concern was whether the Army Chief, Salihu Ibrahim, would back such a move.
Alli lied to Abacha by saying he had not yet approached Salihu Ibrahim.
Caught between two key officers who did not trust one another, Alli
initially backed off. But as the
situation further deteriorated and Army prestige was at an all time low, Alli
again approached Abacha, this time at home, in the presence of Lt. Gen. JT Useni.
Again Abacha chose to be obdurate, taciturn and reflective.
But Alli saw through him and concluded - rightly - that Abacha had some
kind of personal design that he was not yet ready to spring, preferring for
General Babangida to leave the scene first, peacefully. In my view Abacha was probably gauging MC Alli’s
intentions and deciding whether or not to trust him because - as we shall see
later - he had already secretly tapped some officers to begin the delicate
process of recruiting allies for his final drive to power. Simultaneously other dynamics may have been at play
between Generals Babangida and Abacha. One
unconfirmed account says that although they had a “pact”, their wives did
not get along, and that Mrs, Babangida did not relish the thought of him handing
over to General Abacha. Meanwhile
other pro-IBB and anti-IBB military interest groups were scheming, including
some core “IBB Boys” who basically wanted to implement a self succession
plan, after which professional officers in the military would be purged through
a process of being set up and eliminated.
There was also a last ditch effort to get the National Assembly to
“draft” Babangida in some sort of role to plug the apparent vacuum following
annulment but this effort failed after, it is rumored, money had already changed
hands.
On
August 2, 1993, the Army Chief, Lt. Gen. Salihu Ibrahim told senior officers of
the Army in Lagos that difficulties in arranging a new Presidential election
before August 27, 1993 had persuaded the government, with the backing of the two
parties and foreign countries, to form an Interim National Government (ING). The
ING would organize elections and carry out government responsibilities.
Officers discussed options for full civilian government composed of the
two parties, a mixed civilian-military interim regime or a full temporary
military regime. Those
present recommended that Babangida stay no longer than August 27, 1993, and that
officers from all three services should work out the details for transition.
Such officers should not have held political positions in the government.
They also recommended that the National Assembly be on recess while the
ING was active and that the two political parties be self financing.
The interesting thing about this process of military consultation on the
Transitional Program was that it was parallel to the Tripartite Committee
mentioned earlier.
On
August 3, faced with real and imagined threats to his life and with no hope of
getting Babangida to rescind his decision on the June 12 matter, Chief Moshood
Abiola left Nigeria for Europe.
On
August 17, General Babangida informed the National Assembly that he was stepping
aside. His Service Chiefs did not
accompany him to the National Assembly, which was a breach of protocol and an
indicator that he was fast losing control of the military.
On that same day, which happened to be his birthday, senior officers from
all three services met in Lagos and reaffirmed that Babangida could not continue
in office. They did not, however, appoint a successor to replace him, nor did
they make room for him to play the role of a Commander-in-Chief during an
interim government. This “oversight”, which Babangida was not pleased
about, was very convenient for Abacha’s game plan.
On the strength of recommendations of the Tripartite Committee, the
government then established the Nwabueze Panel. It was tasked to draft a
constitution for the proposed ING. The
panel included Professor Ben Nwabueze, Mr. C. Akpamgbo (Attorney General),
Justice P. Nwokedi, Professor Uvieghara, and Dr. Azinge.
In those dangerous days, officers who used to be freely admitted into
Babangida’s courtyard with their security details were now required to be
disarmed and to leave their details as far away as possible.
There was at least one such incident involving General Abacha himself.
On
August 25th, with options for a safe exit closing fast, General
Babangida settled on Chief Ernest Shonekan as his candidate for the Chairmanship
of the proposed ING. Shonekan,
incidentally, was not only Yoruba like Abiola but also from Abeokuta in Ogun
State, like Abiola. Lt. General
Aliyu Gusau Mohammed, then the National Security Adviser, reportedly influenced
his appointment and the British government supported it.
The Nigerian military as an institution had nothing to do with his
appointment.
Professor
Omoruyi opines that Shonekan agreed, as a condition of his appointment, not to
reopen the June 12 matter. He also allegedly made a commitment to assist in
preventing Yorubas from forming a united front on the issue.
Another curious ‘agreement’ was that Shonekan would not move into the
official Presidential Villa in Abuja but would instead stay at the Presidential
Guest House. The main Villa was to
be left vacant.
Another
interesting decision General Babangida made in his confused state of mind was to
leave General Abacha behind as the Secretary of Defence and Vice Chairman of the
ING, reportedly as “an insurance against coups” and to ensure unity of the
military in backing the ING. In
other words, genuinely concerned about the safety of the Hen House, Babangida
asked the Fox to guard it. To
counter-balance Abacha, however, Babangida planned to appoint Lt. Gen. Joshua
Dogonyaro as the Chief of Defence Staff. Abacha
would guide “policy” while Dogonyaro would take charge of “operations”.
This curious arrangement was actually a default for which Babangida had
no serious options, except perhaps Brigadier David Mark.
Once he lost the backing of the Armed Forces to continue in either a
military or political role after August 27, he had to rely on an unstable
alliance of those he had relied on all along to keep power.
On
August 26th, 1993, a retirement parade was held at the Eagle Square
in Abuja for General Babangida. Following
the parade, Babangida - miffed at their lack of backing for his continuation in
office as the C-in-C - announced the retirements, along with his, with effect
from August 27, of all his Service Chiefs and announced the appointment of Lt.
Gen. Dogonyaro as Chief of Defence Staff.
The service chiefs retired were Lt. Gen. Salihu Ibrahim (COAS), Air Vice
Marshall Dada (CAS), Vice Admiral Preston Omatsola (CNS), Vice Admiral Murtala
Nyako (Deputy Chief of Defence Staff) and Alhaji Aliyu Attah (IGP).
Following this announcement by Babangida, the DMI (Brig. MC Alli) met
with the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and Defence Minister, General Abacha in
his bedroom and advised that the retirements made by Babangida be rescinded to
help stabilize the tense situation between the Armed Forces and Babangida on one
hand and the Nigerian public on the other.
Abacha listened patiently, counseled patience, and advised that “there
was need to consolidate military authority before further action.”
What
Abacha did next was a classic move. He
met with the “retired Service Chiefs”, empathized with the way they were
treated and offered to extend the effective dates of their retirements until
September 17th. Then,
the next day, with their support, he backdated the date of Babangida’s
retirement from the Army to August 26th, a step which rendered
Babangida’s pronouncements from the 27th invalid. Then he later rescinded Dogonyaro’s appointment as Chief of
Defence Staff, arguing that three northerners, (Abacha as Defence Secretary,
Dogonyaro as CDS and Aliyu Mohammed Gusau as COAS) should not ‘unfairly’
monopolize top jobs in Defence. He
offered Lt General Oladipo Diya, Commandant of the National War College and a
Yoruba from Abiola’s home Ogun State, the position of Chief of Defence Staff.
This was a cynical move by Abacha, who, as one of his former close
confidants told me, had little regard for Diya personally, and most Yoruba
officers in general. But Abacha
needed to isolate Dogonyaro, and had larger designs on the political class,
particularly Yoruba leaders of thought who he was going to use Diya to pacify.
Therefore, the “Yoruba” strategy was useful
- for now.
The
transition from Babangida to Shonekan was codified by a number of decrees.
Decree No. 59 of 1993 ended the Babangida administration whilst Decree No. 61
created the ING.
Thus,
at about 3.30p.m, on August 26, 1993, Ernest Shonekan was sworn in as the new
“Head of State and President of the ING” by the Chief Justice of Nigeria,
Justice Mohammed Bello, at the Presidential Villa, Abuja.
He was not, however, sworn in as the “Commander-in-Chief” of the
Armed Forces! This “oversight”
was also deliberate. Another
interesting detail was that Decree #61 of 1993 that established the ING
identified General Abacha by name as the Vice-President, Defence Secretary and
“Senior Minister.” The
“Senior Minister” was empowered to succeed the President of the ING in the
event of resignation or other untoward event.
Thus Abacha was Shonekan’s designated successor and Shonekan had no
operational control of the Armed Forces.
Other
members of the ING were:
Agriculture
and Natural Resources: Professor Jerry Gana
Commerce
and Tourism: Chief Mrs.Bola Kuforiji-Olubi
Communications:
Chief Dapo Sarumi
Education
and Youth Development: Professor Abraham Imogie
Finance:
Alhaji Aminu Saleh
FCT
Administrator: Maj.Gen.Gado Nasko
Foreign
Affairs: Chief Matthew Mbu
Secretary
of State (Foreign): Alhaji Saidu Isa
Health
and Human Services: Prince Julius Adelusi-Adeluyi
Internal
Affairs: Chief Ezekiel Yesufu
Industries:
Chief Ignatius Kogbara
Information
and Culture: Mr.Uche Chukwumerije
Justice: Mr. Clement Akpamgbo SAN
Petroleum
and Mineral Resources: Chief Don Etiebet
Secretary
of State (Petroleum): Alhaji Ibrahim Ali
Labour
and Productivity: Prince Bola Afonja
Power
and Steel: Alhaji Hassan Adamu
Secretary of State (Power and Steel): Alhaji Oladunni Ayandipo
Police
Affairs: Alhaji Abdullahi Mahmud Koki
Science
and Technology: Professor
Bartholomew Nnaji
Transport and Aviation: Alhaji Bashir Dalhatu
Water
and Rural Development: Alhaji Isa Mohammed
Works
and Housing: Mr.Barnabas Gemade
Chairman,
National Planning Commission: Mr.Isaac Aluko-Olokun (in lieu of Professor Sam
Aluko)
Establishment
and Management Services: Mr.
Innocent Nwoga
States
and Local Government Affairs: Alhaji Sule Unguwar Alkali
Secretary
to ING: Alhaji Mustapha Umara
National
Assembly Liaison Officer: Alhaji Abba Dabo (House of Representatives)
National
Assembly Liaison Officer: Dr. Samuel Ogboghodo (House of Representatives)
National
Assembly Liaison Officer: Senator George Hoomkwap (Senate).
A
number of military era decrees were then abrogated. However, two days later the National Labour Congress (NLC)
began a nationwide strike to protest fuel scarcity.
Shonekan addressed Nigerians on August 31st.
He had begun the process of releasing most of those detained for their
involvement in pro-June 12 riots like Chief Gani Fawehinmi, Dr. Beko
Ransome-Kuti and Mr. Femi Falana. He re-opened some Universities that had been
shut down and lobbied the National Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers (NUPENG)
and the NLC to suspend industrial actions.
To the military, Shonekan promised to start phased withdrawals from
Liberia.
Even
as Shonekan was making these lofty pronouncements, Abacha was well on his way.
It was on September 3rd that he publicly announced what had
already transpired behind the scenes. Lt-General
Oladipo Diya was his replacement for Lt. Gen. Joshua Dogonyaro as CDS, Air
Commodore John Femi was to replace Air Commodore Nsikak Eduak as Chief of Air
Staff while retaining Lt-General Aliyu Mohammed as Chief of Army Staff, and Rear
Admiral Suleiman Seidu, as Chief of Naval Staff.
Simultaneously he ordered the Military Task Force on Petroleum to restore
normal supply of fuel to marketers within 24 hours. Two days later, the killing
of seven Nigerian soldiers serving the UN Peace-keeping Force in Mogadishu,
Somalia, was announced. It resulted
in a fact-finding tour led by Brigadier-General Cyril Iweze. On September 13th,
Defence Headquarters issued a curious clarification over the recent Army
postings, saying it had no political undertone. Spokesman Colonel Fred Chijuka said a similar exercise was
underway in the Navy and the Air Force. A week later, Chijuka was again making
another statement, this time to announce the appointment of new Divisional
Commanders and the retirement of Lt-Gen. Joshua Nimyel Dogonyaro. With his
position made untenable by Abacha, Dogonyaro “voluntarily” retired from the
Army, alerting the country in the process that Abacha was in the opening phase
of an all out assault on democracy. As
a coup merchant himself he should not have had any difficulty reading the signs.
On
the political front, meanwhile, the calculation that Shonekan's appointment as
Head of the ING would split the Yoruba people and make it easier to consign the
June 12 election to the rubbish heap of history failed. Political threats
against Shonekan began as soon as he took office and his house even had to be
protected from arsonists. The
Governors of Oyo, Ogun, Osun and Ondo States, for example, refused, at least in
public, to recognise Shonekan as the Head of State. They and other Yoruba
opinion leaders also requested Yoruba speaking elements in the ING to resign
their appointments. The legality of the ING was also challenged in court.
Pro-democracy rallies resumed. To
douse this flame, Shonekan, who had earlier agreed as a condition of his
appointment not to raise the June 12 issue, and even stated on September 28th
that the ING will not do so, was advised by some to establish the Mamman Nasir
panel to investigate June 12. He
announced this on October 1st, even as security men were arresting
waves of pro-democracy supporters. Two
days later, in a storm of controversy in the Press, members of the SDP in the
ING threatened to pull out, claiming that they had only accepted to serve
initially because they thought they were supporting a Palace coup to oust the
former President Ibrahim Babangida. Meanwhile the National Assembly was locked
into an internal battle over efforts to repeal the decree that annulled the June
12 election in the first place. Both
Shonekan and Abiola were touring the country to raise support for their
respective agendas. Abiola filed a
court motion to declare the ING illegal.
Shonekan
was also later accused (without evidence) of trying to bribe opposing members of
the National Assembly in an attempt to gain legitimacy and expand his national
support base.
As
far as the Army was concerned, Shonekan relied on his personal friendship with
Lt. Gen Aliyu Gusau, former National Security Adviser and new Chief of Army
Staff. One unconfirmed account suggests that both Gusau and Rear Admiral
Suleiman Seidu of the Navy may have discussed the possibility of retiring Abacha
with Shonekan. If true, it would
have been interesting indeed to see how this would have transpired in practice.
All the Service Chiefs had clearly treated Shonekan with disdain.
For example, during the Passing out Parade at the Nigerian Defence
Academy that year, Shonekan was not accompanied by any of the Service Chiefs.
Such an alleged but presumably unsuccessful effort on the part of Gusau
and Seidu against Abacha, therefore, if true, would have had the effect of
marking both men for subsequent retirement when Abacha started his final push
into Aso Rock.
Long
before this time military officers had begun settling down into various groups
and cliques for and against Babangida, for and against Abiola, and for and
against themselves. What later
became known as the Sani Abacha Lagos group or caucus, comprised various
combinations among officers like Brigadier Ahmed Aboki Abdullahi, Brigadier
Bashir Magashi, Brigadier M Chris Alli, Brigadier Ishaya Bamaiyi, Brigadier
Patrick Aziza, Brigadier Tajudeen Olarenwaju, Brigadier Ibrahim Gumel, Brigadier
David Mark, Air Commodore MA Johnson, Rear Admiral FBI Porbeni, Colonel Lawan
Gwadabe and Lt. Col. Sambo Dasuki, among others.
This group often met in the guest house of Brigadier Bashir Magashi at
Ikoyi. It is pertinent to mention
that Brigadier MC Alli - the former DMI who later became GOC, 1st
Division and then COAS - was “invited” into the group by Brigadier Ahmed
Aboki Abdullahi, not by General Abacha. Nevertheless
it seems apparent that Abacha must have engineered it, appreciative of Brigadier
MC Alli’s confidential visits to his office and home all along.
Between
August 27th and September 17th Abacha made more critical
decisions as the effective political and operational Chief of all the Armed
Services. He publicly announced new
Army postings in Lagos without recourse to Shonekan who was ensconced at Abuja.
Obviously the lame duck Service Chiefs who owed him the decency of being
properly retired with adequate three-week notice and traditional pull out
ceremonies did not question his moves. By
September 20th, therefore, when the new “Service Chiefs” finally
took office, new officers adjudged loyal to General Abacha, were occupying all
the strategically sensitive commands in the Army.
Dangerous ‘IBB Boys’ were defanged, first by being posted out to
politically safe locations and then subsequently kicked out of the Army entirely
- in stages. Indeed nearly all the officers (and prominent northern Traditional
rulers) who helped Abacha to power eventually felt his jackboots.
Regarding
the September postings, at the Lagos Garrison Command, for example, Brigadier
Ishaya Rizi Bamaiyi took command. At
the Brigade of Guards, Brig Gen. Bashir S Magashi replaced Colonel JY Madaki,
who was then posted to the Depot in Zaria.
At the 1st Infantry Division, Brig. Gen. MC Alli, erstwhile
DMI, replaced Brig. Gen. John N Shagaya, as GOC. Shagaya was then posted to
ECOMOG in Liberia as acting Major General.
At the 2nd Division HQ in Ibadan, Brig-Gen. Godwin Osagie Abbe
replaced Brig-Gen. John Inienger as the GOC. At the 3rd Armoured Division, Brig Gen. Tajudeen A Olanrewaju
replaced Brig Gen. Ahmed M Daku. At
the 82 Division, Brig (later Maj Gen.) Timothy M Shelpidi replaced Brigadier
(later Maj Gen.) Chris Abutu Garuba. Brig
Gen. Ahmed Aboki Abdullahi replaced Brig-Gen M Chris Alli as DMI.
Colonel Lawan Gwadabe had taken over from Col. Abdulmumuni Aminu as
Commander, National Guard - a controversial para-military outfit viewed as a
duplication of the regular military. Lt.
Col. Sambo Dasuki was in the Military Secretary’s office.
Most amusingly, Brigadier Halilu Akilu, erstwhile powerful
Director-General of the National Intelligence Agency, was posted to the Oshodi
Resettlement Scheme to rehabilitate disabled and retiring soldiers.
The
Lagos group had began preparing actively for the overthrow of the Shonekan
government right from the moment he was sworn in. Nominations were accepted and votes counted at meetings of
the entire caucus or an inner caucus within the outer caucus.
In this manner, General Sani Abacha was “elected” by this self
appointed military Electoral College to take over as Head of State, C-in-C and
Minister for Defence. Lt. Gen. Diya was ‘voted’ to be his Chief of General
Staff, beating Lt. General Aliyu Gusau. Major
General Abdulsalami Abubakar beat Major Generals Edward Unimna and Cyril Iweze
for the position of Chief of Defence Staff.
Then Brigadier (later Major General MC Alli) was told that “the
scenario had been set” for the position of COAS to fall on him. This implied
that Lt. Gen Aliyu Gusau Mohammed who had been appointed to that position by out
going President Babangida, was to be prospectively frozen out of any top
military position in the planned Abacha dispensation.
Similarly, Rear Admiral Suleiman Seidu was later edged out as Chief of
Naval Staff in favor of Rear Admiral Allison Madueke in a high stakes game of
ethnic balancing championed by Brigadiers MC Alli and Aboki Abdullahi.
In
his book “The Federal Republic of Nigerian Army”, Major General MC Alli (rtd)
explains how he dealt with his personal doubts about Abacha’s quality as the
designated incoming Head of State. When
he raised the issue with General Diya, Diya assured him that Abacha would
“change his habits.” Diya also
reportedly said that Abacha “would not succumb to his intense acquisitive
instinct that utterly was no respecter of systems and order.”
Alli also says that then Director of Military Intelligence, Brigadier
Aboki Abdullahi, on the other hand, “explained that “the ‘North knows’
Sani Abacha, more so, he was the ‘most senior northern officer.’
In fact, he emphasized that Northern Emirs approved of his ascendancy to
power.”
Lt.
Gen. Diya later summoned the Abacha Military Caucus to his office in Lagos.
It was tasked to produce a very detailed Top Secret report regarding the
state of the Nation, issues of National Security, the state of the military and
the political stalemate occasioned by the annulment of the June 12 elections. The Chairman was Brig-Gen MC Alli and the Secretary, Colonel
Lawan Gwadabe. Other members were
Brigadiers Aboki A Abdullahi, Ishaya Bamaiyi, Bashir Magashi, and Patrick Aziza,
Commodore F. Porbeni and Air Commodore MA Johnson.
They subsequently met in the office of Lagos Garrison Commander,
Brigadier Ishaya Bamaiyi, broke up into subcommittees and came out with what was
titled “The Report: The Way Forward”.
Major Gen. MC Alli (rtd) reveals that he sampled the opinion
of officers like Lt. Gen. Aliyu Gusau, then COAS, and Major General Abdulsalami
Abubakar, then Commandant of the War College.
General Gusau expressed the opinion that a full military regime at that
stage would be unwise and might destroy the military.
General Abubakar questioned the rush into removing Chief Shonekan who had
only just been installed. It is not, however, clear what either officer did with
the information Brigadier Alli shared with them.
Meanwhile
on September 13, Chief Gani Fawehinmi told The African Guardian:
“Whether
Shonekan likes it or not, God has ordained his regime as the shortest in history
of Nigeria. And it will be suddenly terminated by God, because June 12 has a
connotation and denotation which Nigerians have not understood. Until they know
the extent of June 12, they will be beating about the bush...”
On
September 24th, a few days after Abacha had fully consolidated
military control, Chief Moshood Abiola returned to Nigeria from Britain. A large
crowd of supporters received him at the presidential wing.
From
the airport, his first stop, even before he went home, was Defence House in
Lagos where he met secretly with General Abacha behind closed doors.
Knowledgeable insiders say that both Abacha and Diya encouraged Abiola to
return home - against Shonekan’s wishes.
Since both Abacha and Abiola are dead it is hard to confirm the report
that Abiola and Abacha agreed to a military take over of the government as an
interim measure before final hand-over to him down the road.
But several witnesses confirm that Abiola actively suggested names to
General Abacha for inclusion in his first cabinet.
It seems clear, however, that Abacha was taking the Abiola along for a
ride and that Abiola fell for it. Maj.
Gen. MC Alli testifies that when he later asked General Abacha whether he had a
pact with Abiola regarding the June 12 election, Abacha’s reaction was: “MC,
you should know better.”
In
early October 1993, the Army became engaged in internal security duties in the
dispute between Ogoni and Andoni in Rivers State. Such operations later became highly controversial and
eventually led to the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and others by General Abacha.
However, during the last week of September and first week of October,
Colonel Abubakar Dangiwa Umar, Commander of the Armoured Corps Center and
School, began making contacts regarding a military coup which he said was aimed
at removing Chief Shonekan from power and installing Chief Abiola. He made an
attempt to recruit the new GOC of the 1st Division in Kaduna,
Brigadier MC Alli, into his group by claiming that his plan had the support of
the Army hierarchy, including General Abacha himself.
Alli apparently contacted his crony Brigadier Aboki Abdullahi who had
taken his place as Director of Military Intelligence in Lagos.
Umar was subsequently arrested on suspicion of treasonable felony or
about October 7th 1993. Because
of his very close personal relationship with former President Babangida, there
was an unstated suspicion that he may have been involved in some kind of
pro-Babangida conspiracy. Luckily
for him he was not charged. Following
appeals on his behalf by Brig MC Alli to Generals Aliyu Gusau and Sani Abacha,
he was released, after which he resigned his commission.
It
is important to note that in deciding to release Colonel Umar without charge,
Abacha was being savvy. He did not
need the diversion at that point from his main focus; did not need to upset
General Babangida unnecessarily at that stage by pushing for one of his closest
“boys” to face possible execution or prolonged imprisonment; and did not
want to deal with the practical implications of granting the Shonekan regime
unnecessary legitimacy by trying an officer for conspiracy against what he
himself considered an illegal government which would soon be removed anyway.
So he chose to deal with the matter administratively within the military,
rather than legally. Colonel Umar
Dangiwa was quietly replaced as the Commander of the Armoured Corps by Colonel
M. A. Garba who acted in that capacity until January 1994 when Colonel Peter Sha
took over as the substantive Director.
Shonekan
meanwhile, on the advice of a local kitchen cabinet of close associates, was
beginning to behave like a head of state and attend foreign meetings.
For example, he addressed the UN General Assembly on October 7th,
even as he was being sued at home for releasing moneys to the NEC for the
purpose of conducting fresh elections and for setting up a panel of inquiry into
the annulment of the elections. Even
the late musician, Fela Anikulapo Kuti publicly described the Shonekan
government as “neocolonialist” and as a “western stooge”.
During this period Shonekan asked security agencies to investigate
corruption in Nigerian parastatals like the NNPC, NEPA, Nigeria Airways, Central
Bank, Customs etc. Abiola was in
the meantime asking Nigerians to fast and seek God’s intervention in the
affairs of Nigeria.
Shonekan
attended the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) from October 21 - 25, 1993 at Limassol, southwest
of Nicosia, on the south coast of Cyprus.
At the CHOGM, Shonekan was embarrassed by an appeal from Sir Douglas
Richard Hurd, the British Foreign Secretary, to "reach an accommodation
with Moshood Abiola, the unofficial winner of the poll."
From
Limassol he was reported to be making calls incessantly to Abacha in Nigeria
regarding the security situation. The
former UAC Chief Executive may have been unnerved by back-channel reports of
Colonel Umar’s arrest and perhaps even alleged whispers from Lt. Gen Gusau
about other conspiracies lurking in the shadows. However, Abacha - in a move reminiscent of how he treated
General Buhari in 1985 - apparently refused to take most of the calls, citing
Shonekan’s lack of authority over him as the Defence Secretary.
Interestingly, the ING announced on October 21, that it planned to scrap
the National Guard, a decision that was popular with the mainstream military and
was already recommended by the secret Brigadier MC Alli Military Caucus report.
Then on the last day of the conference, four members of the Movement for
the Advancement of Democracy (MAD) led by Jerry Yusuff hijacked a Nigerian
Airways Airbus A310 (5N AUH) with 137 passengers and 11 crew bound from Lagos to
Abuja. The plane ended up in Niger republic where it was later stormed by Nigerien
paramilitary commandos. It was
Nigeria’s second aircraft hijacking incident, the first having taken place
back in April 1967 during tensions leading to the Nigerian civil war. At that
time a Nigeria Airways Fokker Friendship F-27 bound for Lagos was hijacked from
Benin to Enugu by Sam Inyang and Onuorah Nwaya of the "Special Task
Force", the militant wing of what later became the Biafran Directorate of
Military Intelligence.
The
manner in which the Shonekan régime handled the hijack matter raises serious
questions in my mind about the civil-military-external affairs relationship at
that time. For one the government
sent a delegation led by the Transport and Aviation Secretary, Alhaji Bashir
Dalhatu, to Niamey to negotiate for the release of the hostages. Secondly, the
ING allowed Niger republic to carry out a military operation to rescue
Nigerian hostages in a Nigerian plane that was hijacked from Nigeria. The
almighty Nigerian military was not in the loop either for lack of Special Forces
expertise, lack of command consensus, or lack of trust.
This writer viewed the development with consternation back then and
interpreted it as a sign that certain elements within the military were
unwilling or unable to undertake a potentially messy international rescue
operation which might undermine its credibility on the eve of a coup at home.
Fortunately for most of the hostages, the rescue operation was carried
out professionally by the Nigeriens and went well.
Ordinarily, no serious country would have allowed another nation
unilaterally take such momentous responsibility for its own citizens.
On
October 31st word leaked in the Nigerian Press about efforts by some
influential Nigerians to get the ING to dissolve both political parties and all
existing political structures. Coincidentally,
such a recommendation was indeed part of the MC Alli secret report.
This was followed soon after by dramatic events at the National Assembly
following which the Senate President was impeached.
Pro and anti-ING factions in the legislature, guided by a strategic
desire to support or oppose Presidential hopeful Major General Shehu Musa
Yar’Adua (rtd), sparred on the floor of the Chambers.
This dispute eventually led to the impeachment of Senate President Dr.
Iyorchia Ayu on November 2, by pro-ING Senators led by Chuba Okadigbo.
Senator Ameh Ebute replaced Ayu. All
of this came against background plans by the new NEC led by Professor Okon Uya
to organize party primaries from January 7 - 9, 1994 followed by Presidential
elections on February 19, 1994.
On
November 3rd, social critic Gani Fawehinmi was quoted during a Book
launching ceremony as saying: “The military must intervene to stop this war of
Shonekan’s government against the people”.
On the contrary, three days later on November 6th, Northern
Elders led by former President Shehu Shagari met to find ways to ensure that
Nigeria remained united. They
expressed support for the ING as the midwife for a stable transition.
Under
these circumstances, Chief Shonekan, taunted by some for “lack of power”,
symbolically moved into Presidential Villa from the Presidential guest house in
early November - against his original understanding with former President
Babangida - and to the consternation of Abacha. General Abacha was increasingly
worried about Shonekan’s growing confidence and irritated by security reports
to Shonekan that he was planning “something”.
Under
pressure from declining international oil prices, Shonekan’s government chose
at that inauspicious time to withdraw the petroleum subsidy on November 8th, and
raise the price of petrol from 70 Kobo to 3.50 Naira, a massive increase with
predictably dramatic effects on inflation. Not surprisingly, it led to street protests and plans
for a full-scale resumption of industrial action by pressure groups.
Two
days later, on November 10, 1993, the Shonekan-led ING was declared illegal in a
ruling at the Lagos High Court presided over by Justice Dolapo Akinsanya.
Back in October, as previously noted, a case had been brought by Moshood
Abiola and Baba Gana Kingibe to declare the ING illegal, null and void. The lead Attorney for the Federal Ministry of Justice,
Mr. Dele Jegede, advised the court that Decree # 61, which was supposedly the
legal basis of the ING, did not exist. Decree
#56 had previously fixed August 27, 1993 as the date of commencement of the 1989
constitution. Justice Akinsanya
reasoned that since Babangida had divested himself of power by signing Decree #
59 of August 26th, he had no power to sign Decree # 61.
All of this dovetailed nicely into General Abacha’s original skillful
backdating of the effective date of Babangida’s retirement to August 26th.
The
day after the Court Judgement, Professor Bolaji Akinyemi publicly pleaded with
General Sani Abacha to rescue Nigeria from a " terrible political and legal
quagmire". But Abacha, ever so patient and disciplined regarding the timing
of coups resisted being rushed before crossing his “Ts” and dotting his
“Is”. After all the ING was contesting the Akinsanya judgement in a higher
court and Abacha still had to watch his flanks within the military carefully.
There was still the matter of how to handle the Chief of Army Staff, Lt.
Gen. Aliyu Gusau Mohammed, who was not a man to be underrated.
On
November 15, 1993, however, the Nigerian Labor Congress called a General Strike.
On November 16, 1993, the Senate began open hearings on the fuel price
increase by the Shonekan Administration while the House of Representatives asked
the ING to rescind the price increase.
The
next day, on November 17th at about 10 am, Generals Sani Abacha,
Oladipo Diya and Aliyu Gusau arrived at the Presidential Villa in Abuja
accompanied by truckloads of fearsome looking soldiers.
These troops were under the command of two “Lagos Group”
conspirators, namely Colonel Lawan Gwadabe of the National Guard and Brigadier
Bashir Magashe of the Brigade of Guards. Magashe
was almost certainly there to make sure Gwadabe followed the Abacha script and
no other. Following a ‘private meeting’ with Chief Ernest Shonekan,
Shonekan was graciously allowed to deliver a farewell speech to the ING after 82
days of controversy, following which he was flown to Lagos.
After waiting patiently for so many years, Abacha, “the successor”, had finally struck.