HISTORY OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN NIGERIA*
By Dr. Nowa Omoigui
[SOUTH CAROLINA, U.S.A.]
Introduction and Definition
According to the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), the phrase
"Civil-Military relations" encompasses all "activities undertaken
by NATO
commanders in war directly concerned with the relationship between allied
armed forces and the government, civil population, or agencies of non-NATO
countries where such armed forces are stationed, supported or employed".
In peacetime, however, a more functional definition is that suggested by
Carolina Hernandez of the Institute for Strategic and Development Studies in
the Philippines. She describes it, quite simply, as "the balance of
power
between military and civilian branches of government". I
dare say,
however, that the interplay of civil and military components of society
extends beyond the bounds of the government.
Traditional civil-military relations presume civil supremacy and guidance,
in other words, full democratic control of the military in its role and
responsibility to society as the ultimate guarantor of national security.
This implies the military is a servant of society which exercises its
monopoly over the most violent means of violence in the interest of its
citizens in response to popular will and consent. To exercise this
role,
however, the military must have unique expertise within a corporate
structure guided by a strong sense of ethical and moral responsibility.
Civil society on the other hand must have strong institutions through which
the will and consent of the citizenry are projected.
On the other end of the spectrum is the situation in which a Military regime
subordinates civil society and civilian branches of government. In between
both extremes, the military may act behind the scenes as the sponsor, guide,
protector and supporter of a civilian government, and thus retain the
ability to influence it in many areas within and outside the defence and
security spheres. In this situation the civilian government has no
influence over military, defence and perhaps even foreign policy but
maintains an appearance of control. Gradual subordination of the military
involves a process of continuously chipping away at the military's exclusive
control over these areas of state activity, first by removing its influence
over policy matters outside defence and security, and then limiting its
influence or policy control to defence per se. The final stage of
subordination is said to have occurred when the civilian government has
total control of all policy areas, including national defence. In this
situation, however, the military still partakes in policy formulation and
debate but ultimate decisions are made by the legitimate civilian
government, presumably acting in trust as it exercises the will of larger
society.
From the foregoing, it would seem that overt intervention in domestic
politics by the conventional state organized and funded military is the
worst kind of civil-military relationship. However, on the other
end,
defining the corporate role of the Armed Forces in formulating and
implementing defence and foreign policy under supervision of constitutional
authority, while simultaneously respecting the "space" of the
military,
remains a challenge to democratically elected governments. It
should be
recognized, though, that dysfunctional civil-military relations may be
expressed in other ways, such as the misuse of the military for civilian
directed repression and even genocide, emergence of child soldiers and
ethnic militia warlords, illegal weapons proliferation, commercialization of
security and other expressions of militarization.
In Nigeria, whether civil society is supreme and has the capacity, will,
responsibility, authority and power to guide the military is open to debate.
The country's creation by British conquest, preceded as it was by the
establishment of a brutal mercantile military machine, consolidated by a
long line of colonial military figures has been followed by a
post-independence record of repeated military interventions. These forays
into politics have often been justified by dubious rationalizations of the
military as the ultimate (and thus unaccountable) constitutional guarantor
and protector of national sovereignty - against all perceived enemies,
foreign and domestic. Along with many events that have legitimized
violence
as a tool for negotiation, it has helped impose a militaristic tradition in
the country's political mindset. At a subconscious level, force and
deception, rather than "rule of law" may have become quasi-respectable
as
ways of doing business. This life cycle has only been punctuated by brief
civilian intermissions during which the military still maintained certain
perks behind the scenes. Thus, given the national charter imposed by history
and habit, one can be forgiven for sometimes wondering whether the question
in modern Nigeria is military-civil rather than civil-military relations.
THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
1850 - 1900
Following a naval bombardment on December 26 and 27, 1851, motivated by
Britain's desire for a share of regional trade, Lagos was brought under
British gunboat influence.
But it was not until 1861, following a gradual erosion of the powers of the
Oba, that Lagos formally became a colony and was the first part of what
later became "Nigeria" to be incorporated into the British Empire,
courtesy
of an agreement signed under duress by Oba Dosunmu, Akitoye's son.
A constabulary force was later formed in 1863 to police the colony, protect
British traders, and handle some raids into the hinterland. It was also
called "Glover's Hausas". This nickname originated from the fact
that Lt.
Glover of the Royal Navy whose exploration ship got wrecked near Jebba on
the River Niger picked up a band of run away Hausa slaves and employed them
as a security force as he made his way back to the coast over Yoruba land.
This unit was the ancestor of what later became the 4th Battalion of the
Nigerian Army at Ibadan during the first republic. All through the various
battles of British conquest, former slaves, exiled criminals, other
disenfranchised individuals and mercenaries formed the bulk of fighting
troops, albeit commanded by British officers.
A summary of these campaigns was previously published on gamji at
http://www.gamji.com/nowa5.htm
Just before amalgamation, the West African Frontier Force Camp was based in
Jebba before being moved to Kaduna in 1912 to test the site of Lugard's
proposed new capital, consistent with the decision to transfer the
headquarters of then Northern Nigeria from Zungeru.
THE NIGERIA REGIMENT
The reasons for the amalgamation of Northern and Southern Nigeria have been
exhaustively analyzed elsewhere. Lord Harcourt, then Colonial
Secretary
said: "We have released Northern Nigeria from the leading strings of the
Treasury. The promising and well conducted youth is now on an allowance on
his own and is about to affect an alliance with a Southern lady of means. I
have issued the special licence and Sir Frederick Lugard will perform the
ceremony. May the union be fruitful and the couple constant"
The Nigeria Regiment, West African Frontier Force, was thus formed by
amalgamation of Northern and Southern Nigeria Regiments on January 1st 1914.
The unit was reorganized under one Commandant. Two Infantry battalions
were
stationed in the North and a battery of Artillery in the South. The "Mounted Infantry" was based in the
North. As of that time, the
main entity
in the South was called the "Southern Nigerian volunteers", which upon
the
outbreak of the First World War, was replaced by the largely European "Land
and Marine Contingent" which later became the Artillery detachment. Lugard
had been the Governor of Northern Nigeria before becoming the
Governor-General of Amalgamated Nigeria after an interlude in Hong Kong. As
governor-general he made strong efforts to move the central capital of the
entire country from Lagos to Kaduna. Kaduna was popular with British
colonial officers because of climate, lack of "congestion", ease of
separating "natives" from "Europeans", good water supply, as
well as the
presence of the Railway Headquarters (at that time), along with the WAFF
headquarters.
In August 1914, as the First World War gathered pace, an Egba revolt was
militarily crushed by ten companies of troops from the newly created
"Nigeria Regiment."
During the First World War, support for the British was very strong among
Emirs many of whom contributed money and helped to raise troops. Nine (9)
battalions of the regiment fought and distinguished themselves at Douala,
Garoua and Banyo in the Cameroons from 1914-16 and at Behobeho and Nyangao
in Tanganyika against Von Lettow from 1916-18. Most recruits were
deliberately culled from so called "martial" minority areas of
northern
Nigeria like the Dakokori of Niger, Tiv of Benue, Numan of Adamawa and
Kanuri of Bornu provinces respectively. Others came from the Calabar,
Ogoja
and Rivers provinces of the south. This pattern of recruitment was to
persist until WW2 when demands for skilled tradesmen and technicians opened
up opportunities for more southerners.
By 1920 the regiment had been reduced to 4 battalions which were used
thereafter for occasional internal tax expeditions. In 1928 it became the
Nigeria Regiment, within the Royal West African Frontier Force (RWAAF). In
1929-1930 the regiment was called upon for a major internal security
operation against Igbo women, mainly at Aba.
The Nigeria regiment-RWAAF structure persisted until it was renamed the Queen's
Own Nigeria Regiment (QONR), Royal West African Frontier Force in July 1956.
Before 1939, the Major General in Lagos reported to the GOC-in-C in Accra who
reported to the War Office in London.
During the Second World War, using a competitive pay scale and opportunity
for travel and trade training to attract volunteers, who were then
supplemented by an unpopular conscription drive, the regiment was expanded
to 28 battalions and support troops comprising 121, 652 servicemen, of whom
30,000 served abroad. The massive expansion of the Regiment led to the
establishment of temporary camps all over Nigeria which created
civil-military tensions with local civilians who often complained of
atrocious and brutal conduct on the part of the recruits. This did not
help
the reputation of the military, particularly in southern Nigeria.
Units of the Nigeria regiment, however, went on to distinguish themselves at
Juba, Goluin, Marda Pass, Babile Gap, Bisidimo, Colito, Omo, and Lechemti
during the Abyssinian campaign in East Africa from 1940-41. In Burma, from
1943-45, as part of the 81st and 82nd West African Divisions, the regiment
fought in North Arakan, Kaladan, Mayu Valley, Myohaung, Arakan Beaches,
Kangaw, Dalet and Tamandu and was a component of Chindit operations in
1944.The high point of the Nigerian regiment in Burma was the fall of
Myohaung on January 24-25, 1945.
Upon return to Nigeria from WW2, many soldiers were demobilized using
various incentives including termination pay and job opportunities reserved
in the public and private sectors. These men formed veterans
associations
some of which became adjuncts to political parties of that era - a unique
civil-quasi-military relationship which was replicated in several West
African countries and formed part of the peaceful independence movement. In 1948, however, active duty Nigerian troops were again power-projected abroad
to Gold Coast for several months to help Britain crush riots there.
In that same year, under Sir John Mcpherson, the first moves toward
Nigerianization began in the public service. Nnamdi Azikiwe (who later
became President) and Muhammadu Ribadu (who later became Defence Minister)
joined Hugh Foot, the Chief Secretary on the Foot Committee. But this did
not include the military in its terms of reference.
In 1949, the GOC-in-Chief of the RWAAF, General Nicholson proposed
establishing a West African Military Academy for West Africans, but
increasingly confident Nigerian political leaders resisted it for fear that
graduates of such an academy would not be viewed as having the same level of
training as British officers trained in Britain. The preference was for
officer training at Sandhurst, Mons or Eaton Hall Officer Cadet Schools.
Other than the previous use of Emirs and community leaders to assist in
recruitment, this represents the first direct input of indigenous Nigerians
into matters of higher defence policy. Interestingly, none of those
involved had served in the colonial military.
Although some vague references exist to a few indigenous field commissions
in the early years of British campaigns in Nigeria, the first ten
commissioned officers were Bassey (1946), Ugboma(1948), Sey, Aguiyi-Ironsi and Ademulegun (1949), Shodeinde (1950) followed by Maimalari,
Lawan, Ogundipe and Adebayo (1953). Maimalari and Lawan, both
northerners
from the North-East, were the first Sandhurst trained officers in Nigeria.
All of this was occurring against the backdrop of emerging North-South
indigenous political tensions. In 1950, for example, during a heated
debate
at the Ibadan Constitutional Conference regarding the distribution of seats
in the proposed central parliament under the Richard's Constitution, the
Emirs of Katsina and Zaria threatened that they would "ask for separation
from the rest of Nigeria on the arrangements existing before 1914".
At that time officer recruitment strategy was based on establishing close
liaison between certain secondary schools like the Government (Barewa)
College Zaria and nearby military institutions (like the Depot) supplemented
by direct recruitment drives by community leaders against a background of
cultural glorification and family traditions. The first 6 officers in the
Army from northern Nigeria, for example, attended that college (Maimalari,
Lawan, Kur Muhammed, Largema, Pam and Gowon). They shared the same alma
mater with the political leaders of the Northern Peoples Congress like
Ahmadu Bello, Balewa and most NPC Ministers of the first republic,
illustrating an interesting model of informal civil-military linkages
through a commonality of pre-military educational and regional ties.
Meanwhile, then Brigadier Browne commented that "Young people in Eastern
and
Western Nigeria with the required education do not appear to like the army
as a career." Such cleavages were to take on
immense importance in
civil-military relations after Nigeria became independent.
Aside from pressure to Nigerianize which resulted in officer recruitment
drives, the main issues in civil-military relations in that era as reflected
in the Press and parliamentary debates include indigenous taxation for
defence without local political control, pay, conditions of service and
prestige. Army Barracks were worse than Police barracks and
policemen were
better paid. Soldiers were often derided in public, particularly in the
Western region where they were even called epithets like "Afamaco" or
"Abobaku" - a preview, one might add, to the epithet
"zombie", which was
popularized by Fela Anikulapo Kuti in the late seventies.
In 1952, the national census was again conducted and was not free of the
usual controversy over relative numbers in competing regions. Expatriates
were suspected of tampering with the figures. In May 1952 there was a
serious mutiny by clerks of southern Nigerian origin at the Command Ordnance
Depot, Yaba over "living conditions". Two European officers were
wounded
and the mutiny was only crushed when "northern riflemen" from the
infantry
were brought in to support Military Police. Such tensions between
"southern" soldiers in the colonial army and European officers
reflected
tensions between southern civilian nationalists and British colonial
administration. The resolution of this mutiny by the British High Command
exploited a deliberate cleavage in the regional origins of men in the rank
and file (who were typically northern) versus those in the trades (who were
typically southern). Other mechanisms of "colonial civil
control" at that
time include the predominance of British citizens in the officer corps in
general, anglification of the artillery unit, manipulation of pay scales for
the rank and file, and frequent rotation of military units to prevent undue
fraternization with locals. However, as previously noted, such inbuilt
organizational tensions bequeathed by British recruitment policies which
served them well, later complicated civil-military and civil-security
relations in post-independence Nigeria. One ominous comment along
these
lines was made during the 1953 Budget Session of the House of Representative
in Lagos. Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto said: "The mistake
of
1914 has come to light".
That same year, however, two Nigerians, Tafawa Balewa and Eni Njoku were
allowed for the first time to attend the West African Forces Conference.
Balewa also took part in subsequent meetings of the West African Military
Council and also had the privilege of being briefed by the Governor General
from time to time about regional security matters of interest to Britain.
After the Gold Coast intervention of 1948, the main role of the Nigeria
Regiment until 1958 was to stand-by to back up the Police during the Kano
riots of 1953, Eastern Nigeria Tax riots of February 1958 and the riots at
Ibadan in March 1958 following the death of Alhaji Adegoke Adelabu.
The
regiment also helped to get rid of marauding Lions, Elephants and Quetta
birds in different parts of the country and constructed Bailey bridges in
rural areas. In addition to the increase in military pay and gradual
transfer of political control from London to Lagos, such civic roles helped
in restoring the image of the military among civilians. However, some key
political leaders like Sir Ahmadu Bello never quite forgot the colonial
heritage of the Nigerian military as the willing tool used by the British to
"conquer" his ancestors. He never fully trusted the institution
until his
death in 1966.
NEXT INSTALLMENT: "NIGERIAN CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE NIGERIAN MILITARY
1958-60"
___________________
* This is an excerpt of a much larger publication by the author
As of 1939, the Nigeria regiment comprised the Regimental HQ, The Nigeria
Regiment, Kaduna;1st Battalion, The Nigeria Regiment: Kaduna; 2nd Battalion, The
Nigeria Regiment: Kano;3rd Battalion, The Nigeria Regiment (Less One Company):
Enugu;4th Battalion, The Nigeria Regiment: Ibadan; One Company: Lagos;5th
Battalion, The Nigeria Regiment: Zaria; Detachments: Maiduguri and Sokoto; 1st
Nigeria Light Artillery Battery: Zaria; Signals Company: Zaria; The Lagos
Defence Force (European Reserve Force): Lagos; The Engineer Cadre (European
Reserve Force): Lagos.
When WW2 broke out, an Army Council was created in London which controlled West
African units of the British Army through a Command Secretary. Defence spending
was shared by local tax-payers in Nigeria as well as through allocations in the
UK budget.
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