The Milk of Human Kindness: An Intellectual Engagement with the Intellectually Challenged  

By

Sanusi Lamido Sanusi

lamidos@hotmail.com

Lagos

 Monday March 18, 2002

 

 

"The most noble of sciences is that in which reason combines with tradition, and opinion is accompanied by revelation. The science of positive law and its principles is of this kind. It takes equally from the quintessence of revelation and reason. Neither is it purely rational discretion to the extent that makes it incompatible with revelation. Nor is it the exclusive obedience to duty, so that reason is unable to endorse it." Abu Hamid al-Ghazali

 

"Continuing in the old ways does not necessarily mean preserving our heritage or holding on to our authenticity. Authenticity is not a fixed point in the past to which we must return in order to establish our identity. It is rather a constant capacity for movement and for going beyond existing limits towards a world which, while assimilating the past and its knowledge, looks ahead to a better future." Adonis

 

"It is only in marriage with the world that our ideals can bear fruit: divorced from it, they remain barren. But marriage with the world is not to be achieved by an ideal which shrinks from facts, or demands in advance that the world shall conform to its desires."  Bertrand Russell

 

"When a writer stops attracting criticism, he is dead."    V.S. Naipaul  

 

Imam Abu Hamid al-Ghazali in the first quote above, taken from his book of legal theory, al-Mustasfa, clearly defines the nature of the dialectical contact between reason and revelation in the production of Muslim knowledge. He further clarifies this relation in his theological work, al-Iqtisad fi 'l-I'tiqad, when he makes an analogy between revelation and the rays of the sun, on the one hand and between reason and the eyes in our heads, on the other. A man who approaches revelation without the active application of reason is, according to al-Ghazali, akin to a man who strolls into daylight with his eyes closed. He who relies on his reason without the light of revelation, on the other hand, is like one who opens his eyes very wide in pitch darkness. Neither the one, nor the other, can see. For man is in need of eyesight and light together in order to see. The quote from Adonis summarizes my understanding of change and authenticity, and the occupation of constantly searching for relevant meaning. Bertrand Russell, finally, captures the philosophy of praxis, the dialectical contact between the ideals we believe in and our lived reality, between our objectives and our objective conditions. Our first prayer is that we be counted among those who have eyes that see, as opposed to those who in foolishness close their eyes, or in arrogance switch off the light of divine guidance.

 

I have laboured through the prolixious tirade written by Danladi Adamu Mohammed entitled "Muslim Intellectuals and the Sharia Debate in Nigeria." Mohammed adds his name to a list of "intellectuals" who have responded to what he calls (in what I presume is classical Welsh) "Sanusi's pedestal scholarship". I intend in this piece to respond, in very general terms, to Mohammed without wasting energy on defending my person against attacks ad hominem. I begin from the position that one should consider it a matter of pride that one has produced a body of knowledge sufficient to require a twenty page critique. As Naipaul said, when a writer stops attracting criticism, he is dead.

 

Let me therefore begin, for the sake of argument and without prejudice to the possibility of returning to this point later, by pleading guilty to all the charges leveled against me as a person. I accept that I am an arrogant secularist who aims to destabilise the noble edifice of northern Muslim society; a pretender to being a reformer in the league of Dan Fodio; an agent of the West and dealer in usury; a Marxist who places reason above revelation and a presumptuous critic who relies on "off the wall" jurists like Ibn Hazm. In this I am employing a tactic I have come to find useful in these arguments. Critics avoid the subject of an article and focus on the writer. As I wrote in my "Dialogue with a Critic", when people fail to confute an argument they libel the advocate. So a popular theme is to review "the views running through Sanusi's writings" as a substitute for responding to concrete points of theory, ideology or fact raised in a paper. I recall debating my "facile" article, "The Adulteress' Diary" with a brother who started by comparing the paper to the Satanic Verses. I said to him: "Let us, for the sake of this argument, assume I am Satan himself. Now what are the issues?"

 

 The paper that seems to be the immediate cause of Danladi's angst was one I presented at a conference in Cape Town entitled "The Politicisation of Ontological Questions: Discourses, Subjectivities and Muslim Family Law in Nigeria." It is not clear to me that Mohammed read the paper with seriousness. If he did it is not evident that he comprehended what he read. So let me explain, in simple English, what the main arguments were.

 

First, that there are two schools of Muslim thought as far as interpreting law in modernity is concerned: One which holds on to a given body of laws inherited from the past and a second which seeks to produce a changed body of laws reflecting changes in time and space. To the extent that this is an epistemological question I show that it can be analysed in the context of a generic philosophy of knowledge.

 

Second, that the debate between these schools is not about rituals and worship so much as about the structure and ordering of the political, including relations among social groups and between individuals and the state. So the debate is usually about such things as the appropriate form of government, about the rights and freedoms of persons to speech and conscience, about the rights of religious minorities, about gender equality and the woman's access to political and economic space, about economic policies and income distribution etc. To the extent that these relations tend to be relations of secular power I approach them with the tools of a generic political sociology.

 

Third, that the scope for producing knowledge and the possible forms it can take are defined by the terms of the spatio-temporal context and discursive horizon within which the knowledge is produced as well as the subject-position or positioning of the epistemic subject in discourse. In this I follow, without apology, an epistemological tradition rooted in Kant, through Marx and the Frankfurt School right through to Levi -Strauss, Althusser, Gramsci and Foucault, among others. In short a tradition that may have commenced in the epistemological turn of Kant's "Copernican revolution" but survived the linguistic turn to the present day. Some of the analysis could also benefit from the insights of philosophers like Charles Taylor and his conception of "the Authentic Ideal".

 

Fourth, that the spread of education and modernity in most of the Muslim world, from the Arab Middle East to the Indian sub-continent has led to the strengthening of previously muted discourses and forced the state to reform Muslim personal laws in line with the terms of the contemporary discourse. Muslims in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Senegal etc have accepted these reforms, which Muslim jurists in those countries have considered consistent with a valid interpretation of the Qur'an and Sunnah, the same sources we hold sacred. None of this suggests, as argued by Mohammed, that the new interpretations are "true" and the old ones "false". On the contrary, the interpretations given to texts by the early jurists were correct within the logic of their own discursive formation, but lose validity with the transformation of those discourses and the exigencies and pressures of modernity.

 

Fifth, these reforms have not been considered in Nigeria and most of our people are not even aware of them. This is due to ignorance and the fusion of patriarchal discourses and political power leading to the social construction of subjectivities among both men and women, such that the inferior status of Woman is considered integral to "Muslimness."

 

One would have thought that a critique of this paper would address for example the philosophical argument (say by disputing the assertion that subjectivity or Discursive Formations have bearing on the interpretation of the law.) Instead we have Mohammed quoting, in one of several instances of self-contradiction, from Shehu Dan Fodio's Tanbih al- Ikhwan that ijtihad "may not necessarily be the same in every age because judgement emanates from the circumstances underlying it." He may have added that the last chapter of the Shehu's Najmul Ikhwan was titled "Conclusion: On admonishing brothers to seek knowledge from the scholars of their generation." The Shehu stated clearly that the scholars of every generation are the most learned about the affairs of that generation. In this there is a subtle point. Any one who aspires to be a scholar of his generation must go beyond cramming and regurgitating the rulings of earlier generations. In Fazlur Rahman's words, he must transcend "learning jurisprudence" and begin to "do" jurisprudence.

 

Or perhaps the critic should have challenged the paper's ideological tenor. Yet Mohammed quotes the Shehu again as saying that "Islam has ever remained a message for the oppressed and the vulnerable against the oppressor and delinquent." Seemingly, to our critic, women and the poor do not qualify as "oppressed and vulnerable." Again, I add that he could have added to this the Shehu's famous quote: "A kingdom may well survive with disbelief but it will not survive if based on injustice."

 

A third option is to challenge the picture presented of northern Nigeria. Mohammed could have argued that literacy rates in the north are higher than presented, or that Muslims are not required to know the meaning of the Qur'an so long as they have "memorised the entire Qur'an and 1,000 hadiths with their isnads". Or he could argue that adolescent girls are not married off by their fathers, that their marriages are filled with love, that women are not divorced arbitrarily by men who just get up and pronounce the magic formula  "I divorce you" because they say it is their religious right, that women in general are maintained well in marriage or after divorce. He could have argued that men who marry more than one wife generally deal equitably between them and that domestic violence is almost unheard of. There was no claim on my part that life in those Muslim countries that have embraced reform is all rosy. But the condition of their women is certainly a million times better and closer to the Islamic spirit than the pathetic state to which our northern Nigerian women have been reduced in the name of Islam.

 

Instead of an engagement of this nature, Mohammed takes us on a panoramic journey through "Sanusi's writings" spanning over four years to expose Sanusi's true character. And what is this character, which consistently appears in my writings and for which I stand condemned?

 

First, Sanusi accuses Nigerian Muslims of "ignorance" because they do not share his view of the shariah. This point I believe was made in connection with Safiya's case and my assertion that it was not a criminal case even in Maliki Law. The key points here are the following:

 

It is a fact, that as reported by al-Darqutni, Malik holds that the maximum period of gestation for pregnancy is four years and it is also a fact that in the Maliki school, particularly in the Arab Maghreb, there is considerable authority for a term of up to seven years.

 

It is a fact that Safiya Husseini had her baby within a period less than four years from the date of her divorce and therefore in Maliki Personal law of nasab the child belonged to her former husband and there is no basis for a criminal case.

 

If, in spite of these facts, which I annotated and which are not in dispute, Safiya is charged under a criminal law and convicted by a sharia judge and sentenced to death by lapidation there are only two options: Either those implementing shariah are ignorant of the law, in which case we are in trouble, or they are cold-blooded murderers in which case we are in even deeper trouble. Take your pick but castigating Sanusi will not change this fact. As for other arguments in law on this point I will not bother repeating them. Pregnancy proves nothing beyond the biological fact of a sperm cell fertilizing an egg. As to how it got there- In-vitro fertilization, rape, invalid marriage, consensual illicit sex- other evidence is required. This is a position held not just by "off-the-wall" jurists like Ibn Hazm. Mohammed should read Imam Sarkashi's al-Mabsut, Imam al-Nawawi's Raudhatul Talibin and Imam Ibn Qudamah's al-Mughni for the Hanafi, Shafii and Hanbali positions respectively. Also, if Mohammed took time to read the editor's introduction to al-Mughni, he would see that the great 13th Century Muslim jurist, Izzuddin Ibn Abdu 's-Salam as-Sulami, who was for his knowledge considered the "Sultanul Ulama" (King of scholars) made the following pronouncement: Of all books ever written in Muslim jurisprudence, none surpassed Ibn qudamah's al-Mughni and Ibn Hazm's al- Muhalla. But then perhaps Izzuddeen is also an "off the wall jurist"!

 

The second charge is that I believe in Nigeria. This is a fact. I was born in an independent Nigeria. I attended the nation's premier federal school. I had access to  education at ABU on full scholarship made possible by resources earned from the entity called Nigeria. I plan to live and die in Nigeria. I love my country and I know it is a multi religious, multi cultural entity whose existence is being threatened from all corners by ethnic bigots and religious fanatics. For some time in my own life I was carried away by the fad of ethnic nationalism as a reaction to the indiscriminate attacks on Hausa/Fulani Muslims by other Nigerians. But most of my life I have retained my faith in the country which I acquired during my memorable five years in King's College. Against Yoruba ethnic bigots I published, for instance, "Afenifere: Syllabus of Errors" and "The Yoruba: Between Madunagu and Abati." Against Igbo zealots I published "The Igbo, the Yoruba and History". Against northern irredentists I wrote "Faseun and the North's Moral Dilemma". Against Muslim opportunistic politicians I wrote "Religion, the Cabinet and a Political Economy of the North." In defence of religious minorities I wrote "Non-Muslims in a Contemporary Islamic State" and in defence of Islam against its enemies I wrote "Between Shariah and Barbarism" and "The Shariah dialogue: A Muslim Intervention." In exposing hypocrites on both sides I wrote "Islam, Christianity and Nigerian Politics" and to warn against using Islam for political ends I wrote "On the Islamisation of Politics and the Politicisation of Islam." In spite of this I have also remained conscious of my own ethnic and religious identity as evidenced by what I call my "Fulani Trilogy". But by and large the charge of the crime of loving Nigeria, if it is a crime, is one to which I plead guilty. I also know that fewer and fewer Nigerians believe in the idea of a nation, but given the increasing illiteracy and mediocrity among Nigerians, even this fact is evidence for the correctness of the idea. For a summary of my view on Nigeria and its nationalities and religions see "Issues in restructuring Corporate Nigeria".

 

As for secularism, if what is meant is that I propose a segregation between religion and state Mohammed exposes himself to ridicule. None of my writings lends itself to such an interpretation. However, there is a fundamental sense in which he is correct. I consider social relations, such as those of class and gender, as well as political institutions and structures to be essentially secular, even if their construction and operation is to be guided by the normative tradition of Islam. To the extent that I do not consider for instance monarchy or the subservience of woman to man as sacred, I engage in a discourse that is secular. It is for this reason that I can quote Kant and Marx and Foucault in these areas in a manner in which I wouldn't on prayer or fasting or pilgrimage or ethics. A funny argument is that because I quoted a secularist without condemning him, then I am a secularist. It is not said that I quoted a "secularist statement" and endorsed it. On the level of logic, this is like saying: "Sanusi quoted Ayesha Imam without condemning her. Ayesha Imam is a woman. Therefore, Sanusi is a woman."

 

I started out by saying I would not respond  to Mohammed's more personal attacks. A close reading of the critique and my articles will show the obvious weaknesses in Mohammed's arguments. Let me here give only one example. Mohammed spends a lot of time on "Sanusi and Philosophy" quoting copiously from other writers to prove a link between Khomeini's theory of government and Plato's philosopher-king, and to also show how this led to dictatorship. All my readers know that this precise point was made by me in "Shariacracy in Nigeria", which Mohammed himself has read because he referred to Marx replacing the prophet in Arab socialist thought. In that article I showed how Khomeini's theory led to a dictatorship of the ulama which was resisted by liberals like Bazargan, a theme to which I returned in my latest posting. This is the type of intellectual dishonesty running through these articles. No one who read my latest article will fail to see the effort made to draw a line between "modernism" and "secularism" in Muslim thought, and to also define the taxonomy employed in classifying certain thinkers as modernists.

 

But devoting much time to self-defence is to fall into the trap of those who want the issues I raise to go away. The issues have been tabled for discussion and they will not disappear. Besides, I must prove to my friend Orok Edem a.k.a. "Farouk for President" that contrary to what he thinks, I do have the milk of human kindness. Readers are smart enough to separate weak arguments from strong ones. What pleasure is there in savaging an intellectual corpse?

 

The philosopher, Peter Kreeft once made a distinction between arguments which are objectively strong by the rules of logic and evidence, and those which are subjectively strong because they convince those immersed in ignorance, prejudice or passion. Those who William James called tough-minded will always bow to truth and logic. The tender-minded will believe what they want to believe based on prejudice, sentiment and ignorance.

 

In my "Values and Identity in the Muslim North" I did foresee this problem. I wrote:

 

"It is very common for a writer to be labelled a "traitor" to "the North" or "Muslims" for taking a position at variance with the fantasies of a sentiment- driven eclectic consciousness. Language is a moral medium; writing an instrument of ethical illumination, political consciencisation and social mobilisation. The task of the intellectual is not one of blending into the opaque consciousness of the tumultous mob around him, his voice drowned in a cacophony of misdirected protests. His task is to remind them of who they are and what they ought to be. Our values are not to be taken from conduct of our adversaries but from the great heritage of our people. "

 

 

At the risk of sounding arrogant (which I can very well afford since I have pleaded to the charge of being guilty of arrogance), one would say objective arguments are what anyone who aspires to be an intellectual must employ. Subjective ones are for the intellectually challenged. On that merry summary of the terms of engagement, I leave you dear reader to judge the case.