The Hudood Punishments in the Northern Nigeria: A Muslim Criticism
By
Sanusi
Lamido Sanusi
[LAGOS]
OCTOBER 1, 2002
Prepared
for publication in ISIM NEWS, the quarterly publication of the Institute for
the
Study of Islam in Modernity, Leiden, Holland
I. Introduction: The background to
discourse
The election of civilian governors in
northern Nigeria in 1999 and the decision taken by several of them to introduce
the full range of punishments in Muslim criminal law has been the subject of
international and local controversies. Many theories have been put forward in an
attempt to understand the quest of the northern Muslim elite and the masses of
the population for authenticity and the transformation of the ideological
landscape through the introduction of the totalizing vision of a distinct Muslim
ummah ruled by divine law, an island of piety in an otherwise secular,
Christian and “animist” nation. I have elsewhere reviewed the various
explanations proffered by both proponents and opponents of this vision[1]
as well as the intellectual roots of the various Islamist discourses in the
Nigerian political context.[2]
Suffice it to say here that, as noted by Karl Popper, periods of disintegration
and uncertainty tend to breed totalizing visions as people grope for an anchor.
This, according to him, is as true of what he calls “theistic historicisms”
like the Jewish concept of “chosen people” as it is of secular ones like
Plato’s Forms, Hegel’s historical idealism and Marxian materialism.[3]
If this is the case, then it is not a mere coincidence that the emergence of
neo-fundamentalist politics in Nigeria is witnessed at a point when the northern
Muslim elite seems to have lost control of the federal government and the
lucrative posts previously held by its members from which the resources from oil
exports were dispensed.
After the annulment of a democratic
election by a military government in 1993 and a succession of corrupt and
dictatorial regimes headed by Muslim military officers of northern extraction
the north found itself increasingly alienated in the scheme of Nigerian
politics. Every Nigerian Head of State from 1979 to 1999 was a Muslim
northerner, with the exception of an interim leader from the south[4] who was a figure-head for
a few months between the two administrations of generals Babangida and Abacha.
When the military finally decided to hand over to civilians in 1999, what became
clear was that the rest of the country was committed to a “power-shift” and
determined not to allow a northern Muslim become the next president.[5]
The misguided and unjustified tendency to blame all Muslims and northerners for
the nation’s woes and their castigation as corrupt, power-hungry incompetents,
coupled with their perceived marginalisation in the new political configuration
heightened the sense of insecurity and disintegration of the power bloc.
Unlike the concept of “God’s chosen
people” or the philosophies of Heraclitus, Plato, Hegel and Marx, which all
originated in times of crisis, the concept of Shari’ah is not a novel
one in the northern Nigerian environment. What is recent is the appropriation of
that concept (and religious symbols in general) for the purpose of reviving a
hitherto lost sense of a common identity and the sublation of individual
peculiarities into a homogeneous group, the northern Muslim ummah. The
call for a return to Shari’ah and to Islamic authenticity both
complements and reinforces the tribal social life of the north. “Tribalism”,
as used by Popper, is “the emphasis on the supreme importance of the tribe
without which the individual is nothing”.[6]
This “tribe” may be an ethnic group, a class or some other collective as, in
our case, the northern Muslim people.
The tribalisation of northern Muslims has a
dual effect relevant to our analysis. On the one hand it accentuates the
difference between northern Muslims and the rest of the country, thus increasing
the potential for conflict with “other” groups and collectivities. Second,
and more important for us, it pretends away distinctions between sub-units of
the new “tribe”. Differences among members on the basis of, say, class and
gender, are blurred. The rich and powerful, the politicians and the farmers,
merchants and laborers, peasants and emirs, men and women- all these become one
homogeneous group with one common interest, the interest of the tribe. This
interest is reduced to the strict application of the fixed punishments
prescribed in sacred texts while relegating such other concerns as poverty,
corruption, mismanagement of public funds and oppression by class and gender.
The attempt at concocting an artificial, contingent harmony and imposing it on
conflicting interests is resisted by those members of the tribe who contest the
very definition of that interest and expose its internal contradictions.[7]
This resistance discommodes the new leaders of the tribe and leads to dialogue
and conflict within the tribe itself, as members resist the appropriation of its
symbols in the service of its dominant elements, without regard to the interests
of the poor, the weak and the disenfranchised. This, in my view, is the defining
character of the debate within and among Nigerian Muslims on the question of Shari’ah
and the method and timing of its implementation. It reflects what Edward Said
refers to as “a struggle within Islamic societies over the definition of
Islam”[8]
itself.
II. Levels of discourse
This paper is principally a paper in
Islamic jurisprudence and Qur’anic exegesis, critiquing the amputation of
convicted thieves and the death sentences passed on two northern Nigerian Muslim
women[9]
for alleged fornication based on evidence in the form of pregnancy and
childbirth after divorce. However, the reader will note that its criticism of
the rulings is, implicitly, a Muslim criticism of the timing and manner of
implementation of the Shari’ah criminal law in northern Nigeria.
At this point one should perhaps make a
distinction between various forms of criticism and levels of discourse. The
“international community” (ie the United States and its western allies),
human rights groups and most non-Muslim critics have argued that the fixed
punishments (hudood) of flagellation (for intoxication, slander and
fornication), amputation(for theft and highway robbery) and lapidation (for
fornication and, in some schools, sodomy) in Muslim criminal law are a violation
of fundamental human rights. They have widely and vociferously described them as
“inhumane”, “uncivilized” and “barbaric” and thus inconsistent with
this age and “modern civilization”. Most Muslim critics of the
implementation of Shari’ah do not support this position[10] and I have elsewhere
critiqued it comprehensively.[11]One
of the enduring legacies of A.J Ayer and the Oxford philosophical school of
logical positivism is a radically subjectivist ethical theory whose arguments
are often too compelling to be ignored. To say that something is “barbaric”
or “immoral” or “uncivilized” is no more than to express a personal
opinion, a disapproval of or abhorrence for that thing. It is not a statement of
fact and is therefore not in any way objective or binding on others. To quote
Ayer, saying for instance that someone has “a distorted or undeveloped moral
sense…signifies merely that he employs a different set of values from our
own.”[12]
The principal philosophical error of the “international community” is the
presumption that its conception of what is “humane”, “moral” or
“civilized” is an objective, universal one, capable of grounding in
unanimously shared utilitarian or empiricist proofs. The weakness of this line
of argument as applied to Muslim law becomes clear when we consider that
imprisonment, detention, hanging, the electric chair and all forms of punishment
(sanctioned by different legal dispensations including western ones) can also be
easily described as “inhuman”, “barbaric” and “uncivilized”,
depending on whose standards are employed. Indeed the debate even within
contemporary western paradigms on the question of capital punishment is a
pointer to the philosophical weaknesses of this line of argument.
Muslim critics in general conduct their
discourse on a different plane, although it is politically expedient for the
targets of their criticism to lump them along with international human rights
activists. The very question of the legitimacy of implementing some of the hudood
in an un-Islamic environment, particularly one in which social and economic
justice are yet to be established has been raised by participants in the
intra-Muslim discourse. For example, some Muslim critics have questioned the
speed with which some of the states embarked on implementing the hadd punishment
of amputation on thieves[13]
without first establishing a strong welfare base. We know from the experience of
the Sudan under Gaafar El-Numayri[14]that
all attempts at implementing the hudood without consideration of the
material conditions of the majority have ended in disaster.
The debate itself is part of a wider debate
in Islam on the interpretation of Qur’anic verses and their application in
specific historical contexts. Perhaps the most lucid exegesis of the verse
prescribing amputation I have come across in any language is to be found in
Muhammad Asad’s English translation, The Message of the Qur’an. In
his commentary on this verse, Asad posits that “the cutting off of a hand in
punishment for theft is applicable only within the context of an already
existing, fully functioning social security scheme, and in no other
circumstances.”[15]
He begins with the premise that “the extreme severity” of this hadd
“can be understood only if one bears in mind the fundamental principle of
Islamic Law that no duty (taklif) is ever imposed on man without his
being granted a corresponding right (haqq); and the term duty also
comprises, in this context, liability to punishment.”[16]
Asad then argues convincingly that among the “inalienable rights” of every
Muslim is that he “must be assured of an equitable standard of living commensurate
with the resources at the disposal of the community.” [17]The
Islamic state, Asad adds, “must be so constituted that every individual, man
and woman, may enjoy that minimum material well-being…for there can be no real
happiness and security and strength in a society that permits some of its
members to suffer undeserved want while others have more than they need.”[18]
Where the state does not “fulfil its duties with regard to everyone of
its members, it has no right to invoke the full sanction of criminal law
(hadd) against the individual transgressor, but must confine itself to
milder forms of administrative punishment.”[19]
Raquibuz Zaman concurs with Asad, arguing
that “before anyone’s hand can be cut off, the Islamic state must ensure
that every citizen, Muslim as well as non-Muslim, has economic, social and
political protection and security.”[20]According
to the former Chief Justice of the Egyptian Supreme Court and a leading jurist,
Said al-Ashmawy, in an interview with Joyce Davis, the hudood
“punishments are to be applied if we reach a just society in which everyone
can find political and economic justice.”[21]
These arguments have formed the basis of
Muslim criticism of amputation sentences in northern Nigeria. Ibrahim El-Zakzaky,
leader of the Muslim Brothers, a radical Islamist Group, predicated his
opposition to the hudood on these premises. Radical Muslim intellectuals
have been scathing in their criticism of the implementation of these laws in
what is by all indicators one of the poorest parts of the globe.[22]
The prolific and popular northern Muslim columnist, Aliyu Tilde, has made
similar arguments.[23]
I have elsewhere tried to analyze this
debate using the tools of Discourse Theory and shown the need to approach legal
rulings in a discursive manner, such that “the meaning of a term is understood
in terms of the context (social, historical, economic) that gives it meaning.”[24]
I argued in the paper that this is consistent with the jurisprudence of ‘Umar,
the second caliph of Islam, as reflected in his suspension of the amputation in
the year of famine, his refusal to give the victorious companions four-fifths of
the conquered territory of Iraq as prescribed in the Qur’an, and his
suspension of compulsory payment of alms to non-Muslims. Each of these acts
reflected a comprehension of injunctions within a given discursive and thus a
possibility for non-compliance in a different discursive horizon.
Thus Muslim thinkers who argue against the
implementation of the sentence of amputation do so not on the basis of the
argument that it is wrong or inhumane but on the strict understanding that the
state can apply this punishment on citizens only after it has provided for their
welfare. The higher the quality of life of all citizens the more unjustifiable
theft becomes and thus the more deserving of the harshest punishment. This
perhaps underlies the Qur’anic choice of the word “zulm” (injustice
or wickedness) in referring to the crime of theft.[25]
What is immoral, if immorality be the term, is not the form of punishment but
its callous implementation by politicians who have failed (and continue in their
failure) to live up to their responsibilities to the citizenry and emulate the
standards set by the leaders of the first Muslim community.
These arguments are of course rejected
completely by the various manifestations of what Roy calls
“neo-fundamentalism”, a movement characterized by its rhetoric on the need
for a strict application of the Shari’ah, but which lacks a coherent
political theory.[26]
This group does not recognize the critical role of a Discursive Horizon in
conferring meaning on legal terms. To its members, as noted by Said, these
matters are “ahistorical categories, not subject to and therefore outside the
critical scrutiny of true believers, who are supposed to accept them on
faith.”[27]
But precisely because the implementation of the penal laws has been appropriated
as the proof of return to authentic Islam, the system is wired towards supplying
evidence of its sincerity by “reviving” the law. Indeed all those states
that have passed new criminal laws incorporating the hudood but not yet
amputated any hands and/or feet are said to be unserious and insincere in their
commitment to Islam and the Shari’ah. Preachers, particularly of proto-Wahhabi
persuasion, whip up popular sentiment against these governors and point out as
role models those states that have carried out these sentences with
quasi-sadistic despatch and alacrity. The result is that a number of rulings are
made which contravene the law itself and which have caused international uproar
and exposed the religion to misunderstanding and avoidable ridicule. Prime among
these are the sentences on the two divorcees mentioned above which I will
analyse in what follows from the perspective of Maliki jurisprudence.
III. Pregnancy as proof of zina
in Maliki law: A critical reading of
Khaleel’s Mukhtasar.[28]
In the chapter “on the hadd of zina
and related matters”, Khaleel sets out the three admissible proofs of zina(fornication)
in Maliki law in the following terms. “(Zina) is proven by:
A
single confession (Iqrar) unless it is withdrawn in any manner
whatsoever (mutlaqan) or (unless) the confessor runs away (after
confessing) even if this happens within the course of implementation of the hadd
punishment;
Testimony
(of four witnesses to the act ie Bayyinah). The hadd is not to
be set aside (after this) even if four women testify to the woman’s intact
virginity; and
Pregnancy
in an unmarried woman, or in a slave woman whose owner does not acknowledge
(being responsible for) it. Any claim by the woman that she was raped is not
acceptable unless where accompanied by corroborating proof.”[29]
The states implementing Shari’ah
have adopted this position and thus recognize any of these three as legitimate
basis for convicting a Muslim for the crime of zina and carrying out the hadd.
The first and second proofs above are accepted unanimously by the Schools of
Law, since proof by acknowledgement or confession (iqrar) was accepted by
the Prophet and proof based on testimony of four witnesses (bayyinah) is
required by the Qur’an. Of the established Sunni schools, only the Maliki
school accepts pregnancy as prima facie evidence of zina and a
basis for the hadd. In all other schools, subject to a few minor
qualifications, pregnancy is at best circumstantial evidence and conviction only
takes place based on confession. I have elsewhere critiqued the Maliki ruling on
this matter and endorsed the view of the majority[30]
so this will not be discussed here. What will be established, however, is that
although in theory pregnancy is proof of zina in Maliki law, in practice
it is impossible to convict a divorcee or widow and punish her for zina
based on pregnancy in that school of law. On a proper understanding of Maliki
jurisprudence such women can only be convicted based testimony or confession.
Elaborating on this point is the subject of this section of the paper.
Both Safiya Hussein and Amina Lawal were
convicted based on 1) their confession to the act of fornication and 2) the fact
of pregnancy and childbirth out of wedlock. The proof of confession is easily
dispensed with, and we will show later that those confessions simply reflected
the failure of the system to provide appropriate guidance such that both women
incriminated themselves in the courts of first instance. For now it is
sufficient to point out that the “confession” effectively became invalid
when it was withdrawn on appeal.
The Sokoto Shari’ah Court of
Appeal upheld Safiya Hussein’s right to withdraw her confession even though
government lawyers had tried to dispute that right. In acquitting her, however,
the court did not address the substantive issue of proof based on pregnancy,
relying instead on the more expedient technical point that the alleged offence
was committed before the state passed the new Shari’ah criminal code.
In the case of Amina Lawal, the Upper Shari’ah Court in Funtua, which
recently heard the appeal, ruled that she could not withdraw her confession, and
concurred with the ruling that pregnancy was proof of zina given by the lower Shari’ah
Court.
The error of the ruling on confession is
self-evident from the text of the Mukhtasar quoted above which explicitly
counts confession as proof “unless it is withdrawn in any manner
whatsoever.” It is trite Islamic Law that in matters involving the hadd apart
from the offence of slander (in which the right of humans is also involved)
withdrawal of confession is possible, even encouraged. To quote Schacht, “in
contrast with the acknowledgement concerning other matters, the confession of an
offence involving a hadd can be withdrawn (ruju’); it is even
recommended that the kadi should suggest this possibility to the person
who has confessed, except in the case of false accusation of unlawful
intercourse.”[31]
Lawal’s lawyers have appealed the ruling at the State Shari’ah Court
of Appeal in Katsina, the same level at which Hussein’s sentence was quashed.
Without doubt this particular ruling on confession will be overturned, leaving
us with the question of pregnancy, which is yet to be addressed by the appeal
courts. We now turn to this question.
A pregnant woman is either married or
unmarried. An unmarried woman is either previously married or not. Each of these
categories has rulings in family law pertaining to the legitimacy of the
pregnancy and only when this is understood can the text of the Mukhtasar on
the third proof of zina be properly interpreted.
In the case of a woman or girl who is known
never to have been married and who is resident in a locality (that is, not a
traveler), pregnancy is taken as prima facie evidence of zina in
Maliki Law. As stated by Khaleel, even if she claims she was raped this claim is
not to be accepted unless it is accompanied by corroborating signs which,
according to commentators, may be for instance that she came bleeding or crying
at the time it happened.[32]
In the case of a married woman who has a
child it is presumed that the child belongs to her husband in so far as a period
of not less than six lunar months has elapsed between the date on which the
marriage was contracted and the date of birth of the child. This is the
unanimous position of all Sunni schools of law.[33] Where the child is born
less than six lunar months (175 days) from the date of marriage, the husband’s
acknowledgement is required to establish its legitimate attribution to him.
This leaves us with the final category,
women who are divorced or whose husbands have died and who are found to be
pregnant and to have a child without having first remarried. This is the
category into which both Safiya Hussein and Amina Lawal fall. The basic
operative rule Maliki Law is that so long as the child is delivered within the
recognized gestation period of pregnancy then it belongs to the (former/dead)
husband automatically unless (in the case of a living former husband) he
repudiates the child through the
oath of Li’an (which will be explained below)[34].
In the chapter “on Iddah (the waiting period for divorcees and widows)
and related matters” the author of the Mukhtasar has this to say:
“And
if she gives birth to a child after (the waiting period) before expiry of the
maximum gestation for pregnancy it is attached to the (former/dead) husband
unless the husband (if alive) rejects it with the oath of Li’an. If she
has doubts about the presence of pregnancy she is to tarry. And is (the maximum
gestation) five years or four years? There is a dispute.”[35]
Evidently, only where the divorcee or widow
has a child after four or after five years from the date of divorce or
husband’s death is there a basis for taking this pregnancy as proof of zina.
But even this is not at all certain in Maliki Law. Khaleel quotes Malik’s
fatwa from the Mudawwanah to the effect that “were she (ie the divorcee
or widow) to remarry four months short of the fifth year (from date of divorce
or husband’s death), and then have a child in the fifth month (of the new
marriage), it belongs to neither husband and she should face the hadd.”
Khaleel then adds, the word “wastushkilat”, referring to this ruling,
indicating that it is viewed as problematic (by some of the shaykhs-
prominent jurists- of the Maliki school).[36]
The ruling is basically this. A previously
married woman remarries after four years and eight months of the end of her last
marriage and has a baby after five months of the new marriage. Because five
months is less than the minimum gestation the child does not belong to the new
husband. However the total period between termination of last marriage and birth
is five years and one month ie. beyond the maximum term (which is here taken as
five years). So the child is not the first husband’s. Malik therefore ruled
that in such a circumstance the pregnancy is proof of zina, the child is
illegitimate and the hadd should be applied on the woman.
As noted by Khaleel this fatwa of
Malik’s has been received with skepticism by Maliki jurists. ‘Ulaysh
mentions Abdul Haqq and Lakhmi among the shaykhs that find the ruling
problematic “since the maximum gestation of five years was not fixed by Allah
nor His Messenger as to warrant distancing the child from the first husband and
lapidating the woman.”[37]
He also quoted Abul Hasan al-Qabisi as viewing with gravity “that a child’s
legitimacy from the first husband be denied and a woman be lapidated for having
a child after five years by one month as if the bar of five years was fixed by
Allah and His Messenger.”[38]
Adding to the complexity of the issue is the fact that the jurists differ widely
over what the maximum gestation is. Indeed Malik himself has given conflicting
rulings. Al-Dasuki sums the position up in his Hashiya when he states
that “ it has been reported from Malik that the maximum term is six years and
narrated from him that it is seven years. The inconsistency is a shubha (uncertainty
which prevents the hadd). So reflect on this.”[39]
The sum of this argument is the following.
Where a divorcee or a widow has a child within the maximum gestation the child
belongs automatically to the previous husband unless he is willing to go through
the process of Li’an. Where the maximum gestation is exceeded then,
according to Imam Malik, the pregnancy is prima facie evidence of zina.
However this maximum gestation has not been fixed in the Qur’an or Hadith
and the jurists differ widely on its limitation[40].
Malik himself has on considerable authority placed it on different occasions at
four, five, six and seven years. Because of this there will always be an element
of uncertainty on the question of maximum gestation and therefore the legitimacy
of the child and its attribution to the former husband should be presumed. The
jurists clearly do not accept the Imam’s ruling on implementing the hadd
on a widow or divorcee even where her pregnancy extends beyond five
years. Indeed the mere fact that Khaleel draws attention to the dissenting
views of Lakhmi, Qabisi and ‘Abdul haqq on this ruling is a pointer to his own
reservations. We have shown that these reservations are implicitly reinforced by
leading commentators of the Mukhtasar, particularly Muhammad ‘Ulaysh(in
the Minahul Jaleel) and ‘Allama Shamsuddeen al-Dasuki (in his
Hashiya).
There is a final, related question in
comparative jurisprudence. It is clear from the text of the Mukhtasar
that only when the former husband denies the child through Li’an can
the child’s legitimacy be questioned. In this Maliki Law differs a bit from
the Hanafi School. In the latter school, where a divorcee has a child within
permissible gestation (two years in their case), the mother remaining unmarried,
this is taken as “conclusive proof that he is the legitimate child of that man
unless (a) the husband had refused, or refuses, to own the child; or (b) the
child was born after the expiration of six lunar months from the date on which
the woman had accepted that the period of her iddat had come to an
end.”[41]
This second condition is not accepted by
Maliki jurists. ‘Ulaysh writes in his commentary on the Mukhtasar that “her
case is not adversely affected were she to acknowledge completion of her iddah.
This is because menstruation as a pointer to the absence of pregnancy applies to
a majority of cases only (ie not to all cases) since a few pregnant women do
indeed menstruate.”[42]In
other words, the fact of menstruation by a woman during iddah is not to
be taken as conclusive proof of the absence of pregnancy.
This leaves us with that single condition
as contained in the Mukhtasar. The process of Li’an is one in
which a husband takes an oath before a court four times swearing by Allah the
Almighty that his wife is guilty of zina. After that he then says
“Allah’s curse be upon me if I am a liar in my accusation of zina
against my wife (and he should name her). Once the husband takes this oath the
child is not his. However the woman is only subjected to hadd if she
fails to take a counter oath in which she also swears four times by Allah the
Almighty that her husband is a liar in his accusation of zina against
her. After that she says “Allah’s wrath be upon me if he is truthful in his
accusation of zina against me.”[43]
What becomes obvious is that although in
theory Maliki Law considers pregnancy in the unmarried woman as proof of zina,
in practice it is impossible to convict a previously married woman of zina
and lapidate her, unless there are four witnesses to the act or unless she
voluntary confesses and refuses to withdraw that confession, her being mature
and of sound mind and aware of the meaning of the crime and the gravity of the
penalty. The difficulty of convicting her arises because quite apart from the
very long gestation period for pregnancy in Maliki Law of Personal Status, the
contradictions among jurists in fixing it are considered by leading jurists of
the Maliki School sufficient reason to prevent the hadd in criminal law.
This conclusion is inescapable from a critical reading of the Mukhtasar
and its commentaries. Furthermore, whereas other schools have taken her
acknowledgement of the completion of her waiting period as proof of absence of
pregnancy, Maliki law gives her the benefit of doubt even
in this circumstance.
In consequence, for all practical purposes
pregnancy is not proof of zina in a previously married woman
in Maliki law, and only the former husband has the locus standi to
initiate action against her. If he does he must go through the grave process of li’an,
taking a major oath and invoking God’s curse upon himself, risking having his
ex-wife stoned to death on the basis of suspicion- since he was presumably not
an eye witness to the act of zina of which he accuses her.
In this respect, Maliki law paradoxically
offers widows and divorcees more protection than other schools. This is because
in the three other schools of law a child born after expiry of gestation is not
automatically considered as the legitimate son of the previous husband, even
though lapidation can only take place based on confession by the woman. In
Maliki law as we have seen, there is considerable authority for presuming its
legitimacy due to the quasi
open-ended gestation period. This is why in spite of the ruling on pregnancy it
is difficult to find historical evidence of lapidation based on it. Indeed in
the Islamic caliphate of pre-colonial northern Nigeria Christelow has concluded,
based on available data, that with the exception of flagellation for fornication
and consumption of intoxicants, the hadd penalty was seldom applied.[44]
The sentences being passed in northern Nigeria reflect ignorance of or undue
politicization of the law, rather than a strict application thereof.
The converse is true in the case of
previously unmarried women. Here Maliki law places upon them the burden of
proof. It is almost as if having gone to extremes to give divorcees and widows
benefit of the doubt, the jurists make up by giving those who have never married
no such benefit, at the risk of convicting victims of rape for zina. For
all practical purposes pregnancy as proof of zina can only be
realistically invoked in the case of previously unmarried women, for whom the hadd
is 100 lashes.
The last section leads to interesting
questions in legal theory, as we try to understand and unravel the logic of
Maliki jurists. This will hopefully be the subject matter of a forthcoming
paper. For now, what is obvious is that pregnancy and childbirth should not have
been the basis for suspecting, much less charging and convicting Amina Lawal and
Safiya Hussein for the crime of zina in received Maliki law. To compound
the issue each of them reportedly had the child less than two years after date
of divorce, long before the point at which a disagreement exists between the
Imam and the Shaykhs. With proper guidance and due process the state
should not have a locus standi to prosecute the women and they would not
have been placed in a position where they incriminated themselves and thus
stripped themselves of the in-built protection in Maliki Law.
[1] See S. L. Sanusi, “The Class Character of Religious Revival: Shari’ah and Ideology in Northern Nigeria”, a paper presented at the Second Essex Graduate Conference in Political Theory, University of Essex, Colchester, May 4-5, 2001. Available on www.gamji.com/sanusi.htm
[2] For example S.L. Sanusi, “Shariacracy in Nigeria : The Intellectual Roots of Islamist Discourses”, published in Akin Osuntokun et al., Abacha & Beyond. Also available on www.gamji.com/sanusi.htm
[3] Karl Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies, esp. chapters 1 & 2.
[4] Chief Ernest Shonekan.
[5] See S. L. Sanusi, “Power-shift and Rotation: between emancipation and obfuscation”. Available on www.gamji.com/sanusi.htm
[6] Popper, K., Op. Cit., p. 8
[7] See for instance my “Islam, Probity and Accountability: A Critical Essay in History, Philosophy and Law”, NTA channel 10 Annual Ramadhan Lecture, Nigerian Law School, Lagos, December 3, 2000. Available on www.gamji.com/sanusi.htm
[8] Edward Said, Orientalism, p. 333
[9] Safiya Husseini from Sokoto whose appeal to the shariah court of Appeal was upheld; and Amina Lawal from Funtua in Katsina state. Her appeal to the Upper Shari’ah Court was turned down but her lawyers have filed an appeal at the State Shari’ah Court of Appeal in Katsina.
[10]
With a few exceptions. A notable Muslim critic of the Hudood from a
“human rights” perspective is the Sudanese scholar and prolific writer,
Professor Abdu An-Na’im. See his Toward an Islamic Reformation.
[11] S.L. Sanusi, “Between Shari’ah and Barbarism,” Weekly Trust newspaper, August 3, 2000. Also available on www.nigerdeltacongress.com
[12] A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, 107
[13] The Qur’an, 5:38
[14] See for example, A.A. An-Na’im, Toward an Islamic Reformation, pp 131-132
[15] Muhammad Asad, The Message of the Qur’an, 150
[16] Ibid. ,149
[17] Ibid,149-150
[18] Ibid,150
[19] Ibid
[20] M. Raquibuz Zaman, “Islamic Perspectives on territorial Boundaries and Autonomy”, in Sohail H. Hashmi, Islamic Political Ethics, 85-86
[21] Joyce M. Davis, Between Jihad and Salaam, 157
[22] See Mohammed, A. S. et al., “Human Living Conditions and Reforms of Legal Systems: The Talakawa and the issue of Shariah in Contemporary Nigeria”, www.ceddert.com/article2.htm
[23] See Aliyu Tilde, “Shariah and our Welfare”, Weekly Trust, April 27, 2000.
[24] “ The Class Character of Religious Revival”, Op. Cit. See also, for a full discussion on the examples given from ‘Umar’s rulings, Al-Qadi Abu Yusuf, Kitab al-Kharaj, 13-25; M. Bultajiy, Manhaj ‘Umar b. al-Khattab fi ‘l-Tashri’, passim; Abdullahi An-Na’im, Toward an Islamic Reformation, 28; and Raquibuz Zaman, Op. Cit, 86
[25] See Qur’an, 5: 39
[26] Olivier Roy, The Failure of Political Islam, esp Chapter 5
[27] Edward Said, Op. Cit., 333
[28]
The Mukhtasar of Khaleel is the magnum opus of Maliki law in northern
Nigeria (and indeed the whole of West Africa and most of the Maghreb).
References hereunder are made to the text as contained in Muhammad
‘Ulaysh’s nine-volume commentary, Minah
al-Jaleel ,Sharh ‘ala Mukhtasar Sayyid
Khaleel.
[29] Minahul Jaleel, 9:255-259
[30] See my “Class, Gender and a Political Economy of Shari’ah”, “The Class Character of Religious Revival” and “The Refutation of Rushdie-fication”, www.gamji.com/sanusi.htm. Also refer to Ibn Qudamah, Al- Mughni, Vol 10 esp pp 191 ff; Al-Jazairi, Kitabul fiqh ala ‘l-Madhahib al-Arba’, Vol 5 73, 94 and passim; M. Abu Hassaan, Ahkam al-Jareemah wa ‘l-‘Uqoobah fi ‘l-Shariah al-Islamiyyah,255-257; Ibn Hazm , Al- Muhalla, Vol 11: 155-157, among others.
[31] Joseph Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law, 177
[32] Minahul Jaleel, 9:259
[33] Imam Abu Zahra, Al-Ahwal al-Shakhsiyyah,385; Syed Ameer Ali, Muhammadan Law, 2:170;
J. Schacht, Op. Cit., 166;M.M. AbdulHameed, Al-Ahwal al-Shakhsiyyah fi ‘l-Shari’ah al-Islamiyyah, 357; David Pearl & Werner Menski, Muslim Family Law, 400
[34] See p 9 below
[35] Minahul Jaleel, 4:307
[36] Ibid. 4:308
[37] Ibid.
[38] Ibid
[39] Shamsuddeen al-Dasuki, Hashiya al-Dasuki ‘ala Sharh al-Kabeer, 2:474
[40] See N. J. Coulson, A History of Islamic Law,174
[41] Section 128 of the Pakistani Qanun-e-shahadat Order 1984, reproduced in Pearl & Menski, Op. Cit.,404
[42] Minahul Jaleel, 4:307
[43] See Pearl & Menski, Op. Cit,406
[44] Allan Christelow, “The Persistence and Transformation in the Politics of Sharia-Nigeria, 1958-2002: In Search of an Explanatory Framework”, paper presented at the Third Symposium of the Islamic Law in Africa Project, Cape Town, South Africa, 11-14 March, 2002