FRIDAY DISCOURSE WITH DR. ALIYU TILDEMemo To Liman Ciroma Committeealiyutilde@yahoo.comPresident
Obasanjo has constituted a technical committee on local government
reforms. He is principally concerned with the alarming corruption at the
“third tier” of government and the possible involvement of
traditional rulers in its future administration. The committee is now
headed by Malam Liman Ciroma, after the death of its first chairman,
late Etsu Nupe. This essay is a memo, sort of, briefly discussing the
difficulty of the task of the committee and containing some few
suggestions on the reform measures required. But as it is the tradition
with students of administration law, it starts with a review of major
trends in local government administration during the last fifty years in
the country. This
is not the first time local governments are coming under scrutiny. In
fact, it appears that in every decade since 1950, there has been a
reconstruction of their structure and a redefinition of their roles.
Between 1952 and 1966 the emphasis was on democratization under the
ambit of regional administrations. Traditional rulers were increasingly
becoming less powerful as indirect rule gradually gave way to popular
participation. The
second phase started immediately after states were created in 1966.
Instruments of coercion – police, prison and judiciary – were taken
over by state and federal governments, while development matters like
primary education, health, roads, water, etc, remained under local
government councils. More local councils were also created. However,
for the next decade there were still no nationwide rules regarding their
structure and functions. That had to wait until 1976 when harmonization
become the thrust of reform. Guidelines for the creation of new ones
were given; committees, councils – executive and traditional – local
government service boards, and so on, were formed. The objectives were
four: decentralization of decision-making, stabilization of
administration, popular participation and recognition of the future role
of traditional rulers. In
preparation for civil rule, there was the growing need to insulate local
governments from undue influence of, and abuses by, state governments.
The temptation to make them completely independent was high, given the
failure of the 1976 reform to provide such protection. But 1979
constitution, in respect for the principle of federalism, suppressed
that temptation. And though the constitution gave guidelines to their
creation and guaranteed the democratic basis of their councils, it was
silent over whether state governments can be compelled to carry out
their constitutional duties vis-à-vis local governments. Jakande and
some governors dissolved elected councils and replaced them by
management committees, an act that the courts declared unconstitutional.
Many councils were created on political grounds which were abolished by
the military in 1984. The
temptation to make local governments independent finally became
irresistible during the failed transition program of the Babangida
administration. Their number was doubled in one instant, contrary to his
earlier promise, and they were directly connected to the federal
government. The reason behind this could easily be discerned from the
fact that Babangida belonged to a different party – the military –
and the governors were civilians; opening a direct line of communication
with the center was meant to give him direct control of grassroots
politics, which was necessary for manipulating the transition program.
This was the period when corruption in local government, like in the
federal, reached its peak. Local governments got the liberty they never
dreamt of. In fact, they were encouraged by the federal government to
look at state governments with disdain. The supervisory roles of state
governments were returned to state governments under the Abacha regime,
and some sanity prevailed for a while. With
return to democracy in 1999, massive corruption returned. Local
governments also became ponds in the game of political manipulation.
Many new ones were created, as during the Second Republic, which were
not be recognized by the constitution. The inability of the Obasanjo
administration to compile voters’ register was used as a pretext for
the dissolution of their councils and misappropriation of their status
by state governments. Under
this condition, the federal government is contemplating to reinstate the
hold of traditional aristocracy over the affairs of local government, a
move supported by a nostalgia for a past. I find it funny when people,
for lack of good recollection, regard the era when local governments
were under aristocratic control as golden. It was far from it. Let us,
for example, hesitate here and recall something that happened in the
defunct Northern House of Assembly in August 1950. Sir Abubakar Tafawa
Balewa, in what is considered as his most remarkable speech, cited
bribery and corruption among the reasons for his call for native
authority reforms. He said: “One feature of native administrations
above all demands the attention of the commission. It is, as all of you
are well aware, the twin curses of bribery and corruption which pervade
every rank and department… I cannot over emphasize the importance of
eradicating this ungodly evil… Unless the commission fully realize the
gravity of this problem and tackle it with courage, any recommendations
they make for superficial reforms are bound to fail. It is a most
disturbing fact that few officials can afford to be honest.” Obasanjo
may therefore need to know that he is faced with an “ungodly evil”
that is possibly as old as himself. The committee he constituted would
hence need to study the situation carefully and dispassionately. There
are many reasons why the committee may not be finding its task easy.
One, the issue of corruption is not limited to local governments. It
will thus be difficult to envisage a prudent local system working under
the supervision or control of corrupt state and federal governments. Two,
in countries ridden with corruption, democracy seems to guarantee poor
governance. This arises from the fact that popular participation under
such circumstances promotes only mediocre personalities in contempt for
the honest. In addition, in a democratic rule, leadership is farther
weakened by enormous pressure from the people and the ruling party
seeking patronage, the refusal of which means losing the chance for a
second tenure. Finally, decision-making is tedious, bringing in more
contention and, thus, taking longer time to arrive at. Three,
there is lack of competent aspirants for the positions of chairman and
councilor in most local governments in the country, a situation
exacerbated by declining standard of education. To worsen the situation,
the existing rules discourage civil servants from filling the gap. Four,
a lot of the corruption is forced on local governments by state
government from above. Governors and public servants at local government
service commission and ministry of local governments use their
supervisory role to misappropriate local government funds. Many times,
governors dip their ten fingers deep into their treasuries in the name
of loans while the commission and the ministry become accomplices to
corrupt practices perpetrated by the local government councils. Five,
this nation has long abdicated from the principle of reward and
punishment. Where crime is not punished, deterrence is lost and the
treasury becomes the treasure of anybody entrusted with it. Local
governments are poorly audited, as does many state governments. The
irony is that Obasanjo, the reformist, has sacked the auditor-general of
the federation less than a year ago for simply carrying out the
constitutional duty of publishing his annual report. Etc… Notwithstanding
the above impediments, the committee may find the following suggestions
useful. One, to improve the quality of participation, the law preventing
civil servants from contesting elections should be removed in case of
local government election, as an exemption. The risk should be lessened,
such that civil servants can return to their jobs if they fail to secure
the ticket of their party or win the seat they vied for. Also, the term
they would serve as councilors or chairmen of their local governments
should be added to their years of service. These will help us get rid of
illiterates becoming our local government chairmen. Two,
I have earlier expressed the need to raise the educational qualification
for eligibility to contest local government seats. Leaving the affairs
of between 100,000 and 250,000 people in the hands of a secondary school
failure is sheer imprudence. A recognized diploma for the post of a
councilor is necessary, while a degree or its equivalent is needed for
the post of local government chairman, both with at least 10 years
experience. Three,
I would like the constitution to set conditions for creation of new
local governments, especially conditions relating to population and
viability. It appears, as it was first envisaged in 1976, that there
would be no end to the demand for creation of new local governments.
Given the enormous overheads required to run them, creation of new local
governments simply depletes the little resources that would have been
used to serve the people; the whole subvention may go to paying staff
salaries and allowances of elected officials. That is the situation in
many local governments now. Four,
conduct of local government election need to return to INEC. State
electoral commissions can never be fair in their conduct. By
implication, the governor is given a free hand to determine the winner
of the local elections. With the expected increase in perfection and
improved efficiency of the electoral process, I have no doubt that the
future will find this suggestion useful. Five,
it is necessary to harmonize local government elections with those of
state and federal offices. All elections should hold at the same time,
and the tenures should be the same. This will prevent the recurrence of
our present predicament. Six,
since there is no way local governments could be allowed to be
independent of state governments under a federal arrangement, there is
the dire need for a constitutional provision that will prevent any
governor from using local government funds in any way, not even with the
consent of the local government chairman or council. Seven,
it would not be a bad idea if the presidential system is reviewed at the
local government level. Here the debate of the 1979 constitution
drafting committee will be found very useful. Eight,
the roles of traditional rulers in local government administration
should be left to individual state houses of assembly to determine.
There is still a big disparity in the social relevance of their royal
highnesses across the country. They are undoubtedly playing the most
important stabilizing role presently, but defining their responsibility
in governance under a democratic dispensation is a bit scary and
difficult. Nine
and finally, staffing local governments need to be upgraded; the power
of any computer depends on the size of its memory and the speed of its
processor. Rather than keeping staff of 1950 standards, we need more
graduates and professionals, similar to those in the services of states
and federal governments. In the end, Nigeria must maintain local governments for the purpose of addressing local matters of communities, in spite of their shortcomings. What it requires is purposeful leadership, which, unfortunately, our selfishness and the contradiction in our composition have denied us so far. As the members of the technical committee sit down to write their recommendations, I am sure one fact will not fail to strike their minds: Corruption is not in the system; it is in the mind. That is the monster that Obasanjo should give a real fight. So far, he has not gone beyond mere rhetoric. |