NIGERIAN
CIVIL WAR FILE
Federal
Nigerian Army Blunders of the Nigerian Civil War (1)
By
Nowa
Omoigui
The
failure to relieve large isolated battle groups in critical theaters of war
often portends devastating military and political consequences. Classical examples previously noted include Stalingrad and
Dien Bien Phu. Owerri was no
different. The Biafran recapture of
Owerri following the breakout and fighting withdrawal of the 16th
Brigade resulted in very significant consequences on both sides.
Biafran
consequences
Zdenek
Cervenka identified five consequences to Biafra of the recapture of Owerri. They
are:
1.
It sent a signal to Nigeria and the world that despite all the reverses
of the war to date, Biafra was still capable of significant resistance.
2.
It destroyed the myth surrounding the federal 3rd Marine
Commando Division and its well known commander, Colonel B.A.M. Adekunle, a.k.a.
“Black Scorpion”.
3.
It enhanced road and telecommunications links within the residue of
Biafra.
4.
It relieved the threat to the strategic Uli-Ihiala airstrip.
5.
It created a hinge point for subsequent aggressive Biafran probes towards
Port Harcourt.
Former
Nigerian and Biafran soldiers who bore direct witness to the event have
amplified all of these consequences and more.
According to Madiebo:
“The
Owerri victory revived the dying Biafra. All
Biafrans who a few days before wanted nothing but an end to the war, now pressed
for a continuation of the struggle to the end.
The Umuahia disaster was soon forgotten and the only quarrel civilian
military tacticians had against the Army was that they allowed the enemy to
escape from Owerri. The enemy left a considerably large amount of ammunition of
different calibres, but he managed to take away almost his entire heavy
equipment including armoured vehicles and artillery pieces.
The town was completely ravaged and not a single building was habitable
without major repairs. All vehicles
not taken away by the enemy were overturned and burnt by him.”
In
addition, Madiebo claims that:
“Mass
graves were discovered all over the town and the victims appeared to be
civilians and prisoners of war.”
It
is more likely, however, that those graves were predominantly graves of the
thousands of soldiers of the 16th brigade that died between September
1968 when they first arrived and April 1969 when survivors broke out of the
siege. No official casualty count
has ever been rendered, but if Major General Shuwa’s estimate is correct, then
it can be surmised that of the approximately 3000 soldiers that confidently
thundered into the town in September 1968, about 300 made it back alive in April
1969. Assuming they were all
recovered and buried, the graves of over 2000 Nigerian soldiers killed in action
were thus among those the besieging Biafrans “discovered” after retaking the
town. In any case several independent international sources confirm that what
was left of the 16th Brigade brought along a large number of civilians and
prisoners of war out of the Owerri pocket.
That
said, favorable and unfavorable reactions within and outside the Biafran
military to the victory at Owerri were not without high drama and recrimination.
For example, Madiebo, who had held the rank of Major General since
September 1967 when he relieved Brigadier Hilary Njoku as Commander of the
Biafran Army, observed in his memoirs that:
“The
Head of State put out a long list of promotions to commemorate the recapture of
Owerri. He himself became a General
while Okwechime, Eze and Kalu were all promoted to Brigadiers.
Various others were promoted except Onwuatuegwu, the darling of the
people, who was left out of General Ojukwu’s list.
That omission became a national political issue.
“Jet 77,” the government sponsored propaganda company of
Onwuatuegwu’s “S” Division accused the Army Headquarters of not promoting
Onwuatuegwu because it hated him. The
“Jet 77” produced hand-outs for the public in which they revealed that the
“S” Division under Onwuatuegwu had cleared the Ugba junction and Owerri and,
on each occasion, the gallant Onwuatuegwu got nothing in return but humiliation
from the GOC of the Army.”
“I
was not worried by this propaganda which I knew was just one of those false
rumours deliberately released against various individuals from time to time in
order to control their popularity with the masses.
I often disagreed with Onwuatuegwu in the same way I disagreed
occasionally with all other commanders under me.
To talk of an Army Commander in war loving or hating officers under his
command is being childish in the extreme. In
such a game involving human lives, a commander’s aim is to end it successfully
as soon as possible. Onwuatuegwu,
as an individual being the godfather of my first son and the officer closest to
my family, knew I was putting the welfare of the people before family ties and
friendship.”
Incidentally,
newly promoted Brigadier Michael Okwechime, the first indigenous Commander of
Nigerian Army Corps of Engineers, was the Adjutant General of the Biafran army
at that time. His last
“Nigerian” posting was as the officer in charge of Engineering and
Communications in the 4th Area Command HQ in Benin City.
Like Brigadier Conrad Nwawo, he too was based in the Midwest at the time
of the Biafran invasion in August 1967, but folded into the Biafran rearguard as
it retreated to Biafra. Brigadier
Anthony Eze, on the other hand, was then Commander of the Biafran 12 Division in
the Aba sector. He had served in
the Nigerian Army as the first indigenous commander of the Corps of Signals.
His last “Nigerian” appointment was as the Commanding Officer of the
Lagos Garrison before the July 29, 1966 coup.
“After
the fall of Umuahia and the recapture of Owerri, General Ojukwu in May, 1969,
took two significant decisions for reasons best known to him. Thereafter I was allowed to see the Head of State on military
matters at any time of the day or night without booking for an appointment in
advance----a privilege I had not enjoyed before then. Again the Head of State decided to set up a Joint Planning
Committee chairmanned by himself, with the Chief of Staff, General Effiong, and
the Commanders of Army, Navy and Air Force as members.
In addition, I was given the privilege of controlling for the first time,
a small fraction of the national ammunition holding, but the bulk of it still
remained under the control of the Head of State.”
These
tepid changes reflected an effort on the part of Ojukwu to signal sensitivity to
criticisms of his leadership style that dated back to the beginning of the
conflict. Civilians were often
played off against soldiers. He created special units that reported to him and
no one else, and regularly subsumed the authority and responsibilities of his
military commanders. As US
Marine Major Stafford observed in his Staff College analysis of the war, Ojukwu
“established directorates to control the logistical aspects of the war
efforts, thus creating a rivalry not only with the military but also with the
existing civil service.” Stafford
concluded “the cumulative effect of these special units and
extra-organizational control groups divided the direction of the war effort.
They took authority away from those most responsible for fighting the war--the
military--and institutionalized Ojukwu's actions to mitigate any potential
political opposition by producing a fragmented power structure that answered
only to him. “
Indeed,
long after the war, in an interview a few years ago with the Nigerian Army Civil
War Historical Investigative Team, Ojukwu himself said (among other things):
“……I
sat in my office as Military Governor, Head of State, whatever it was, Army
Commander, I was them all…(Italics mine)…”
“…..Believe
you me, nobody went into battle on my side with more than 10 rounds in his
rifle. Nobody! I will go further.
As Head of State, I was the one to allocate mortar shells to various
companies. (Italics mine) Whenever,
during the war, you heard of a serious bombardment from the Biafran side, that
should be taken as a sign that I personally commanded that front…..I was in
personal command so I could call for certain extra ammunition…...”
(Italics mine)
“All
those privileges and changes were in effect an eye wash, designed to satisfy
civilian and military pressures, which had existed since the beginning of the
war, in favour of the establishment of a war council.
Civilians now had the impression that not only did we do joint planning,
but also that the Army Commander controlled all ammunition.
The Joint Planning Committee met once a week from May 1969 to the end of
the war but not one of the 14 operational plans, which it produced, was ever
carried out. The committee planned
all the time without knowing what was available; and invariably at the end of
each plan it discovered that there were no resources for such a plan which would
then be discarded and a new plan produced.
The Planning Committee under Brigadier Okwechime worked like that until
the end of the war. However, we
looked forward to JPC meetings because they were held in the State House, one of
the very few places in Biafra where one could get a glass of cold beer.”
On
the federal Nigerian side, according to Major General Oluleye (rtd),
“With
the loss of Owerri, Benjy’s [ie Colonel Benjamin Adekunle’s] image was both
militarily and politically dented. Army Headquarters pressed fanatically that
Benjy had to be relieved to save further loss of lives.
The C-in-C did not agree until the rebels came close to Igritta and
civilians in Port Harcourt started fleeing back to Lagos. I think the C-in-C was
more concerned with political stability in the rear.
Had there been no set backs, relieving Benjy could have been impossible. Benjy had become spent months before.
It
was at this stage that the C-in-C directed me to implement an earlier
recommendation of splitting the Division into two.
But I told him I had no resources and went further to state that there
was no alternative to the removal of the Black Scorpion.
It was on this occasion that the Chief of Naval Staff, Vice Admiral
[Commodore] JEA Wey described me as the ‘Ifa Oracle of the Army’ adding that
I gave indication of a major disaster occurring sometime in the southern sector
but that I could not predict the exact time.
On this note, the C-in-C gave up the idea of retaining Benjy in the
front. He then directed that I should head a panel to recommend the
necessary changes. The panel
recommended the reliefs of all the Field Commanders so that tribal
meanings might not be read into the changes. (Italics mine)
As
at that time, the famous 3rd Marine Commando had been crippled and it
required rebuilding through reinforcements of all forms.
The Black Scorpion had become completely worn out. He had become [so]
unpopular among the rank and file of his division that he could not safely visit
the front again for fear of dear life.”
In
fact AHQ received many petitions against Adekunle from some of his own Brigade
Commanders and Staff officers. Others
simply abandoned the Division in protest against him, without authority.
Oluleye’s assessment is consistent with that of General Olusegun
Obasanjo (rtd). In his opinion,
“The
Federal victory in capturing Umuahia, the next rebel administrative headquarters
after Enugu, was almost immediately effectively nullified by the loss of Owerri
to the rebels. The rebels, strengthened and emboldened by their recapture of
Owerri, swiftly advanced southwards to threaten Igritta, a distance of fifteen
miles north of Port Harcourt on the Owerri road. The federal finger-tip hold on
Aba was considerable weakened. The morale of the soldiers at least of 3 Marine
Commando Division was at its lowest ebb. Desertion and absence from duty without
leave was rife in the Division. The despondence and general lack of will to
fight in the soldiers was glaringly manifest in the large number of cases of
self-inflicted injuries throughout the formation. Some officers tacitly
encouraged these malpractices and unsoldierly conduct by condoning such acts or
withdrawing their own kith or kin or fellow tribesmen to do guard duties in the
rear and in the officers' own houses. Distrust and lack of confidence plagued
the ranks of the officer corps. Operations were unhealthily competitive in an
unmilitary fashion and officers openly rejoiced at each other's misfortunes.
With the restrictions imposed by the Federal Military Government on many items
of imported goods and the country in the grip of inflation, the civilian
population began to show signs of impatience with a war, which appeared, to them
unending. In fact, some highly placed Nigerians started to suggest that the
Federal Government should sue for peace at all cost to prevent the disaster that
would befall it and its supporters if rebel victory seemed imminent.”
The
Biafran high command sensed all of this. Preparations
were, therefore, made for an ambitious “hot pursuit” – which eventually
began in mid-July. With
the 14 Division (under Brigadier Ogbugo Kalu) thrusting toward Port Harcourt
from Owerri, the 12 Division (under Brigadier Eze) planned to seize Aba and then
drive southwards to link up with Kalu in Port Harcourt followed by seizure of
Bonny. From there they would swing
eastwards, in collaboration with other Biafran units, with the objective of
recapturing Ikot-Ekpene and Calabar, thus evicting the federal army from the
Biafran seaboard.
Nevertheless,
in the weeks immediately following the Biafran recapture of Owerri, airwaves
were preoccupied with news reports of the 3MCDO recapture of Okpuala, Olakwo,
Obokwe, Eziama, Umukani and Umuagu. These
reports were punctuated by the subsequent kidnap of Italian oilmen at Kwale in
the Midwest by Biafran commandos on May 9, 1969.
On that same day, quietly, behind the scenes, an Army HQ operational
order was issued, changing all the federal divisional commanders.
Following an article by British Major General HT Alexander in the Sunday
Telegraph of May 11 criticizing the Nigerian military, it was publicly announced
on May 12, 1969 that Colonel Olusegun Obasanjo had replaced Colonel Benjamin
Adekunle as GOC 3 Marine Commando. On
May 16, 1969, Obasanjo physically took over the Division in the field.
Simultaneously – to avoid ethnic interpretation - Lt. Col. G.S. Jalo
relieved Col. Ibrahim Haruna of the 2nd Infantry Division while Col.
I. D. Bissala was billed to take Colonel Shuwa’s place at 1st
Infantry Divisional HQ. The actual change of command in the relatively
well-organized and managed 1st Division, however, was delayed until
the end of September.
Not
until Adekunle destroyed his own name and mythical reputation, therefore, even
among Yorubas, was Gowon finally comfortable enough – in the face of
overwhelming military justification - to fire him.
Even then, mindful of his services to the nation, he refused to probe
serious allegations made against him. Instead he promoted him substantive
Colonel and gave him a desk job as Director of Training and Planning at AHQ. He
was also careful not to tinker with the “Northern-Western” alliance against
the “East” and expose himself to charges of tribalism by replacing ALL
divisional commanders simultaneously – irrespective of military effectiveness.
To refine this further, he made sure another Yoruba officer – then
Colonel Olusegun Obasanjo - replaced Adekunle at the now famous (some say
notorious), albeit battered 3MCDO.
When
men of the 16th Brigade finally linked up with the rest of the 3MCDO
at Ohoba, they looked scrawny, bearded, and frazzled – little better than
their prisoners of war. But they
had broken out of Owerri with their rifles, trucks, field guns and armoured
vehicles, and now stood, in uniform, with ranks, behind their surviving
non-commissioned and commissioned officers, with Lt. Col. EA Etuk in front and
the lifeless body of the late Major Hamman in tow.
Battered though they appeared, they still projected the image of an
organized fighting unit – one that had earned the eternal respect of their
adversaries in combat. As Field
Marshall the Viscount Slim recalled about the men of the Burma Corps at Imphal
in 1942, “they might look like scarecrows, but they looked like soldiers
too.”
In
time to come, the 16th Brigade was reinforced, refitted and
refurbished, and returned to combat duty near the Ohaji palm plantation and
along the Umu Nelu-Umuakpu-Owerri road.
On
January 9, 1970, Owerri was captured once again – for the last time, this time
in an all out assault by the 12 Brigade under Captain Isemede, 17 Brigade under
Major Tomoye and 13 Brigade under Major Innih - and the war brought to an end.
It
is to the memory of all that perished – on both sides - during the siege of
Owerri that this article was dedicated.
APPENDIX
Throughout
this essay I have referred to this fine officer as “Etuk.”
In some publications he is referred to as “Utuk” but I have used
“Etuk” because that is what was used in the most recent official Army
publication on the Civil War. Colonel
EA Etuk (rtd) [N415] was admitted to the “Boys Company” (Nigerian Military
School) in 1954 at age 14. In 1958,
he graduated from NMS and was a soldier at the officer preparatory school at
Apapa in Lagos. He was selected for
further officer cadet training at Fort Dix in New Jersey, followed by six
months of cavalry and armored training at Fort Knox in Kentucky, both in the
United States – as part of the USAAF Officer Leadership Training program of
that era. He was commissioned Second Lieutenant in June 1963, underwent further
training and was welcomed home in 1964 by then Defence Minister, Alhaji
Muhammadu Ribadu.
Etuk
served as a subaltern in the 4th Battalion at Ibadan under the late
Lt. Col. Abogo Largema. As a
Captain he was deployed to the 2nd Brigade at Apapa under the late
Brigadier Zakaria Maimalari. During
the count down to the war he rejected an invitation by Colonel Effiong to return
to the eastern region to fight under Ojukwu.
He was subsequently a staff officer (operations), charged with weapons
acquisition under Lt. Col. Iliya Bissala at AHQ and went on arms purchasing
missions abroad for Nigeria at the onset of the civil war.
In October 1967, Lt. Col. Bissala prevented then Lt. Col. Murtala
Mohammed from drafting Etuk to the 2nd Division for the disastrous
Onitsha assault river crossing. However,
he was later literally “hijacked” by Lt. Col. B.A.M. Adekunle and deployed
to the 3rd Division as the Officer Commanding the 8 Battalion in
Calabar. After battalion operations in the Calabar-Itu-Ikot-Ekpene
axis he was redeployed to Port Harcourt as Commander, 16 Brigade.
As a Field Major, he took part in the successful 3MCDO campaign for Port
Harcourt along with officers like Lt. Col. Filemon Shande, Lt. Col. Pius
Eromobor, Major George Innih, and (initially) Adaka Boro, among others.
After
the fall of Port Harcourt, Etuk was tasked (as a Field Lt. Col.) with the
capture of Owerri as part of “Operation
OAU”.
“…..
the enemy force at Owerri which was the [16] Brigade under a young Calabar
officer called Utuk [Etuk], was easily the best fighting unit fielded by Nigeria
throughout the war. Right from Port
Harcourt, and particularly at Afam, it had become obvious that the Brigade was a
force well led. Inside Owerri, they
fought with extraordinary courage, flexibility and determination.
The withdrawal of the Brigade from Owerri was tactically tidy and well
planned and executed. Without doubt no other Nigerian Brigade could have withstood
for more than a month the punishment the enemy [16] Brigade absorbed with
patience for over four months. Only
that Brigade could have got out of Owerri under the circumstances.”